[no subject]
Fucking nuts. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html?pagewanted=print&position=bottom Agency Weighed, but Discarded, Plan Reconfiguring the Internet By JOHN MARKOFF The Pentagon research agency that is exploring how to create a vast database of electronic transactions and analyze them for potential terrorist activity considered but rejected another surveillance idea: tagging Internet data with unique personal markers to make anonymous use of some parts of the Internet impossible. The idea, which was explored at a two-day workshop in California in August, touched off an angry private dispute among computer scientists and policy experts who had been brought together to assess the implications of the technology. The plan, known as eDNA, called for developing a new version of the Internet that would include enclaves where it would be impossible to be anonymous while using the network. The technology would have divided the Internet into secure "public network highways," where a computer user would have needed to be identified, and "private network alleyways," which would not have required identification. Several people familiar with the eDNA discussions said such secure areas might have first involved government employees or law enforcement agencies, then been extended to security-conscious organizations like financial institutions, and after that been broadened even further. A description of the eDNA proposal that was sent to the 18 workshop participants read in part: "We envisage that all network and client resources will maintain traces of user eDNA so that the user can be uniquely identified as having visited a Web site, having started a process or having sent a packet. This way, the resources and those who use them form a virtual `crime scene' that contains evidence about the identity of the users, much the same way as a real crime scene contains DNA traces of people." The proposal would have been one of a series of technology initiatives that have been pursued by the Bush administration for what it describes as part of the effort to counter the potential for further terrorist attacks in the Unites States. Those initiatives include a variety of plans to trace and monitor the electronic activities of United States citizens. In recent weeks another undertaking of the the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa, the Pentagon research organization, has drawn sharp criticism for its potential to undermine civil liberties. That project is being headed by John M. Poindexter, the retired vice admiral who served as national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan. Dr. Poindexter returned to the Pentagon in January to direct the research agency's Information Awareness Office, created in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. That office has been pursuing a surveillance system called Total Information Awareness that would permit intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials to mount a vast dragnet through electronic transaction data ranging from credit card information to veterinary records, in the United States and internationally, to hunt for terrorists. In contrast, with eDNA the user would have needed to enter a digital version of unique personal identifiers, like a fingerprint or voice, in order to use the secure enclaves of the network. That would have been turned into an electronic signature that could have been appended to every Internet message or activity and thus tracked back to its source. The eDNA idea was originally envisioned in a private brainstorming session that included the director of Darpa, Dr. Tony Tether, and a number of computer researchers, according to a person with intimate knowledge of the proposal. At the meeting, this person said, Dr. Tether asked why Internet attacks could not be traced back to their point of origin, and was told that given the current structure of the Internet, doing so was frequently not possible. The review of the proposal was financed by a second Darpa unit, the Information Processing Technology Office. This week a Darpa spokeswoman, Jan Walker, said the agency planned no further financing for the idea. In explaining the reason for the decision to finance the review in the first place, Ms. Walker said the agency had been "intrigued by the difficult computing science research involved in creating network capabilities that would provide the same levels of responsibility and accountability in cyberspace as now exist in the physical world." Darpa awarded a $60,000 contract to SRI International, a research concern based in Menlo Park, Calif., to investigate the concept. SRI then convened the workshop in August to evaluate its feasibility. The workshop brought together a group of respected computer security researchers, including Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems and Matt Blaze of AT&T Labs; well-known computer scientists like Roger Needham of Microsoft Research in
Re: Worm Klez.E immunity
In case someone missed this, the content of tim may's file is: 0617 13 010 1 1 RODRIGUEZ DUARTE IRENE EJIDO SAN CARLOS . 0873 02 010 1 1 GONZALEZ MONTOYA RAYMUNDO1 DE MAYO CALLE 3 # 195 . 8047 13 010 1 1 FLORES BELTRAN JUAN MANUEL 10 DE MAYO L.DONALDO COLOSIO # 321 . 8043 03 010 1 1 NUNEZ RABELO JESUS 28 DE JUNIO AQUILES SERDAN # 830 . 0616 03 010 1 1 NUNEZ RAVELO MARIA DEL SOCOR 28 DE JUNIO AQUILES SERDAN # 830 . 8341 40 010 1 1 ESQUIVEL RODRIGUEZ LUZ MARIA 28 DE JUNIO B. DOMINGUEZ # 560 . 8497 02 010 2 3 MORALES BARTOLO MINERVA 28 DE JUNIO CASILLA # 1377 . 6512 80 070 1 1 ARMENDARIZ FRANCO MARIA GUADALUPE28 DE JUNIO CORREGIDORA # 1525 . 3900 01 060 1 1 RAMIREZ QUINTERO AURELIO 28 DE JUNIO DONATO GUERRA # 1290 . 1802 03 010 2 3 MENA HERNANDEZ JAVIER28 DE JUNIO OCAMPO # 1020. 0761 02 010 2 3 MARTINEZ REYES JORGE 28 DE JUNIO PINO SUAREZ E ITURBIDE . 0957 02 060 2 3 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ ESAU 28 DE JUNIO PROL.VICTORIA. 0895 80 050 1 1 RICO SAUCEDO JUAN SANTIAGO 28 DE JUNIO VILLALDAMA # 1390. 0827 02 010 2 3 HERNANDEZ ESQUIVEL JUAN CRUZ 5 DE MAYO CONOCIDO . 8649 03 010 2 3 BATRES RAMIREZ MARIO 5 DE MAYO DEL ALAMO S/N. 9254 03 010 1 1 BERNAL RIVAS LUCIA AEROPUERTO ALDAMA # 1995. 4658 02 010 2 3 HERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ JOSE AEROPUERTO CARLOS A. ROBIROSA # 1560. 4657 02 060 1 1 HERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ JESUSAEROPUERTO CARLOS A. RUBIROSA # 1560. 0755 02 010 2 3 LOPEZ CASILLAS ILDA AEROPUERTO CHAPULTEPEC # 500. 1337 02 030 1 1 TELLEZ ELIAS GLORIA ELIDAAEROPUERTO COLEGIO DE MEDICOS # 137 . 0772 02 010 2 3 ROMAN GOMEZ CECILIO AEROPUERTO CONOCIDO . 6321 03 060 1 1 CARRILLO MIJARES GREGORIOAEROPUERTO CONQ. DEL CIELO # 275. 6873 80 050 1 1 QUESADA QUESADA VICTOR MERCEDAEROPUERTO CUARENTENARIA # 380 . 0953 40 010 1 1 POSADA RIOS SANTA MONICA AEROPUERTO CUARENTENARIA # 670 . 0697 13 010 1 1 FELIPE PASCUAL ARCELIA AEROPUERTO CUARENTENARIA #670 . 9878 80 070 1 1 CASTANEDA CRUZ JUAN JOSE AEROPUERTO ESCUADRON # 1010 . 1006 81 020 1 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ LUCERO AEROPUERTO ESCUADRON 201 # 795. 0775 03 010 1 1 RODRIGUEZ ALCANTARA ARACELY AEROPUERTO FCO. SARABIA S/N . 0880 02 010 1 1 AVILA SALIVA JORGE AEROPUERTO HNOS. WRITH # 560. 0061 80 030 1 1 GARCIA RICO JOSE ANTONIO AEROPUERTO PRIV.CLUB AGUILAS # 1232 . 8856 80 060 1 1 ALVIZO SANCHEZ ADRIANALAMEDAS QUINONES # 180 . 7355 03 010 2 3 RODRIGUEZ CALDERON LEOPOLDO AMERICAS BUENOS AIRES # 514 . 0952 14 010 1 1 CONTRERAS MORENO JOSE FRANCISCO ATILANO BARRERA CAMPECHE # 395 . 0937 15 010 1 1 SANTOS HERNANDEZ FETILA ATILANO BARRERA JESUS FDEZ. S/N . 0983 13 010 1 1 RAMIREZ SANTOS MARBELLA ATILANO BARRERA JESUS FERNANDEZ # 300. 4948 01 060 2 3 LUNA AGUIRRE RAMON ATILANO BARRERA LA RIBERA. 8225 80 060 2 3 DE LOS RIOS GONZALEZ JOSE SANTOS ATILANO BARRERA LA RIVERA. 7998 80 060 1 1 DE LOS RIOS GONZALEZ GILBERTOATILANO BARRERA PRIV. PAZ QUINTERO 471 . 8994 14 010 1 1 CHAVEZ MARTINEZ SAUL ATILANO BARRERA ZACATECAS # 335 . 4552 14 010 1 1 MARTINEZ GUZMAN EDITH ADRIANABENITO JAUREZ BELISARIO DMGUEZ. # 775 N. 0103 81 020 1 1 SEGOVIA ZERTUCHE BLANCA IDALIA BENITO JUAREZ 5 DE FEBRERO # 1321 . 8563 81 020 1 1 PALOS VASQUEZ VERONICA BENITO JUAREZ 5 DE FEBRERO #1350 . 9953 01 010 1 1 LOPEZ PEREZ MICELINA BENITO JUAREZ BELISARIO DMGUEZ. # 280 . 4647 80 020 1 7 LOPEZ LAGUNA ADOLFO ARISTIDE BENITO JUAREZ CAPITAL LEAL # 215 . 1002
Re: Onion Self-Censorship
Marc Branchaud wrote: > Having read the article I can't help but consider more benign reasons > for its removal... > 1. It's not funny. > 2. It's jokes are in pretty poor taste. > 3. Michael Bay got his lawyers to send a letter to the Onion. Color me dumb, but when I read the article, I assumed it was an satirical op-ed piece that The Onion had gotten Michael Bay to write for them. Even outrageous humor magazines do not generally fail to distinguish comedy articles written by famous people for the magazine, from parodies written by their own staff writers. If I pick up a copy of "Hustler," for instance, I can tell that a Poem by Charles Bukowski was in fact written by Charles Bukowski, and a liquor ad in which Jerry Falwell celebrates losing his virginity to his mother in an outhouse was not written by Jerry Falwell. If Hustler started publishing its own poems as the work of Charles Bukowski, he would no doubt be displeased, (well, actually he's been dead a long time) but you get my point. Do we actually know that Michael Bay didn't write this article, and have second thoughts about it afterwards? I suppose he probably didn't, and it was dumb of The Onion not to alter the spelling of his name, or do one of the other common things used to alert the reader that parody mode is being entered. I know I'd probably be pissed if I found an article in The Onion being passed off as something I had written, and my inbox started filling up with hate mail from people who didn't know the difference. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"
Blaze, Diffie, et al torpedo eDNA
Markoff writes in the NY Times about a proposal called eDNA which would "reconfigure" the Internet to forbid anonymous usage of certain parts. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html The scheme was explored by DARPA a few months ago, which gave a contract to SRI to look into it. SRI convened a panel that included Matt Blaze, Whit Diffie, Roger Needham and Marc Rotenberg (of EPIC). These guys hated the idea, but the SRI contact, one Victoria Stavridou, refused to allow Blaze to write up the consensus once it became clear that he was going to shred the proposal. The commmitee members exchanged furious emails, full of personal attacks, complaining that Stavridou was hijacking the report. But she persisted, briefing DARPA orally and refusing to include Blaze and the others in the teleconference as had been planned. Despite Stavridou's attempt to spin the results, DARPA currently says it has no intention of pursuing eDNA. SRI says that it concluded "that the costs and risks would outweigh any benefit."
Re: Worm Klez.E immunity
On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 02:47:24PM -0600, tcmay wrote: > Content-Type: application/octet-stream; > name=RPOUDOMI.TXT > Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 > Content-ID: > Who are all these people with Hispanic names anyway ? Doesn't look like a list of arab terrorists to me -- Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
Re: Torture done correctly is a terminal process
-- > On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 09:33:39AM -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: > > To flesh this out a little more - the judge was Stephen > > Trott, speaking on September 18 2002 at the Commonwealth > > Club. Trott credits the torture warrant idea to Alan > > Dershowitz, whom he describes as a good friend and a "great > > civil libertarian". On 21 Nov 2002 at 22:24, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Yes. Clearly it's okay for torture warrants to exist -- as > long as you're a member of the political class that gets to > approve them... At present, if the US wants someone terminally interrogated, they ship him to Egypt and ask the Egyptians to do the interrogation. I am mildly suprised they do not ask the Afghans to do the interrogations, since poems have been written concerning the remarkable effectiveness of Afghan interrogations. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG Jyf5nXEcZGYbFVFMsrtVZ973GZhAHY04PCKLDC4a 4OpiaSbnH8yY1vYQHQAPfTAfNqbAvyyBgFMDUG6Ir
Re: Microsoft on Darknet
On Thu, 21 Nov 2002, James A. Donald wrote: > Mojo was intended to do this but it failed, I think it failed > because they failed to monetize mojo before it was introduced > as service management mechanism. Mojo ultimatively failed because MojoNation failed. MNet is very alive, though, and it will get a new mint eventually. What I didn't like about Mojo is that the developers didn't treat it like a currency which it was. If your client doesn't care about Mojo, why should you? If you treat currency like toilet paper, it's not worth very much.
All you need to know about Stavridou
"identifying network miscreants and revoking their network privileges" If one has any doubt, this sentence says it all. In fact, "revoking their network privileges" does it. No, wait, "network privileges" is enough. From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 10:30:32 +0100 (CET) Fucking nuts. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html?pagewanted=print&position=bottom Agency Weighed, but Discarded, Plan Reconfiguring the Internet By JOHN MARKOFF The Pentagon research agency that is exploring how to create a vast database of electronic transactions and analyze them for potential terrorist activity considered but rejected another surveillance idea: tagging Internet data with unique personal markers to make anonymous use of some parts of the Internet impossible. The idea, which was explored at a two-day workshop in California in August, touched off an angry private dispute among computer scientists and policy experts who had been brought together to assess the implications of the technology. The plan, known as eDNA, called for developing a new version of the Internet that would include enclaves where it would be impossible to be anonymous while using the network. The technology would have divided the Internet into secure "public network highways," where a computer user would have needed to be identified, and "private network alleyways," which would not have required identification. Several people familiar with the eDNA discussions said such secure areas might have first involved government employees or law enforcement agencies, then been extended to security-conscious organizations like financial institutions, and after that been broadened even further. A description of the eDNA proposal that was sent to the 18 workshop participants read in part: "We envisage that all network and client resources will maintain traces of user eDNA so that the user can be uniquely identified as having visited a Web site, having started a process or having sent a packet. This way, the resources and those who use them form a virtual `crime scene' that contains evidence about the identity of the users, much the same way as a real crime scene contains DNA traces of people." The proposal would have been one of a series of technology initiatives that have been pursued by the Bush administration for what it describes as part of the effort to counter the potential for further terrorist attacks in the Unites States. Those initiatives include a variety of plans to trace and monitor the electronic activities of United States citizens. In recent weeks another undertaking of the the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa, the Pentagon research organization, has drawn sharp criticism for its potential to undermine civil liberties. That project is being headed by John M. Poindexter, the retired vice admiral who served as national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan. Dr. Poindexter returned to the Pentagon in January to direct the research agency's Information Awareness Office, created in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. That office has been pursuing a surveillance system called Total Information Awareness that would permit intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials to mount a vast dragnet through electronic transaction data ranging from credit card information to veterinary records, in the United States and internationally, to hunt for terrorists. In contrast, with eDNA the user would have needed to enter a digital version of unique personal identifiers, like a fingerprint or voice, in order to use the secure enclaves of the network. That would have been turned into an electronic signature that could have been appended to every Internet message or activity and thus tracked back to its source. The eDNA idea was originally envisioned in a private brainstorming session that included the director of Darpa, Dr. Tony Tether, and a number of computer researchers, according to a person with intimate knowledge of the proposal. At the meeting, this person said, Dr. Tether asked why Internet attacks could not be traced back to their point of origin, and was told that given the current structure of the Internet, doing so was frequently not possible. The review of the proposal was financed by a second Darpa unit, the Information Processing Technology Office. This week a Darpa spokeswoman, Jan Walker, said the agency planned no further financing for the idea. In explaining the reason for the decision to finance the review in the first place, Ms. Walker said the agency had been "intrigued by the difficult computing science research involved in creating network capabilities that would provide the same levels of responsibility and accountability in cyberspace as now exist in the physical world." Darpa awarded a $60,000 contract to SRI International, a research concern based in Menlo Park, Calif., to investi
Re: Worm Klez.E immunity
On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 09:46 PM, Dave Emery wrote: On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 02:47:24PM -0600, tcmay wrote: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=RPOUDOMI.TXT Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: Who are all these people with Hispanic names anyway ? Doesn't look like a list of arab terrorists to me Why are you copying me on this message? I had nothing to do with sending it. Get a clue. --Tim May
Re: Microsoft on Darknet
At 04:59 PM 11/21/02 -0800, James A. Donald wrote: >-- >According to Microsoft, > >http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc > >Darknet is being undermined by free riders. They attribute this to 2 things: most are on 56Kbps, and legal harassment of large sharers is possible. I suspect it is mostly that broadband isn't too common yet.
Re: Blaze, Diffie, et al torpedo eDNA
At 08:20 AM 11/22/2002 +0100, Nomen Nescio wrote: Markoff writes in the NY Times about a proposal called eDNA which would "reconfigure" the Internet to forbid anonymous usage of certain parts. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html The scheme was explored by DARPA a few months ago, which gave a contract to SRI to look into it. SRI convened a panel that included Matt Blaze, Whit Diffie, Roger Needham and Marc Rotenberg (of EPIC). These guys hated the idea, but the SRI contact, one Victoria Stavridou, refused to allow Blaze to write up the consensus once it became clear that he was going to shred the proposal. I wish this was all so simple. Inclusion of tagging Internet traffic is still in the IETF process AFAIK. As I recall from a CP talk given in 2000 by Hugh Daniel, the proposals would have routers connecting an entry-point (e.g., a user at an ISPs) send a relatively small number of out-of-band messages, related to packets randomly chosen from its queue, to the end-point router (as noted in the packet headers). These messages would contain the "true" source and destination addresses as known to the sending router. For those packets which the end-point router received such a message it could immediately identify address spoofing and other nasties. steve
Re: Microsoft on Darknet
On Fri, 22 Nov 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >Darknet is being undermined by free riders. > > They attribute this to 2 things: most are on 56Kbps, and legal > harassment of large sharers is possible. I attribute this to lack of agoric load levelling, and prestige accounting. Legal harassment is becoming more difficult if the content is encrypted, ephemeral/has adaptive amplification, and there is swarm delivery. > I suspect it is mostly that broadband isn't too common yet. Swarm delivery is very possible with 56k modems.
Q: opportunistic email encryption
Question: if you control the traffic layer you can easily disrupt opportunistic encryption (STARTTLS & Co) by killing public key exchange, or even do a MITM. Is there any infrastructure in MTAs for public key caching, and admin notification if things look fishy? (Fishy: a host which used to do PKI with you suddenly says it can't, or its key differs from key you cached). (Okay, it's unlikely, but maybe people have been anticipating this).
[Burbclaves + Brinworld] Geek 'Vigilantes' Monitor Border
Geek 'Vigilantes' Monitor Border By Michelle Delio | Also by this reporter Page 1 of 1 02:00 AM Nov. 22, 2002 PT A group of tech-savvy ranchers in Arizona is using military technology to monitor and apprehend illegal immigrants crossing the border from Mexico into the United States. Members of the group have spiked their land with thousands of motion sensors. They also use infrared tracking devices, global positioning systems, night vision goggles, radar and other gear to survey movement near the border. http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,56523,00.html
Re: Q: opportunistic email encryption
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:23:57PM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: | Question: if you control the traffic layer you can easily disrupt | opportunistic encryption (STARTTLS & Co) by killing public key exchange, | or even do a MITM. | | Is there any infrastructure in MTAs for public key caching, and admin | notification if things look fishy? (Fishy: a host which used to do PKI | with you suddenly says it can't, or its key differs from key you cached). | | (Okay, it's unlikely, but maybe people have been anticipating this). Not that we've found. I did a little experimenting with huge SSL session timeouts and high log levels, but saw nothing logged that indicated that someone who should have had a key didn't. While what you propose is useful enough that I spent time looking for it, lets not let the best become the enemey of the good. Needing to disrupt a network connection is a huge cost for an Eve who prefers to avoid detection. Not an unpayable one, but not to be ignored. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume
