-Caveat Lector-
from:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1998-12/30/081l-123098-idx.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/WPlate/1998-12/30/081l-123098-idx.html">Secret Deals, Awkward Bargain
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Secret Deals, Awkward Bargain
U.S. Probes Firm's Covert Acquisition of Arms for CIA, DIA
By John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 30, 1998; Page A01
The federal agents who burst into the Alexandria office of Vector
Microwave Research Corp. one morning late last year got right to the
point. "This is a court-authorized search," an agent announced. "Stand
up, don't turn off your computers. We'll take care of that."
The raid, which netted U.S. Customs Service and Navy investigators boxes
of records and computer disks, came as a shock to a firm that made a
business of eluding attention. For years, Vector had performed secret
tasks for the CIA and the U.S. military, using guile, experience and
connections, including those of its president, retired Lt. Gen. Leonard
Perroots, a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Vector was a leading entrepreneur in a classified or "black" specialty
with high stakes and few rules: covertly acquiring foreign missiles,
radar, artillery and other weapons for U.S. intelligence agencies. Its
work was seen as crucial by some U.S. officials who study innovations in
foreign weaponry as part of efforts to protect Americans from the global
spread of ballistic missiles and other arms.
But the rise and fall of Vector illustrates the awkward bargain that can
result when agencies such as the CIA and the DIA privatize covert
operations. When Vector went out of business earlier this year, it left
a trail of mysterious dealings, some that may have run counter to U.S.
policy, according to government officials, former Vector employees and
the firm's competitors.
Today, investigators are trying to determine at whose behest the firm
bid for a batch of North Korean missiles. Also unresolved is whether the
firm, trying to sweeten a deal for the purchase of Chinese missiles,
provided China sensitive technical specifications on the U.S. Stinger
antiaircraft missile.
So complex was the web of connections surrounding Vector that its
founder, Donald Mayes, became a business partner with China's
state-owned missile manufacturer while secretly buying Chinese weapons
for the U.S. government.
Government officials admit they may never know the scope of Vector's
activities. "Where's the reality?" said a U.S. official who has pursued
Vector for years. "We'll never untangle some of this."
No charges have been brought in the federal inquiry, and attorneys for
Vector and its executives deny wrongdoing. The agents who led the Nov.
20, 1997, raid are looking into a number of Vector projects, as well as
a private side deal in which Mayes sold Russian helicopters to the
Mexican navy.
Guidelines for Bribes
The ongoing investigation had not been made public previously, and,
besides scant references in the business press, Vector itself has hardly
been mentioned in print. The firm quietly went out of business recently
after spinning off parts of the company to competitors. Perroots, 65,
did not respond to messages left at his Virginia home. Mayes, 60, who is
living in Mexico, responded through his Washington attorney, Thomas
Green.
"It's hard for me to get into Mr. Mayes' activities, but they were
appropriate and didn't violate any laws," Green said. Green also read a
statement issued by Mayes, which said: "Anything we've done for the U.S.
government was completely approved." Vector's allies said any
prosecution would fail because of Vector's intelligence ties.
Executives of Vector and its competitors in the "foreign materiel
acquisition" business, such as BDM International of McLean and
Electronic Warfare Associates of Dulles, stride the marble halls of
defense ministries from Moscow to Minsk to Beijing competing for
weaponry on secret CIA and DIA wish lists. Because they can deny any
direct tie to the U.S. government, they can buy from people who wouldn't
deal with Washington, or require deniability to do so. The contractors,
in turn, are held to secrecy by the U.S. government.
Operating largely on their own in this shadowy world, people who scour
the globe for arms on the government's behalf acknowledge that they
could face legal trouble if U.S. investigators questioned them about
their methods. U.S. officials say people who bribe foreign officials
while on authorized U.S. government assignment won't be prosecuted under
statutes that prohibit such corrupt practices. But people who bribe
seeking foreign arms "on speculation" -- in the hopes of finding a
government buyer -- may be in legal jeopardy, officials said.
"If you say what you do, you can go to jail" because of U.S.
anti-bribery laws, said a Vector competitor, who acknowledged that
people in his industry commonly retain middlemen to bribe foreign
officials. "The U.S. is paying us to go to a foreign c
