Diebold
So, we know Diebold commited vote fraud. Irregularities, my ass. Why did Kerry just roll over? The second time, after Gore? This just doesn't make sense. There's been over a year to prepare. Or is the entire process just a charade? -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpL7b1jxJfWi.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Backdoor found in Diebold Voting Tabulators
On Tue, Aug 31, 2004 at 11:30:35AM -0400, Sunder wrote: Oops! Is that a cat exiting the bag? http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78 Apparently so. Going to www.blackboxvoting.org now just gives: This Account Has Been Suspended Please contact the billing/support department as soon as possible. Interestingly, while the whois info is gone, the DNS records are still around: % dig blackboxvoting.org any ; DiG 8.3 blackboxvoting.org any ;; res options: init recurs defnam dnsrch ;; got answer: ;; -HEADER- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 4 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 6, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 3 ;; QUERY SECTION: ;; blackboxvoting.org, type = ANY, class = IN ;; ANSWER SECTION: blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN A 69.73.175.26 blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN NSns4.nocdirect.com. blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN NSns2.nocdirect.com. blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN NSns3.nocdirect.com. blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN SOA ns3.nocdirect.com. admin.nocdirect.com. ( 2004081101 ; serial 4H ; refresh 2H ; retry 5w6d16h ; expiry 1D ); minimum blackboxvoting.org. 4H IN MX0 blackboxvoting.org.
Re: Backdoor found in Diebold Voting Tabulators
A-Yup: We're sorry, the server is currently experiencing load issues. We apologize for the inconvenience. Please try again later. Got the above off this blog: http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/31/diebold_voting_machi.html related links: http://www.technorati.com/cosmos/search.html?rank=sub=mtcosmosurl=http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/31/diebold_voting_machi.html Here's the text of part 1: Consumer Report Part 1: Look at this -- the Diebold GEMS central tabulator contains a stunning security hole Submitted by Bev Harris on Thu, 08/26/2004 - 11:43. Investigations Issue: Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator -- 1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million votes at a time. By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches the correct votes. The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully mitigate the risks. This program is not stupidity or sloppiness. It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments. Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told you about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black Box Voting will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure over the phone. E-mail Bev Harris or Andy Stephenson to set up a time to do this. For the media: Harris and Stephenson will be in New York City on Aug. 30, 31, Sep.1, to demonstrate this built-in election tampering technique. Members of congress and Washington correspondents: Harris and Stephenson will be in Washington D.C. on Sept. 22 to demonstrate this problem for you. Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill in the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately brought to the mother ship, the central tabulator at the county which adds them all up and creates the results report. These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two million votes at once. (Click read more for the rest of this section) The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen terminals. Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable target. Findings: The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with election tampering in mind. We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up procedures to mitigate risks. Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own internal memos written by its programmers. Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective measures. In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris, and director Jim March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims by Diebold, seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and appears to be designed for fraud. The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly a year ago. Harris and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy Stephenson visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb. 2004 to inform them of the problem. Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using the system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been implemented. In fact, Gov. Arnold Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, which would have paid for increased scrutiny of the voting system in California. On April 21, 2004, Harris appeared before the California Voting Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated and upgraded the GEMS program. On Aug. 8, 2004, Harris demonstrated to Howard Dean how easy it is to change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV. On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the time for Harris was already
Re: Backdoor found in Diebold Voting Tabulators
Quoting Eric Murray [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Tue, Aug 31, 2004 at 11:30:35AM -0400, Sunder wrote: Oops! Is that a cat exiting the bag? http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78 Apparently so. Going to www.blackboxvoting.org now just gives: Don't break out the tinfoil hats yet. Maybe they exceeded their bandwidth because that link was spread around.
Re: Backdoor found in Diebold Voting Tabulators
No problem accessing blackbox.org and Parts 1 and 2 of the file at 5:15 PM EST. Perhaps there are blocks on some incoming routes.
Re: Backdoor found in Diebold Voting Tabulators
see fit. That's right, GEMS comes with a secret digital on-off switch to link and unlink its multiple vote tables. Someone who tests GEMS, not knowing this, will not see the mismatched sets of books. When you put a two-digit code into a secret location can you disengage the vote tables, so that tampered totals table don't have to match precinct by precinct results. This way, it will pass a spot check -- even with paper ballots -- but can still be rigged. How and when did the double set of books get into GEMS? Black Box Voting has traced the implementation of the double set of books to Oct. 13, 2000, shortly after embezzler Jeffrey Dean became the senior programmer. Dean was hired as Vice President of Research and Development in September 2000, and his access to the programs is well documented through internal memos from Diebold. The double set of books appeared in GEMS version 1.17.7. Almost immediately, according to the Diebold memos, another Diebold programmer, Dmitry Papushin, flagged a problem with bogus votes appearing in the vote tables. The double set of books remained, though, going through several tweaks and refinements. From the time Jeffrey Dean was hired in September, until shortly before the Nov. 2000 election, GEMS went through over a dozen changes, all retaining the new hidden vote tables. For four years, anyone who has known how to trigger the double set of books has been able to use, or sell, the information to anyone they want. Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy Stephenson has obtained the court and police records of Jeffrey Dean. It is clear that he was under severe financial stress, because the King County prosecutor was chasing him for over $500,000 in restitution. During this time, while Jeffrey Dean was telling the prosecutor (who operated from the ninth floor of the King County Courthouse) that he was unemployed, he was in fact employed, with 24-hour access to the King County GEMS central tabulator -- and he was working on GEMS on the fifth floor of the King County Courthouse. (Dean may now be spending his nights on the tenth floor of the same building; after our investigations appeared in Vanity Fair and the Seattle Times, Dean was remanded to a work release program, and may be staying in the lockup on in the courthouse now.) Jeffrey Dean, according to his own admissions, is subject to blackmail as well as financial pressure over his restitution obligation. Police records from his embezzlement arrest, which involved sophisticated manipulation of computer accounting records, report that Dean claimed he was embezzling in order
Re: [johnmacsgroup] Diebold query for the Group
[cc'd to cryptography (where clues reside...), and to cypherpunks (yeah, I know, don't feed the animals :-))] At 8:32 PM -0800 12/1/03, Donald L. Luskin wrote: I see that Krugman's column today is about Diebold and his voting machines. I recall that this discussion group had a thread going about that several weeks ago that seemed quite involved, but I never read it. Would someone be so kind as to remind me what that was all about? Thanks! Coming from someone whose primary interest is (still?...) financial cryptography these days, and internet bearer financial cryptography in particular, the answer here is a simple -- if you will -- paradox: --- You cannot have a perfectly secret electronic vote unless everybody can sell their votes. --- The most anonymous protocols for electronic voting are the same protocols that were invented for electronic bearer transactions like anonymous digital cash, bearer bonds/stock, etc. You're given a unique, anonymous, blinded, non-forgeable glop of bits, which you produce in exchange for a single operation of the voting protocol at the time of your vote. The problem is, you can sell said glop of bits -- for, say, another glop of bits representing a requisite amount of cash in the fiat, or commodity-backed, currency of your choice. Thus, more important, and to turn the above paradox on its head, the *only* way you can prevent the sale of that glop of bits is with some form of direct observation of the voter, complete with is-a-person identity schemes and/or other forms of virtual state-sponsored proctology. As an anarchocapitalist, of course, selling votes is fine by me. Monopolies on force are evil anyway, so selling my franchise for a mess o' pottage doesn't carry nearly the moral suasion that it used to. Moore's law and the internet can't price force-monopoly out of business fast enough, if you ask me. But, for your average demopublican (okay, I vote congenitally Republican, somebody stop me, I know it only encourages them -- but then again I go to church, too, silly atavist me...) selling votes is the highest sacrilege against the State there is. Something on the order of eating the wafer before the wine, or vice-versa, or whatever. For anarchocapitalists, selling your vote (aka equity), is something you're *supposed* to be able to do, something you're *honor-bound* to do, borrowing votes, if necessary, and selling them *short*... Cheers, RAH Whose last Financial Cryptography conference, in the Caymans in 2001, was spent pointing out that the previous stolen election was not a *financial* problem, 4 hours of the best and brightest's vociferous disputation through lunch to the contrary. Camels, fleas, and princes exist everywhere. -- Persian proverb The direct use of physical force is so poor a solution to the problem of limited resources that it is commonly employed only by small children and great nations. -- David Friedman, _The_Machinery_of_Freedom_ No matter who you vote for, the government gets elected. --Lizard, fronting an old chestnut, he says When I was your age we didn't have Tim May! We had to be paranoid on our own! And we were grateful! --Alan Olsen -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
[cdr] Diebold takes down blackboxvoting.org (fwd)
Who said there were significant differences in corporations and governments...Oh yeah, CACL didI guess they were wrong...again. http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=11743 -- -- God exists because mathematics is consistent, and the Devil exist because we can't prove it. Andre Weil, in H. Eves, Mathematical Circles Adieu [EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com www.open-forge.com
