THE TOR SCAM - Re: Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
On Wed, 8 Aug 2018 18:33:40 -0400 grarpamp wrote: > On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 5:37 PM, juan wrote: > > stikns > > You're funny, here, have some fyrstikken's... > Im eagerly waiting for your next mental vomit promoting the agenda of the US military and its spy network, tor - which is your assigned task here - apart from spamming links to 'bitcoin' 'music'.
Re: Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 5:37 PM, juan wrote: > stikns You're funny, here, have some fyrstikken's... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gfntBEI3Aw
Re: Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
On Wed, 8 Aug 2018 16:31:33 -0400 grarpamp wrote: > >> https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf > > > all the knowledge about tor that the NSA has is cointained in those 'slides' > > Only the stupid would suggest that, stop being stupid. fucking idiot - you know pretty well what you are doing when you link that sort of snowden propaganda. So don't play the fucking the idiot grarpamp - your torbot game got pretty old, a long time ago. tor indeed stikns, from the point of view of USERS, not attackers. > > > if packets arrive at a relay at different times and then, after a > > delay, all leave the relay at the same time then there's no timing > > information to exploit. > > Yes there is, the packets you sent were observed arriving, but the next hop gets(and forwards) all packets at the same time. So even if you can time packets when they enter the network you are missing the outgoing timing information needed to correlate them. So what the hell are you talking about, apart from your usual torbot propaganda. bottom line : it is possible to make timing analysis harder but the piece of shit software you promote (a US military network) in your role as US govt agent doesn't do that.
Re: Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
>> https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf > all the knowledge about tor that the NSA has is cointained in those 'slides' Only the stupid would suggest that, stop being stupid. Tor is well known to not provide defense against GPA / GAA for at least some particular analysis / deployment threats. Some of which are hidden in that doc, including between weasel words, among other threats in other docs by various authors, some of which you've reposted. > if packets arrive at a relay at different times and then, after a > delay, all leave the relay at the same time then there's no timing > information to exploit. Yes there is, the packets you sent were observed arriving, or being sent, at different times, in the voids when there was no chaff / fill / other traffic that was not also otherwise discriminated, possibly for even over your whole path through the fully observed network. Harder yes, bulletproof no. If you accepted an unreliable net, where your shit was thrown away due to low traffic conditions, that would be another area of research to do. Depending on use case, unlikely you would accept such unreliability. NNTP flood... you received the msg to you relatively metadata free regarding intended recipient being you due to the flood over wire to disk. But your posts don't receive the same protection as there is no flood there. So you have to use guerrilla or other tactics to post securely, that could pose alternative risks to the poster, including not being able to post [full dataset]. Where are the networks that experiment with fill traffic / chaff? Only thing I've heard is, OMG bandwidth cost, can't do it. Which as said elsewhere is, for many real world applications and users of such a net, bullshit. Dedicate a rate and use that happily.
Re: Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
On Wed, 8 Aug 2018 00:38:04 -0400 grarpamp wrote: > >> > for other stuff...do you have to ask? What sort of system do you > >> > think should be used for coordinating 'criminal' activity, instead of > >> > streaming super full SHD video for retards? > > > And the answer is : some sort of 'high latency' mixing network. And > > interestingly enough such a network doesn't seem to exist, although it > > seems to me it would require less resources than something like tor. And > > nobody seems to be worried about having or not having that kind of > > network, which strikes me as odd... > > > What I was trying to say is that, if the use case is 'criminal > > activity', then using a 'low latency' network like tor which provides > > centralized 'hidden' services is a not a good idea. It's more like a recipe > > for disaster. > > https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf Thanks for showing that snowden only leaked mostly useless 'information' or *outright propaganda* like your link above. And thanks for showing that you remain a torbot grarpamp. And thanks for showing that you are an intelectual fraud. Now, I'm sure I already mentioned this, but I will again : if you think that all the knowledge about tor that the NSA has is cointained in those 'slides' you are either a complete fucking retard - or a propaganda agent. In your case grarpamp it is clearly the second case. > > If the mix or other network design is doing it's job, > programmed delay, being a part of observed latency, > might not end up mattering much to security. wut if packets arrive at a relay at different times and then, after a delay, all leave the relay at the same time then there's no timing information to exploit.
Overlay Network Designs and the Odds of Voids, Link Crypto [was: AP, latency]
>> > for other stuff...do you have to ask? What sort of system do you think >> > should be used for coordinating 'criminal' activity, instead of streaming >> > super full SHD video for retards? > And the answer is : some sort of 'high latency' mixing network. And > interestingly enough such a network doesn't seem to exist, although it seems > to me it would require less resources than something like tor. And nobody > seems to be worried about having or not having that kind of network, which > strikes me as odd... > What I was trying to say is that, if the use case is 'criminal > activity', then using a 'low latency' network like tor which provides > centralized 'hidden' services is a not a good idea. It's more like a recipe > for disaster. https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/Tor%20Stinks.pdf If the mix or other network design is doing it's job, programmed delay, being a part of observed latency, might not end up mattering much to security. ie: Think of latency as the clock speed of the network. The job of passing around cells from here to there is a compute task, a fixed todo list set into instructions. Doesn't matter whether your job completes in 10 seconds, or 10 days, or with each instruction artificially delayed by a billion nop's on the fast cpu. Your cpu can still be probed and watched for months regardless how long it takes, so it doesn't seem that waiting n time units before passing a cell from a to b, b to c, c to d, will help in itself, because the network, or your path over it is not guaranteed to be full. Enough of those odds of empty voids happening at the right points, the ones your data is moving over, and you're hosed. If you've got all this idle time, might as well fill the mix, an actual defensive move. Zen's remindful blurb something others suggested for longer, me included. It really needs cross checked against available research, and researched into development if it works.. Would also like to see work on opensource IETF standard for all physical ports on all network hardware, each port having independant full time random keyed link encryption with tamper alerts, and full time fill to the capacity of the link with random data, baked in the silicon and silently on by default out of the box. Limited to opposing crypto suites, say three with a q resistant one. The silicon, firmware, and software required is expected to be trivial cost, like $1/port when applied globally. That'll seriously fuck with the vampires on the wire who don't have legal authority to force you to turn it off, or to particularly regulate your hardware, which in the western world is many jurisdictions. To wit, apple secure enclave is still thought by many to be resistant and live years later in T2 and A11. No, operators don't need to turn it off to debug their net, they copy the port above the MAC PHY of the chaff at the logical layer to another port. Which also is a human action which can't currently be forced, in any sane regime, and fishing for win with an illegal general warrant.
