Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
On Sunday, August 31, 2003, at 06:16 PM, Steve Furlong wrote: On Sunday 31 August 2003 19:20, James A. Donald wrote: Talk is cheap. ... Indeed, the one may be connected to the other -- the absence of stoolies may well be connected to the presence of hot talk. Dunno. I'm not sure that mere talk of killing a librarian would dissuade the potential stoolies. As you say, talk is cheap. Actions, reported widely in the mass media, will grab people's attention. You're being way too unimaginative, or literal, or something. This is at the discussion stage, and probably will be followed-through by others (if at all). The too literal part comes from thinking that discussions here mean someone here is going to kill some librarians. The too unimaginative part comes from thinking that publicity about the idea will not itself have an effect. The Mob doesn't actually have to kill too many stoolies for it to be widely known that ratting can be a very dangerous business. Maybe Big Brother will create a Witness Relocation Program especially for librarians who turn state's evidence. (But we will still find their families...bawaaahaaahaaa!) --Tim May
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
On Sunday, August 31, 2003, at 04:20 PM, James A. Donald wrote: -- Tim May is the perfect example why vigilante justice is generally considered to be a bad thing -- stupid assholes like Tim May spout off take action based on paranoia instead of facts principles of anarchy instead of justice and innocent parties get hurt. Talk is cheap. Actions are done more carefully. Tim implied he would kill stoolies that shopped him to the police, not that stoolies had shopped him to the police. Indeed, the one may be connected to the other -- the absence of stoolies may well be connected to the presence of hot talk. And there is nothing immoral in discussing the fact that actions may have consequences. Take the work camps described in Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch. (Or, of course, the Nazi extermination camps. Or the U.S. concentration camps in Gitmo.) The camp management clearly sought a docile, policeman inside, stoolie-oriented system where informers and capos (those who cooperate and act as de facto guards) see no reason NOT to be stoolies and capos. But merely the threat that stoolies and capos will be found with their throats slit is often enough to deter such behaviors. My point is that if librarians even think there is some small chance that someone they narc out to Big Brother will kill them or their families, such stoolie behavior may drop precipitously. --Tim May A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. --Robert A. Heinlein
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
Tim May: If cops ask local neighborhood members to report any suspicious activity, the folks know that any benefits they gain from acting as informants tend to be a lot smaller than the danger of being beat up or even killed by the Mafia. When the cost of acting as an informant is zero, no risk, more people act as informants. I think restoring some risk to being a rat is a good thing. Unbelievable. The man who invented Blacknet, who has called for and supported the idea of offshore data havens, now tries to control the flow of information! What the hell do you call people who rat you out about your bad debts, if not informants? The whole point of the cypherpunk movement is to make it easier and less risky to spread information even when there are those who want to suppress it. This is just another example of May's hypocrisy and lack of critical thinking abilities. He's all for crypto anarchy until he realizes his own ass is vulnerable. Then he starts trying to think of ways to keep people from exchanging information he doesn't like. Here's a clue. If and when crypto anarchy ever becomes a reality, Tim May is going to be one of the first ones killed. He's pissed off too many people. Once they can get retribution anonymously, his days are numbered.
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
On Sunday 31 August 2003 19:20, James A. Donald wrote: Talk is cheap. ... Indeed, the one may be connected to the other -- the absence of stoolies may well be connected to the presence of hot talk. Dunno. I'm not sure that mere talk of killing a librarian would dissuade the potential stoolies. As you say, talk is cheap. Actions, reported widely in the mass media, will grab people's attention. On a related note, does anyone have a recommendation for a nice chianti? -- Steve FurlongComputer Condottiere Have GNU, Will Travel If someone is so fearful that, that they're going to start using their weapons to protect their rights, makes me very nervous that these people have these weapons at all! -- Rep. Henry Waxman
[AntiSocial] Syracuse U tracks the Department of Homeland Security(fwd)
Of interest to many here, I am sure. Tim: hide your eyes... -- Yours, J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] Every living thing dies alone. Donnie Darko --- FORWARDED MESSAGE --- I don't know how many people have seen this already... Interesting new data released Monday by Syracuse University on the Dept. of Homeland Security. It includes employees by county for the entire country: http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/tracdhs/030825/county_full.html which, curiously, shows Boulder with zero full-time DHS employees but San Miguel (Telluride) with 7! It also includes this, from http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/tracdhs/aboutdata030825.html TRACs direct experiences with the DHS in connection with the FOIA law thus far have not been encouraging. Most of our FOIA requests to the department, for example, have yet to be acted upon although -- given the short time that has elapsed since our initial requests -- this may not be entirely surprising. More disturbing is the fact that many of public records that the Freedom of Information Act requires be posted on the agencys web site are not yet available. But there have been a number of additional specific incidents that heighten our concern. In an attempt to telephone the departments public affairs office in June, for example, TRAC was twice informed that the direct-dial number of this office was not a matter of public record. On a second occasion, after a FOIA officer in one of DHS sub-agencies promised to fax TRAC a list identifying documents that the FOIA specifically mandates be made public, the promise was withdrawn. Then another DHS sub-agency informed TRAC it would not act on our FOIA request -- an outcome flowing from its failure to classify Syracuse University as qualifying as an educational ...institution whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research. On yet another occasion, a TRAC request for more timely information to update material posted some months before on a sub-agencys public web site was summarily refused. They also track FBI and other govt ops... -- Forwarded message -- Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2003 13:30:43 -0400 (EDT) From: TRAC [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) TRAC's first special report on the DHS is now available. This report provides comprehensive information about the staff of an agency which now employs one out of every twelve full-time federal workers: where they work, what they are paid, what they do and the agencies within the department that employ them. Analysis, maps, tables and graphs are available. Also presented are data documenting staff changes between 9/11 and March 31, 2003. For more information go to: http://trac.syr.edu/media David Burnham and Susan B. Long, co-directors Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Syracuse University 488 Newhouse II Syracuse, NY 13244-2100 315-443-3563 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://trac.syr.edu
RE: DoS of spam blackhole lists
John: .. a) admit that your stupid, self-appointed-netcop blacklists and self-righteous spam projects are inherently flawed, and .. Please spend your sophomore year working on something besides self-appointed-spam-netcop-site-of-the-week. .. ..., and don't require some asshole swooping in to save us with his miraculous spews database. .. I fail to see how the above is at all necessary in responding to the statement. Either a) an explanation, or b) a link to an explanation as to why you have these opinions would have been far more useful than the above troll. b) realize that the distributed method you suggest already exists - it is called procmail(*). Procmail serves no purpose by itself. It requires no small amount of effort on the part of the administrator to utilise for any type of systems implmentation, and thus administrators with limited time (common in smaller companies) will rather rely on (flawed) projects than self-initiated implementations. (*) or you could setup a dummy email account on all web-published documents, and delete any email that arrives in both mailboxes, or you could implement a challenge/response mechanism for all new senders. All three mechanisms mentioned are distributed, independent The above is useful information. Specifically, the recognition of duplicate mail receipts is a concept that is new to me, though that would require that both email addresses would receive an equal amount of 'publicity' on newsgroups, mailing lists, etc in order that they are both acquired by a potential spammer. The latter idea I have heard before. If you have a preferred implementation however, which one it is and why is information that I would find useful. A. -- Andrew G. Thomas Hobbs Associates Chartered Accountants (SA) (o) +27-(0)21-683-0500 (f) +27-(0)21-683-0577 (m) +27-(0)83-318-4070
Re: Terror Reading
On Sun, 31 Aug 2003, Anonymous wrote: Some librarians are probably now thinking they have a patriotic duty to see what people are reading and to report any suspicious behavior. Part of the intent of the Patriot Act and the Library Awareness Program was to bamboozle the nation's librarians into acting as the kind of ward watchers that were once so common in the Soviet Union (the babushkas who sat on each floor of apartment buildings and filed reports on the comings and goings of their flock). The purpose of this is purely a show and indoctrination. 1. No self-respecting terrorist would go to a fucking library to do terror reading (maybe there is something positive here - I think that we should get protected by pigs from extremely dumb terorists.) The risk is not one terrorists have to fear. The biggest problem with the librarian narc program is the same as most of these anti-terrorism measures: completely innocent people are harassed, arrested, or placed under suspicion. You won't catch a terrorist learning to be evil at a library, but you might wrongfully snare an innocent citizen who happens to have an interest in bad books. How long until this program is extended to include anyone checking out any book that some part of the US law enforcement body deems bad? If you read Pikhal, do you end up on a watch list? -MW-
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
I wasn't even going to answer the absurd hypothetical, but since it's now in play... On Mon, 1 Sep 2003, Sunder wrote: In that case, I would suspect the ISP itself would have incoming/outgoing feeds from other ISP's. Obviously, every ISP does. If that single moral objector ISP refuses to allow carnivores, the other, not quite as moral ISP's might be persuaded to allow it, in which case the fedZ get what they want, just one traceroute hop further up the chain. Perhaps not all of them, but perhaps enough of them... Duh! Maybe I should have been clearer: the feds didn't show us at any of the small guys (AFAIK), such as the regional or small nationals - they showed up at the large multinationals (of which the one I work at was likely the smallest, with a mere 48 countries of footprint). They clearly understood that sniffing my peering/transit pipes wasn't technically *possible* (yet) - what they were interested in was sniffing my regional POPs, with [relatively] low speed OC3/OC12 pipes. To rephrase it: they were interested in *my* customers, not the traffic from other companies (they had other field officers at the other NSPs). That's the thing about the internet - your packets must travel through other ISP's (unless you're communicating with other nodes hosted by that single ISP which is unlikely). It's a lot more likely than you seem to realize. The internet is a collection of aggregation points (ISPs): get the individual aggregations, and the rest is as visible as a reconstructed RAID5 stripe. From the fedZ point of view, you need not tap each and every single ISP. You can tap upstream, and still get the data without tipping off the target, or his moral objector friends at her ISP. This type of thing certainly goes on, but not in the vaccum cleaner world of large pipes. This is only technically feasible for targetted investigations. At some point every ISP goes through MCI, Sprint, and ATT, and don't forget the local (phone company) loops. The loops are too far out on the edge to be useful for anyone but the loop owner themselves, and there are *way* too many [ever changing] paths out of any individual ASN - the aggregation point is where this kind of action *must* happen. Assuming that such a moral objector ISP would exist, As I noted: much to my amazement, many do exist. it would be foolish to assume that it would provide much of a measure of protection against tapping cleartext transmissions. Hence, encryption is important. Want privacy and security? It's up to you to provide it: encrypt. Agrred. Encryption, properly implemented and executed, is the only real path to privacy. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] Every living thing dies alone. Donnie Darko
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
What Tim is (correctly) observing here is that a working challenge to the force monopoly is a very effective way to modify behaviour. Where Tim is wrong, though, is that he may have anything resembling a working challenge. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: __ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com
Re: CDR: Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
An Metet (2003-09-01 05:54Z) wrote: Here's a clue. If and when crypto anarchy ever becomes a reality, Tim May is going to be one of the first ones killed. He's pissed off too many people. Once they can get retribution anonymously, his days are numbered. Are we talking about the tendency of the general population to kill anyone who pisses them off, or yours? -- No man is clever enough to Times are bad. Children no longer know all the evil he does. obey their parents, and everyone -Francois de la Rochefoucauld is writing a book. -Cicero
Philips CRYPTO1 stream cipher
Does anyone have any source code or algos for Philips CRYPTO1 stream cipher as used in their MIFARE products?
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
In that case, I would suspect the ISP itself would have incoming/outgoing feeds from other ISP's. If that single moral objector ISP refuses to allow carnivores, the other, not quite as moral ISP's might be persuaded to allow it, in which case the fedZ get what they want, just one traceroute hop further up the chain. Perhaps not all of them, but perhaps enough of them... Duh! That's the thing about the internet - your packets must travel through other ISP's (unless you're communicating with other nodes hosted by that single ISP which is unlikely). From the fedZ point of view, you need not tap each and every single ISP. You can tap upstream, and still get the data without tipping off the target, or his moral objector friends at her ISP. At some point every ISP goes through MCI, Sprint, and ATT, and don't forget the local (phone company) loops. Assuming that such a moral objector ISP would exist, it would be foolish to assume that it would provide much of a measure of protection against tapping cleartext transmissions. Hence, encryption is important. Want privacy and security? It's up to you to provide it: encrypt. --Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--- + ^ + :25Kliters anthrax, 38K liters botulinum toxin, 500 tons of /|\ \|/ :sarin, mustard and VX gas, mobile bio-weapons labs, nukular /\|/\ --*--:weapons.. Reasons for war on Iraq - GWB 2003-01-28 speech. \/|\/ /|\ :Found to date: 0. Cost of war: $800,000,000,000 USD.\|/ + v + : The look on Sadam's face - priceless! [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.sunder.net On Sun, 31 Aug 2003, Steve Schear wrote: Well maybe. What if a US ISP is incorporated with all foreign residents and no local employees (only trusted local contractors). No one to serve legal notice upon. ISP is housed in a standalone building which is owned outright (no landlord to serve). Site is monitored 24/7 via Internet and satellite links with remote controlled self-destruct devices (which to be effective must be capable of destroying the entire building).
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
At 12:02 PM 8/31/03 -0700, Tim May wrote: He said: An ISP is free to say anyone requesting a tap is required to pay a fee, just as any ISP is free to say that it will handle installation of special Carnivore equipment for a certain fee. A customer of the ISP is certainly _not_ the one requesting a tap. And he is certainly not the one installing Carnivore equipment. If you rent your house, and the renters cause you to get billed for something they do, you can certainly pass on the cost to the renter. If you get a ticket in a rented car, you (not the car owner) reimburse the owner. If your ISP gets a lot of complaints about your usage, they *could* pass on the cost to you. An ISP could regard its court-ordered hassles (or other hassles, eg attacks launched from your node) as your fault.
RE: DoS of spam blackhole lists
At 11:03 AM 9/1/03 +0200, Andrew Thomas wrote: b) realize that the distributed method you suggest already exists - it is called procmail(*). Procmail serves no purpose by itself. It requires no small amount of effort on the part of the administrator to utilise for any type of systems implmentation, and thus administrators with limited time (common in smaller companies) will rather rely on (flawed) projects than self-initiated implementations. The overworked small netadmin will simply use someone else's scripts. Not hard. (*) or you could setup a dummy email account on all The above is useful information. Specifically, the recognition of duplicate mail receipts is a concept that is new to me, though You're behind then. Putting harvest this and get blocked email bait is common practice, eg on websites with addresses. I don't suppose you've ever heard of fake streets in maps (cartographic watermarks) to detect copying?
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
At 01:54 AM 9/1/03 -0400, An Metet wrote: Here's a clue. If and when crypto anarchy ever becomes a reality, Tim May is going to be one of the first ones killed. He's pissed off too many people. Once they can get retribution anonymously, his days are numbered. What, exactly, has Tim done that wrongs others? Publishing bits doesn't matter. Change the channel. Coercion (under threat of violence) matters. Sticks and stones.
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
At 08:06 PM 8/31/03 -0700, Tim May wrote: The Mob doesn't actually have to kill too many stoolies for it to be widely known that ratting can be a very dangerous business. Ask David Kelly. Or his associates. Reputation is a tool.
Re: Terror Reading
On Monday, September 1, 2003, at 12:03 PM, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: The risk is not one terrorists have to fear. The biggest problem with the librarian narc program is the same as most of these anti-terrorism measures: completely innocent people are harassed, arrested, or placed under suspicion. You won't catch a terrorist learning to be evil at a library, but you might wrongfully snare an innocent citizen who happens to have an interest in bad books. How long until this program is extended to include anyone checking out any book that some part of the US law enforcement body deems bad? If you read Pikhal, do you end up on a watch list? The chilling effect is that libraries will get the message and remove seditious and questionable books. I'm not spending much time in public libraries, favoring the UCSC Science Library, but I'll bet that after 9/11 a lot of the old stand-by books on rocketry, explosives, hydroponic gardening, etc. were removed by helpful librarians. (A lot meaning at least 5% of the libraries doing at least some removal of books. In some states, if not in large cities.) Librarians are our first defense against terrorism! Ignorance is strength. --Thought Criminal We are at war with Oceania. We have always been at war with Oceania. We are at war with Eurasia. We have always been at war with Eurasia. We are at war with Iraq. We have always been at war with Iraq. We are at war with France. We have always been at war with France.
Re: DoS of spam blackhole lists
On Monday 01 September 2003 05:03, Andrew Thomas wrote: The above is useful information. Specifically, the recognition of duplicate mail receipts is a concept that is new to me, though that would require that both email addresses would receive an equal amount of 'publicity' on newsgroups, mailing lists, etc in order that they are both acquired by a potential spammer. That 'publicity' may be easier to come by than you think. I migrated to my present domain from a much older one just 4 months ago. Now, a quick check of my spam folder shows that fully 5% of the received spam is directed to the new domain address. Considering that the old domain had a 7-year history, I'd say the harvest bots are working harder than one might otherwise think.
Re: CDR: [AntiSocial] Syracuse U tracks the Department of Homeland Security (fwd)
J.A. Terranson (2003-09-01 04:33Z) wrote: which, curiously, shows Boulder with zero full-time DHS employees but San Miguel (Telluride) with 7! That must be where all the terrorists ski. -- No man is clever enough to Times are bad. Children no longer know all the evil he does. obey their parents, and everyone -Francois de la Rochefoucauld is writing a book. -Cicero
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
Indeed. Despite all of Tim's rage, we're still just rats in a cage, and despite Tim's urging of necklacing ISP owners, or other foam at the mouth arm-chair solutions, Occam's razor still supplies the better, and cleaner solutions: If your MTA has it, turn on the START TLS option. If it doesn't, either compile it in, or get a new MTA for your server. Also add GPG/PGP, and hard drive encryption, to both your client and the server. (Since the discussion is about ISP's, we can assume that you own the server either hosted by or fed by your ISP - if you don't - i.e. you're on a dial-up PPP, you're at the ISP's mercy anyway, and the ISP can read/forge your mail unless you PGP every piece of email.) Don't have secure IMAP/POP capabilities? Use ssh as a secure tunnel to transport IMAP/POP/SMTP from the client into the server. Even when your client lives on the same network segment as the server. If you don't realize why this is useful, get clued in as quickly as you can. Of course, as usual, this discussion will next focus on physical security (hint for the above paragraph for those in need of a clue), then detecting black bag operations, with the usual Read the Fucking Archives coming from the usual source(s). And you know what? This indeed has already been dealt with, so yes, by all means, Read the fucking archives does apply. So go and read the fucking archives - all of you. That's your homework. Do it! There will be a quiz tomorrow! Be sure to bring your #2 pencils! :) --Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--- + ^ + :25Kliters anthrax, 38K liters botulinum toxin, 500 tons of /|\ \|/ :sarin, mustard and VX gas, mobile bio-weapons labs, nukular /\|/\ --*--:weapons.. Reasons for war on Iraq - GWB 2003-01-28 speech. \/|\/ /|\ :Found to date: 0. Cost of war: $800,000,000,000 USD.\|/ + v + : The look on Sadam's face - priceless! [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.sunder.net On Sat, 30 Aug 2003, Eric Murray wrote: This is a problem that's better solved with crypto.
Re: domestic terrorism, fat lazy amerikans ducks
I'm keeping this one. It's tendng to the condition of poetry. John Young wrote: [...] Commies, now there's a diversion fabricated in the propaganda mills by ideological word-toolers of capitalists and socialists, heeding the marketplace rule 1: concoct a worse evil to send the pack howling at phantasms while draining their savings, cutting back their jobs, sending their sons off to slaughter pens, or, to put it more vulgarly, the free hand of the market lifting wallets and crushnig lives while the media-mesmerized yokels stare bug-eyed shitless at angels and devils paraded from pulpits to chickenhawk feeding lots. [...]
Re: JAP back doored
This piece of political PR was sent to a mailing list intended for internal reporting of computer problems at a university, so was obviously automatically grabbed. Maybe someone sold them a list of ac.uk addresses. Dr Sean Gabb wrote: 2nd September 2003 Dear Educator, We are writing to ask whether you would like to receive the future publications of the Libertarian Alliance by email. The Libertarian Alliance is the UK's premier radical libertarian group. [...snip...] Yours sincerely, Dr. Chris R. Tame Director The Libertarian Alliance I'd have thought Gabb Tame (if it is them not some spoof) were sussed enough to realise that spamming just makes you look like a prat. Ken Brown
Look who's spamming now. [was falsely Re: JAP back doored]
Whoops - apologies for stupid posting here caused by /me/ being a prat with my mail program. Though the message body it isn't entirely off-topic here - the subject line is quite unrelated to it. Mea culpa. Ken ken wrote: This piece of political PR was sent to a mailing list intended for internal reporting of computer problems at a university, so was obviously automatically grabbed. Maybe someone sold them a list of ac.uk addresses. Dr Sean Gabb wrote: 2nd September 2003 Dear Educator, We are writing to ask whether you would like to receive the future publications of the Libertarian Alliance by email. The Libertarian Alliance is the UK's premier radical libertarian group. [...snip...] Yours sincerely, Dr. Chris R. Tame Director The Libertarian Alliance I'd have thought Gabb Tame (if it is them not some spoof) were sussed enough to realise that spamming just makes you look like a prat. Ken Brown
Searching for uncopyable key made of sparkles in plastic
Several months ago, I read about someone who was making a key that was difficult if not impossible to copy. They mixed sparkly things into a plastic resin and let them set. A camera would take a picture of the object and pass the location of the sparkly parts through a hash function to produce the numerical key represented by this hunk of plastic. That numerical value would unlock documents. This was thought to be very difficult to copy because the sparkly items were arranged at random. Arranging all of the sparkly parts in the right sequence and position was thought to be beyond the limits of precision for humans. Can anyone give me a reference to this paper/project? Thanks! -Peter
Re: Needed a WiFi FidoNet
Steve Schear wrote: It would seems that the means may soon be at hand for using WiFi, or WiFi-like, equipment to create ad hoc, meshed, non-commercial networks. The means are at hand, have been at hand for quite a few years in the form of packet radio, and now of course, as you say, wi-fi. Folks an I used to pipedream about a xtra-net or hyper-net that was completely non-commercial, completely censor-free shadow internet running on top of the internet. The idea being to tunnel IPv6 over IPv4 over packet radio and the occasional real internet where wireless networks can't span. Running a distributed hack of named and a shared trust base of nic records. This would use the unallocated IP space. In order to host a node you had to relay for all all nodes. In order to participate, you had to actually be familiar with and utilise netiquette. Not a big deal, Linux and FreeBSD make it all completely possible. But like many utopian visions, not too likely.
Re: Searching for uncopyable key made of sparkles in plastic
On Tue, 2 Sep 2003, Peter Wayner wrote: Can anyone give me a reference to this paper/project? Is it the MIT project with a laser and glass balls in epoxide resin? http://slashdot.org/articles/02/09/20/1217221.shtml?tid=172 http://www.nature.com/nsu/020916/020916-15.html
Re: JAP back doored
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jk-02.09.03-005/ German police have searched and seized the rooms (dorm?) of one of the JAP developers. They were on the look for data that was logged throughout the period when JAP had to log specific traffic. The JAP-people say that the seizure was not conform with German law. They suggest that the police was afraid that they wouldn't gain the right to use this data before a normal court. So they stole it to make things clear. And since the JAP team did cooperate with them the previous time they now have the logs to get seized. I'll bet the logs weren't encrypted. Fools. steve Anarchy may not be a better form of government, but it's better than no government at all.
Re: Searching for uncopyable key made of sparkles in plastic
--- begin forwarded text Status: U Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2003 15:59:05 -0400 Subject: Re: Searching for uncopyable key made of sparkles in plastic Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Ravi Pappu [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peter, That paper was the result of my dissertation. The reference is Physical-One Way Functions R. Pappu, B. Recht, J. Taylor, N. Gershenfeld Science, vol. 297, pp. 2026-2030, 20 September 2002 The actual paper is available from http://web.media.mit.edu/~pappu/htm/publications.htm The current issue of RSA's Cryptobytes has a more detailed article. http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/ Best, Ravi - Ravi Pappu [EMAIL PROTECTED] / off: +1.617.758.4136 / fax: +1.707.215.0156 ThingMagic LLC, One Broadway 14th Floor, Cambridge, MA 02142. USA. http://www.thingmagic.com Please note new mobile phone #: 617-642-6681 - --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement
Tim May is the perfect example why vigilante justice is generally considered to be a bad thing -- stupid assholes like Tim May spout off take action based on paranoia instead of facts principles of anarchy instead of justice and innocent parties get hurt. Well, on one hand taking justice into one's own hands opens the doors to pretty much anything anybody can think of that ticks them off. On the other hand, there are clearly times and societies where such an approach is warranted. The usual exmples have already been given. These examples seem to have at their intersection a time where the government (and the powers that be) are themselves immune from legal consequence and above the law, while 'enforcing' laws that are innately evil. Such a society has pretty much boiled down to might makes right, and such a government is a government in name only. The question then becomes, when do we know when we've entered such a time? More specifically, have we in the US entered such a time? And if we have not, does it not at least appear that we might, soon? If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then Tim May's suggestion is not a matter of if, but when. If the Koran becomes outlawed but a librarian rats on a Muslim trying to access the Koran online, then is this not much different from the Nazi days? Of course, we believe that the librarian is trying to do the right thing. But do you really think that enthusiastic Hitler followers believed they were evil? No, Tim May's statement is not scary because he's suggesting anarchy. It's scary because sometime in the near future it may actually be a reasonable response. (Well, I dont agree with the 'killing the kids' thing.) If Mike Hawash can be grabbed off the streets without any acknowledgement by the Feds and then go to prison for NOT fighting against the US (but clearly thinking about it), then we are in deep trouble. -TD From: Tim May [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Responding to orders which include a secrecy requirement Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2003 18:01:52 -0700 On Sunday, August 31, 2003, at 04:20 PM, James A. Donald wrote: -- Tim May is the perfect example why vigilante justice is generally considered to be a bad thing -- stupid assholes like Tim May spout off take action based on paranoia instead of facts principles of anarchy instead of justice and innocent parties get hurt. Talk is cheap. Actions are done more carefully. Tim implied he would kill stoolies that shopped him to the police, not that stoolies had shopped him to the police. Indeed, the one may be connected to the other -- the absence of stoolies may well be connected to the presence of hot talk. And there is nothing immoral in discussing the fact that actions may have consequences. Take the work camps described in Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch. (Or, of course, the Nazi extermination camps. Or the U.S. concentration camps in Gitmo.) The camp management clearly sought a docile, policeman inside, stoolie-oriented system where informers and capos (those who cooperate and act as de facto guards) see no reason NOT to be stoolies and capos. But merely the threat that stoolies and capos will be found with their throats slit is often enough to deter such behaviors. My point is that if librarians even think there is some small chance that someone they narc out to Big Brother will kill them or their families, such stoolie behavior may drop precipitously. --Tim May A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. --Robert A. Heinlein _ Help protect your PC: Get a free online virus scan at McAfee.com. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963
Re: Terror Reading
Tim wrote: Even the owner of my ISP is narcing me out. Read what he wrote recently to a Net.Nazi who wanted my speech limited: I'm sorry that Tim is being a bother again. He has a long history of being obnoxious and threatening. So far, he has not broken any laws. We have talked to the authorities about him on numerous occasions. They have chosen to watch but not act. Please feel free to notify me if he does anything that is beyond rude and actually violates any laws and I will immediately inform the authorities. Thank You Don Frederickson (co-owner and CEO of got.net, Santa Cruz) Every police state is enabled by the actions of thousands of little peons (like Don Frederickson here), who insert themselves into things that are none of their business, in order that they may feel that they are important in the new scheme of things. Indeed, baggage screeners, librarians, and operators of small mom and pop ISPs do more damage to individual freedom than the uniformed jackboots do. I am reminded of that scene in Roman Polanski's movie in which the hero staggers out of the apartment where he has been hiding, and is pursued out the building by a middle-aged woman screaming - Stop him, He's a Jew! Replace suspected Jew by Terrorist, Child Molester, Drug Dealer, or Money Launderer, and you basically have the current climate for neighbor on neighbor snooping here in AmeriKKKa. Indeed, the hallmark of the Neocon climate of fear we current live under is the successful exportation of the technology of critic silencing formerly found only in areas such as Holocaust Promotion or the Sex Abuse Agenda to every facet of our everyday lives. The new rule for personal political speech seems to be - Don't tip your hand until you have the firepower to defend yourself. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law
Re: Terror Reading
On Mon, Sep 01, 2003 at 12:03:00PM -0700, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: On Sun, 31 Aug 2003, Anonymous wrote: Some librarians are probably now thinking they have a patriotic duty to see what people are reading and to report any suspicious behavior. First of all, the entire library community is outraged at being put in this position, and, in fact, the American Library Assoc. is suing Asskruft and the fedzis over it. Secondly, I personally know a great many librarians, holding an MLIS myself and having worked in several libraries, and all the librarians I know are very pissed about this and have no interest in cooperating if at all possible. Part of the intent of the Patriot Act and the Library Awareness Program was to bamboozle the nation's librarians into acting as the kind of ward watchers that were once so common in the Soviet Union (the babushkas who sat on each floor of apartment buildings and filed reports on the comings and goings of their flock). The purpose of this is purely a show and indoctrination. 1. No self-respecting terrorist would go to a fucking library to do terror reading (maybe there is something positive here - I think that we should get protected by pigs from extremely dumb terorists.) The risk is not one terrorists have to fear. The biggest problem with the librarian narc program is the same as most of these anti-terrorism measures: completely innocent people are harassed, arrested, or placed under suspicion. So far I only know of one instance of the pigs coming to a library and demanding info on a patron. And it wasn't the fedzis, it was the local pigs and they weren't after a terrorist, they were after some poor souls library records because they suspected him of something to do with drugs. And I'll bet you that the vast majority of pig demands on libraries are in the same vein. This one was on the web: The Virginia Public Library received a request for patron records from the Deputy Sheriff. The staff member informed the officer he would need to talk to the Director. Director Nancy Maxwell stated that she would check with the city attorney. When he could not be located in time, she contacted ALS and was advised to give them the information requested since it was accompanied by a court order. http://www.arrowhead.lib.mn.us/compass/minutes/august02.html You won't catch a terrorist learning to be evil at a library, but you might wrongfully snare an innocent citizen who happens to have an interest in bad books. How long until this program is extended to include anyone checking out any book that some part of the US law enforcement body deems bad? If you read Pikhal, do you end up on a watch list? Yup. That's their main interest. Fuck terrorists -- the pigs are only interested if there is something to steal at the bust, like drugs or money, or there might be property to grab. Just try and get them to do anything about regular crime like enforcing disturbing the peace or drunk and disorderly. So, of course, that's what they are using the unpatriot act for. -- Harmon Seaver CyberShamanix http://www.cybershamanix.com
