Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-08 Thread Laurent Bigonville
Le Wed, 7 May 2014 08:18:09 -0700,
Steve Langasek vor...@debian.org a écrit :

 On Wed, May 07, 2014 at 10:13:02AM +0200, Laurent Bigonville wrote:
  Le Tue, 6 May 2014 09:36:59 -0700,
  Steve Langasek vor...@debian.org a écrit :
 
   On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 09:12:59AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
Laurent Bigonville bi...@debian.org writes:
 
 On Fedora they are using:
 
   session optional pam_keyinit force revoke
 
force revoke looks good to me.  I'm not sure that force is
necessary, but it's probably a good idea in general.
 
 As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking
 of adding a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think
 this is OK for Debian?
 
Yes, although this is where it would be nice if this could
somehow be handled by pam-auth-update so that the PAM module
wouldn't be configured at all on systems that don't have it.
 
   As discussed on IRC, we don't want this to silently fail on Linux
   systems because of some unrelated bug; that will just cause
   difficult-to-diagnose problems.  Since the module will be present
   on all Linux systems, it's better to ship a different pam config
   on Linux vs. non-Linux architectures, which can be done fairly
   easily without duplication using dh-exec.
 
  And couldn't we use the (dirty) trick we are using for pam_selinux?
 
 Which trick are you talking about?
 

pam_selinux is called like this in some pam services to not fail if the
module is not existing:

session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad]
pam_selinux.so open


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Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-07 Thread Laurent Bigonville
Le Tue, 6 May 2014 09:36:59 -0700,
Steve Langasek vor...@debian.org a écrit :

 On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 09:12:59AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
  Laurent Bigonville bi...@debian.org writes:
 
   On Fedora they are using:
 
 session optional pam_keyinit force revoke
 
  force revoke looks good to me.  I'm not sure that force is
  necessary, but it's probably a good idea in general.
 
   As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking of
   adding a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think this is
   OK for Debian?
 
  Yes, although this is where it would be nice if this could somehow
  be handled by pam-auth-update so that the PAM module wouldn't be
  configured at all on systems that don't have it.
 
 As discussed on IRC, we don't want this to silently fail on Linux
 systems because of some unrelated bug; that will just cause
 difficult-to-diagnose problems.  Since the module will be present on
 all Linux systems, it's better to ship a different pam config on
 Linux vs. non-Linux architectures, which can be done fairly easily
 without duplication using dh-exec.
 

And couldn't we use the (dirty) trick we are using for pam_selinux?


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Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-07 Thread Steve Langasek
On Wed, May 07, 2014 at 10:13:02AM +0200, Laurent Bigonville wrote:
 Le Tue, 6 May 2014 09:36:59 -0700,
 Steve Langasek vor...@debian.org a écrit :

  On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 09:12:59AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
   Laurent Bigonville bi...@debian.org writes:

On Fedora they are using:

  session optional pam_keyinit force revoke

   force revoke looks good to me.  I'm not sure that force is
   necessary, but it's probably a good idea in general.

As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking of
adding a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think this is
OK for Debian?

   Yes, although this is where it would be nice if this could somehow
   be handled by pam-auth-update so that the PAM module wouldn't be
   configured at all on systems that don't have it.

  As discussed on IRC, we don't want this to silently fail on Linux
  systems because of some unrelated bug; that will just cause
  difficult-to-diagnose problems.  Since the module will be present on
  all Linux systems, it's better to ship a different pam config on
  Linux vs. non-Linux architectures, which can be done fairly easily
  without duplication using dh-exec.

 And couldn't we use the (dirty) trick we are using for pam_selinux?

Which trick are you talking about?

-- 
Steve Langasek   Give me a lever long enough and a Free OS
Debian Developer   to set it on, and I can move the world.
Ubuntu Developerhttp://www.debian.org/
slanga...@ubuntu.com vor...@debian.org


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Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-06 Thread Laurent Bigonville
Hello,

Steve Langasek wrote:
 Hi Russ,
 
 On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:00:54PM -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
  It would be better for any application that uses the kernel keyring
  if pam_keyinit were run by default in the PAM session stack.
  Without this module, users are placed in a default UID-based user
  session, which doesn't isolate each session's keys.
 
  Worse, currently (although this is a separate bug that's been
  separately reported and may be fixed in the future), the kernel uses
  the UID session for reading, but when writing creates a new session
  keyring that's limited to children of the writing process.  This
  basically makes use of keyring Kerberos caches impossible unless one
  does the equivalent of what pam_keyinit does first.  It's rather
  inobvious that this is necessary.
 
  The problem with this, which will make it more complex, is that one
  generally does not want to create a new session keyring when running
  commands like su or sudo, just for login sessions, since you
  normally want to preserve the user's existing credentials.  I'm not
  sure what this means for how to achieve this configuration.
 
 Unfortunately, there's no central way to configure PAM modules only
 for use in login sessions.  As with pam_selinux and pam_loginuid, the
 only way to do this is for each service to include the module
 directly in their own PAM config.

Do you have an idea on how it should be called?

On Fedora they are using:

  session optional pam_keyinit force revoke

As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking of adding
a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think this is OK for Debian?

I guess it should be the same in all the initial login pam services.

Cheers,

Laurent Bigonville


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Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-06 Thread Russ Allbery
Laurent Bigonville bi...@debian.org writes:

 On Fedora they are using:

   session optional pam_keyinit force revoke

force revoke looks good to me.  I'm not sure that force is necessary, but
it's probably a good idea in general.

 As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking of adding
 a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think this is OK for Debian?

Yes, although this is where it would be nice if this could somehow be
handled by pam-auth-update so that the PAM module wouldn't be configured
at all on systems that don't have it.

 I guess it should be the same in all the initial login pam services.

I think so, yes.

Thanks for looking at this!

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)   http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/


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Bug#734818: enable pam_keyinit by default

2014-05-06 Thread Steve Langasek
On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 09:12:59AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
 Laurent Bigonville bi...@debian.org writes:

  On Fedora they are using:

session optional pam_keyinit force revoke

 force revoke looks good to me.  I'm not sure that force is necessary, but
 it's probably a good idea in general.

  As it's only available on linux architectures, I was thinking of adding
  a '-' at the beginning of the call. Do you think this is OK for Debian?

 Yes, although this is where it would be nice if this could somehow be
 handled by pam-auth-update so that the PAM module wouldn't be configured
 at all on systems that don't have it.

As discussed on IRC, we don't want this to silently fail on Linux systems
because of some unrelated bug; that will just cause difficult-to-diagnose
problems.  Since the module will be present on all Linux systems, it's
better to ship a different pam config on Linux vs. non-Linux architectures,
which can be done fairly easily without duplication using dh-exec.

-- 
Steve Langasek   Give me a lever long enough and a Free OS
Debian Developer   to set it on, and I can move the world.
Ubuntu Developerhttp://www.debian.org/
slanga...@ubuntu.com vor...@debian.org


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