Blood, Bullets, Bombs and Bandwidth

2005-10-22 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


 Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2005 01:50:38 -0400
 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Blood, Bullets, Bombs and Bandwidth

 The long version of the Wired Story on Ryan Lackey, including lots more
 about Tyler Wagner, who I've been reading about almost since he got there
 after the liberation :-) in 2003...

 Just bumped into the bit below, having abandoned Tyler and Jayme's LJs
 after they split, and finding the link after they went back recently.

 Meanwhile, the author bought the wrong vowel, apparently. ;-).

 Cheers,
 RAH
 --

 http://www.rezendi.com/travels/.html

 Blood, Bullets, Bombs, and Bandwidth:
 a tale of two California cipherpunks who went to Baghdad to seek their
 fortune, and bring the Internet to Iraq.

 Ryan Lackey wears body armor to business meetings. He flies armed
 helicopters to client sites. He has a cash flow problem: he is paid in
 hundred-dollar bills, sometimes shrink-wrapped bricks of them, and flowing
 this money into a bank is difficult. He even calls some of his company's
 transactions drug deals - but what Lackey sells is Internet access. From
 his trailer on Logistics Staging Area Anaconda, a colossal US Army base
 fifty miles north of Baghdad, Lackey runs Blue Iraq, surely the most
 surreal ISP on the planet. He is 26 years old.

 Getting to Anaconda is no joke. Incoming airplanes make a 'tactical
 descent' landing, better known to military cognoscenti as the 'death
 spiral'; a nose-down plummet, followed by a viciously tight 360-degree
 turn, then another stomach-wrenching dive. The plane is dragged back to
 level only just in time to land, and brakes so hard that anything not
 strapped down goes flying forward. Welcome to Mortaritaville - the
 airbase's mordant nickname, thanks to the insurgent mortars that hit the
 base daily.

 From above, the base looks like a child's sandbox full of thousands of
 military toys. Dozens of helicopters litter the runways: Apaches,
 Blackhawks, Chinooks. F-16 fighters and C-17 cargo planes perch in huge
 igloo-like hangars built by Saddam. The roads are full of Humvees and
 armored personnel carriers. Rows of gunboats rest inexplicably on arid
 desert. A specific Act of Congress is required to build a permanent
 building on any US military base, so Anaconda is full of tents the size of
 football fields, temporary only in name, that look like giant caterpillars.
 Its 25,000 inhabitants, soldiers and civilian contractors like Ryan, are
 housed in tent cities and huge fields of trailers.

 Ryan came to Iraq in July 2004 to work for ServiceSat International, hired
 sight unseen by their CTO Tyler Wagner. Three months later, Ryan quit and
 founded Blue Iraq. He left few friends behind. I think if Ryan had
 stayed, Tyler says drily, the staff would have sold him to the
 insurgents.

 - - -

 Iraq is new to the Internet. Thanks to sanctions and Saddam, ordinary
 citizens had no access until 1999. Prewar, there were a mere 1.1 million
 telephone lines in this nation of 26 million people, and fewer than 75 Net
 cafés, connecting via a censored satellite connection. Then the American
 invasion knocked nearly half of Baghdad's landlines out of service, and the
 local exchanges that survived could not connect to one another.

 After the invasion, an army of contractors flooded into Baghdad. Billions
 of reconstruction dollars were being handed out in cash, and everybody -
 local Internet cafés, Halliburton, Ahmed Chalabi, the US military itself -
 wanted Internet access. With the landline service destroyed by war, and
 sabotage a continuing problem, satellite access was the only realistic
 option. Among the companies vying to provide this access in early 2003,
 scant months after the invasion, was ServiceSat International. SSI, a
 startup founded by Kurdish expats, needed an American CTO: partly to import
 America's culture of technical excellence, partly to help deal with Western
 clients and authorities. They called Tyler Wagner. He was 25 years old.

 - - -

 San Francisco, aka Baghdad-by-the-Bay, July 2003. Tyler Wagner is a typical
 counterculture California techie: a Cal Poly CS graduate, part of the
 California punk scene, working for Greenpeace as a network engineer. Then
 an old friend in London recommends him to SSI. They call him. They need a
 capable Westerner willing to move to Iraq. Is he interested?

 When he hangs up the phone, Tyler is shaking with excitement. The risks of
 relocating to a war zone are obvious. But it is a lucrative senior
 management position, offered to a man only two years out of university.
 Life doesn't often offer you a hand up like that, he reminisces two years
 later, and when it does, you can't afford to turn it down. One big
 complication: Tyler's girlfriend, Jayme. They have been dating only six
 months. He doesn't want to lose her. He calls and tells her the news - and
 they both ask at the same time if she can come with 

Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1

2005-10-22 Thread cyphrpunk
On 10/13/05, Brian Minder [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005.  This
 includes the cypherpunks-moderated list.  Please adjust your subscriptions
 accordingly.

Gmail would facilitate automating a new cypherpunks-moderated list.
Gmail's spam filtering is great and even a regular cypherpunks
subscription has almost no spam.

Sign up a gmail account and subscribe it only to cypherpunks. Use the
POP interface to fetch message from gmail, and redistribute those to
the new cypherpunks-moderated list. Subscribers gain the anti spam
features of cp-moderated without any manual filtering or moderating
necessary.

CP



[EMAIL PROTECTED]: nym paper preprint]

2005-10-22 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] -

From: Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2005 10:20:40 + (UTC)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: nym paper preprint
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


I've finished a first draft of an academic paper on nym:

http://www.lunkwill.org/cv/nym.pdf

Abstract:
nym is a straightforward application of blind signatures to create a
pseudonymity system with extremely low barriers to adoption.  Clients use
an entirely browser-based application to pseudonymously obtain a blinded
token which can be anonymously exchanged for an ordinary TLS client
certificate.  In the appendix, we give the complete Javascript application
and the necessary patch to use client certificates in place of IP addresses
in the popular web application MediaWiki.

-J

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Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems

2005-10-22 Thread Ian G

R. Hirschfeld wrote:

Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 11:31:39 -0700
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]




2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no
means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash
transactions _irreversibility_.


Certainly Chaum ecash has this property. Because deposits are
unlinkable to withdrawals, there is no way even in principle to
reverse a transaction.



This is not strictly correct.  The payer can reveal the blinding
factor, making the payment traceable.  I believe Chaum deliberately
chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
the payer) in order to address concerns such as blackmailing,
extortion, etc.  The protocol can be modified to make it fully
untraceable, but that's not how it is designed.



Huh - first I've heard of that, would be
encouraging if that worked.  How does it
handle an intermediary fall guy?   Say
Bad Guy Bob extorts Alice, and organises
the payoff to Freddy Fall Guy.  This would
mean that Alice can strip her blinding
factors and reveal that she paid to Freddy,
but as Freddy is not to be found, he can't
be encouraged to reveal his blinding factors
so as to reveal that Bob bolted with the
dosh.

iang



MediaSentiment Newsletter: Vol. No. 1, Issue No. 10, October 11, 2005

2005-10-22 Thread Newsletter














































































































































   
 




   

Re: Judy Miller needing killing

2005-10-22 Thread John Kelsey
The question is, can 
she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class 
that an ordinary person could not defy?

It seems like the real question is how membership in the class is determined.  
If anyone who's acting like a reporter in a certain context (say, Adam Shostack 
interviewing me for his blog) qualifies, then I don't see the constitutional 
problem, though it may still be good or bad policy.  If you've got to get a 
special card from the government that says you're a journalist, it seems like 
that's more of a problem.  

I guess other places where there's some right not to answer these questions 
exist, but they're mostly based on licensed professions.  I gather your lawyer 
or priest has much more ability to refuse to talk than your doctor or 
accountant, and that your psychologist has a shockingly small ability to refuse 
to talk.  Other than priest, though, all these fields are at least somewhat 
licensed by the state for other reasons, so that makes it easy to use 
possession of a license as a way to tell when someone really is a doctor, 
lawyer, psychologist, etc.  For constitutional reasons, that's not really true 
for journalists.  

GH

--John



[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] CALEA and Colleges]

2005-10-22 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -

From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2005 16:35:00 -0400
To: Ip Ip ip@v2.listbox.com
Subject: [IP] CALEA and Colleges
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Begin forwarded message:

From: Bruce Schneier [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: October 22, 2005 2:40:49 PM EDT
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EPIC_IDOF] CALEA and Colleges


New York Times
October 23, 2005

Colleges Protest Call to Upgrade Online Systems
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/technology/23college.html? 
hpex=113004en=82e2a961640ae05bei=5094

By SAM DILLON
and STEPHEN LABATON

The federal government, vastly extending the reach of an 11-year-old  
law, is requiring hundreds of universities, online communications  
companies and cities to overhaul their Internet computer networks to  
make it easier for law enforcement authorities to monitor e-mail and  
other online communications.

The action, which the government says is intended to help catch  
terrorists and other criminals, has unleashed protests and the threat  
of lawsuits from universities, which argue that it will cost them at  
least $7 billion while doing little to apprehend lawbreakers. Because  
the government would have to win court orders before undertaking  
surveillance, the universities are not raising civil liberties issues.

The order, issued by the Federal Communications Commission in August  
and first published in the Federal Register last week, extends the  
provisions of a 1994 wiretap law not only to universities, but also  
to libraries, airports providing wireless service and commercial  
Internet access providers.

It also applies to municipalities that provide Internet access to  
residents, be they rural towns or cities like Philadelphia and San  
Francisco, which have plans to build their own Net access networks.

So far, however, universities have been most vocal in their opposition.

The 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,  
requires telephone carriers to engineer their switching systems at  
their own cost so that federal agents can obtain easy surveillance  
access.

Recognizing the growth of Internet-based telephone and other  
communications, the order requires that organizations like  
universities providing Internet access also comply with the law by  
spring 2007.

The Justice Department requested the order last year, saying that new  
technologies like telephone service over the Internet were  
endangering law enforcement's ability to conduct wiretaps in their  
fight against criminals, terrorists and spies.

Justice Department officials, who declined to comment for this  
article, said in their written comments filed with the Federal  
Communications Commission that the new requirements were necessary to  
keep the 1994 law viable in the face of the monumental shift of the  
telecommunications industry and to enable law enforcement to  
accomplish its mission in the face of rapidly advancing technology.

The F.C.C. says it is considering whether to exempt educational  
institutions from some of the law's provisions, but it has not  
granted an extension for compliance.

Lawyers for the American Council on Education, the nation's largest  
association of universities and colleges, are preparing to appeal the  
order before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of  
Columbia Circuit, Terry W. Hartle, a senior vice president of the  
council, said Friday.

The Center for Democracy and Technology, a nonprofit civil liberties  
group, has enlisted plaintiffs for a separate legal challenge,  
focusing on objections to government control over how organizations,  
including hundreds of private technology companies, design Internet  
systems, James X. Dempsey, the center's executive director, said Friday.

The universities do not question the government's right to use  
wiretaps to monitor terrorism or criminal suspects on college  
campuses, Mr. Hartle said, only the order's rapid timetable for  
compliance and extraordinary cost.

Technology experts retained by the schools estimated that it could  
cost universities at least $7 billion just to buy the Internet  
switches and routers necessary for compliance. That figure does not  
include installation or the costs of hiring and training staff to  
oversee the sophisticated circuitry around the clock, as the law  
requires, the experts said.

This is the mother of all unfunded mandates, Mr. Hartle said.

Even the lowest estimates of compliance costs would, on average,  
increase annual tuition at most American universities by some $450,  
at a time when rising education costs are already a sore point with  
parents and members of Congress, Mr. Hartle said.

At New York University, for instance, the order would require the  
installation of thousands of new devices in more than 100 buildings  
around Manhattan, be they small switches in a wiring closet or large  

[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] more on Colleges protest netwoprk upgrades to allow easier surveillance]

2005-10-22 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -

From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2005 16:36:43 -0400
To: Ip Ip ip@v2.listbox.com
Subject: [IP] more on  Colleges protest netwoprk upgrades to allow easier 
surveillance
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Begin forwarded message:

From: finin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: October 22, 2005 3:22:57 PM EDT
To: Dave Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Colleges protest netwoprk upgrades to allow easier surveillance


According to this story, the only complaint from colleges is
the cost.  In addition to ultimate concerns about privacy,
are there also technical issues that might come up, like
adding to latency or congestion?  Many universities are
engaged in building and testing innovative high speed
computation and communication applications and testbeds that
span the Internet.  Would a required re-architecting of
campus networks cause problems for this kind of research?
I'm not expert enough in these areas to have a well informed
opinion. Tim

--

Colleges Protest Call to Upgrade Online Systems
By Sam Dillon and Stephen Labaton, NYT, October 23, 2005
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/technology/23college.html? 
pagewanted=all

The federal government, vastly extending the reach of an
11-year-old law, is requiring hundreds of universities,
online communications companies and cities to overhaul their
Internet computer networks to make it easier for law
enforcement authorities to monitor e-mail and other online
communications.

The action, which the government says is intended to help
catch terrorists and other criminals, has unleashed protests
and the threat of lawsuits from universities, which argue
that it will cost them at least $7 billion while doing
little to apprehend lawbreakers. Because the government
would have to win court orders before undertaking
surveillance, the universities are not raising civil
liberties issues.

The order, issued by the Federal Communications Commission
in August and first published in the Federal Register last
week, extends the provisions of a 1994 wiretap law not only
to universities, but also to libraries, airports providing
wireless service and commercial Internet access providers.

It also applies to municipalities that provide Internet
access to residents, be they rural towns or cities like
Philadelphia and San Francisco, which have plans to build
their own Net access networks.  So far, however,
universities have been most vocal in their opposition.
...
The universities do not question the government's right to
use wiretaps to monitor terrorism or criminal suspects on
college campuses, Mr. Hartle said, only the order's rapid
timetable for compliance and extraordinary cost.
...
But the federal law would apply a high-tech approach,
enabling law enforcement to monitor communications at
campuses from remote locations at the turn of a switch.  It
would require universities to re-engineer their networks so
that every Net access point would send all communications
not directly onto the Internet, but first to a network
operations center where the data packets could be stitched
together into a single package for delivery to law
enforcement, university officials said.
...
Law enforcement has only infrequently requested to monitor
Internet communications anywhere, much less on university
campuses or libraries, according to the Center for Democracy
and Technology. In 2003, only 12 of the 1,442 state and
federal wiretap orders were issued for computer
communications, and the F.B.I. never argued that it had
difficulty executing any of those 12 wiretaps, the center
said.

We keep asking the F.B.I., What is the problem you're
trying to solve? Mr. Dempsey said. And they have never
showed any problem with any university or any for-profit
Internet access provider. The F.B.I. must demonstrate
precisely why it wants to impose such an enormously
disruptive and expensive burden.
...

-- 
 Tim Finin, Computer Science  Electrical Engineering, Univ of Maryland
 Baltimore County, 1000 Hilltop Cir, Baltimore MD 21250. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 http://ebiquity.umbc.edu 410-455-3522 fax:-3969 http://umbc.edu/~finin



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Undeliverable Mail

2005-10-22 Thread Postmaster
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