Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
also sprach gary ng <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2005.05.26.0812 +0200]: > Forgive me ignorance. Would the same situation happens > in say SMB/CIFS ? To the server, the authentication > would still be whoever mount it from the client side. If I mount a SMB/CIFS share with umask 0700, nobody but myself can enter the mounted hierarchy, or read/write files therein. -- .''`. martin f. krafft <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> : :' :proud Debian developer, admin, user, and author `. `'` `- Debian - when you have better things to do than fixing a system Invalid/expired PGP subkeys? Use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! "alles sollte so einfach, wie möglich gemacht sein, aber nicht einfacher." -- albert einstein signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 11:12:04PM -0700, gary ng wrote: > Forgive me ignorance. Would the same situation happens > in say SMB/CIFS ? To the server, the authentication > would still be whoever mount it from the client side. > I don't think this is a bug(if it is at all) worth RC status. SMB/CIFS mounts honor the uid, gid, fmask, dmask mount options which restrict who is allowed to access files/directories under the mountpoint. Having support for not exposing the entire mount point to access by arbitrary users on the system really is a rather basic requirement, and davfs is the only filesystem type I've heard of which doesn't support this correctly in one form or another. -- Steve Langasek postmodern programmer signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
Forgive me ignorance. Would the same situation happens in say SMB/CIFS ? To the server, the authentication would still be whoever mount it from the client side. I don't think this is a bug(if it is at all) worth RC status. __ Do you Yahoo!? Make Yahoo! your home page http://www.yahoo.com/r/hs -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 02:40:19AM +0200, martin f krafft wrote: > also sprach Moritz Muehlenhoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2005.05.26.0109 +0200]: > > Disclaimer: I don't know davfs2 and I don't use. But I disgree > > that every file system should implement POSIX access semantics. > > There are production class systems that don't, e.g. the Andrew > > file system. And as Coda, which according to the package > > description is used as the backend, is a descandant of AFS this > > may very well be in order. > Thanks for this valuable information. > One way to secure a davfs2 mount is to enclose the mount point in > a directory that can only be accessed by the authorised people. > However, this still gives everyone write access, even if some should > only have read access. > DAV does implement a fine-grained set of permissions. However, > a davfs2 resource is mounted with a single username and password. > Essentially, thus, mounting a DAV resource on a publicly accessible > place (e.g. /mnt) has the same effect as distributing the username > and password to each user with access to the system. And *this* > would be a security problem. :) > How does AFS/Coda work wrt this? I cannot imagine that every user of > a system with AFS mounts has unconditional read and write access to > those resources... Quite the contrary; most AFS shares are mounted using Kerberos, such that only processes with the necessary Kerberos ticket (or rather, AFS token, which is acquired using the Kerberos ticket) can access the files. -- Steve Langasek postmodern programmer signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
also sprach Moritz Muehlenhoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2005.05.26.0109 +0200]: > Disclaimer: I don't know davfs2 and I don't use. But I disgree > that every file system should implement POSIX access semantics. > There are production class systems that don't, e.g. the Andrew > file system. And as Coda, which according to the package > description is used as the backend, is a descandant of AFS this > may very well be in order. Thanks for this valuable information. One way to secure a davfs2 mount is to enclose the mount point in a directory that can only be accessed by the authorised people. However, this still gives everyone write access, even if some should only have read access. DAV does implement a fine-grained set of permissions. However, a davfs2 resource is mounted with a single username and password. Essentially, thus, mounting a DAV resource on a publicly accessible place (e.g. /mnt) has the same effect as distributing the username and password to each user with access to the system. And *this* would be a security problem. :) How does AFS/Coda work wrt this? I cannot imagine that every user of a system with AFS mounts has unconditional read and write access to those resources... -- .''`. martin f. krafft <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> : :' :proud Debian developer, admin, user, and author `. `'` `- Debian - when you have better things to do than fixing a system Invalid/expired PGP subkeys? Use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! "for art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: intoxication." -- friedrich nietzsche signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Bug#310757: There are file systems without POSIX semantics
Hi, Disclaimer: I don't know davfs2 and I don't use. But I disgree that every file system should implement POSIX access semantics. There are production class systems that don't, e.g. the Andrew file system. And as Coda, which according to the package description is used as the backend, is a descandant of AFS this may very well be in order. Cheers, Moritz -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
