Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Nomen Nescio wrote: Ben Laurie wrote: Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it This is true, if you do like DeCSS and try to publish software with the key in it. The content consortium will put the cert for that key onto a CRL, and the key will stop working. The other possibility is to simply keep the key secret and use it to strip DRM protection from content, then release the now-free data publicly. This will work especially well if the companies offer free downloads of content with some kind of restrictions that you can strip off. If you have to pay for each download before you can release it for free, then you better be a pretty generous guy. Or maybe you can get paid for your efforts. This could be the true killer app for anonymous e-cash. Heh. Cool! Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff
Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Ben Laurie wrote: Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it This is true, if you do like DeCSS and try to publish software with the key in it. The content consortium will put the cert for that key onto a CRL, and the key will stop working. The other possibility is to simply keep the key secret and use it to strip DRM protection from content, then release the now-free data publicly. This will work especially well if the companies offer free downloads of content with some kind of restrictions that you can strip off. If you have to pay for each download before you can release it for free, then you better be a pretty generous guy. Or maybe you can get paid for your efforts. This could be the true killer app for anonymous e-cash.
Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it Simulate a Pentium VI in Java and all extant code could be accessed. If you live long enough for it to run, yeah. Similarly, is Microsoft's signing keys were cracked then any code could be signed. Duh. If the software needs a real-time connection to the internet though, then protection could be built into it. Oh yeah? How? Laptop applications would be vulnerable until we have pervasive wireless connection. How many bits do you think MS will use for the keys? Enough. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff
Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] was seen to declaim: Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it I would think it would be more likely to match the mod chips that address this very issue in the Gaming world - a replacement chip that tells the OS yeah, everythings ok even when it isn't :)
