Finland considering new internet speech restrictions
Subject: Fwd: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 10/18/02 FINLAND CONSIDERING NEW INTERNET SPEECH RESTRICTIONS Finland is considering establishing changes to its freedom of speech laws that focus on the Internet. A proposed bill would allow a court to order an online publication to remove messages or news items. Moreover, all online publications would be required to name an editor-in-chief and would be responsible for content posted on the site. http://www.helsinki-hs.net/news.asp?id=20021017IE2 I had trouble the first time I used the link, but it's also in http://www.helsinki-hs.net/archive.asp dated October 17th. Helsingin Sanomat is published on the web in English. There was a bombing at a mall in Finland last week, with seven people killed, including the suspected bomber, a 19-year-old chemistry student, who frequented a message board Forum for Home Chemistry. The 17-year-old moderator of the board was arrested for a couple of days, but then released. Some more excerpts from Helsinkin Sanomat: --- The Constitutional Law Committee heard from various internet experts during its meeting on Wednesday. After the meeting, committee Chairwoman Paula Kokkonen was not willing to comment on whether something should be done differently by the committee because of the Myyrmanni incident. The question of whether or not internet chatrooms and message boards are, by definition, publications, is still in the open. Centre Party MP Johannes Leppdnen, a member of the Constitutional Law Committee, commented that it is now necessary to ponder if incidents such as the Myyrmanni bombing could be prevented with more careful monitoring. However, I hope that a momentary situation is not taken advantage of in a way that would limit some fundamental rights, Leppdnen stated. He also pointed out that the question of internet supervision has not been solved anywhere else either, nor has the question of responsibility for online information. The new law on freedom of speech will not reach a plenary session of Parliament until some time next year. The goal is for the law to take effect next autumn. ---
Re: Intel Security processor + a question
[There's been some discussion of whether you can trust hardware crypto.] At 11:54 AM 10/18/2002 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: OK...a follow up question (actually, really the same question in a diferent form). Let's say I had a crypto chip or other encryption engine, the code of which I could not see. Now what if someone had monkeyed with it so that (let's say) the pool of prime numbers it drew from was actually a subset of the real pool that should be available for encryption. Let's also say that somebody knows this, and can search byte streams for known strings of products of these primes. They can then break this cypherstream very easily. Sure. As long as you can't evaluate the process that's being used to generate your crypto material, you can't trust it. If it's broken up into separate phases where you can get at the interfaces, sometimes you can tell, but even then sometimes you can't. For instance, if there's a hardware module that does randomness, and another that does (random input - pair of primes), you may be able to try your own sets of random inputs and decide that the output is good, but if the module is built so that when the random number decrypted by DES key 0xDeadBeef has low bits , it generates primes from a short list, you probably won't notice, and you probably won't detect that the random number generator's output is less random. Meanwhile, someone who doesn't know that the code's been tampered with can try to break the cypherstream using traditional brute force methods, and it will appear that this is a truly hard-encrypted message. Yup. AND if this is possible, is there some way to examine the encrypted output and then, say, search for unusual frequency traces of certain sequences, and determine tha the code has been tampered with? Not if it's done half-credibly. Otherwise, that would mean that looking at the cyphertext would tell you about the key or plaintext, which means the crypto algorithm is easily broken. There are exceptions - seeing the same cyphertext really often means that the bad guy was doing a bad job of making fake random numbers. To some extent, it's a tradeoff on the bad guy is trying to reduce his search space - if he's willing to try a million primes rather than a dozen, the output looks a lot better.
Re: XORing bits to eliminate skew
Sarad AV wrote: --- Sandy Harris [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: there's a well known simple scheme ... I read that Intel chipsets use something similar, its given in rfc 1750 5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew I know the von Neumann technique for pairs of bits. George explained it correctly, and RFC 1750 and various other sources also do so. My question was: What is the technique with three input bits that Intel is reported to use?
