Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-07 Thread James A. Donald
--
On 4 Sep 2004 at 21:50, Nomen Nescio wrote:
 The ratio of remailer use to abuse is painfully low because
 there's no way to actually communicate. You can broadcast but
 not recieve, because no system exists to receive mail
 psuedononymously. This is not communication.

 Remailer use is restricted to when senders don't care about 
 listener, which means rants, death threats, and the abuse
 of spam. The only systems for receiving mail are at best some
 college student's unimplemented thesis.

alt.anonymous.messages provides a channel for people who wish
to receive messages without themselves being identified.

If I want to receive a message without providing and email
address that can be traced, I ask the recipient to post in in
the newsgroups such as alt.anonymous.messages.

For obvious reasons people who read alt.anonymous.messages, or
think they might need to read it in the future, download the
newsgroup in its entireity. 

--digsig
 James A. Donald
 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
 fzparMQ1YGMHFGGQ4eabvrdbfX3oQPnGSeUNNkuX
 4UV3sPQUJdBwqav34D5pBXRBNtLg+GX5dxE+YM5P8




Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-06 Thread nobody
This is a Type III anonymous message, sent to you by the Mixminion
server at mercurio.mixmaster.it.  If you do not want to receive
anonymous messages, please contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]

-BEGIN TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-
Message-type: plaintext

Nomen Nescio [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 The ratio of remailer use to abuse is painfully low because there's no way
 to actually communicate. You can broadcast but not recieve, because no
 system exists to receive mail psuedononymously. This is not communication.

Mixminion (http://www.mixminion.net) supports secure two way
communication.  The current release uses an insecure mix algorithm
which facilitates debugging.  This will change.
-END TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-



Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-06 Thread Ben Laurie
Tyler Durden wrote:
The hascash idea is OK, and obviously will work (as of now...the 
dividing line between human and machine is clearly not static, and 
smarter spam operations will start doing some segmentation analysis and 
then find it worthwhile to pay up). But the kind of person that may have 
legitimate need of a remailer may not understand and/or trust what would 
probably be necessary to use hashcash. And OK that's their tough luck, 
but then I always feel there's safety in numbers.
Since you already have to use a special client to inject email to the 
remailer network, they would have no need to understand hashcash. It 
would just happen.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/
There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff


Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-04 Thread Nomen Nescio
 We want to be able to provide the means for whistleblowers and
 others to communicate in a secure and anonymous fashion. Yet we need
 to make sure we're not abused too much since sooner or later laws
 will catch up with the remailers should abuse sky-rocket.

The ratio of remailer use to abuse is painfully low because there's no way
to actually communicate. You can broadcast but not recieve, because no
system exists to receive mail psuedononymously. This is not communication.

Remailer use is restricted to when senders don't care about listener,
which means rants, death threats, and the abuse of spam. The only systems
for receiving mail are at best some college student's unimplemented thesis.

Let's take our shining example of truth and freedom, the whistle-blower.
When they send out mail to the media or whomever, one of two things happens:
they see the story published or they don't. If not, there's no idea why: was
it received? Did the media want more information? Did they need more
support? Do they want to verify it? Do they want to help the whistle-blower?
Even if the story is published, whistle-blowing is kneecapped: it can't be
supported, or expanded on, or debated in any but the most rudimentary
fashion.

It doesn't matter if remailers disappear, they've already failed.




Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-04 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Sat, Sep 04, 2004 at 09:50:14PM +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote:

 Let's take our shining example of truth and freedom, the whistle-blower.
 When they send out mail to the media or whomever, one of two things happens:
 they see the story published or they don't. If not, there's no idea why: was
 it received? Did the media want more information? Did they need more
 support? Do they want to verify it? Do they want to help the whistle-blower?
 Even if the story is published, whistle-blowing is kneecapped: it can't be
 supported, or expanded on, or debated in any but the most rudimentary
 fashion.

It's easy. The whistleblower says: if you want more info, post your questions
encrypted with this PGP key I just generated to alt.test.messages with a
subject that contains Fluffy Bunnies, and I will reply to you. Of course
they'll want to trash that key pretty quickly afterward, since it's proof
that they where the whistleblower. Obviously that is more technical that many
journalists could handle, but nothing saying it can't be largely automated with
a web frontend stuck on it.

And don't most/all remailers support responder blocks?

-Jack



Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread John Young
Remailers remain effective when you run your own as the
first hop and accept no incoming remail.

To be sure, if everyone did that no remailer would accept
remails. Shhh.






Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Nomen Nescio
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Are remailers an unsolveable paradox?

We want to be able to provide the means for whistleblowers and
others to communicate in a secure and anonymous fashion. Yet we need
to make sure we're not abused too much since sooner or later laws
will catch up with the remailers should abuse sky-rocket.

Once upon a time all email servers were open relays. This was a
friendly time and spam wasn't invented. As time changed the focus
turned on securing the relaying procedures and has continued until
this day. Yet as we know the flow of spam (most of it coming directly
or indirectly from US) continued to increase, despite even existing
legislation today.

What are the possible solutions for the remailers? Make all
remailers middleman only and adding the ability to opt-in for
delivery outside the network? Having a network of middleman remailers
and some nymservers that only delivers to other nymserver or opted-in
servers will at least provide some means for people to communicate
between themselves. It would in practise destroy the ability to
contact anyone outside the network though, making the network an
isolated place for a few. Using techniques like Hashcash should be
more or less mandatory even today to make it harder to mailbomb or
send large amounts spam? Why is it not?

Regardless of what any hardcore cypherpunk or old-timers in the
remailer community may think about any ideas imposing restrains on
the useability of remailers something just have to be made about the
abuse of the system. I also predict that the abuse will increase so
time is ticking in a sense.

Making sure we have robust remailing services in one shape or
another and at the same time have some kind of at least indirect
acceptance from legislators and also a low degree of spam flowing
through are essential goals.

The average naive and ignorant redneck will never ever understand
the principal arguments for free speech that makes remailers useful.
The average american do not think and analyze what is told to him.
You will probably today find millions of americans who believe that
Saddam and Al-Qaeda did business just because Bush and the
administration lied about that initially, even though it's more or
less confirmed today that those links were not there.

The rednecks also vote however (to some extent) and that's why it
will be a piece of cake to strike against the remailers if the
politicians would like to. And they will, if and when serious abuse
were to happen more often utilizing remailers. What would happen if
it was found (or simply suspected or claimed) that some terror deed
was planned using remailers? How long time would it take for us to
see new laws being proposed? Not long. And don't forget that anyone
(like Tom Ridge himself) could send bogues messages through the
system trying to 

Since providing a true non-censoring remailing service and at the
same time safeguard against spam and abuse are therotically
incompatible I guess remailers are indeed a paradox waiting to be
shut down sooner or later by politicians if we're not open to at
least discuss some aspects of how these services are operated.


Johnny Doelittle


-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: Tom Ridge Special v1.01

iQA/AwUBQTWdszVaKWz2Ji/mEQJlUwCfT/jWnw/p2ydTJTKMYKA5/hs+Dm8AoNoE
r9bl2EtJ3CQpZPgfkSPfGBWB
=B8dt
-END PGP SIGNATURE-




 Effective today, Lemuria will be going middlemen.
 
 Sometime around the middle of the month, Lemuria will go away.
 
 This is final.
 
 
 The main reasons are that I've lost my faith in the usefulness of
 the remailer network. I have indications that the remailer network
 is
 being massively abused, on the scale where the legitimate mails are
 a tiny fraction that would be better served using other means.
 
 There are two main reasons for my thoughts. One is I have looked at
 the bounces I receive, and compared their numbers to my statistics.
 According to that data, without having run a statistically
 significant analysis, the major traffic coming through Lemuria is
 Spam, with
 threats and harrassment a second. I realize that in the no-bounces,
 the fraction of legitimate mails will be higher, but even assuming
 a factor of 10, it is still a negligable part.
 
 Second, I've the mail attached below yesterday. In case you can't
 read german, it is essentially spam advertising the mixmaster
 software and some book and/or software I haven't tested, might be a
 mixmaster
 client, might be a trojan. This is a sign for me that the anonymous
 remailer network is being used systematically for abuse, on a large
 scale. I don't want to be a part of that.
 
 As mixmaster has no features whatsoever to prevent this crap, and
 the encrypted only switch doesn't do what it should do, and
 legitimate traffic is close to zero anyways, I'll be taking Lemuria
 down and
 leaving the remailer community.
 
 It was an interesting time, and between frog, the SciTol fanatics

RE: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Tyler Durden
Some good points, Johnny.
I'm not convinced Spam and the remailers are inherently incompatible. Or at 
least, I'm thinking there's a sort of uncertainty principle that should work 
between legit remailable messages and spam.

it may be a tricky business, but I suspect that the need of spammers to send 
out huge numbers of messages may be exploitable. Hell...they may in some 
ways be an asset if handled correctly: Much easier to hide remailed messages 
in larger torrents than in sparsely trafficked remailer networks.

And of course, it may be that the need to sell goods (ie, from a specific 
URL) means that anonymity is not so useful, particularly if there are 
time+bandwidth constraints on portions of the network (eg a remailer has a 
max bandwidth that gets throttled back if there's a large woosh of traffic 
in a certain period of time).

So I don't think the problem is unsolvable, but I agree with your essential 
point that it needs looking into.

-TD

From: Nomen Nescio [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?
Date: Wed,  1 Sep 2004 13:30:01 +0200 (CEST)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Are remailers an unsolveable paradox?
We want to be able to provide the means for whistleblowers and
others to communicate in a secure and anonymous fashion. Yet we need
to make sure we're not abused too much since sooner or later laws
will catch up with the remailers should abuse sky-rocket.
Once upon a time all email servers were open relays. This was a
friendly time and spam wasn't invented. As time changed the focus
turned on securing the relaying procedures and has continued until
this day. Yet as we know the flow of spam (most of it coming directly
or indirectly from US) continued to increase, despite even existing
legislation today.
What are the possible solutions for the remailers? Make all
remailers middleman only and adding the ability to opt-in for
delivery outside the network? Having a network of middleman remailers
and some nymservers that only delivers to other nymserver or opted-in
servers will at least provide some means for people to communicate
between themselves. It would in practise destroy the ability to
contact anyone outside the network though, making the network an
isolated place for a few. Using techniques like Hashcash should be
more or less mandatory even today to make it harder to mailbomb or
send large amounts spam? Why is it not?
Regardless of what any hardcore cypherpunk or old-timers in the
remailer community may think about any ideas imposing restrains on
the useability of remailers something just have to be made about the
abuse of the system. I also predict that the abuse will increase so
time is ticking in a sense.
Making sure we have robust remailing services in one shape or
another and at the same time have some kind of at least indirect
acceptance from legislators and also a low degree of spam flowing
through are essential goals.
The average naive and ignorant redneck will never ever understand
the principal arguments for free speech that makes remailers useful.
The average american do not think and analyze what is told to him.
You will probably today find millions of americans who believe that
Saddam and Al-Qaeda did business just because Bush and the
administration lied about that initially, even though it's more or
less confirmed today that those links were not there.
The rednecks also vote however (to some extent) and that's why it
will be a piece of cake to strike against the remailers if the
politicians would like to. And they will, if and when serious abuse
were to happen more often utilizing remailers. What would happen if
it was found (or simply suspected or claimed) that some terror deed
was planned using remailers? How long time would it take for us to
see new laws being proposed? Not long. And don't forget that anyone
(like Tom Ridge himself) could send bogues messages through the
system trying to
Since providing a true non-censoring remailing service and at the
same time safeguard against spam and abuse are therotically
incompatible I guess remailers are indeed a paradox waiting to be
shut down sooner or later by politicians if we're not open to at
least discuss some aspects of how these services are operated.
Johnny Doelittle
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: Tom Ridge Special v1.01
iQA/AwUBQTWdszVaKWz2Ji/mEQJlUwCfT/jWnw/p2ydTJTKMYKA5/hs+Dm8AoNoE
r9bl2EtJ3CQpZPgfkSPfGBWB
=B8dt
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

 Effective today, Lemuria will be going middlemen.

 Sometime around the middle of the month, Lemuria will go away.

 This is final.


 The main reasons are that I've lost my faith in the usefulness of
 the remailer network. I have indications that the remailer network
 is
 being massively abused, on the scale where the legitimate mails are
 a tiny fraction that would be better served using other means.

 There are two main reasons for my thoughts. One is I have looked

Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Roy M. Silvernail
Nomen Nescio wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Are remailers an unsolveable paradox?
 

Yes.
Adios, Lemuria.  Hate to see you go, but I understand completely.
--
Roy M. Silvernail is [EMAIL PROTECTED], and you're not
It's just this little chromium switch, here. - TFS
SpamAssassin-procmail-/dev/null-bliss
http://www.rant-central.com


Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 01:30 PM 9/1/04 +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote:
 Yet we need
to make sure we're not abused too much since sooner or later laws
will catch up with the remailers should abuse sky-rocket.

You need a Bill of Rights that specifies freedom of expression,
and judges that understand it.  Since you appear to be European,
where eg singers can be busted for singing political songs,
these ideas may be foreign to you.

 Using techniques like Hashcash should be
more or less mandatory even today to make it harder to mailbomb or
send large amounts spam? Why is it not?

Because when someone tells us that something is *mandatory*, we
tell them to fuck off, and we put them on our watch list.
OTOH nothing prevents you from 1. implementing
a hashcash-based node 2. automatically filtering what you receive.

Regardless of what any hardcore cypherpunk or old-timers in the
remailer community may think about any ideas imposing restrains on
the useability of remailers something just have to be made about the
abuse of the system.

Will no one think of the chiiildren?

Making sure we have robust remailing services in one shape or
another and at the same time have some kind of at least indirect
acceptance from legislators and also a low degree of spam flowing
through are essential goals.

Any legislator seeking to control how people use a communications
medium needs killing.

The average naive and ignorant redneck will never ever understand
the principal arguments for free speech that makes remailers useful.

That's why mob rule^H^H^H^H democracy loses to the constitution.
If you don't have the latter, you suffer the former.

The average american do not think and analyze what is told to him.

Well duh.

Since providing a true non-censoring remailing service and at the
same time safeguard against spam and abuse are therotically
incompatible I guess remailers are indeed a paradox waiting to be
shut down sooner or later by politicians if we're not open to at
least discuss some aspects of how these services are operated.

Why not use one of those are you human visually-distorted checks
that various websites use?  That is robust to automated spam.
Adding *voluntary* hashcash to remailer injection nodes is another
layer of defense in depth against spammers.

BTW, while spam is abuse, is a threatening message really abuse, or just

uncomfortable feedback?





Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Morlock Elloi
 What are the possible solutions for the remailers? Make all
 remailers middleman only and adding the ability to opt-in for

Open wireless access points. 

No one said you are entitled to mail anonymously from the comfort of your
home/office. Stop whining.




=
end
(of original message)

Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows:




__
Do you Yahoo!?
New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - 100MB free storage!
http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail 



Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Tyler Durden
Variola wrote...
Making sure we have robust remailing services in one shape or
another and at the same time have some kind of at least indirect
acceptance from legislators and also a low degree of spam flowing
through are essential goals.
Any legislator seeking to control how people use a communications
medium needs killing.
Well, although the sentiment is appreciated, I'm not sure it's well applied 
in this case.

What this guy seems to be saying is that it's better to 'solve' the SPAM 
problem now rather than waiting for legislators to use Spam as a reason to 
try to shut down the remailers (and this seems distinctly possible 
particularly if George W makes it to his 3rd term!). I don't think the guy 
is looking for state-ish 'OK', but pointing out that things get a lot more 
difficult if/when remailers or their use is outlawed.  Like back in the day 
when I used to toke on a regular basis...I sure was going to keep scoring 
nicklebags and whatnot, but my count would probably have been better at my 
potstore if it were legal. (And yes, a potstore...there's tons of them in 
NYC with plexiglass walls and a few canned food props lying around. You 
stand in line and order your nickel/dime bag just like buying tokens.)

The hascash idea is OK, and obviously will work (as of now...the dividing 
line between human and machine is clearly not static, and smarter spam 
operations will start doing some segmentation analysis and then find it 
worthwhile to pay up). But the kind of person that may have legitimate need 
of a remailer may not understand and/or trust what would probably be 
necessary to use hashcash. And OK that's their tough luck, but then I 
always feel there's safety in numbers.

-TD
_
Get ready for school! Find articles, homework help and more in the Back to 
School Guide! http://special.msn.com/network/04backtoschool.armx



Re: Remailers an unsolveable paradox?

2004-09-01 Thread Hal Finney
Spam is the least of the problems for remailers when it comes to
abuse.  You should be more concerned about possible liability for
illegal messages.

In a way, spam has actually made the remailer operator's life easier
as people today are used to receiving annoying and obscene email.
Ten years ago, when I ran a remailer, people were genuinely shocked
to receive unsolicited pornography.  Yes, it's hard to believe today,
but in those quaint times, when the Internet was in black and white,
most users got only a few email messages a day and they were all from
their friends, family and co-workers.

As far as spam, next-generation remailers should incorporate hashcash,
www.hashcash.org, to make sending an anonymous message relatively costly.
Let it take a minute or more to generate the stamp necessary for a
message to enter the remailer system and spam will not be a problem,
while legitimate users will have no barrier.

Hal