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Clean Money, Dirty Conscience: Are some Americans guilty of banking while Muslim?

[R.A. Hettinga]

Reason magazine


December 28, 2004

 Clean Money, Dirty Conscience
Are some Americans guilty of banking while Muslim?
Jeff Taylor




 The headline grabbing quirkiness of Yasser Arafat's investment in the
American bowling industry demonstrates that true global connectedness
remains a scary thing. Such financial scorekeeping-whose money, what money,
where-is a pointless exercise in an age when funds can circle the Earth in
a second and mutate several times along the trip.

 The clean money, dirty money, blood money obsession would be quaint were
it not for the tremendous burden the pursuit of money laundering places on
innocent people just trying to enjoy the immense benefits of a modern
financial system. The PATRIOT Act's veil of secrecy is beginning to bite in
this regard without any evidence that the United States is made safer in
the bargain.

 Some Middle Eastern-surnamed individuals in the U.S. now report an
unwillingness on the part of some banks to do business with them based on
government  money laundering/anti-terror regulations. In fact, while other
parts of the PATRIOT Act initially  drew fire,  Section 314 glided by,
largely overlooked by everyone except  the bankers. As it turns out,
Section 314 is a ticking time-bomb for anyone a buttoned-down banker might
consider suspicious.

 This section requires banks and other federal regulated financial
institutions to comply with government requests for information on
customers. As with other parts of PATRIOT, Section 314 built upon other
long-standing federal bank regs, allowing PATRIOT boosters to use their
tired  Officer Barbrady "this is nothing out of the unusual" defense of the
provision.

 But Section 314 anticipated and sanctioned a much larger number of
information requests in a much shorter period of time, increasing the cost
of compliance to banks. Indeed, the initial crush of information requests
from the government in September 2002 was so great that the banks won a
temporary suspension of the requests. Banks thought they had a  much firmer
grasp of  what to do with Section 314 requests when they resumed in
February 2003.

 However, the catch remained that banks are supposed to comply with Section
314 requests  quickly and accurately, divulging no information to anyone
about them, and then promptly forget all about the requests. In particular,
if an information request for a Joe Terror comes in, and Podunk Bank has no
records of a Joe Terror as a customer, the law directs Podunk Bank to do
nothing.

 This practice does avoid flooding the reporting system with replies that
say, "yes, we have no Joe Terror," but leaves Podunk Bank with the queasy
feeling that it responded to federal regulators by doing nothing. This is
not in the nature of bankers. If the feds dropped in, particularly a suit
from the criminal section of the Treasury Department, and suggested a
change in the color of the balloons in the lobby, there would not be a
whole lot of discussion as to why. Banks comply; that is why they are banks.

 So rather than risk the wrath of regulators, banks very quickly hit  upon
the idea of keeping names submitted on Section 314 requests on their
do-not-do-business-with lists. All banks have them and the lists are
perfectly legal. After all, some customers-bad credit risks, chronic check
bouncers-may just be more trouble than they are worth. Putting
314-requested names on the list would at least create a paper trail should
the feds someday request one and remove a troublesome class of customer
from bank rolls to boot.

 This brings us to the question of the day: Has Section 314 made all
Muslim-surnamed customers, or even more broadly, those of Middle Eastern
descent in general, more trouble than they are worth to American banks?

 The American Civil Liberties Union says it has dozens of complaints
involving financial institutions denying services to Muslims. A recent case
involves a Mississippi man who was suddenly told by his bank that his
account had been closed. No explanation was given for the action.
Interestingly, however, the bank, AmSouth, recently was fined $40 million
by the Treasury for failure to comply with reporting regulations involving
money laundering.

 It is certainly true that the more Middle Eastern names a bank has on
record, the more likely it is to be forced to complete Section 314
information requests. The more requests you get, the more likely you are to
screw one up and get walloped with a fine. Why not lighten that load and
reduce that risk by cutting back on "trigger" names? The logic is
undeniable.

 The banks, of course, would never admit to such a practice, and regulators
point to official directions not to use Section 314 requests as a guidepost
to a customer's desirability as a client. But this language simply ignores
reality, and the reality is that the law has set up a powerful incentive to
keep Muslims outside the mainstream financial services sector.

DIMACS Workshop on Information Markets, NJ Feb 2-4 2005

[R.A. Hettinga]

--- begin forwarded text


Delivered-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2005 11:11:50 -0500 (EST)
From: Linda Casals <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], cryptography@metzdowd.com,
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: DIMACS Workshop on Information Markets, NJ Feb 2-4 2005
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Announcement and Call For Participation

*

DIMACS Workshop on Information Markets

  February 2-4, 2005
  DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

  http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Markets/

Organizers:

  Robin Hanson, George Mason University, rhanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] gmu.edu
  John Ledyard, California Institute of Technology, jledyard [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]
hss.caltech.edu
  David Pennock, Yahoo! Research Labs, pennockd [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
yahoo-inc.com

Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences

*

A market designed for information gathering and forecasting is called
an information market. Information markets can be used to elicit a
collective estimate of the expected value or probability of a random
variable, reflecting information dispersed across a population of
traders. The degree to which market forecasts approach optimality in
practice, or at least surpass other known methods of forecasting, is
remarkable. Supporting evidence can be found in empirical studies of
options markets, commodity futures markets, political stock markets,
sports betting markets, horse racing markets, market games, laboratory
investigations of experimental markets, and field tests. In nearly all
these cases, market prices reveal a reliable forecast about the likely
unfolding of future events, often beating expert opinions or polls.

Despite a growing theoretical and experimental literature, many
questions remain regarding how best to design, deploy, analyze, and
understand information markets, including both technical challenges
and social challenges.

This workshop will include talks on information markets by a number of
distinguished invited speakers. Speakers will cover a range of topics
including mechanism design, experiments, analysis, policy, and
industry experience. Speakers will include representatives from
academia, industry, and government. The workshop will feature research
talks, opinions, reports of industry experience, and discussion of
government policy from the perspective of a number of fields,
including economics, business, finance, computer science,
gambling/gaming, and policy. See the workshop program for more
details: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Markets/program.html

The workshop will feature a tutorial session on Wednesday afternoon
(Feb. 2, 2005) to help those new to the field get up to speed. The
workshop will include a panel discussion on the Policy Analysis Market
(a.k.a., "Terror Futures") and a "rump" session where anyone who
requests time can have the floor for five minutes to speak on any
relevant topic. To participate in the rump session, please email David
Pennock: pennockd [EMAIL PROTECTED] yahoo-inc.com.

*
Registration Fees:

(Pre-registration deadline: January 26, 2005)

Please see website for additional registration information.

*
Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel
can be found at:

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Markets/

**PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY**

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

Hello

[Gregg Smith]

Check here if your message below does not load.




 We are discreet sheep; we wait to see how the drove is going, and then go with the drove.	-Mark Twain [Samuel Langhornne Clemens] (1835-1910)	 antepyretic
 Don't those teachers very often love jogging? agoniadin
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ChristianMrtg

Re: California Bans a Large-Caliber Gun, and the Battle Is On

[Riad S. Wahby]

"Roy M. Silvernail" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What leads you to believe that was accidental?

Most likely the fact that Michael Moore is pro-gun control.  It shows a
certain level of cognitive dissonance to say "guns aren't the problem!
Ban guns!"

Of course, in Michael Moore's case, that level of dissonance was long
ago demonstrated (and surpassed).

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

[i2p] 0.4.2.6 is available (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from jrandom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: jrandom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2005 08:45:23 -0800
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [i2p] 0.4.2.6 is available

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Hi y'all, time for a new update

The 0.4.2.6 release has a whole slew of bug fixes, reliability
improvements, and bundles Ragnarok's addressbook as a client
application.  The release is backwards compatible and should not
be too disruptive, so upgrade when you get the chance.

As mentioned in the weekly status notes [1], the addressbook
essentially just automates the anonymous fetching and merging of
hosts.txt files from locations of your choosing (defaults being
http://duck.i2p/hosts.txt and http://dev.i2p/i2p/hosts.txt).  More
details can be found on Ragnarok's site [2], and the source is in
cvs [3].

If you don't have the addressbook installed already, you have no
additional work to do.  However, if you previously installed the
addressbook and manually wired it to run in your router (through
the lines in clients.config and a reference to the .jar file in
wrapper.config), you will need to remove those.  Existing
addressbook configuration and data files will be honored if they
are located in the default addressbook/ directory.

[1] http://dev.i2p.net/pipermail/i2p/2005-January/000541.html
[2] http://ragnarok.i2p/
[3] http://dev.i2p.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/i2p/apps/addressbook/

Anyway, thats that.  The full list of updates in the release can
be found in the usual place [4], and upgrading uses the same process
as before [5].

[4] http://dev.i2p.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/i2p/history.txt?rev=HEAD
[5] http://www.i2p.net/download

=jr

[EMAIL PROTECTED]:~/dev/i2p_0_4_2_6_dist$ openssl sha1 *
SHA1(i2p-0.4.2.6.tar.bz2)= 2e66927bbcff6fbbedcd58d3a3382f20b98e8f79
SHA1(i2p.tar.bz2)= ddb2c45f2c52b266d6794d7e1ae7b4648e697ce7
SHA1(i2pupdate.zip)= 7a4547d391166d0886a3cee502889e568cf77677
SHA1(i2pinstall.jar)= a71dc5c64fb5a990d1893b8ae5dfd48ba2c9a3b6
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFB3WoCGnFL2th344YRAmK9AJ0TumNsfz1llb2Te8nMNuvSdXShvACg996G
KWe+IxvsPxG2zfVZcTxZTvQ=
=GXbq
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
___
i2p mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p

- End forwarded message -
-- 
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net


pgppUGQmXccGH.pgp
Description: PGP signature

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Spaf's mailing list on information assurance/security, cybercrime

[Bill Stewart]

-- Forwarded Message
From: Gene Spafford <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2005 15:06:18 -0500
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: mailing list announcement for IP
I have created the mailing list "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
for distributing announcements of funding opportunities, conference
and journal calls, and similar solicitations specifically about
issues of information assurance, information security, and
cybercrime-related issues.  This is not limited to academics -- these
announcements should be of interest as well to people in government
and industry.
Members of the list can send announcements such as the above to the
list.   Non-members can send announcements to
"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" for posting.
If you are interested in subscribing to the list, send email to
"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" with the message
subscribe
If you want to subscribe an address other than the one from which you
send the email, use the message
subscribe 
This list is for announcements only -- not discussions, and should be
low-volume.
A WWW-archive of posts is available at
.
Cheers,
--spaf
-- End of Forwarded Message

Re: sitting ducks

[Trei, Peter]

Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> 
> At 12:16 PM 1/4/05 -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
> >Interesting questions:  How hard is it for someone to actually 
> hit an airplane with a rifle bullet?  How often do airplane 
> maintenance people notice bulletholes?
> >
> >My understanding is that a single bullethole in a plane 
> is not likely to do anything serious to its operation--the 
> hole isn't big enough to depressurize the cabin of a big 
> plane, and unless it hits some critical bits of the plane, 
> it's not going to cause mechanical problems.
 
> FWIW Recall that a few 'copters have been taken down with 
> AK fire, though the birds/round is likely low.  And copters 
> are more delicate than a  multi-engined fixed wing.

It appears that the Iraqi resistance fighters figured out that
of several of them simultaneously fire full-auto AK's in front 
of a chopper flying overhead, sometimes they'll get lucky. Of
course, these are low, slow targets. 

We're discussing a terrorist trying to take out a commercial
jet with a 50 BMG, right? Even at takeoff, a passenger
jet is moving at 150-200 mph, a *lot* faster than a clay
pigeon, or the choppers the Iraqis hit.

> Hitting the cabin would be pretty effective though.  And 
> certain parts of big planes are vital, perhaps moreso 
> on fly by wire Airbus planes.

I understand that there is redundancy in the critical
components. Hitting the pilot AND copilot at takeoff
would probably be effective, but you've got one (1)
shot before its out of range, and its moving fast.
A tracer into a fuel tank may also be effective.
 
> A homemade mortar through the roof of your van 
> (IRA style) onto a stationary, taxiing plane 
> would be pretty spectacular, sitting ducks... 
> lots of cameras... easy getaway or
> repeat fire..

But that's not the 50 BMG scenario. The most effective
way to use the 50 BMG would probably be to hit an
engine intake rotor while the jet is still on the
ground, starting its takeoff roll. This probably
won't kill anyone, but would have a big economic
impact as people decided not to fly.

...but that's still a damn difficult shot. The
target is moving, the bullet has non-trivial
flight time (well over a second at long range).
Getting a first shot hit is highly improbable.

All in all, the 50 BMG vs jet scenario is just
plain bogus.
 
> Of course the BMG crap is all about eroding 
> rights, not reality.

I honestly don't think that many politicians
wake up in the morning and think to themselves
'What rights can I erode today?'. I think it's
more 'what can I do that will make me *look* 
good?' . It doesn't matter if their action is
actually effective, it matters that it makes
them appear to be 'doing something' and makes
for a good 5 second sound bite.

50 BMG rifles are used, very rarely, for
hunting. For an example, see:
http://www.fcsa.org/articles/1994-1/elk_hunt.html
More people are into very long
range (1000 yard and up) target shooting.
Those are the only 'legitimate' civilian
reasons to use a 50 BMG. It's like owning a
McLaren F1 - you can't use it much, but its
very, very, cool.

As a result, it's difficult for most people 
to come up with a justification to own 
one beyond 'because it's very, very cool'.
[I'm deliberately leaving aside the 2A
rights issue (which in a better world would
be then end of the argument) since it 
doesn't seem to get much traction with 
most politicians or sheeple any more].

50BMG rifles look very, very, tactical.
I've never seen one with a walnut stock. 
They are the canonical 'scary looking gun'.

So, the politician sees a type of gun:
* Which theoreticly could be used to do Very
  Bad Things.
* Owned by a group of people too 
  small to be significant voting block.
* For which its difficult to come up with
  a practical use.
* Which looks very photogenicly scary.

...and he or she thinks 'Wow, a lot of 
people will feel safer it I ban these,
and I can make them think I'm protecting
them. Also, getting on TV with one of 
these is a great visual.'

Actual reality doesnt enter it.

Peter Trei

 
 

Re: California Bans a Large-Caliber Gun, and the Battle Is On

[Roy M. Silvernail]

Tyler Durden wrote:
And come to think of it, "Bowling for Columbine" has the accidental 
affect of making it clear that Guns themselves are not the problem in 
the US.
What leads you to believe that was accidental?
--
Roy M. Silvernail is [EMAIL PROTECTED], and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com

Re: California Bans a Large-Caliber Gun, and the Battle Is On

[Tyler Durden]

Well, I used to be pro gun-control prior to the Patriot Act. Guess the 
Patriot Act made me something of a Patriot.

And come to think of it, "Bowling for Columbine" has the accidental affect 
of making it clear that Guns themselves are not the problem in the US.

-TD

From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: California Bans a Large-Caliber Gun, and the Battle Is On
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 06:45:22 -0800
At 09:53 AM 1/4/05 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>Terri Carbaugh, a spokeswoman for the governor, said Mr.
Schwarzenegger, a
>Republican, had made his position clear during his campaign.
>
> "It's a military-type weapon," Ms. Carbaugh said of the .50 BMG, "and
he
>believes the gun presents a clear and present danger to the general
public."
Ms C has earned herself a few hundred footpounds, or a few meters of
rope
and tree-rental.  The Constitution explicitly protects our right to bear
military (not animal-hunting) arms.
--
An RPG a day keeps the occupiers away.

Ready, Aim, ID Check: In Wrong Hands, Gun Won't Fire

[R.A. Hettinga]

Ah... Book-entry to the trigger.

The ganglia, as the man said, twitch.

Whole new meaning to digital "rights" management.

Cheers,
RAH
---



The New York Times

January 6, 2005
WHAT'S NEXT

Ready, Aim, ID Check: In Wrong Hands, Gun Won't Fire
 By ANNE EISENBERG


HE computer circuits that control hand-held music players, cellphones and
organizers may soon be in a new location: inside electronically controlled
guns.

Researchers at the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark are
building a handgun designed to fire only when its circuitry and software
recognize the grip of an authorized shooter.

 Sensors in the handle measure the pressure the hand exerts as it squeezes
the trigger. Then algorithms check the shooter's grip with stored,
authorized patterns to give the go-ahead.

"We can build a brain inside the gun," said Timothy N. Chang, a professor
of electrical engineering at the New Jersey Institute of Technology who
devised the hardware for the grip-recognition system. "The technology is
becoming so cheap that we can have not just a computer in every home, but a
computer in every gun."

The main function of the system is to distinguish a legitimate shooter
from, for example, a child who comes upon a handgun in a drawer.
Electronics within the gun could one day include Global Positioning System
receivers, accelerometers and other devices that could record the time and
direction of gunfire and help reconstruct events in a crime investigation.

For a decade, researchers at many labs have been working on so-called smart
or personalized handguns designed to prevent accidents. These use
fingerprint scanners to recognize authorized shooters, or require the
shooter to wear a small token on the hand that wirelessly transmits an
unlocking code to the weapon.

At the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Michael L. Recce, an associate
professor in the department of information systems, decided instead to
concentrate on the shooter's characteristic grip. Dr. Recce created the
software that does the pattern recognition for the gun.

 Typically, it takes one-tenth of a second to pull a trigger, Dr. Recce
said. While that is a short period, it is long enough for a computer to
match the patterns and process the authorization.

 To bring Dr. Recce's recognition software to life, Dr. Chang created
several generations of circuits using off-the-shelf electronic components.
He equipped the grips of real and fake handguns with sensors that could
generate a charge proportional to the pressure put on them.

 The pressure on the grip and trigger are read during the beginning of the
trigger pull. The signals are sent to an analog-to-digital converter so
that they can be handled by the digital signal processor. Patterns of
different users can be stored, and the gun programmed to allow one or more
shooters.

 At first the group worked mainly with a simulated shooting range designed
for police training. "You can't have guns in a university lab," Dr. Recce
said.

The computer analysis of hand-pressure patterns showed that one person's
grip could be distinguished from another's. "A person grasps a tennis
racket or a pen or golf club in an individual, consistent way," he said.
"That's what we're counting on."

During the past year, the team has moved from simulators to tests with live
ammunition and real semiautomatic handguns fitted with pressure sensors in
the grip. For five months, five officers from the institute's campus police
force have been trying out the weaponry at a Bayonne firing range. "We've
been going once a month since June," said Mark J. Cyr, a sergeant in the
campus police. "I use a regular 9-millimeter Beretta weapon that fires like
any other weapon; it doesn't feel any different."

For now, a computer cord tethers the gun to a laptop that houses the
circuitry and pattern-recognition software. In the next three months,
though, Dr. Chang said, the circuits would move from the laptop into the
magazine of the gun. "All the digital signal processing will be built right
in," he said.

Michael Tocci, a captain in the Bayonne Police Department, recently saw a
demonstration of the technology. One shooter was authorized, Captain Tocci
said. When this person pulled the trigger, a green light flashed. "But when
other officers picked up the gun to fire, the computer flashed red to
register that they weren't authorized," he said.

 The system had a 90 percent recognition rate, said Donald H. Sebastian,
senior vice president for research and development at the institute.
"That's better fidelity than we expected with 16 sensors in the grip," Dr.
Sebastian said. "But we'll be adding more sensors, and that rate will
improve."

Dr. Chang said the grip for the wireless system would have 32 pressure
sensors. "Now, in the worst case, the system fails in one out of 10 cases,"

CONSIDER YOUR SELF

[SMITH VAND]

sir:
Good day to you out there,this might sound funny.I am an African,from The 
GAMBIA.
 I was once a chief security in one of the Embassy in Libya north Africa.that 
was the year 2003.but for now,I am in one of the Europe country.I came with 
some Amount of money,of
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contact me with this
e mail address [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I am waiting your reply.

your sincerly, smith vand.
  

sitting ducks

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 12:16 PM 1/4/05 -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
>Interesting questions:  How hard is it for someone to actually hit an
airplane with a rifle bullet?  How often do airplane maintenance people
notice bulletholes?
>
>My understanding is that a single bullethole in a plane is not likely
to do anything serious to its operation--the hole isn't big enough to
depressurize the cabin of a big plane, and unless it hits some critical
bits of the plane, it's not going to cause mechanical problems.

FWIW Recall that a few 'copters have been taken down with AK fire,
though the birds/round
is likely low.  And copters are more delicate than a multi-engined fixed
wing.

Hitting the cabin would be pretty effective though.  And certain parts
of big planes
are vital, perhaps moreso on fly by wire Airbus planes.

A homemade mortar through the roof of your van (IRA style) onto a
stationary, taxiing plane would be
pretty spectacular, sitting ducks... lots of cameras... easy getaway or
repeat fire..

Of course the BMG crap is all about eroding rights, not reality.

Technology vs social solutions

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 12:06 PM 1/4/05 -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
>>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>3. Homebrew warning systems will face the same problems as eg pro
>>volcano warning systems: too many false alarms and no one cares.
>
>The best defense would seem to be a population with a lot of TVs and
radios.  At least after the first tsunami hit, the news would quickly
spread, and there were several hours between when the waves arrived at
different shores.  (And a 9.0 earthquake on the seafloor, or even a 7.0
earthquake on the seafloor, is a rare enough event that it's not crazy
to at least issue a "stay off the beach" kind of warning.)

Actually, people should know this as *background* in the same way that
you know
not to stand in open fields during lightening, play with downed
powerlines, or
walk into tail rotors.  I think some places have signs pointing
to higher elevations, with wave-glyphs.  I know that FLA has signs like
that for
hurricane storm-surges, and there are tornado signs in the midwest.

The rational explanation, I suppose, is that tsunami are so rare that
the knowledge is not
maintained.  (How many 'Merkins would know how to construct a nukebomb
shelter
these days?  How many SoCal'ians know how to drive on icy roads?)

Of course, broadcast media are used to tell people the obvious, eg don't
play in
channellized rivers during storms, and the evolution of the species
suffers slightly
but not entirely from the caveats.

Re: California Bans a Large-Caliber Gun, and the Battle Is On

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 09:53 AM 1/4/05 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>Terri Carbaugh, a spokeswoman for the governor, said Mr.
Schwarzenegger, a
>Republican, had made his position clear during his campaign.
>
> "It's a military-type weapon," Ms. Carbaugh said of the .50 BMG, "and
he
>believes the gun presents a clear and present danger to the general
public."

Ms C has earned herself a few hundred footpounds, or a few meters of
rope
and tree-rental.  The Constitution explicitly protects our right to bear

military (not animal-hunting) arms.

--
An RPG a day keeps the occupiers away.

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Re: AOL Help : About AOL® PassCode

[Ian G]

Joerg Schneider wrote:
So, PassCode and similar forms of authentication help against the 
current crop of phishing attacks, but that is likely to change if 
PassCode gets used more widely and/or protects something of interest 
to phishers.

Actually I have been waiting for phishing with MITM to appear for some 
time (I haven't any yet ...

By this you mean a dynamic, immediate MITM where
the attacker proxies through to the website in real
time?
Just as a point of terms clarification, I would say that
if the attacker collects all the information by using
a copy of the site, and then logs in later at leisure
to the real site, that's an MITM.
(If he were to use that information elsewhere, so for
example creating a new credit arrangement at another
bank, then that technically wouldn't be an MITM.)
Perhaps we need a name for this:  real time MITM
versus delayed time MITM?  Batch time MITM?

Assuming that MITM phishing will begin to show up and agreeing that 
PassCode over SSL is not the solution - what can be done to counter 
those attacks?

The user+client has to authenticate the server.  Everything
that I've seen over the last two years seems to fall into
that one bucket.
Mutual authentication + establishment of a secure channel should do 
the trick. SSL with client authentication comes to my mind...

Maybe.  But that only addresses the MITM, not the
theft of user information.
--
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   http://financialcryptography.com/

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Re: Banks Test ID Device for Online Security

[Eugen Leitl]

On Wed, Jan 05, 2005 at 02:43:00PM -0300, Mads Rasmussen wrote:

> Here in Brazil it's common to ask for a new pin for every transaction

Ditto in Germany, when PIN/TAN method is used. There's also HBCI-based banking, 
which
either uses keys living in filesystems, or smartcards -- this one doesn't
need TANs.

Gnucash and aqmoney/aqmoney2 can do HBCI, even with some smartcards.

-- 
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
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http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net


pgpKJ8gx2q3NQ.pgp
Description: PGP signature

Re: AOL Help : About AOL® PassCode

[Joerg Schneider]

Florian Weimer wrote:
I think you can forward the PassCode to AOL once the victim has
entered it on a phishing site.  Tokens à la SecurID can only help if
Indeed.
the phishing schemes *require* delayed exploitation of obtained
credentials, and I don't think we should make this assumption.  Online
MITM attacks are not prevented.
So, PassCode and similar forms of authentication help against the 
current crop of phishing attacks, but that is likely to change if 
PassCode gets used more widely and/or protects something of interest to 
phishers.

Actually I have been waiting for phishing with MITM to appear for some 
time (I haven't any yet - if somebody has, I'd be interested to hear 
about), because it has some advantages for the attacker:

* he doesn't have to bother to (partially) copy the target web site
* easy to implement - plug an off-the-shelf mod_perl module for reverse 
proxy into your apache and add 10 minutes for configuration. You'll find 
the passwords in the log file. Add some simple filters to attack PassCode.

* more stealthy, because users see exactly, what they are used to, e.g. 
for online banking they see account balance etc. To attack money 
transfers protected by PassCode, the attacker could substitute account 
and amount and manipulate the server response to show what was entered 
by user.

Assuming that MITM phishing will begin to show up and agreeing that 
PassCode over SSL is not the solution - what can be done to counter 
those attacks?

Mutual authentication + establishment of a secure channel should do the 
trick. SSL with client authentication comes to my mind...

CMA's March Program

[conferences]

It is always a pleasure to introduce to the market the Connecticut 
Maritime Association's annual Conference Program.

A pleasure because once again a team of industry participants have 
created a program packed with substance, energy and a schedule 
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The following link will take you to our show website and the first 
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Fax: +1.203.406.0110
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