RE: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15)]

2005-09-07 Thread Tyler Durden

Like I said:

We need a WiFi VoIP over Tor app pronto! Let 'em CALEA -that-. Only then 
will the ghost of Tim May rest in piece.


Then again, the FBI probably loves hanging out in Starbucks anyway...

-TD



From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The  FBI 
is Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15)]

Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2005 15:58:08 +0200

- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2005 09:48:13 -0400
To: Ip Ip 
Subject: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble 
on

the Line", Aug. 15)
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Begin forwarded message:

From: Seth David Schoen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: September 5, 2005 6:10:02 PM EDT
To: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Donna Wentworth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [E-PRV] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is
Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15)


David Farber writes:


>Can I get a copy for IP
>

The original article is at

http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1090908,00.html
(subscription required)

Here's the letter we sent:

Your account of FBI efforts to embed wiretapping into the design of
new Internet communication technologies ("Psst! The FBI is Having
Trouble on the Line," Notebook, August 15) is in error.

You claim that police "can't tap into [Internet] conversations or
identify the location of callers, even with court orders."

That is false. Internet service providers and VoIP companies have
consistently responded to such orders and turned over information
in their possession. There is no evidence that law enforcement is
having any trouble obtaining compliance.

But more disturbingly, you omit entirely any reference to the
grave threat these FBI initiatives pose to the personal privacy
and security of innocent Americans. The technologies currently
used to create wiretap-friendly computer networks make the people
on those networks more pregnable to attackers who want to steal
their data or personal information. And at a time when many of our
most fundamental consititutional rights are being stripped away in
the name of fighting terrorism, you implicitly endorse opening yet
another channel for potential government abuse.

The legislative history of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) shows that Congress recognized the danger
of giving law enforcement this kind of surveillance power "in the
face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing
technologies"
(H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3493 [1994] [House
Report]). The law explicitly exempts so-called information
services;
law enforcement repeatedly assured civil libertarians that the
Internet would be excluded. Yet the FBI and FCC have now betrayed
that promise and stepped beyond the law, demanding that Internet
software be redesigned to facilitate eavesdropping. In the coming
months, we expect the federal courts to rein in these dangerously
expansive legal intepretations.

--
Seth Schoen
Staff Technologist[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Electronic Frontier Foundationhttp://www.eff.org/
454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA  94110 1 415 436 9333 x107



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Re: Tor VoIP, & etc...

2005-09-07 Thread Damian Gerow
Thus spake Shawn K. Quinn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [06/09/05 09:22]:
: > TOR can only contact other entry/mid/exit nodes on the ports they're
: > listening on.  The documentation actually requests that people set up nodes
: > on TCP ports 80 and 443, for the exact case that this Houston, TX library
: > seems to be in.
: 
: The bigger problem is convincing the library's computer to run your
: software without getting caught. Even then, there's no guarantee that
: the computers have direct Internet access; it's likely everything is
: funneled through proxies.

Generally speaking, it's not terribly difficult to convince a library
computer to run your software.  Especially if there's anything from MS
Office installed.  And whether or not it's funneled through proxies doesn't
matter one bit: you're submitted a valid HTTP request to a valid HTTP port.
There's no reason the proxy would reject your request.

At this point, I think I'll put my money where my mouth is, and try running
a TOR node (client only) at my local library.  See what happens.