Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-04-20 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Hi.

Was on a dCache workshop and hadn't time to answer before...


On Mon, 2012-04-16 at 16:08 +0200, Dennis van Dok wrote:
  I'm not sure what I prefer:
  a) ship/create symlinks for both formats
 I went with a) at the moment. That is what 'upstream' does and it's
 really handy for legacy software.
Well,.. as said I'm unsure myself...
I think software wise it's not needed for Debian,.. the transition to
ssl1.x is complete, isn't it, so there is no legacy software in Debian.

One argument against shipping both formats is, that openssl always at
least stats all files in the respective dirs...
So this could mean that for every access you get twice as many stats on
files as needed...


  But I guess this is a separate debconf thingy,... configuring what you
  put in /etc/grid-security and not the one from ca-certificates?
 yes
:)

  /etc/grid-security should then _only_ contain symlinks, IMHO.
 Agreed, and that's how it works.
:)


 Rather than start a lot of fuss here...maybe TERENA could be included in
 the ca-certificates package. It takes only a couple of sponsors IIRC.
Would perhaps make sense...


 I haven't given the metapackage a thought yet. I also don't see the need
 as there are just three packages for all the accredited stuff. Better to
 make it a conscious choice.
I personally usually prefer having meta-packages, well at least if they
don't force you to install more than really necessary (e.g. the gnome
metapackages in debian depend one many useless crap, where a recommends
would be enough IMHO).
Anyway,... given that you need to somehwere put the logic for
the /etc/grid-security handling,... a ca-certificates-igtf
(meta-)package could be a good place, IMHO


  No I don't mean older versions...
  IGTF updates quite often... once the packages are in stable (e.g.
  wheezy) we still would need to update it...
  I guess stable-updates is what this is called in the meantime.
 Sure, if upstream brings out a new version, the Debian stable package
 would have to be updated. Isn't this essentially a security fix?
Well not sure... strictly speaking I don't think so...
If a CA was broken, and therefore be removed,.. that would be a security
fix.
If a CA was no longer member of IGTF,.. that could be a security fix,...
but already questionable.
If just adding CAs surely no security fix.


  I thought David Groep is from NIKHEF? And he signed the key that is used
  to sign the eugridpma distripution key...
 Well, sure. And I'll take his word that it's the right bundle ;-) He's
 practically in the next office.
:)


 I can promise that I will diligently check the signatures, but then
 you'll have to trust me that I will do as I say...
Obviously,... but that's the trust relation users have to Debian ;)



Chris.


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Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-04-16 Thread Dennis van Dok
Op 31-03-12 04:47, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
 On Sat, 2012-03-31 at 01:38 +0200, Dennis van Dok wrote:
 It's better not to get these things mixed up too much.
 Definitely.
 I agree that the actual PEM files should be placed
 in /usr/share/ca-certificates/ and I'd propose a structure like this:
 /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/classic
 /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/slcs
 /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/mlcs
That's *almost* how I've packaged it.

 One thing I just recall:
 OpenSSL hash links... pre/post 1.0 format.
 
 I'm not sure what I prefer:
 a) ship/create symlinks for both formats
 b) ship/create symlinks for post 1.0 only

I went with a) at the moment. That is what 'upstream' does and it's
really handy for legacy software.

 But I guess this is a separate debconf thingy,... configuring what you
 put in /etc/grid-security and not the one from ca-certificates?

yes

 /etc/grid-security should then _only_ contain symlinks, IMHO.

Agreed, and that's how it works.

 Not sure if this is easily possible, but it would be nice, if the cert
 selection was somehow sorted by the respective PMA.. and perhaps when
 you see the country code of the respective CA.

I'm not sure how I could easily implement this. I don't see this as such
an urgent matter, and as I'm apolitical I don't understand what the fuss
is about.

 Splitting the file hierarchy would make sense here, as people quickly
 recognise which type (i.e. MLCS/SLCS) a cert is of.

This is indeed split into different packages.

 I revised my idea,.. ALL (that are installed) should show up... but one
 should be able to see where they're belonging to, which is easily
 possible via the path.

Agreed.

  but there may even be some from the 'unaccredited' set
 that you would want to have in ca-certificates (e.g. the TERENA-SSL-CA).
 TERENA is in unaccredited,.. damn...
 Nevertheless, I think if you follow my idea to split the packages and
 make one metapackage, I would NOT depend on the -unaccredited
 package at most suggest it.. but even that is questionable, because
 while specifically TERENA is likely generally useful, for the main
 purpose of IGTF it's not.

Rather than start a lot of fuss here...maybe TERENA could be included in
the ca-certificates package. It takes only a couple of sponsors IIRC.

 
 For the ca-certifcates part... it's anyway up the the admin to decide
 (if he configured ask,... if he did not one can't help him ;) )
 Well on the other hand... uhm... I'm just thinking what a meta package
 should do (if you split up)

I haven't given the metapackage a thought yet. I also don't see the need
as there are just three packages for all the accredited stuff. Better to
make it a conscious choice.

 No I don't mean older versions...
 IGTF updates quite often... once the packages are in stable (e.g.
 wheezy) we still would need to update it...
 I guess stable-updates is what this is called in the meantime.

Sure, if upstream brings out a new version, the Debian stable package
would have to be updated. Isn't this essentially a security fix?

 When you're from NIKHEF you can probably easily get David's OpenPGP key
 in a secure way to add only securely downloaded igtf bundles to
 Debian :)

 Nothing NIKHEF specific here,
 I thought David Groep is from NIKHEF? And he signed the key that is used
 to sign the eugridpma distripution key...

Well, sure. And I'll take his word that it's the right bundle ;-) He's
practically in the next office.

I can promise that I will diligently check the signatures, but then
you'll have to trust me that I will do as I say...


 I'm all for a further discussion of how to do this properly for Debian;
 I've put a lot of my own thought into this and I've reflected this with
 others, notably the upstream maintainer, but I still consider this very
 much as an initial attempt.
 
 Well I guess you're on a good way... especially your idea to separate
 between ca-certificates an another debconf for grid-security
 = +1

Thanks,

Dennis

-- 
D.H. van Dok :: Software Engineer :: www.nikhef.nl :: www.biggrid.nl
Phone +31 20 592 22 28 :: http://www.nikhef.nl/~dennisvd/



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Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-03-30 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Hi Dennis.


Running the LMU-LRZ Tier-2 this is quite good news, however..


On Thu, 2012-03-29 at 23:29 +0200, Dennis van Dok wrote:
  The certificates are kept in /usr/share/igtf-policy/ and
  /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf-*/.
Why two locations (i.e. why the one outside
of /usr/share/ca-certificates/)


  They are meant to be placed in
  /etc/grid-security/certificates, where the commonly used grid middleware
  will look for it; it is also possible to include (some of) the certificates
  in /etc/ssl/certs by using dpkg-reconfigure ca-certificates.
Well here the problems start, IMHO.
I always considered the whole /etc/grid-security/ quite broken and not
more than a quite and dirty hack to ease up life with multiple grid
apps.

It more or less contradicts the way certificates are meant to be handled
in Debian (i.e. ca-certificates).
Are you going to automatically create /etc/grid-security/certificates
and put links in there?

Will it be possible to configure only selected CAs?

Will you integrated into ca-certificates (i.e. which certs-get enabled
and not)?
Probably not all certificates in IGTF should show up in what
ca-certificates creates (i.e. SLCS and MLCS).


btw: Are you going to provide backports or better said volatile
support?


When you're from NIKHEF you can probably easily get David's OpenPGP key
in a secure way to add only securely downloaded igtf bundles to
Debian :)


Cheers,
Chris.


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Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-03-30 Thread Dennis van Dok
Op 30-03-12 13:40, Christoph Anton Mitterer schreef:
 Hi Dennis.

Hi Chris,

 Running the LMU-LRZ Tier-2 this is quite good news, however..

(H'm, coincidentally I'm just back from LRZ after the EGI community forum.)

 On Thu, 2012-03-29 at 23:29 +0200, Dennis van Dok wrote:
  The certificates are kept in /usr/share/igtf-policy/ and
  /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf-*/.
 Why two locations (i.e. why the one outside
 of /usr/share/ca-certificates/)

There is an easy answer and a more complicated answer.

The easy answer is that the IGTF CAs come with several files besides
just the certificates. The info, namespaces, crl_url and signing_policy
files are used by tools such as fetch-crl. And each certificate is also
available as hash.0. They would pollute the certificate collection if
they were installed under /usr/share/ca-certificates. I now just put the
certificates there for convenience; dpkg-reconfigure ca-certificates
will pick them up, and they can be enabled for general-purpos uses.

The more complicated answer is that the IGTF collection has a different
purpose than the general ca_certificates. It covers different use cases,
has different security controls (the IGTF works with CRLs) and covers
different risks. It's better not to get these things mixed up too much.
The fact that the same technology is involved is not enough of a reason
to place them together.

  They are meant to be placed in
  /etc/grid-security/certificates, where the commonly used grid middleware
  will look for it; it is also possible to include (some of) the certificates
  in /etc/ssl/certs by using dpkg-reconfigure ca-certificates.
 Well here the problems start, IMHO.
 I always considered the whole /etc/grid-security/ quite broken and not
 more than a quite and dirty hack to ease up life with multiple grid
 apps.

Nevertheless, this is a location used by many, many systems.

 It more or less contradicts the way certificates are meant to be handled
 in Debian (i.e. ca-certificates).
 Are you going to automatically create /etc/grid-security/certificates
 and put links in there?

Yes; right now the package works (you can try already as it is in
mentors[1]) by symlinking the files in /etc/grid-security/certificates.

1. http://mentors.debian.net/package/igtf-policy-bundle

 Will it be possible to configure only selected CAs?

Yes, through debconf. It's either exclusion based (install all but a
selected few) or inclusion based (only install a selected few).

 Will you integrated into ca-certificates (i.e. which certs-get enabled
 and not)?

There is some integration; running dpkg-reconfigure on ca-certificates
after installing an igtf package with
ca-certificates/trust_new_crts: ask
will give you the option to select the IGTF certificates. This choice is
independent of what's installed in /etc/grid-security/certificates
(again, different use cases!)

 Probably not all certificates in IGTF should show up in what
 ca-certificates creates (i.e. SLCS and MLCS).

Probably not; but there may even be some from the 'unaccredited' set
that you would want to have in ca-certificates (e.g. the TERENA-SSL-CA).
We could make a hand-picked selection but
a) who would do the choosing and
b) what would be the criteria?

Neither a or b are very clear to me. At least in the current setup it's
clear that the choice and the responsibility fall to the sysadmin.

 btw: Are you going to provide backports or better said volatile
 support?

...Not sure what this means but I could provide backports to older
flavours of Debian, Ubuntu, if there is enough demand.

 When you're from NIKHEF   you can probably easily get David's OpenPGP key
 in a secure way to add only securely downloaded igtf bundles to
 Debian :)

Nothing NIKHEF specific here, you'd have to have a face-to-face at some
point and he gets around quite a lot...

Not sure what you mean by 'securely downloaded'. Do you mean over an SSL
connection, or do you mean that it's verified that the downloaded
sources are the same as the original?


I'm all for a further discussion of how to do this properly for Debian;
I've put a lot of my own thought into this and I've reflected this with
others, notably the upstream maintainer, but I still consider this very
much as an initial attempt.

Cheers,

Dennis
-- 
D.H. van Dok :: Software Engineer :: www.nikhef.nl :: www.biggrid.nl
Phone +31 20 592 22 28 :: http://www.nikhef.nl/~dennisvd/



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Description: S/MIME cryptografische ondertekening


Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-03-30 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Hi.


On Sat, 2012-03-31 at 01:38 +0200, Dennis van Dok wrote:
 (H'm, coincidentally I'm just back from LRZ after the EGI community forum.)
Hope you had a nice stay in Garching.



 The easy answer is that the IGTF CAs come with several files besides
 just the certificates. The info, namespaces, crl_url and signing_policy
 files are used by tools such as fetch-crl. And each certificate is also
 available as hash.0.
Yeah that's all clear... even though the hash.N is no IGTF specialty
but a SSL thing, the same for .rN files.


 The more complicated answer is that the IGTF collection has a different
 purpose than the general ca_certificates. It covers different use cases,
 has different security controls (the IGTF works with CRLs) and covers
 different risks.
Well CRLs could be encoded in X.509 certs themselves, too, but I guess
we don't need to discuss the weirdness of the grid world,.. things are
as they are :(


 It's better not to get these things mixed up too much.
Definitely.
I agree that the actual PEM files should be placed
in /usr/share/ca-certificates/ and I'd propose a structure like this:
/usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/classic
/usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/slcs
/usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf/mlcs



For the package structure it may make sense to split this, too, e.g.
ca-certificates-igtf (meta package, depending on the following three)
ca-certificates-igtf-classic
ca-certificates-igtf-slcs
ca-certificates-igtf-mlcs

Maybe one could add (withOUT depending, recommending or suggesting)
ca-certificates-igtf-experimental
ca-certificates-igtf-unaccredited
etc.

But if you don't split up the packages like this and have just one big
package, I would generally exclude -experimental, -unaccredited, etc.
(for security reasons).


One thing I just recall:
OpenSSL hash links... pre/post 1.0 format.

I'm not sure what I prefer:
a) ship/create symlinks for both formats
b) ship/create symlinks for post 1.0 only

a) has the advantage that you can e.g. NFS export the files and they can
be used by older systems

b) doesn't clutter debian with old style stuff, that is no longer needed
(Debian has already OpenSSL 1.x).

I guess I tend to (b),... from a Debian point of view there is no need
to support foreign legacy systems.
And if someone really wants the hashes, he can create them manually.


 Yes; right now the package works (you can try already as it is in
 mentors[1]) by symlinking the files in /etc/grid-security/certificates.
 1. http://mentors.debian.net/package/igtf-policy-bundle
Will do so once I find the time :)


 Yes, through debconf. It's either exclusion based (install all but a
 selected few) or inclusion based (only install a selected few).
But I guess this is a separate debconf thingy,... configuring what you
put in /etc/grid-security and not the one from ca-certificates?
If so, good.
/etc/grid-security should then _only_ contain symlinks, IMHO.
Not sure if this is easily possible, but it would be nice, if the cert
selection was somehow sorted by the respective PMA.. and perhaps when
you see the country code of the respective CA.
I mean this makes it quickly possible to sort out CAs, when this
demanded by law (i.e. Iran as of now).


 There is some integration; running dpkg-reconfigure on ca-certificates
 after installing an igtf package with
 ca-certificates/trust_new_crts: ask
 will give you the option to select the IGTF certificates. This choice is
 independent of what's installed in /etc/grid-security/certificates
 (again, different use cases!)
Great.
Splitting the file hierarchy would make sense here, as people quickly
recognise which type (i.e. MLCS/SLCS) a cert is of.
I guess the certs installed via ca-certificates, are installed by
functions of ca-certificates, so it is responsible for choosing the hash
format (hopefully it does only post 1.x).



  Probably not all certificates in IGTF should show up in what
  ca-certificates creates (i.e. SLCS and MLCS).
 
 Probably not;
I revised my idea,.. ALL (that are installed) should show up... but one
should be able to see where they're belonging to, which is easily
possible via the path.

  but there may even be some from the 'unaccredited' set
 that you would want to have in ca-certificates (e.g. the TERENA-SSL-CA).
TERENA is in unaccredited,.. damn...
Nevertheless, I think if you follow my idea to split the packages and
make one metapackage, I would NOT depend on the -unaccredited
package at most suggest it.. but even that is questionable, because
while specifically TERENA is likely generally useful, for the main
purpose of IGTF it's not.


 We could make a hand-picked selection but
 a) who would do the choosing and
 b) what would be the criteria?
No,.. for get about this :)

For the ca-certifcates part... it's anyway up the the admin to decide
(if he configured ask,... if he did not one can't help him ;) )
Well on the other hand... uhm... I'm just thinking what a meta package
should do (if you split up)
I could think about those 

Bug#666229: ITP: igtf-policy-bundle -- IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

2012-03-29 Thread Dennis van Dok
Package: wnpp
Severity: wishlist
Owner: Dennis van Dok denni...@nikhef.nl

* Package name: igtf-policy-bundle
  Version : 1.46
  Upstream Author : David Groep i...@eugridpma.org
* URL : http://www.igtf.net/
* License : Apache 2
  Programming Lang: X.509 CA certificates
  Description : IGTF profiles for Authority Root Certificates

 The International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) maintains a common
 trust base for the benefit of distributed science and research
 computing infrastructures by maintaining a list of trust anchors, for
 accredited authorities. The distribution contains root certificates,
 certificate revocation list (CRL) locations, contact information, and
 signing policies.

 The package is split up according to the different profiles of the
 IGTF (each profile covers a different set of rules and policies).
 The most important ones are classic, mics (member integrated credential
 service) and slcs (short lived credential service).

 The trust anchors maintained by the IGTF form a trust backbone for many
 large-scale science communities, among which the European Grid
 Infrastructure (http://www.ige.eu/) and the World-wide LHC Computing
 Grid (http://lcg.web.cern.ch/lcg/).

 The certificates are kept in /usr/share/igtf-policy/ and
 /usr/share/ca-certificates/igtf-*/. They are meant to be placed in
 /etc/grid-security/certificates, where the commonly used grid middleware
 will look for it; it is also possible to include (some of) the certificates
 in /etc/ssl/certs by using dpkg-reconfigure ca-certificates.



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