Re: SHA1 broken?
Ah. You meant as a principal in general. Of course the prevailing wisdom is to go from FPGAs to ASICs when you have heavy tasks. In Telecom equipment, however, there's a few issues that basically 'require' FPGAs. First, the standards change quite a bit, depending on which area you're in. For instance, RPR didn't really get settled until very recently. Second, your customers may ask for more or different kinds of functionality, so you may have a new release of firmware to address that. Putting the framing and/or PM on an FPGA while keeping the guts (eg, packet processing) on the main ASIC/processor allows you to swap out the trivial without a major heart transplant. In addition, there's probably the far more important issue of design cycle times. ASICs will take (at the very minimum) 18 months to create, and if you make a mistake early on and don't catch, you have to start all over again. For some fields that's just unacceptable. Then again, if you're looking for sheer, brute performance and design cycle times are not a limiting factor, ASICs are often the way to go. Even in a Variola Suitcase, however, I'd bet some of the trivial functions are off-loaded to an FPGA, though, for reasons above. -TD From: Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2005 13:26:48 -0600 Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, maybe I misunderstand your statement here, but in Telecom most heavy iron has plenty of FPGAs, and as far as I understand it, they more or less have to. Have to in what sense? If they're constantly reconfiguring the FPGAs (new software revs, or some sort of evolutionary learning process--- the latter not likely in telecom, of course), sure, they have to be on reprogrammable structures. If, on the other hand, you're building a custom hash cracking machine, you don't need to reconfigure your gates. You could design your parallelized SHA1 cracking machine and dump it onto a bunch of FPGAs, but if you really have unlimited resources you take the plunge into ASICs, at which point you can tighten your timing substantially. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then again, if you're looking for sheer, brute performance and design cycle times are not a limiting factor, ASICs are often the way to go. Even in a Variola Suitcase, however, I'd bet some of the trivial functions are off-loaded to an FPGA, though, for reasons above. Oh, sure. Buy yourself the flexibility of the FPGA, e.g., by putting an FPGA on a huge DMA pipe. But don't count on the FPGA to do the brunt of the crunching once you've settled on an implementation. Note also that you can probably buy yourself lots of performance without increasing the design cycle time all that much by simply synthesizing (via Synopsys or the like) the same Verilog with which you would have programmed the FPGA. Buy (or pirate if you can; it's not like you're selling these things, so who cares about the IP issues?) a set of standard logic cells in the smallest process you can afford so that even the lion's share of the layout can be done in a completely automated fashion, and you're basically all set. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Then again, if you're looking for sheer, brute performance and design cycle times are not a limiting factor, ASICs are often the way to go. Even in a Variola Suitcase, however, I'd bet some of the trivial functions are off-loaded to an FPGA, though, for reasons above. Oh, sure. Buy yourself the flexibility of the FPGA, e.g., by putting an FPGA on a huge DMA pipe. But don't count on the FPGA to do the brunt of the crunching once you've settled on an implementation. Note also that you can probably buy yourself lots of performance without increasing the design cycle time all that much by simply synthesizing (via Synopsys or the like) the same Verilog with which you would have programmed the FPGA. Buy (or pirate if you can; it's not like you're selling these things, so who cares about the IP issues?) a set of standard logic cells in the smallest process you can afford so that even the lion's share of the layout can be done in a completely automated fashion, and you're basically all set. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Ah. You meant as a principal in general. Of course the prevailing wisdom is to go from FPGAs to ASICs when you have heavy tasks. In Telecom equipment, however, there's a few issues that basically 'require' FPGAs. First, the standards change quite a bit, depending on which area you're in. For instance, RPR didn't really get settled until very recently. Second, your customers may ask for more or different kinds of functionality, so you may have a new release of firmware to address that. Putting the framing and/or PM on an FPGA while keeping the guts (eg, packet processing) on the main ASIC/processor allows you to swap out the trivial without a major heart transplant. In addition, there's probably the far more important issue of design cycle times. ASICs will take (at the very minimum) 18 months to create, and if you make a mistake early on and don't catch, you have to start all over again. For some fields that's just unacceptable. Then again, if you're looking for sheer, brute performance and design cycle times are not a limiting factor, ASICs are often the way to go. Even in a Variola Suitcase, however, I'd bet some of the trivial functions are off-loaded to an FPGA, though, for reasons above. -TD From: Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2005 13:26:48 -0600 Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, maybe I misunderstand your statement here, but in Telecom most heavy iron has plenty of FPGAs, and as far as I understand it, they more or less have to. Have to in what sense? If they're constantly reconfiguring the FPGAs (new software revs, or some sort of evolutionary learning process--- the latter not likely in telecom, of course), sure, they have to be on reprogrammable structures. If, on the other hand, you're building a custom hash cracking machine, you don't need to reconfigure your gates. You could design your parallelized SHA1 cracking machine and dump it onto a bunch of FPGAs, but if you really have unlimited resources you take the plunge into ASICs, at which point you can tighten your timing substantially. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Well, maybe I misunderstand your statement here, but in Telecom most heavy iron has plenty of FPGAs, and as far as I understand it, they more or less have to. -TD From: Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 17:57:50 -0600 Thomas Shaddack shaddack@ns.arachne.cz wrote: There are FPGAs with on-chip RISC CPU cores, allowing reaping the benefits of both architectures in a single chip. FPGAs are mostly useful for prototyping. Once you've decided on a design, there's no point in realizing it in a reprogrammable environment. Synthesize it, time it carefully, and run it as fast as your process allows. TSMC 0.13u just ain't that pricey any more. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, maybe I misunderstand your statement here, but in Telecom most heavy iron has plenty of FPGAs, and as far as I understand it, they more or less have to. Have to in what sense? If they're constantly reconfiguring the FPGAs (new software revs, or some sort of evolutionary learning process--- the latter not likely in telecom, of course), sure, they have to be on reprogrammable structures. If, on the other hand, you're building a custom hash cracking machine, you don't need to reconfigure your gates. You could design your parallelized SHA1 cracking machine and dump it onto a bunch of FPGAs, but if you really have unlimited resources you take the plunge into ASICs, at which point you can tighten your timing substantially. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
FPGAs will have very hard time to be as fast as dedicated CPUs, frequency-wise. The FPGA structures have to be too generic, and are much bigger than specialized structures of the CPUs, so they have higher capacity, which limits the maximum achievable switching frequency. The length of the wiring between the structures together with the lazy speed of light plays its role as well. However, the FPGA structure allows parallelizing of processing tasks, which can in some cases neatly beat the sequential CPUs. There are FPGAs with on-chip RISC CPU cores, allowing reaping the benefits of both architectures in a single chip. On Sat, 5 Mar 2005, Tyler Durden wrote: Well, what would you call a network processor? An FPGA or a CPU? I think of it as somewhere in between, given credence to the FPGA statement below. -TD From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Sat, 05 Mar 2005 06:51:24 -0800 At 09:23 PM 2/19/05 +, Dave Howe wrote: I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty FPGAs scale with tech the same as CPUs, however CPUs contain a lot more design info (complexity). But FPGAs since '98 have gotten denser (Moore's observation), pioneering Cu wiring, smaller features, etc.
Re: SHA1 broken?
Thomas Shaddack shaddack@ns.arachne.cz wrote: There are FPGAs with on-chip RISC CPU cores, allowing reaping the benefits of both architectures in a single chip. FPGAs are mostly useful for prototyping. Once you've decided on a design, there's no point in realizing it in a reprogrammable environment. Synthesize it, time it carefully, and run it as fast as your process allows. TSMC 0.13u just ain't that pricey any more. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SHA1 broken?
Well, what would you call a network processor? An FPGA or a CPU? I think of it as somewhere in between, given credence to the FPGA statement below. -TD From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Sat, 05 Mar 2005 06:51:24 -0800 At 09:23 PM 2/19/05 +, Dave Howe wrote: I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty FPGAs scale with tech the same as CPUs, however CPUs contain a lot more design info (complexity). But FPGAs since '98 have gotten denser (Moore's observation), pioneering Cu wiring, smaller features, etc.
Re: SHA1 broken?
At 09:23 PM 2/19/05 +, Dave Howe wrote: I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty FPGAs scale with tech the same as CPUs, however CPUs contain a lot more design info (complexity). But FPGAs since '98 have gotten denser (Moore's observation), pioneering Cu wiring, smaller features, etc.
Re: SHA1 broken?
Well, what would you call a network processor? An FPGA or a CPU? I think of it as somewhere in between, given credence to the FPGA statement below. -TD From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Date: Sat, 05 Mar 2005 06:51:24 -0800 At 09:23 PM 2/19/05 +, Dave Howe wrote: I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty FPGAs scale with tech the same as CPUs, however CPUs contain a lot more design info (complexity). But FPGAs since '98 have gotten denser (Moore's observation), pioneering Cu wiring, smaller features, etc.
Re: SHA1 broken?
On Sat, Feb 19, 2005 at 03:53:53PM +, Dave Howe wrote: I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :) FPGAs are too slow (and too expensive), if you want lots of SHA-1 performance, use a crypto processor (or lots of forthcoming C5J mini-ITX boards), or an ASIC. Assuming, fast SHA-1 computation is the basis for the attack -- we do not know that. While looking, came across http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/02jul/slides/saag-1.pdf We really DO NOT need SHA-256 for Message Authentication, mid-2002. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpiyYiZfRHUC.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Indeed so. however, the argument in 1998, a FPGA machine broke a DES key in 72 hours, therefore TODAY... assumes that (a) the problems are comparable, and (b) that moores law has been applied to FPGAs as well as CPUs. That is only misreading my statements and missing a very large portion where I specifically stated that the new machine would need to be custom instead of semi-custom. The proposed system was not based on FPGAs, instead it would need to be based on ASICs engineered using modern technology, much more along the lines of a DSP. The primary gains available are actually from the larger wafers in use now, along with the transistor shrinkage. Combined these have approximately kept the cost in line with Moore's law, and the benefits of custom engineering account for the rest. So for exact details about how I did the calculations I assumed Moore's law for speed, and an additional 4x improvement from custom chips instead of of the shelf. In order to verify the calculations I also redid them assuming DSPs which should be capable of processing the data (specifically from TI), I came to a cost within a couple orders of magnitude although the power consumption would be substantially higher. Joe
Re: SHA1 broken?
Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you substantially misunderstood my statements, 2^69 work is doable _now_. 2^55 work was performed in 72 hours in 1998, scaling forward the 7 years to the present (and hence through known data) leads to a situation where the 2^69 work is achievable today in a reasonable timeframe (3 days), assuming reasonable quantities of available money ($500,000US). There is no guessing about what the future holds for this, the 2^69 work is NOW. I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :)
Re: SHA1 broken?
Eugen Leitl wrote: On Sat, Feb 19, 2005 at 03:53:53PM +, Dave Howe wrote: I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :) FPGAs are too slow (and too expensive), if you want lots of SHA-1 performance, use a crypto processor (or lots of forthcoming C5J mini-ITX boards), or an ASIC. Assuming, fast SHA-1 computation is the basis for the attack -- we do not know that. Indeed so. however, the argument in 1998, a FPGA machine broke a DES key in 72 hours, therefore TODAY... assumes that (a) the problems are comparable, and (b) that moores law has been applied to FPGAs as well as CPUs. I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty much the same spec sheet as the ones I looked at back then. However, I am not a gate array techie, and most of my experience with them has been small (two-three chip) devices at very long intervals, purely for my own interest. It is possible there has been a quantum leap foward in FPGA tech or some substitute tech that can perform massively parallel calculations, on larger block sizes and hence more operations, at a noticably faster rate than the DES cracker could back then. Schneier apparently believes there has been - but is simply applying moore's law to the machine from back then, and that may not be true unless he knows something I don't (I assume he knows lots of things I don't, but of course he may not have thought this one though :)
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Indeed so. however, the argument in 1998, a FPGA machine broke a DES key in 72 hours, therefore TODAY... assumes that (a) the problems are comparable, and (b) that moores law has been applied to FPGAs as well as CPUs. That is only misreading my statements and missing a very large portion where I specifically stated that the new machine would need to be custom instead of semi-custom. The proposed system was not based on FPGAs, instead it would need to be based on ASICs engineered using modern technology, much more along the lines of a DSP. The primary gains available are actually from the larger wafers in use now, along with the transistor shrinkage. Combined these have approximately kept the cost in line with Moore's law, and the benefits of custom engineering account for the rest. So for exact details about how I did the calculations I assumed Moore's law for speed, and an additional 4x improvement from custom chips instead of of the shelf. In order to verify the calculations I also redid them assuming DSPs which should be capable of processing the data (specifically from TI), I came to a cost within a couple orders of magnitude although the power consumption would be substantially higher. Joe
Re: SHA1 broken?
Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you substantially misunderstood my statements, 2^69 work is doable _now_. 2^55 work was performed in 72 hours in 1998, scaling forward the 7 years to the present (and hence through known data) leads to a situation where the 2^69 work is achievable today in a reasonable timeframe (3 days), assuming reasonable quantities of available money ($500,000US). There is no guessing about what the future holds for this, the 2^69 work is NOW. I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :)
Re: SHA1 broken?
On Sat, Feb 19, 2005 at 03:53:53PM +, Dave Howe wrote: I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :) FPGAs are too slow (and too expensive), if you want lots of SHA-1 performance, use a crypto processor (or lots of forthcoming C5J mini-ITX boards), or an ASIC. Assuming, fast SHA-1 computation is the basis for the attack -- we do not know that. While looking, came across http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/02jul/slides/saag-1.pdf We really DO NOT need SHA-256 for Message Authentication, mid-2002. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpZRzeFp36Q6.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: SHA1 broken?
Eugen Leitl wrote: On Sat, Feb 19, 2005 at 03:53:53PM +, Dave Howe wrote: I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :) FPGAs are too slow (and too expensive), if you want lots of SHA-1 performance, use a crypto processor (or lots of forthcoming C5J mini-ITX boards), or an ASIC. Assuming, fast SHA-1 computation is the basis for the attack -- we do not know that. Indeed so. however, the argument in 1998, a FPGA machine broke a DES key in 72 hours, therefore TODAY... assumes that (a) the problems are comparable, and (b) that moores law has been applied to FPGAs as well as CPUs. I am unaware of any massive improvement (certainly to the scale of the comparable improvement in CPUs) in FPGAs, and the ones I looked at a a few days ago while researching this question seemed to have pretty much the same spec sheet as the ones I looked at back then. However, I am not a gate array techie, and most of my experience with them has been small (two-three chip) devices at very long intervals, purely for my own interest. It is possible there has been a quantum leap foward in FPGA tech or some substitute tech that can perform massively parallel calculations, on larger block sizes and hence more operations, at a noticably faster rate than the DES cracker could back then. Schneier apparently believes there has been - but is simply applying moore's law to the machine from back then, and that may not be true unless he knows something I don't (I assume he knows lots of things I don't, but of course he may not have thought this one though :)
Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])
- Forwarded message from \Hal Finney\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 14:25:36 -0800 (PST) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Reply-To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] The problem with the attack scenario where two versions of a program are created with the same hash, is that from what little we know of the new attacks, they aren't powerful enough to do this. All of the collisions they have shown have the property where the two alternatives start with the same initial value for the hash; they then have one or two blocks which are very carefully selected, with a few bits differing between the two blocks; and at the end, they are back to a common value for the hash. It is known that their techniques are not sensitive to this initial value. They actually made a mistake when they published their MD5 collision, because they had the wrong initial values due to a typo in Schneier's book. When people gave them the correct initial values, they were able to come up with new collisions within a matter of hours. If you look at their MD5 collision in detail, it was two blocks long. Each block was almost the same as the other, with just a few bits different. They start with the common initial value. Then they run the first blocks through. Amazingly, this has only a small impact on the intermediate value after this first block. Only a relatively few bits are different. If you or I tried to take two blocks with a few bits different and feed them to MD5, we would get totally different outputs. Changing even one bit will normally change half the output bits. The fact that they are able to change several bits and get only a small difference in the output is the first miracle. But then they do an even better trick. They now go on and do the second pair of blocks. The initial values for these blocks (which are the outputs from the previous stage) are close but not quite the same. And amazingly, these second blocks not only keep things from getting worse, they manage to heal the differences. They precisely compensate for the changes and bring the values back together. This is the second miracle and it is even greater. Now, it would be a big leap from this to being able to take two arbitrary different initial values and bring them together to a common output. That is what would be necessary to mount the code fraud attack. But as we can see by inspection of the collisions produced by the researchers (who are keeping their methodology secret for now), they don't seem to have that power. Instead, they are able to introduce a very carefully controlled difference between the two blocks, and then cancel it. Being able to cancel a huge difference between blocks would be a problem of an entirely different magnitude. Now, there is this other idea which Zooko alludes to, from Dan Kaminsky, www.doxpara.com, which could exploit the power of the new attacks to do something malicious. Let us grant that the only ability we have is that we can create slightly different pairs of blocks that collide. We can't meaningfully control the contents of these blocks, and they will differ in only a few bits. And these blocks have to be inserted into a program being distributed, which will have two versions that are *exactly the same* except for the few bits of difference between the blocks. This way the two versions will have the same hash, and this is the power which the current attacks seem to have. Kaminsky shows that you could still have good and bad versions of such a program. You'd have to write a program which tested a bit in the colliding blocks, and behaved good if the bit was set, and bad if the bit was clear. When someone reviewed this program, they'd see the potential bad behavior, but they'd also see that the behavior was not enabled because the bit that enabled it was not set. Maybe the bad behavior could be a back door used during debugging, and there is some flag bit that turns off the debugging mode. So the reviewer might assume that the program was OK despite this somewhat questionable code, because he builds it and makes sure to sign or validate the hash when built in the mode when the bad features are turned off. But what he doesn't know is, Kaminsky has another block of data prepared which has that flag bit in the opposite state, and which he can substitute without changing the hash. That will cause the program to behave in its bad mode, even though the only change was a few bits in this block of random data. So this way he can distribute a malicious build and it has the hash which was approved by the reviewer. And as Zooko points out, this doesn't have to be the main developer who is doing this, anyone who is doing some work on creating the final package might be able to do so. On the other hand, this attack is pretty blatant once you know it is possible. The lesson is that a reviewer should
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2005 2:49 AM Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet. I believe you substantially misunderstood my statements, 2^69 work is doable _now_. 2^55 work was performed in 72 hours in 1998, scaling forward the 7 years to the present (and hence through known data) leads to a situation where the 2^69 work is achievable today in a reasonable timeframe (3 days), assuming reasonable quantities of available money ($500,000US). There is no guessing about what the future holds for this, the 2^69 work is NOW. - Original Message - From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Cryptography cryptography@metzdowd.com Actually, the final challenge was solved in 23 hours, about 1/3 Deep Crack, and 2/3 Distributed.net. They were lucky, finding the key after only 24% of the keyspace had been searched. More recently, RC5-64 was solved about a year ago. It took d.net 4 *years*. 2^69 remains non-trivial. What you're missing in this is that Deep Crack was already a year old at the time it was used for this, I was assuming that the most recent technologies would be used, so the 1998 point for Deep Crack was the critical point. Also if you check the real statistics for RC5-64 you will find that Distributed.net suffered from a major lack of optimization on the workhorse of the DES cracking effort (DEC Alpha processor) even to the point where running the X86 code in emulation was faster than the native code. Since an Alpha Processor had been the breaking force for DES Challenge I and a factor of 1/3 for III this crippled the performance resulting in the Alphas running at only ~2% of their optimal speed, and the x86 systems were running at only about 50%. Based on just this 2^64 should have taken only 1.5 years. Additionally add in that virtually the entire Alpha community pulled out because we had better things to do with our processors (e.g. IIRC the same systems rendered Titanic) and Distributed.net was effectively sucked dry of workhorse systems, so a timeframe of 4-6 months is more likely, without any custom hardware and rather sad software optimization. Assuming that the new attacks can be pipelined (the biggest problem with the RC5-64 optimizations was pipeline breaking) it is entirely possible to use modern technology along with GaAs substrate to generate chips in the 10-20 GHz range, or about 10x the speed available to Distributed.net. Add targetted hardware to the mix, deep pipelining, and massively multiprocessors and my numbers still hold, give or take a few orders of magnitude (the 8% of III done by Deep Crack in 23 hours is only a little over 2 orders of magnitude off, so within acceptable bounds). 2^69 is achievable, it may not be pretty, and it certainly isn't kind to the security of the vast majority of secure infrastructure, but it is achievable and while the cost bounds may have to be shifted, that is achievable as well. It is still my view that everyone needs to keep a close eye on their hashes, make sure the numbers add up correctly, it is simply my view now that SHA-1 needs to be put out to pasture, and the rest of the SHA line needs to be heavily reconsidered because of their close relation to SHA-1. The biggest unknown surrounding this is the actual amount of work necessary to perform the 2^69, if the workload is all XOR then the costs and timeframe I gave are reasonably pessimistic
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, February 18, 2005 3:11 AM [the attack is reasonable] Reading through the summary I found a bit of information that means my estimates of workload have to be re-evaluated. Page 1 Based on our estimation, we expect that real collisions of SHA1 reduced to 70-steps can be found using todays supercomputers. This is a very important statement for estimating the real workload, assuming there is an implicit in one year in there, and assuming BlueGene (Top 500 list slot 1) this represents 22937.6 GHz*years, or slightly over 2^69 clock cycles, I am obviously still using gigahertz because information gives us nothing better to work from. This clearly indicates that the operations used for the workload span multiple processor clocks, and performing a gross estimation based on pure guesswork I'm guessing that my numbers are actually off by a factor of between 50 and 500, this factor will likely work cleanly in either adjusting the timeframe or production cost. My suggestion though to make a switch away from SHA-1 as soon as reasonable, and to prepare to switch hashes very quickly in the future remains the same, the march of processor progress is not going to halt, and the advance of cryptographic attacks will not halt which will inevitably squeeze SHA-1 to broken. I would actually argue that the 2^80 strength it should have is enough to begin its retirement, 2^80 has been strong enough for a decade in spite of the march of technology. Under the processor speed enhancements that have happened over the last decade we should have increased the keylength already to accomodate for dual core chips running at 20 times the speed for a total of 40 times the prior speed (I was going to use Spec data for a better calculation but I couldn'd immediately find specs for a Pentium Pro 200) by adding at least 5 bits preferrably 8 to our necessary protection profile. Joe
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2005 2:49 AM Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet. I believe you substantially misunderstood my statements, 2^69 work is doable _now_. 2^55 work was performed in 72 hours in 1998, scaling forward the 7 years to the present (and hence through known data) leads to a situation where the 2^69 work is achievable today in a reasonable timeframe (3 days), assuming reasonable quantities of available money ($500,000US). There is no guessing about what the future holds for this, the 2^69 work is NOW. - Original Message - From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Cryptography cryptography@metzdowd.com Actually, the final challenge was solved in 23 hours, about 1/3 Deep Crack, and 2/3 Distributed.net. They were lucky, finding the key after only 24% of the keyspace had been searched. More recently, RC5-64 was solved about a year ago. It took d.net 4 *years*. 2^69 remains non-trivial. What you're missing in this is that Deep Crack was already a year old at the time it was used for this, I was assuming that the most recent technologies would be used, so the 1998 point for Deep Crack was the critical point. Also if you check the real statistics for RC5-64 you will find that Distributed.net suffered from a major lack of optimization on the workhorse of the DES cracking effort (DEC Alpha processor) even to the point where running the X86 code in emulation was faster than the native code. Since an Alpha Processor had been the breaking force for DES Challenge I and a factor of 1/3 for III this crippled the performance resulting in the Alphas running at only ~2% of their optimal speed, and the x86 systems were running at only about 50%. Based on just this 2^64 should have taken only 1.5 years. Additionally add in that virtually the entire Alpha community pulled out because we had better things to do with our processors (e.g. IIRC the same systems rendered Titanic) and Distributed.net was effectively sucked dry of workhorse systems, so a timeframe of 4-6 months is more likely, without any custom hardware and rather sad software optimization. Assuming that the new attacks can be pipelined (the biggest problem with the RC5-64 optimizations was pipeline breaking) it is entirely possible to use modern technology along with GaAs substrate to generate chips in the 10-20 GHz range, or about 10x the speed available to Distributed.net. Add targetted hardware to the mix, deep pipelining, and massively multiprocessors and my numbers still hold, give or take a few orders of magnitude (the 8% of III done by Deep Crack in 23 hours is only a little over 2 orders of magnitude off, so within acceptable bounds). 2^69 is achievable, it may not be pretty, and it certainly isn't kind to the security of the vast majority of secure infrastructure, but it is achievable and while the cost bounds may have to be shifted, that is achievable as well. It is still my view that everyone needs to keep a close eye on their hashes, make sure the numbers add up correctly, it is simply my view now that SHA-1 needs to be put out to pasture, and the rest of the SHA line needs to be heavily reconsidered because of their close relation to SHA-1. The biggest unknown surrounding this is the actual amount of work necessary to perform the 2^69, if the workload is all XOR then the costs and timeframe I gave are reasonably pessimistic
RE: SHA1 broken?
Actually, the final challenge was solved in 23 hours, about 1/3 Deep Crack, and 2/3 Distributed.net. They were lucky, finding the key after only 24% of the keyspace had been searched. More recently, RC5-64 was solved about a year ago. It took d.net 4 *years*. 2^69 remains non-trivial. Peter -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Dave Howe Sent: Thu 2/17/2005 5:49 AM To: Cypherpunks; Cryptography Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet.
Re: SHA1 broken?
Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet.
Re: SHA1 broken?
On 1108637369 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch Dave Howe wrote: Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) I think that it is generally prudent to make the most ``conservative'' assumption with regards to Moore's Law in any given context. I.e. bet that it will continue when determining how easy your security is to brute force, and assume that it will not when writing code. -- Roland Dowdeswell http://www.Imrryr.ORG/~elric/
Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 14:25:36 -0800 (PST) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) Reply-To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The problem with the attack scenario where two versions of a program are created with the same hash, is that from what little we know of the new attacks, they aren't powerful enough to do this. All of the collisions they have shown have the property where the two alternatives start with the same initial value for the hash; they then have one or two blocks which are very carefully selected, with a few bits differing between the two blocks; and at the end, they are back to a common value for the hash. It is known that their techniques are not sensitive to this initial value. They actually made a mistake when they published their MD5 collision, because they had the wrong initial values due to a typo in Schneier's book. When people gave them the correct initial values, they were able to come up with new collisions within a matter of hours. If you look at their MD5 collision in detail, it was two blocks long. Each block was almost the same as the other, with just a few bits different. They start with the common initial value. Then they run the first blocks through. Amazingly, this has only a small impact on the intermediate value after this first block. Only a relatively few bits are different. If you or I tried to take two blocks with a few bits different and feed them to MD5, we would get totally different outputs. Changing even one bit will normally change half the output bits. The fact that they are able to change several bits and get only a small difference in the output is the first miracle. But then they do an even better trick. They now go on and do the second pair of blocks. The initial values for these blocks (which are the outputs from the previous stage) are close but not quite the same. And amazingly, these second blocks not only keep things from getting worse, they manage to heal the differences. They precisely compensate for the changes and bring the values back together. This is the second miracle and it is even greater. Now, it would be a big leap from this to being able to take two arbitrary different initial values and bring them together to a common output. That is what would be necessary to mount the code fraud attack. But as we can see by inspection of the collisions produced by the researchers (who are keeping their methodology secret for now), they don't seem to have that power. Instead, they are able to introduce a very carefully controlled difference between the two blocks, and then cancel it. Being able to cancel a huge difference between blocks would be a problem of an entirely different magnitude. Now, there is this other idea which Zooko alludes to, from Dan Kaminsky, www.doxpara.com, which could exploit the power of the new attacks to do something malicious. Let us grant that the only ability we have is that we can create slightly different pairs of blocks that collide. We can't meaningfully control the contents of these blocks, and they will differ in only a few bits. And these blocks have to be inserted into a program being distributed, which will have two versions that are *exactly the same* except for the few bits of difference between the blocks. This way the two versions will have the same hash, and this is the power which the current attacks seem to have. Kaminsky shows that you could still have good and bad versions of such a program. You'd have to write a program which tested a bit in the colliding blocks, and behaved good if the bit was set, and bad if the bit was clear. When someone reviewed this program, they'd see the potential bad behavior, but they'd also see that the behavior was not enabled because the bit that enabled it was not set. Maybe the bad behavior could be a back door used during debugging, and there is some flag bit that turns off the debugging mode. So the reviewer might assume that the program was OK despite this somewhat questionable code, because he builds it and makes sure to sign or validate the hash when built in the mode when the bad features are turned off. But what he doesn't know is, Kaminsky has another block of data prepared which has that flag bit in the opposite state, and which he can substitute without changing the hash. That will cause the program to behave in its bad mode, even though the only change was a few bits in this block of random data. So this way he can distribute a malicious build and it has the hash which was approved by the reviewer. And as Zooko points out, this doesn't have to be the main developer who is doing this, anyone who is doing some work on creating the final package might be able to do so. On the other hand, this attack is pretty blatant once you know it is possible. The lesson is that a reviewer
RE: SHA1 broken?
Actually, the final challenge was solved in 23 hours, about 1/3 Deep Crack, and 2/3 Distributed.net. They were lucky, finding the key after only 24% of the keyspace had been searched. More recently, RC5-64 was solved about a year ago. It took d.net 4 *years*. 2^69 remains non-trivial. Peter -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Dave Howe Sent: Thu 2/17/2005 5:49 AM To: Cypherpunks; Cryptography Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet.
Re: SHA1 broken?
Joseph Ashwood wrote: I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) This of course assumes that the break doesn't match the criteria from the previous breaks by the same team - ie, that you *can* create a collision, but you have little or no control over the plaintext for the colliding elements - there is no way to know as the paper hasn't been published yet.
Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken?
On Wed, Feb 16, 2005 at 07:55:15AM -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote: From: Serguei Osokine [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 00:11:07 -0800 Okay, so the effective SHA-1 length is 138 bits instead of full 160 - so what's the big deal? It is still way more than, say, MD5 In applications where collisions are important, SHA1 is now effectively 69 bits as opposed to 80. That's not very much, and odds are there will be an improvement on this attack in the near future. Eric
Re: SHA1 broken?
-- There is however a huge problem replace SHA-1 by something else from now to tomorrow: Other algorithms are not as well anaylyzed and compared against SHA-1 as for example AES to DES are; so there is no immediate successor of SHA-1 of whom we can be sure to withstand the possible new techniques. Second, SHA-1 is tightly integrated in many protocols without a fallback algorithms (OpenPGP: fingerprints, MDC, default signature algorithm and more). They reduced the break time of SHA1 from 2^80 to 2^69. Presumably they will succeed in reducing the break time of SHA256 from 2^128 to a mere 2^109 or so. So SHA256 should be OK. 2^69 is damn near unbreakable. 2^80 is really unbreakable. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG IQqit8pqSokARYxy1xVLrTaVRSKMAGvz2MXbQqXi 4DAQZgw0sbP3OcD3kgO+x7f+VfsPD4E8EBsB96d/D
Re: SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 11:13:23 -0500 (EST) From: Atom Smasher [EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenPGP: id=0xB88D52E4D9F57808; algo=1 (RSA); size=4096; url=http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Wed, 16 Feb 2005, David Shaw wrote: In terms of GnuPG: it's up to you whether you want to switch hashes or not. GnuPG supports all of the SHA-2 hashes, so they are at least available. Be careful you don't run up against compatibility problems: PGP doesn't support 384 or 512, and only recently started supporting 256. GnuPG before 1.2.2 (2003-05-01), doesn't have any of the new hashes. Finally, if you have a DSA signing key (most people do) you are required to use either SHA-1 or RIPEMD/160. RSA signing keys can use any hash. there's more to it than that. openPGP specifies SHA-1 (and nothing else) as the hash used to generate key fingerprints, and is what key IDs are derived from. a real threat if this can be extended into a practical attack is substituting a key with a *different* key having the same ID and fingerprint. it would be difficult for average users (and impossible for the current openPGP infrastructure) to tell bob's key from mallory's key that claims to be bob's. it can also be used (if the attack becomes practical) to forge key signatures. mallory can create a bogus key and sign it with anyone's real key. this would turn the web of trust into dust. the openPGP spec seemed to have assumed that SHA-1 just wouldn't fail. ever. this was the same mistake made in the original version of pgp that relied on md5. the spec needs to allow a choice of hash algorithms for fingerprints and key IDs, or else we'll play this game every time someone breaks a strong hash algorithm. - -- ...atom _ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 - Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. -- Arthur C. Clarke -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJCE3EoAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcinwsIAKnjw1AqwY0guPtdxMagoZC2 Rv7mCZt3QnpH4uEaWNLh5R3VImVwOBevW9VdYm+UdMwdmodD79Bc0MyPOaHDuUiP okmo0PigWIht2vGWK7F6xLtUwLUlGyuAWO5w8g/hNCt0ftdb1jUam0wQtqnTTarM B1kyTWU0sHsjyloSh0umQ8kC0nt9nNhLIasp84oIo+D3b0r6yKIWjMS7dHr1hIbx 2gXBdVw01HJng/BtF/THfZwAD2IE+OLNPg4Q6v6QnVf3BGBBPSiiD2mXrizuknA8 RevXGYgBc4plOWOlDmx2ydbRqFHe5obGMGFCk4muFh8veFhPbFxCKvfBwsawi+U= =f0+g -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? 2^69 is damn near unbreakable. I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe
Re: SHA1 broken?
On 1108637369 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch Dave Howe wrote: Its fine assuming that moore's law will hold forever, but without that you can't really extrapolate a future tech curve. with *todays* technology, you would have to spend an appreciable fraction of the national budget to get a one-per-year break, not that anything that has been hashed with sha-1 can be considered breakable (but that would allow you to (for example) forge a digital signature given an example) I think that it is generally prudent to make the most ``conservative'' assumption with regards to Moore's Law in any given context. I.e. bet that it will continue when determining how easy your security is to brute force, and assume that it will not when writing code. -- Roland Dowdeswell http://www.Imrryr.ORG/~elric/
Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 01:10:13 -0800 From: Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi) [EMAIL PROTECTED] User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0 (X11/20041206) To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Reply-To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Serguei Osokine wrote: # * collisions in the the full SHA-1 in 2**69 hash operations, # much less than the brute-force attack of 2**80 operations... Okay, so the effective SHA-1 length is 138 bits instead of full 160 - so what's the big deal? If the results hold up: SHA1 is not as strong as it was designed to be, and its effective strength is being sent in the wrong direction, rather than being confirmed, by new research. Even while maintaining that SHA1 was unbroken and likely to remain so just last week, NIST was still recommending that SHA1 be phased out of government use by 2010: http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2005/0207/web-hash-02-07-05.asp One more paper from a group of precocious researchers anywhere in the world, or unpublished result exploited in secret, could topple SHA1 from practical use entirely. Of course, that's remotely possible with any hash, but the pattern of recent results suggest that a further break is now more likely with SHA1 (and related hashes) than others. So the big deal would be: don't rely on SHA1 in any applications you intend to have a long effective life. It is still way more than, say, MD5 length. And MD5 is still widely used for stuff like content id'ing in various systems, because even 128 bits is quite a lot, never mind 138 bits. Just because it's widely used doesn't mean it's a good idea. MD5 should not be used for content identification, given the ability to create content pairs with the same MD5, with one version being (and appearing and acquiring a reputation for being) innocuous, and the other version malicious. - Gordon @ Bitzi ___ p2p-hackers mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ___ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
RE: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Serguei Osokine [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 00:11:07 -0800 Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] # * collisions in the the full SHA-1 in 2**69 hash operations, # much less than the brute-force attack of 2**80 operations... Okay, so the effective SHA-1 length is 138 bits instead of full 160 - so what's the big deal? It is still way more than, say, MD5 length. And MD5 is still widely used for stuff like content id'ing in various systems, because even 128 bits is quite a lot, never mind 138 bits. Best wishes - S.Osokine. 16 Feb 2005. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Gordon Mohr (@ Bitzi) Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2005 9:41 PM To: p2p-hackers Subject: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Via Slashdot, as reported by Bruce Schneier: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html Schneier writes: # SHA-1 Broken # # SHA-1 has been broken. Not a reduced-round version. Not a # simplified version. The real thing. # # The research team of Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu # (mostly from Shandong University in China) have been quietly # circulating a paper announcing their results: # # * collisions in the the full SHA-1 in 2**69 hash operations, # much less than the brute-force attack of 2**80 operations # based on the hash length. # # * collisions in SHA-0 in 2**39 operations. # # * collisions in 58-round SHA-1 in 2**33 operations. # # This attack builds on previous attacks on SHA-0 and SHA-1, and # is a major, major cryptanalytic result. It pretty much puts a # bullet into SHA-1 as a hash function for digital signatures # (although it doesn't affect applications such as HMAC where # collisions aren't important). # # The paper isn't generally available yet. At this point I can't # tell if the attack is real, but the paper looks good and this # is a reputable research team. # # More details when I have them. - Gordon @ Bitzi ___ p2p-hackers mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ___ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ___ p2p-hackers mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ___ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken?
On Wed, Feb 16, 2005 at 07:55:15AM -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote: From: Serguei Osokine [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [p2p-hackers] SHA1 broken? Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 00:11:07 -0800 Okay, so the effective SHA-1 length is 138 bits instead of full 160 - so what's the big deal? It is still way more than, say, MD5 In applications where collisions are important, SHA1 is now effectively 69 bits as opposed to 80. That's not very much, and odds are there will be an improvement on this attack in the near future. Eric
Re: SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 11:13:23 -0500 (EST) From: Atom Smasher [EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenPGP: id=0xB88D52E4D9F57808; algo=1 (RSA); size=4096; url=http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Wed, 16 Feb 2005, David Shaw wrote: In terms of GnuPG: it's up to you whether you want to switch hashes or not. GnuPG supports all of the SHA-2 hashes, so they are at least available. Be careful you don't run up against compatibility problems: PGP doesn't support 384 or 512, and only recently started supporting 256. GnuPG before 1.2.2 (2003-05-01), doesn't have any of the new hashes. Finally, if you have a DSA signing key (most people do) you are required to use either SHA-1 or RIPEMD/160. RSA signing keys can use any hash. there's more to it than that. openPGP specifies SHA-1 (and nothing else) as the hash used to generate key fingerprints, and is what key IDs are derived from. a real threat if this can be extended into a practical attack is substituting a key with a *different* key having the same ID and fingerprint. it would be difficult for average users (and impossible for the current openPGP infrastructure) to tell bob's key from mallory's key that claims to be bob's. it can also be used (if the attack becomes practical) to forge key signatures. mallory can create a bogus key and sign it with anyone's real key. this would turn the web of trust into dust. the openPGP spec seemed to have assumed that SHA-1 just wouldn't fail. ever. this was the same mistake made in the original version of pgp that relied on md5. the spec needs to allow a choice of hash algorithms for fingerprints and key IDs, or else we'll play this game every time someone breaks a strong hash algorithm. - -- ...atom _ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 - Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. -- Arthur C. Clarke -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJCE3EoAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcinwsIAKnjw1AqwY0guPtdxMagoZC2 Rv7mCZt3QnpH4uEaWNLh5R3VImVwOBevW9VdYm+UdMwdmodD79Bc0MyPOaHDuUiP okmo0PigWIht2vGWK7F6xLtUwLUlGyuAWO5w8g/hNCt0ftdb1jUam0wQtqnTTarM B1kyTWU0sHsjyloSh0umQ8kC0nt9nNhLIasp84oIo+D3b0r6yKIWjMS7dHr1hIbx 2gXBdVw01HJng/BtF/THfZwAD2IE+OLNPg4Q6v6QnVf3BGBBPSiiD2mXrizuknA8 RevXGYgBc4plOWOlDmx2ydbRqFHe5obGMGFCk4muFh8veFhPbFxCKvfBwsawi+U= =f0+g -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: SHA1 broken?
--- begin forwarded text To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Werner Koch [EMAIL PROTECTED] Organisation: g10 Code GmbH OpenPGP: id=5B0358A2; url=finger:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Mail-Followup-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 19:54:35 +0100 User-Agent: Gnus/5.1007 (Gnus v5.10.7) Emacs/21.3 (gnu/linux) Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 11:57:36 -0500, David Shaw said: Yes it is. Assuming this is true, we must start migrating away from SHA-1. Actually, we should start this anyway - even the NIST recommends moving away from SHA-1 for long-term security. The real problem with the breakthrough is, that it seems that they have developed a new cryptoanalytical method and that might pave the way for further improvements. Over the last 2 decades the art of cryptoanalysis has changed dramatically in the area of symmetric ciphers. This will probably also happen to hash algorithms now. There is however a huge problem replace SHA-1 by something else from now to tomorrow: Other algorithms are not as well anaylyzed and compared against SHA-1 as for example AES to DES are; so there is no immediate successor of SHA-1 of whom we can be sure to withstand the possible new techniques. Second, SHA-1 is tightly integrated in many protocols without a fallback algorithms (OpenPGP: fingerprints, MDC, default signature algorithm and more). Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: SHA1 broken?
-- There is however a huge problem replace SHA-1 by something else from now to tomorrow: Other algorithms are not as well anaylyzed and compared against SHA-1 as for example AES to DES are; so there is no immediate successor of SHA-1 of whom we can be sure to withstand the possible new techniques. Second, SHA-1 is tightly integrated in many protocols without a fallback algorithms (OpenPGP: fingerprints, MDC, default signature algorithm and more). They reduced the break time of SHA1 from 2^80 to 2^69. Presumably they will succeed in reducing the break time of SHA256 from 2^128 to a mere 2^109 or so. So SHA256 should be OK. 2^69 is damn near unbreakable. 2^80 is really unbreakable. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG IQqit8pqSokARYxy1xVLrTaVRSKMAGvz2MXbQqXi 4DAQZgw0sbP3OcD3kgO+x7f+VfsPD4E8EBsB96d/D
Re: SHA1 broken?
- Original Message - From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: SHA1 broken? 2^69 is damn near unbreakable. I believe you are incorrect in this statement. It is a matter of public record that RSA Security's DES Challenge II was broken in 72 hours by $250,000 worth of semi-custom machine, for the sake of solidity let's assume they used 2^55 work to break it. Now moving to a completely custom design, bumping up the cost to $500,000, and moving forward 7 years, delivers ~2^70 work in 72 hours (give or take a couple orders of magnitude). This puts the 2^69 work well within the realm of realizable breaks, assuming your attackers are smallish businesses, and if your attackers are large businesses with substantial resources the break can be assumed in minutes if not seconds. 2^69 is completely breakable. Joe