Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia Tor]
Tyler Durden wrote: Sorry...I don't understand...why would psuedonymity services be provided within Tor? I find the concept of having both pseudonymous and anonymous traffic through TOR quite interesting. In some cases, you really do wish to just separate yourself from your meatspace identity but you may want the reputation of a bitspace identity; in other cases, you want to completely separate yourself from any identity. There are audited anonymizers that provide a form of pseudonymity, in that, they know who you are and can regulate your behavior accordingly. These are generally in the commercial space. Building a TOR nymspace would be much more interesting and distributed. TOR itself does not necessarily have to deal with this. There could be services flowing through TOR that provide this. However, TOR nodes implementing pseudonymous traffic for their own network seems more natural and easier to do. Entry/exit nodes, some nodes, all nodes, or whatever subset makes the most sense could then authenticate pseudonymous traffic and determine capabilities based on things like reputation. But, that was not a why. Anonymity has the property of removing responsibility from the actor for their actions, which is not always a good thing. I am sure TOR exit nodes are hit with the responsibility for those actors, which can lead to the end of exit nodes. At a minimum, pseudonymity can provide a degree of responsibility through reputation. Exit nodes could support either pseudo or anon, or both, depending on beliefs, risks, etc. Also, users could select anon or pseudo as needed. I like choice. Anyway, that is a why and an interesting topic, but TOR has other things to focus on. -Andrew
Re: The cost of online anonymity
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/programmes/click_online/4227578.stm Digital evidence expert at the London School of Economics, Peter Sommer says: A few years ago I was very much in favour of libertarian computing. What changed my mind was the experience of acting in the English courts as a computer expert and examining large numbers of computers from really nasty people, who were using precisely the same sort of technology in order to conceal their activities. Assuming someone has come under suspicion in some other way and that they continue to use a computer to view illegal material wouldn't the likes of TEMPEST, hidden cameras and tampering with the suspect's software provide all the computer-based evidence necessary ? Combine that with a raid thats finds only one person in the house at the time and what more do you need ? I think it should be possible to debunk the idea of lawlessness expressed in the article. There is also this mail from (I think the same) Mr Sommer http://lists.virus.org/ukcrypto-0311/msg00215.html that mentions wider goals, but even these may be tackled to some extent by observations like thoe above. Especially (in the absence of Trusted Computing!) and amended version of Freenet s/w that produces concealed logs. I suppose some estimate of the number of really nasty people, of Freenet users and the cost of investigating this way would be good to have. According to this article http://www.wsacp.org/child-porn-news/Child_%20Pornography.htm there's an attempt to speed up Operation Ore (and I think all will agree it needs it). Peter Sommer says: Ian [Clarke] is placing a powerful tool in the hands of other people. He's like an armaments manufacturer. Should we see as virtual armaments all encryption software, digital cameras, CD burners etc ? And if not where should the line be drawn ?
