Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-08 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Colin,

  that is exactly how it works and we can't use signal. Even directed
  signal are not working since the method call into the agent has to
  return the result or an error.
 
  What problem do you guys actually have with this? The agent inside
  bluez-gnome is verifying that the method comes from the daemon it
  registers its agent with and thus there is not even a security issue
  here with trying to send arbitrary method calls to the UI.
 
 I talked with davidz about this on IRC in a bit more high bandwidth
 mode; he's doing something similar with PolicyKit.  I think if the
 rule is of the form:
 
 allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent send_path=/org/bluez/Agent/
 
 that's probably fine.  It does allow any process to send any message
 with that interface and path to any other, but we're in a similar
 situation with signals anyways right now.  I wouldn't call it a
 problem even if it's just an allow send_interface, but ideally we
 don't have many of these since they're not as strong as allow
 send_destination.

the path where the Bluetooth agent lives can be freely chosen by the
agent. We are not restricting it to any path. This is needed since in
some cases an application might wanna register two agents. The BlueZ
agents are kinda stackable. We have a default one for normal requests
that can come in any time. And then transaction specific ones when we do
expect a pairing or authorization request. This design is on purpose to
allow the UI to present or overwrite these requests and handle them as
it fits best in that situation.

So what is your security concern here? Only the root user is to send
these information anyway. And once you are root, you can do whatever you
want. If you don't like the D-Bus policy, you just edit that file and
change it. I really don't get what you are trying to protect here.

And keep in mind that the client/agent has to protect itself and
bluez-gnome is doing this by verifying the sender of the request.

Regards

Marcel





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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Simon McVittie
On Mon, 05 Jan 2009 at 23:32:50 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
 On Mon, Jan 05, 2009 at 08:32:58PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
   allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/
  
  That will work but is not ideal; D-Bus upstream opinion seems to be that
  a bare send_interface without a corresponding send_destination is
  almost always an error (because it matches the corresponding interface on
  completely unrelated processes). Do Agent implementations have a well-known
  service name you can use?
  
  Failing that, maybe you could at least match on object path as well as
  on interface?
 
 Unfortunately they don't a well known service name nor object path, agents are
 user-registered

Never mind. We have a lot of these rules in the archive anyway
(http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?users=pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.orgtag=fdo-18961)
and as far as I can tell it's not a release-critical bug, particularly
as an allow rule... so leave it like that unless D-Bus upstream can
explain something better.

  Debian packages usually have a dual at_console/group-based policy for device
  accesses like this (e.g. members of powerdev and netdev can use various
  interfaces on hal even if they are not at_console), by duplicating the
  permissions of the at_console policy into a separate group policy. See
  NetworkManager's configuration in Debian, for instance.
 
 Okay, given that using AF_BLUETOOTH sockets requires CAP_NET_ADMIN for some
 ioctls I'd go for netdev group, makes sense?

netdev sounds the most appropriate, yes. avahi-daemon has some suitable
postinst snippets to create the group if necessary, before telling D-Bus
to reload:

case $1 in
  configure)

...

# Add the netdev group unless it's already there
if ! getent group netdev /dev/null; then
  addgroup --quiet --system netdev || true
fi

...

# Ask the bus to reload the config file
if [ -x /etc/init.d/dbus ]; then
  invoke-rc.d dbus force-reload || true
fi
  ;;

Apparently at_console works (or at least, can be made to work) if you have
ConsoleKit installed, so you should have two policy sections, one for
at_console and one for netdev, containing the same allow rules.

Please go ahead with the unstable upload, but also attach the resulting
bluetooth.conf to this bug so I can review it.

Thanks,
Simon


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Colin Walters
On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 2:17 PM, Simon McVittie
simon.mcvit...@collabora.co.uk wrote:

 Unfortunately they don't a well known service name nor object path, agents 
 are
 user-registered

 Never mind. We have a lot of these rules in the archive anyway
 (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?users=pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.orgtag=fdo-18961)
 and as far as I can tell it's not a release-critical bug, particularly
 as an allow rule... so leave it like that unless D-Bus upstream can
 explain something better.

What's the scenario exactly?  I had thought the allow
send_destination=org.bluez/ was sufficient for bluetooth; is that
not the case?



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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Simon McVittie
On Wed, 07 Jan 2009 at 14:45:37 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
 On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 2:17 PM, Simon McVittie
 simon.mcvit...@collabora.co.uk wrote:
 
  Unfortunately they don't a well known service name nor object path, agents 
  are
  user-registered
 
  Never mind. We have a lot of these rules in the archive anyway
  (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?users=pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.orgtag=fdo-18961)
  and as far as I can tell it's not a release-critical bug, particularly
  as an allow rule... so leave it like that unless D-Bus upstream can
  explain something better.
 
 What's the scenario exactly?  I had thought the allow
 send_destination=org.bluez/ was sufficient for bluetooth; is that
 not the case?

As far as I can tell, BlueZ agents work like this:

* the agent (a UI process run by a user) calls a method on the hci daemon (run
  by root) and passes in its unique name and its (arbitrary) object path
* later, the hci daemon calls a method on the agent

so the only thing that can be relied on is that when the hci daemon calls
the method, it's on the org.bluez.Agent interface!

Mitigating factor: the hci daemon runs as root, so only root needs
permission to call arbitrary methods from the Agent interface on
arbitrary processes at arbitrary object paths, and root can ptrace or
impersonate hcid (or indeed dbus-daemon) anyway.

Simon


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Colin Walters
On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 3:09 PM, Simon McVittie
simon.mcvit...@collabora.co.uk wrote:

 As far as I can tell, BlueZ agents work like this:

 * the agent (a UI process run by a user) calls a method on the hci daemon (run
  by root) and passes in its unique name and its (arbitrary) object path
 * later, the hci daemon calls a method on the agent

 so the only thing that can be relied on is that when the hci daemon calls
 the method, it's on the org.bluez.Agent interface!

Urf.  Can we just change this to use signals?  Signals can be sent to
a particular destination only (I'm pretty sure).

 Mitigating factor: the hci daemon runs as root, so only root needs
 permission to call arbitrary methods from the Agent interface on
 arbitrary processes at arbitrary object paths, and root can ptrace or
 impersonate hcid (or indeed dbus-daemon) anyway.

In the absence of extended security systems like SELinux, yes.



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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Filippo Giunchedi
On Wed, Jan 07, 2009 at 07:17:35PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
 On Mon, 05 Jan 2009 at 23:32:50 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
  On Mon, Jan 05, 2009 at 08:32:58PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/
   
   That will work but is not ideal; D-Bus upstream opinion seems to be that
   a bare send_interface without a corresponding send_destination is
   almost always an error (because it matches the corresponding interface on
   completely unrelated processes). Do Agent implementations have a 
   well-known
   service name you can use?
   
   Failing that, maybe you could at least match on object path as well as
   on interface?
  
  Unfortunately they don't a well known service name nor object path, agents 
  are
  user-registered
 
 Never mind. We have a lot of these rules in the archive anyway
 (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?users=pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.orgtag=fdo-18961)
 and as far as I can tell it's not a release-critical bug, particularly
 as an allow rule... so leave it like that unless D-Bus upstream can
 explain something better.
 
   Debian packages usually have a dual at_console/group-based policy for 
   device
   accesses like this (e.g. members of powerdev and netdev can use various
   interfaces on hal even if they are not at_console), by duplicating the
   permissions of the at_console policy into a separate group policy. See
   NetworkManager's configuration in Debian, for instance.
  
  Okay, given that using AF_BLUETOOTH sockets requires CAP_NET_ADMIN for some
  ioctls I'd go for netdev group, makes sense?
 
 netdev sounds the most appropriate, yes. avahi-daemon has some suitable
 postinst snippets to create the group if necessary, before telling D-Bus
 to reload:

okay, thanks, I'll put a note in NEWS.Debian too

[...]

 Apparently at_console works (or at least, can be made to work) if you have
 ConsoleKit installed, so you should have two policy sections, one for
 at_console and one for netdev, containing the same allow rules.
 
 Please go ahead with the unstable upload, but also attach the resulting
 bluetooth.conf to this bug so I can review it.

attached, note that I used AuthorizationAgent and PasskeyAgent interfaces
because that's what bluez 3.x uses while 4.x has Agent interface

filippo
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-- Groucho Marx
!-- This configuration file specifies the required security policies
 for Bluetooth core daemon to work. --

!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC -//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Bus Configuration 1.0//EN
 http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd;
busconfig

  !-- ../system.conf have denied everything, so we just punch some holes --

  policy user=root
allow own=org.bluez/
allow send_destination=org.bluez/
allow send_interface=org.bluez.PasskeyAgent/
allow send_interface=org.bluez.AuthorizationAgent/
  /policy

  policy at_console=true
allow send_destination=org.bluez/
  /policy

  policy group=netdev
allow send_destination=org.bluez/
  /policy

/busconfig


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Simon McVittie
On Wed, 07 Jan 2009 at 22:55:56 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
 On Wed, Jan 07, 2009 at 07:17:35PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
  Please go ahead with the unstable upload, but also attach the resulting
  bluetooth.conf to this bug so I can review it.
 
 attached, note that I used AuthorizationAgent and PasskeyAgent interfaces
 because that's what bluez 3.x uses while 4.x has Agent interface

Looks good to me - please ask for a freeze exception on -release too, as
we probably won't upload dbus to unstable until bluez-utils and other
such packages migrate.

Thanks,
Simon


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Simon McVittie
On Wed, 07 Jan 2009 at 15:26:31 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
 On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 3:09 PM, Simon McVittie
 simon.mcvit...@collabora.co.uk wrote:
 
  As far as I can tell, BlueZ agents work like this:
 
 Urf.  Can we just change this to use signals?  Signals can be sent to
 a particular destination only (I'm pretty sure).

As a long-term solution, that'd probably be a good thing to suggest (I've
avoided cross-posting to BlueZ upstream, until we have a consistent
recommendation to give them!)

As a solution for the current release of BlueZ, assuming that rethinking
the Agent API completely is not an option, does the proposed policy at
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?msg=59;filename=bluetooth.conf;att=1;bug=510644
need to be vetoed? It seems to me to be non-ideal, but the best we can get
right now; but I still don't fully understand the D-Bus policy language (I'm
not convinced anyone does...) so I could be wrong.

(It is intentional that the netdev group always have privileges equal to an
at_console user; that particular change is an odd Debianism caused by
ConsoleKit/pam_console/etc. not being a hard dependency.)

Thanks,
Simon


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Colin Walters
On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 6:25 PM, Simon McVittie
simon.mcvit...@collabora.co.uk wrote:

 As a solution for the current release of BlueZ, assuming that rethinking
 the Agent API completely is not an option, does the proposed policy at
 http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?msg=59;filename=bluetooth.conf;att=1;bug=510644
 need to be vetoed? It seems to me to be non-ideal, but the best we can get
 right now; but I still don't fully understand the D-Bus policy language (I'm
 not convinced anyone does...) so I could be wrong.

I think that policy is ok; but not ideal as you say.  It seems
extremely unlikely to me that it would introduce any security problem.
 Regardless hopefully bluez can move to signals over a transition
period.



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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Marcel Holtmann
Hi Colin,

  As far as I can tell, BlueZ agents work like this:
 
  * the agent (a UI process run by a user) calls a method on the hci daemon 
  (run
   by root) and passes in its unique name and its (arbitrary) object path
  * later, the hci daemon calls a method on the agent
 
  so the only thing that can be relied on is that when the hci daemon calls
  the method, it's on the org.bluez.Agent interface!
 
 Urf.  Can we just change this to use signals?  Signals can be sent to
 a particular destination only (I'm pretty sure).

that is exactly how it works and we can't use signal. Even directed
signal are not working since the method call into the agent has to
return the result or an error.

What problem do you guys actually have with this? The agent inside
bluez-gnome is verifying that the method comes from the daemon it
registers its agent with and thus there is not even a security issue
here with trying to send arbitrary method calls to the UI.

Regards

Marcel





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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-07 Thread Colin Walters
On Wed, Jan 7, 2009 at 6:41 PM, Marcel Holtmann mar...@holtmann.org wrote:

 that is exactly how it works and we can't use signal. Even directed
 signal are not working since the method call into the agent has to
 return the result or an error.

 What problem do you guys actually have with this? The agent inside
 bluez-gnome is verifying that the method comes from the daemon it
 registers its agent with and thus there is not even a security issue
 here with trying to send arbitrary method calls to the UI.

I talked with davidz about this on IRC in a bit more high bandwidth
mode; he's doing something similar with PolicyKit.  I think if the
rule is of the form:

allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent send_path=/org/bluez/Agent/

that's probably fine.  It does allow any process to send any message
with that interface and path to any other, but we're in a similar
situation with signals anyways right now.  I wouldn't call it a
problem even if it's just an allow send_interface, but ideally we
don't have many of these since they're not as strong as allow
send_destination.



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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-05 Thread Filippo Giunchedi
On Sun, Jan 04, 2009 at 08:36:57PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
 tags 510644 - fixed-upstream
 thanks
 
 On Sun, 04 Jan 2009 at 14:27:33 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
  I have tried with the experimental version of dbus and the said 
  bluetooth.conf
  file and it doesn't seem to work, though I'm investigating.
 
 Thanks. You might get better debug logging with my release candidate
 version of dbus from http://people.debian.org/~smcv/dbus-cve-2008-4311/ -
 this is what we want to push into lenny once hal, system-tools-backends,
 policykit and bluez-utils are fixed.

It seems like upstream config was missing the reply part, I got this:

  policy user=root
allow own=org.bluez/
allow send_destination=org.bluez/
allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/
  /policy

  policy at_console=true
allow receive_sender=org.bluez/
  /policy

  policy context=default
allow send_destination=org.bluez/
  /policy

and seems to work, will upload to unstable shortly.

filippo
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Bug#510644: Debian Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-05 Thread Simon McVittie
Cross-posting to D-Bus upstream and pkg-utopia Debian maintainers in an
attempt to get some clarification. We should take this to BlueZ upstream
too, once we've worked out what it is we should be recommending...

On Mon, 05 Jan 2009 at 20:32:09 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
 It seems like upstream config was missing the reply part, I got this:
 
   policy user=root
 allow own=org.bluez/
 allow send_destination=org.bluez/

Looks fine so far...

 allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/

That will work but is not ideal; D-Bus upstream opinion seems to be that
a bare send_interface without a corresponding send_destination is
almost always an error (because it matches the corresponding interface on
completely unrelated processes). Do Agent implementations have a well-known
service name you can use?

Failing that, maybe you could at least match on object path as well as
on interface?

(Sorry, I didn't spot that upstream had done this. This is
http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=18961.
deny with only a send_interface is certainly harmful; allow like
this might be OK?)

   policy at_console=true
 allow receive_sender=org.bluez/
   /policy

I think this is meant to be unnecessary in dbus 1.2.8 (and 1.2.1-5 in
Debian, which has the patches backported).

   policy context=default
 allow send_destination=org.bluez/
   /policy

Is it safe for every local user to be able to call methods on the org.bluez
service? If not, this needs fixing. To match the behaviour of the lenny
bluetooth.conf it should be in policy at_console=true, but I don't
think that ever actually worked on Debian systems unless you have
libpam-foreground or ConsoleKit (and possibly not even then).

Debian packages usually have a dual at_console/group-based policy for device
accesses like this (e.g. members of powerdev and netdev can use various
interfaces on hal even if they are not at_console), by duplicating the
permissions of the at_console policy into a separate group policy. See
NetworkManager's configuration in Debian, for instance.

 and seems to work, will upload to unstable shortly.

OK, but please don't request an unblock from the release team until we've had
some feedback from D-Bus upstream; the services whose rules don't work
seem to be the complicated ones :-(

Thanks,
Simon


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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: Debian Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-05 Thread Filippo Giunchedi
On Mon, Jan 05, 2009 at 08:32:58PM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
policy user=root
  allow own=org.bluez/
  allow send_destination=org.bluez/
 
 Looks fine so far...
 
  allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/
 
 That will work but is not ideal; D-Bus upstream opinion seems to be that
 a bare send_interface without a corresponding send_destination is
 almost always an error (because it matches the corresponding interface on
 completely unrelated processes). Do Agent implementations have a well-known
 service name you can use?
 
 Failing that, maybe you could at least match on object path as well as
 on interface?

Unfortunately they don't a well known service name nor object path, agents are
user-registered

 
 (Sorry, I didn't spot that upstream had done this. This is
 http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=18961.
 deny with only a send_interface is certainly harmful; allow like
 this might be OK?)

That is allow send_interface=org.bluez.Agent/ ?

I think so, yes. (note that upstream 4.x uses org.bluez.Agent while 3.x (which
is debian) uses org.bluez.PasskeyAgent and org.bluez.AuthorizationAgent but they
basically the same)

 
policy at_console=true
  allow receive_sender=org.bluez/
/policy
 
 I think this is meant to be unnecessary in dbus 1.2.8 (and 1.2.1-5 in
 Debian, which has the patches backported).

I just retried and indeed it seems to work without, thanks for spotting this.

 
policy context=default
  allow send_destination=org.bluez/
/policy
 
 Is it safe for every local user to be able to call methods on the org.bluez
 service? If not, this needs fixing. To match the behaviour of the lenny
 bluetooth.conf it should be in policy at_console=true, but I don't
 think that ever actually worked on Debian systems unless you have
 libpam-foreground or ConsoleKit (and possibly not even then).

Mh, no it wouldn't be safe indeed.

 
 Debian packages usually have a dual at_console/group-based policy for device
 accesses like this (e.g. members of powerdev and netdev can use various
 interfaces on hal even if they are not at_console), by duplicating the
 permissions of the at_console policy into a separate group policy. See
 NetworkManager's configuration in Debian, for instance.

Okay, given that using AF_BLUETOOTH sockets requires CAP_NET_ADMIN for some
ioctls I'd go for netdev group, makes sense?

thanks,
filippo
--
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PGP key: 0x6B79D401
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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-04 Thread Filippo Giunchedi
On Sun, Jan 04, 2009 at 01:29:44AM +, Simon McVittie wrote:
 Package: bluez-utils
 Version: 3.36-2
 Severity: serious
 Justification: blocker for #503532 (CVE-2008-4311) and far-fetched security 
 hole
 Tags: fixed-upstream
 User: pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.org
 Usertags: CVE-2008-4311
 
 bluez-utils installs a D-Bus system policy file intending to allow users
 at the console to send BlueZ messages to hcid. However, it actually
 allows users at the console to send messages to the object path '/' on
 any service, slightly subverting access control for those other services.

Agreed.

 
 Furthermore, it might be insufficient to allow everything that hcid intends to
 allow; messages used to be allowed accidentally by a dbus-daemon bug, but
 with the dbus-daemon changes targeted for lenny, they will be denied
 unless explicitly allowed.
 
 http://git.kernel.org/?p=bluetooth/bluez.git;a=history;f=src/bluetooth.conf;h=c0476237;hb=fb333f1c
 shows the recent history of this file - the latest version,
 http://git.kernel.org/?p=bluetooth/bluez.git;a=blob;f=src/bluetooth.conf;hb=06637b08,
 appears to be appropriate.

I have tried with the experimental version of dbus and the said bluetooth.conf
file and it doesn't seem to work, though I'm investigating.

thanks,
filippo
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Bug#510644: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-04 Thread Simon McVittie
tags 510644 - fixed-upstream
thanks

On Sun, 04 Jan 2009 at 14:27:33 +0100, Filippo Giunchedi wrote:
 I have tried with the experimental version of dbus and the said bluetooth.conf
 file and it doesn't seem to work, though I'm investigating.

Thanks. You might get better debug logging with my release candidate
version of dbus from http://people.debian.org/~smcv/dbus-cve-2008-4311/ -
this is what we want to push into lenny once hal, system-tools-backends,
policykit and bluez-utils are fixed.

Regards,
Simon


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Processed: Re: [Pkg-bluetooth-maintainers] Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-04 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Processing commands for cont...@bugs.debian.org:

 tags 510644 - fixed-upstream
Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus
Tags were: fixed-upstream
Tags removed: fixed-upstream

 thanks
Stopping processing here.

Please contact me if you need assistance.

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Bug#510644: bluetooth.conf needs alterations for new D-Bus

2009-01-03 Thread Simon McVittie
Package: bluez-utils
Version: 3.36-2
Severity: serious
Justification: blocker for #503532 (CVE-2008-4311) and far-fetched security hole
Tags: fixed-upstream
User: pkg-utopia-maintain...@lists.alioth.debian.org
Usertags: CVE-2008-4311

bluez-utils installs a D-Bus system policy file intending to allow users
at the console to send BlueZ messages to hcid. However, it actually
allows users at the console to send messages to the object path '/' on
any service, slightly subverting access control for those other services.

Furthermore, it might be insufficient to allow everything that hcid intends to
allow; messages used to be allowed accidentally by a dbus-daemon bug, but
with the dbus-daemon changes targeted for lenny, they will be denied
unless explicitly allowed.

http://git.kernel.org/?p=bluetooth/bluez.git;a=history;f=src/bluetooth.conf;h=c0476237;hb=fb333f1c
shows the recent history of this file - the latest version,
http://git.kernel.org/?p=bluetooth/bluez.git;a=blob;f=src/bluetooth.conf;hb=06637b08,
appears to be appropriate.

Regards from the Cambridge BSP,
Simon


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