- Forwarded message from Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 01:51:32 + (UTC)
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 01:49:26 + (UTC)
From: Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1
Per the recent discussion regarding tor and wikipedia, I've hacked together
an implementation of the basic system from Chaum, Fiat and Naor's 1990
Untraceable Electronic Cash paper. This system allows CAs to blindly
issue tokens (or coins) which can then be spent elsewhere. It runs in
perl, and comprises a CA, nym-maker, client application and auth checker
(for the server).
The tarball is here:
http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/
Of course, it's useless at the moment since it gives out tokens
indiscriminately (and probably has massive bugs), but if anyone actually
cares about this idea, it will be (more or less) easy to do the following:
* Put up a sample CA and server that people can use (potentially as hidden
services).
* Make the CA issue only one token per email address, or one token per IP
address, one per computational puzzle, one for every $20 mailed in...
* Automatically expire CA keys and generate new ones on a regular basis
(rather than bothering with CRLs)
* Instead of randomly generated tokens, have the CA sign an actual X.509
cert request, which will then become a perfectly valid X.509 cert useful as
a client-side cert in unmodified browsers and web servers
* Create some sort of aid for maintaining server-side (or CA) blacklists of
improperly behaving users
* Check to see if the protocol is actually still secure and properly
implemented.
Comments welcome.
-J
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