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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Tor 0.1.1.8-alpha is out]
- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2005 18:26:23 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Tor 0.1.1.8-alpha is out User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This is the eighth development snapshot for the 0.1.1.x series. The main changes are that clients now use the new directory protocol, that servers that are tight on resources stop advertising their DirPort, and that we use OpenSSL's AES if it's available. http://tor.eff.org/download.html Changes in version 0.1.1.8-alpha - 2005-10-07 o New features (major): - Clients don't download or use the directory anymore. Now they download and use network-statuses from the trusted dirservers, and fetch individual server descriptors as needed from mirrors. See dir-spec.txt for all the gory details. - Be more conservative about whether to advertise our DirPort. The main change is to not advertise if we're running at capacity and either a) we could hibernate or b) our capacity is low and we're using a default DirPort. - Use OpenSSL's AES when OpenSSL has version 0.9.7 or later. o New features (minor): - Try to be smart about when to retry network-status and server-descriptor fetches. Still needs some tuning. - Stop parsing, storing, or using running-routers output (but mirrors still cache and serve it). - Consider a threshold of versioning dirservers (dirservers who have an opinion about which Tor versions are still recommended) before deciding whether to warn the user that he's obsolete. - Dirservers can now reject/invalidate by key and IP, with the config options AuthDirInvalid and AuthDirReject. This is useful since currently we automatically list servers as running and usable even if we know they're jerks. - Provide dire warnings to any users who set DirServer; move it out of torrc.sample and into torrc.complete. - Add MyFamily to torrc.sample in the server section. - Add nicknames to the DirServer line, so we can refer to them without requiring all our users to memorize their IP addresses. - When we get an EOF or a timeout on a directory connection, note how many bytes of serverdesc we are dropping. This will help us determine whether it is smart to parse incomplete serverdesc responses. - Add a new function to change pseudonyms -- that is, to stop using any currently-dirty circuits for new streams, so we don't link new actions to old actions. Currently it's only called on HUP (or SIGNAL RELOAD). - On sighup, if UseHelperNodes changed to 1, use new circuits. - Start using RAND_bytes rather than RAND_pseudo_bytes from OpenSSL. Also, reseed our entropy every hour, not just at startup. And entropy in 512-bit chunks, not 160-bit chunks. o Fixes on 0.1.1.7-alpha: - Nobody ever implemented EVENT_ADDRMAP for control protocol version 0, so don't let version 0 controllers ask for it. - If you requested something with too many newlines via the v1 controller protocol, you could crash tor. - Fix a number of memory leaks, including some pretty serious ones. - Re-enable DirPort testing again, so Tor servers will be willing to advertise their DirPort if it's reachable. - On TLS handshake, only check the other router's nickname against its expected nickname if is_named is set. o Fixes forward-ported from 0.1.0.15: - Don't crash when we don't have any spare file descriptors and we try to spawn a dns or cpu worker. - Make the numbers in read-history and write-history into uint64s, so they don't overflow and publish negatives in the descriptor. o Fixes on 0.1.0.x: - For the OS X package's modified privoxy config file, comment out the logfile line so we don't log everything passed through privoxy. - We were whining about using socks4 or socks5-with-local-lookup even when it's an IP in the virtual range we designed exactly for this case. - We were leaking some memory every time the client changes IPs. - Never call free() on tor_malloc()d memory. This will help us use dmalloc to detect memory leaks. - Check for named servers when looking them up by nickname; warn when we'recalling a non-named server by its nickname; don't warn twice about the same name. - Try to list MyFamily elements by key, not by nickname, and warn if we've not heard of the server. - Make windows platform detection (uname equivalent) smarter. - It turns out sparc64 doesn't like unaligned access either. - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
[fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
--- begin forwarded text From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: undisclosed-recipients: ; Subject: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2005 18:30:56 +0100 (BST) (( Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems )) October 08, 2005 https://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000561.html Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf ===8=8== Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the author s opinion, contributed to the fact that despite the availability of the technology for more than a decade, it has not achieved even a fraction of the anticipated popularity. The basic assumptions and requirements for such a system are revisited, clear (economic) objectives are formulated and cryptographic techniques to achieve them are proposed. Introduction. Chaum et al. begin their seminal paper (D. Chaum, 1988) with the observation that the use of credit cards is an act of faith on the part of all concerned, exposing all parties to fraud. Indeed, almost two decades later, the credit card business is still plagued by all these problems and credit card fraud has become a major obstacle to the normal development of electronic commerce, but digital cash-like payment systems similar to those proposed (and implemented) by D. Chaum have never become viable competitors, let alone replacements for credit cards or paper-based cash. One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems based on similar schemes lack some key characteristics of paper-based cash, rendering them economically infeasible. Let us quickly enumerate the most important properties of cash: 1. Money doesn't smell. Cash payments are -- potentially -- _anonymous_ and untraceable by third parties (including the issuer). 2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash transactions _irreversibility_. 3. Cash payments are _peer-to-peer_. There is no distinction between merchants and customers; anyone can pay anyone. In particular, anybody can receive cash payments without contracts with third parties. 4. Cash allows for acts of faith or _naive transactions_. Those who are not familiar with all the antiforgery measures of a particular banknote or do not have the necessary equipment to verify them, can still transact with cash relying on the fact that what they do not verify is nonetheless verifiable in principle. 5. The amount of cash issued by the issuing authority is public information that can be verified through an auditing process. The payment system proposed in (D. Chaum, 1988) focuses on the first characteristic while partially or totally lacking all the others. The same holds, to some extent, for all existing cash-like digital payment systems based on untraceable blind signatures (Brands, 1993a; Brands, 1993b; A. Lysyanskaya, 1998), rendering them unpractical. ... [bulk of paper proposes a new system...] Conclusion. The proposed digital payment system is more similar to cash than the existing digital payment solutions. It offers reasonable measures to protect the privacy of the users and to guarantee the transparency of the issuer s operations. With an appropriate business model, where the provider of the technical part of the issuing service is independent of the financial providers and serves more than one of the latter, the issuer has sufficient incentives not to exploit the vulnerability described in 4.3, even if the implementation of the cryptographic challenge allowed for it. This parallels the case of the issuing bank and the printing service responsible for printing the banknotes. The author believes that an implementation of such a system would stand a better chance on the market than the existing alternatives, none of which has lived up to the expectations, precisely because it matches paper-based cash more closely in its most important properties. Open-source implementations of the necessary software are being actively developed as parts of the ePoint project. For details, please see http://sf.net/projects/epoint =8=8= -- Powered by Movable Type Version 2.64 http://www.movabletype.org/ ___ fc-discuss mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc-discuss --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar
E-gold Account Alert Case ID Number: EG-26-939-001
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