RE: Secure IDE?

2003-07-31 Thread Trei, Peter
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 
 Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
 No info on chaining modes, if any, nor of IV handling.
 
 DES/ECB, originally with a 40-bit key, more recently with 56-bit and 3DES.
 Keys generated by the manufacturer onto a USB dongle.  No easy way to make
 backups of the dongle.  It's a messy tradeoff: If you want something like
 laptop/data-theft-protection (which will suit the majority of the market),
 then DES-40/ECB is fine, but you want to be able to back up the dongle
 because
 if that goes (and after multiple insertions and removals it will) you've
 lost
 all your data.  OTOH if you want protection from the MIB the fragile
 nature of
 the key storage is probably a benefit, but then you want 3DES/CBC to go
 with
 it.  At the moment you have laptop-theft-protection crypto and
 MIB-protection
 key storage.
 
 You can buy truckloads of these things on ebay for about $20 a pop if you
 want
 to play with one.
 
 Peter.
 
Color me dissapointed. 

It's a move in the right direction, but I wish they had followed through and
done the right things:

* [AES | 3DES]/CBC with a good distribution of IVs
* User-generated keys (before initial disk setup, of course).
* Shutdown on dongle removal.
* Some kind of PIN or password protection on the dongle.

eNova claims not to keep a database of keys (they don't
say that 'there is no database of keys', which is a little
different), and to get a key copied you have to send it to
them. They do seem to supply a spare.

Back a few years ago, I calculated that with the DES key
search software then available, a single 200MHz machine
could search 40 bits of keyspace over a long weekend. 
Today it would take a few hours.

40 bit DES is not secure against your kid sister (if she's
a cypherpunk :-), much less industrial espionage.

Quote from
http://www.abit.com.tw/abitweb/webjsp/english/mb_spec.jsp?pPRODUCT_TYPE=Moth
erBoardpMODEL_NAME=SecureIDE :

40-bit DES (US Data Encryption Standard) is adequate 
for general users

Yeah. Right.

Peter



RE: Secure IDE?

2003-07-30 Thread Trei, Peter
 Trei, Peter
 
 ABIT has come out with a new motherboard, the 
 IC7-MAX3 featuring something called 'Secure 
 IDE', which seems to involve HW crypto in the 
 onboard IDE controller:
 
 From the marketing fluff at
 http://www.abit.com.tw/abitweb/webjsp/english/news1.jsp?pDOCNO=en_0307251
 
   For MAX3, the ABIT Engineers listened 
   to users who were asking for information 
   security. SecureIDE connects to your IDE 
   hard disk and has a special decoder; 
   without a special key, your hard disk cannot 
   be opened by anyone. Thus hackers and 
   would be information thieves cannot access 
   your hard disk, even if they remove it from your 
   PC. Protect your privacy and keep anyone 
   from snooping into your information. Lock 
   down your hard disk, not with a password, 
   but with encryption. A password can be 
   cracked by software in a few hours. ABIT's 
   SecureIDE will keep government 
   supercomputers busy for weeks and will 
   keep the RIAA away from your Kazaa files.
 
 No, I have no idea what this actually means either.
 I'm trying to find out.
 
 Peter Trei
 
Yeah, I know it's tacky to followup ones own messages, but
I found a little more:

http://www.abit.com.tw/abitweb/webjsp/english/SecureIDE.htm

SecureIDE is a encryption device that uses 
the eNOVA X-Wall chipset that ensures 
confidentiality and privacy of your data 
through disk encryption. When booting 
up your system, go to DOS and implement 
the FDISK instruction. This instruction will 
make a partition to format the Hard Disk 
to accept the secure IDE key. After this 
procedure, there are no more extra steps 
to perform besides using the key to open 
the hard disk each time you boot up your system.

The accompanying diagram shows a daughterboard 
sitting between the HD and the system, with a USB
dongle coming off the side. eNova has more info at:

http://www.enovatech.com/w/html/about.htm

The USB dongle apparently acts only as a key
store, for a DES or 3DES key. It needs to be
present at boot time. It appears that the key
is put on the device by the manufacturer 
though they promise Enova Technology 
does not maintain a database of X-Wall 
Secure Keys. On the good side, it seems
to encrypt the whole disk, including the
boot sector and swap.

No info on chaining modes, if any, nor of
IV handling. There is no mention of a PIN
or other 'something you know' required to
use the USB key. I can't tell if pulling the
dongle shuts down the system.

Might be neat, but as yet, insufficient information.

Peter



RE: GPS blackbox tracking

2003-07-29 Thread Trei, Peter
 Harmon Seaver[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
Before this, AFAIK, we only had to worry about getting a GPS
 transmitting
 device planted on our vehicles, which would be bulky enough to spot fairly
 easily by anyone checking out the cars underside, etc. Here's one that
 doesn't
 transmit, just records where you go, and that info can be retrieved later
 ala
 bluetooth from 30 feet away. 
 
 http://www.blackboxgps.com
 
 Harmon Seaver 
 
Of course, if you have one of the newer 'enhanced 911' cellphones,
you've done their work for them.

Peter



RE: Cypherpunks archive

2003-07-22 Thread Trei, Peter
I'd very much like to see the archives in a downloadable
form.

Peter


 --
 From: Steve Furlong[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Monday, July 21, 2003 8:12 PM
 To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject:  Re: Cypherpunks archive
 
 On Monday 21 July 2003 19:49, someone wrote:
Can you make the raw mbox archive available, or do you have that? 
  If it's less than about 200 meg, I can also receive it as an
  attachment, if you're sadistic with your mail server.
 
 Let me think about it, and maybe ask some of the list members. The HTML 
 that appears on the web page is sanitized a bit to prevent address 
 harvesting. Not that c-punks' addresses are that hard to obtain other 
 ways, but when I started the archive several people emphatically stated 
 that they wanted the sanitizing.
 
 Maybe I'll write a short script to sanitize the addresses in the mbox. 
 That'll take a while to develop, to make sure I don't miss anything and 
 because my spare time is limited for the next month and a half.
 
 If I do make the mboxes available, they'll be available as .gz's off my 
 top cypherpunks page. I'll post to the list if I do it.
 
 
 List members: any preferences?
 
 
 SRF
 
 -- 
 Steve FurlongComputer Condottiere   Have GNU, Will Travel
 
 If someone is so fearful that, that they're going to start using
 their weapons to protect their rights, makes me very nervous that
 these people have these weapons at all!  -- Rep. Henry Waxman



RE: [Brinworld] Car's data recorder convicts driver

2003-06-19 Thread Trei, Peter
Googling on (event data recorders automobiles) will give a lot
of hits. 

For example:
http://wpoplin.com/EventDataRecordersAutomotiveBlackBoxes.pdf

These devices are a byproduct of the introduction of
airbags - the airbag processor stores the data which led it to
deploy the bag.

This can include

delta v
vehicle speed
engine speed
brake use
throttle position
driver seatbelt use

The cited report claims they only store the most recent 5 seconds
of data, snapshotted at 1 second intervals. It notes that the data 
can thus be confusing - for example, if a wheel leaves the ground
the speed reported can be way off, and if the driver pumps the
brakes, the 'brake use' data is ambiguous. It's not clear whether they
store data continuously, or just when the airbag deploys.

OTOH, I seem to remember reports of drivers of high-end cars (Audis?
BMWs?) getting their warranties invalidated because the main car
computer noted that they had exceeded certain speeds during the
break-in period.

Its not just the airbag computer that can narc you out

Peter



RE: Airlines IDs [was RE: Amtrak The War On Drugs]

2001-04-27 Thread Trei, Peter

 Tim May[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 At 12:51 PM -0700 4/25/01, Woody Patterson wrote:
 --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   It's just as easy today- at least for one-ways.  Just have the
   individual
   with the ID check in and hand the ticket to you.  I've done it a
   million
   times.
   Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com
 
 Just don;t do it on United Airlines.  In several airports, there are
 cameras behind the check-in counter that take a photo of you when you
 check in.  This photo is available on a computer screen at the gate to
 any employee of the airline that cares to look.
 
 Boarding for all flights I have taken in the past several 
 years--Southwest, American, United--has been so hectic and rushed 
 that no stewardess is bothering to compare the boarding passes to 
 photos!
 
 In the case of Southwest, the boarding passes are of course not even 
 associated with a person: they are just numbered pieces of plastic. 
 (Yeah, I _suppose_ some sufficiently determined adversary could be 
 recording that Boarding Pass # 37 was handed to Alice Smith and 
 that the photo of the person handing in # 37 does not match the photo 
 taken at the ticket check-in counterI guarantee this is not 
 happening UNLESS Southwest has been tipped-off and is cooperating 
 with FBI or DEA types.)
 
 --Tim May
 
The bit Declan put in Wired today about the '4th 
Information Hiding  Workshop', which contains 
some relevant material.

Towards the end of the article, he notes:

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,43355,00.html
-- start quote 
[...]
Convenience can also lend itself to anonymity. 

Starting about a decade ago, U.S. airlines began 
to check travelers' identification before letting them 
board a flight. But to stave off long lines, U.S. Airways 
now offers electronic check-in services at some airports. 

The automated kiosks allow travelers -- at least 
those not checking luggage -- to select their 
seat assignment and board the plane after inserting 
a frequent flyer card. No government-issued 
identification or credit card is necessary. 

What's so encouraging about this is that even the 
most respectable companies see nothing socially 
stigmatizing about offering these options, said Rosen, 
the Georgetown University professor. It's extremely 
encouraging since it shows what an American value 
privacy is and how many people will (buy it). 
-- end quote 

Now, this isn't perfect - I suspect it only works for 
e-tickets, which have already been bought through 
an identifiable credit card, but it breaks the link 
between who buys the ticket, and who turns up at 
the airport. Note that someone who has a FF card 
is actually motivated to loan it out,  since he'd get 
credited with the FF points.

Sigh... Anyone remember People Express?
You could get in line, get on the plane, and pay
in-flight with cash (it was very cheap). No reserved 
seats, giant overhead bins for luggage. No IDs 
required. Now, *that* was private travel, circa 1980.

Peter Trei




Airlines IDs [was RE: Amtrak The War On Drugs]

2001-04-25 Thread Trei, Peter

 Ralph Wallis[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 
 
 On Tuesday, 24 Apr 2001 at 16:13, Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  However, it used to be SOP to buy train tickets at the ticket 
  window--for cash and with no I.D. or phone numbers or SS numbers or 
  forehead marks.
  
  It looks like the temporary measures to combat the TWA 800 
  bombing sorts of events, even though TWA 800 almost certainly wasn't 
  a bombing, are now spreading to the trains.
 
 I just read Database Nation, which notes that this was an immediate
 result of TWA 800 and the Atlanta Olympic bombing. (Along with similar
 policies for air travel.)
 
 So it's not a sign of spreading. Since Atlanta was 5 years ago,
 it's not a temporary measure either.
 
I think you've both been blindsided as to the true reason 
why airlines ask for ID.

While the FAA did for a while (after the TWA 800 crash)
suggest that airlines ask for ID, it's my understanding 
that at no time was it actually a regulatory requirement 
(I'd welcome actual cites to the contrary.)

My understanding is this:

1. It is not a regulatory requirement for an airline 
passenger  in the US to produce identification.

2. In fact, it's a violation of the airline's common carrier 
status for them to do so - they must admit anyone who 
shows up with a valid ticket. The ticket is a bearer 
instrument.

3. Regardless of the legalities, US airlines will usually
request ID. If you refuse, and stand your ground, and can 
cite the appropriate  common carrier regs, and show that 
they can't cite any regulatory requirement, they in fact 
WILL let you fly without ID. However, doing so involves 
moving far up beyond the counter-droids to superdupervisors,
calls to corporate legal counsel, and unfriendly attention 
from airport security. While you would win in the end, 
you will almost certainly have missed your plane.

4. The reason airlines do this has nothing to do with 
security, and everything to do with extracting the max 
from your wallet 

Before these regs existed, and citizen units rightfully 
refused to let themselves be pushed, filed, stamped, 
indexed, briefed, debriefed, or numbered to the extent 
they do today, the bearer instrument status of the 
tickets allowed people who traveled often to save money.

It worked like this:

In the US, unscheduled, immediate travel ticket prices are
extremely expensive. On American Airlines, an unrestricted
Boston to San Francisco coach return ticket is over $2400
if I leave today and return tommorrow. If I book a month
ahead and stay over the weekend, it's a tad over $400, a
$2000 dollar savings.

Companies with lots of predictable travel (for example, 
one with offices near Boston and San Francisco) would 
buy  'John Doe' tickets a month ahead, scheduled for
over-weekend stays. A traveller would go to the 
travel office, and pick up an outbound and return
ticket (from different original trips) with dates and
times which suited him, and execute his business
trip at a fraction of the cost of it would have if
he'd bought his ticket in the naive manner.

By hassling travellers who try to use tickets with
someone elses name, and lying that it is illegal
to do so, airlines have greatly cut down on this
cost saving strategy.

If you're going to make more than one business
trip between the same cities on predictable dates
in the next year, you can still execute this strategy
on a personal level, but it requires planning.

So don't believe the lies of the airline spinmeisters.
The only security they are enhancing is that of
their bottom line.

Peter Trei




RE: Airlines IDs [was RE: Amtrak The War On Drugs]

2001-04-25 Thread Trei, Peter

 Sandy Sandfort[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote
 
 Peter wrote:
 
  My understanding is this:
  
  1. It is not a regulatory requirement for an airline 
  passenger  in the US to produce identification.
  
  2. In fact, it's a violation of the airline's common carrier 
  status for them to do so - they must admit anyone who 
  shows up with a valid ticket. The ticket is a bearer 
  instrument.
  ...
 
 How about a citation?
 
  S a n d y
 
That's a fair request.

It looks like I can confirm assertion 1, but
am (now at least) probably wrong on assertion 2.

See:
http://cas.faa.gov/faq.html

-start quote---

Q. Do I have to have a photo ID to fly?

A. The FAA does not prohibit the airline from transporting any passenger
who does not
present a photo ID. Airlines have available to them alternate procedures
that allow them to
transport passengers without ID. However, some airlines choose not to
use such
procedures, which is their prerogative. 

Q. Why didn't the airline ask for my ID?

A. The FAA does not require all passengers to present ID. The FAA
requires that airlines
apply additional security measures to passengers who are unable to
produce ID upon
request. 

-end quote---


I know that in the pre-TWA800 days, it was common to travel on 
tickets issued to another name than one's own. I did so on numerous
occasions. Of course, the airlines hated people saving money in this
manner.

Peter