Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
Perhaps we should find time to hack at DebConf -T On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 5:16 PM, Steve McIntyre st...@einval.com wrote: On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 01:38:44PM -0700, Ben Hutchings wrote: So far as I know, no progress has been made on the above steps or any alternate approach. Ditto, I've not seen (or done) anything about this. -- Steve McIntyre, Cambridge, UK.st...@einval.com Mature Sporty Personal More Innovation More Adult A Man in Dandism Powered Midship Specialty -- :wq -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-cd-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: https://lists.debian.org/CAO6P2QQQaRyyJ=35Vm=Ux+xst=ln56t5uv0kx8oj3dkwyr6...@mail.gmail.com
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
On Thu, 2014-08-14 at 23:38 +0200, Cyril Brulebois wrote: [...] 1. Colin Watson will prepare dak changes to support upload and subsequent signing of EFI executables. (This is an embedded, not detached, signature.) 2. Steve Langasek will prepare and upload a package of the 'shim' EFI boot loader. This will embed our own set of public keys (corresponding to those used by dak) and can load any other EFI executable signed by one of them. Later, there will be a shim-signed package containing the same executable with a Microsoft signature. (This costs money and takes several days, but shim should require only very infrequent changes.) 3. Colin Watson will update the GRUB package to build a to-be-signed monolithic EFI executable separate from the package. Then he will add a grub-signed package that includes the Debian-signed executable from the archive. This executable would be suitable for use on both removable media and the installed system. 4. The kernel team may also need to upload kernel images for signing and add linux-image-signed packages with the Debian-signed kernel images. This is because some quirks in the kernel should be run before calling ExitBootServices(). could you please tell us whether anything changed during the past year? Is there any chance we could think of having SB in jessie, or should we consider it an unreasonable goal for this release and concentrate on other things? So far as I know, no progress has been made on the above steps or any alternate approach. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Anthony's Law of Force: Don't force it, get a larger hammer. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 01:38:44PM -0700, Ben Hutchings wrote: So far as I know, no progress has been made on the above steps or any alternate approach. Ditto, I've not seen (or done) anything about this. -- Steve McIntyre, Cambridge, UK.st...@einval.com Mature Sporty Personal More Innovation More Adult A Man in Dandism Powered Midship Specialty -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-cd-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: https://lists.debian.org/20140819211641.gi7...@einval.com
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
Hi Ben, Ben Hutchings b...@decadent.org.uk (2013-08-13): Colin Watson and Stefano Rivera talked about how Ubuntu had implemented Secure Boot and what they believed were the requirements. Apparently, the Secure Boot spec requires each stage of the boot code to validate signatures only until ExitBootServices() is called. (At this point the firmware makes some parts of its non-volatile configuration inaccessible.) While some users would probably like to be able to 'lock down' the kernel, requiring signed modules and disabling other kernel features that allow code injection, this does not seem to be a requirement for booting on systems that implement Windows 8 logo requirements in the usual way, i.e. that require a Microsoft-signed first stage boot loader. There seemed to be a consensus that we could use an implementation quite similar to Ubuntu's. Some may be concerned that use of a Microsoft signing key results in a non-free binary, but so long as the target machines (amd64 architecture) generally allow installation of alternate public keys this is not so different from the way that APT on a Debian system requires Debian-signed Release files by default. So the plan seems to be: 1. Colin Watson will prepare dak changes to support upload and subsequent signing of EFI executables. (This is an embedded, not detached, signature.) 2. Steve Langasek will prepare and upload a package of the 'shim' EFI boot loader. This will embed our own set of public keys (corresponding to those used by dak) and can load any other EFI executable signed by one of them. Later, there will be a shim-signed package containing the same executable with a Microsoft signature. (This costs money and takes several days, but shim should require only very infrequent changes.) 3. Colin Watson will update the GRUB package to build a to-be-signed monolithic EFI executable separate from the package. Then he will add a grub-signed package that includes the Debian-signed executable from the archive. This executable would be suitable for use on both removable media and the installed system. 4. The kernel team may also need to upload kernel images for signing and add linux-image-signed packages with the Debian-signed kernel images. This is because some quirks in the kernel should be run before calling ExitBootServices(). could you please tell us whether anything changed during the past year? Is there any chance we could think of having SB in jessie, or should we consider it an unreasonable goal for this release and concentrate on other things? Mraw, KiBi. signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 12:30:55AM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: Editing of binary packages is icky, so that's not part of the plan. Instead, after dak signs an executable, the package maintainer downloads and copies those into a separate 'source' package, which has a trivial debian/rules. (And of course will generate an appropriate 'Built-Using' header.) This will most likely go via by-hand. So a script on the dak side is needed anyway. Why not do the dummy source package stuff in this script and let dak do all the work semi-automatically? It needs a prepared binary tree in a tar, a list of files to be signed and a DEBIAN dir. Bastian -- Landru! Guide us! -- A Beta 3-oid, The Return of the Archons, stardate 3157.4 -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-cd-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/20130814094925.ga16...@mail.waldi.eu.org
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
Cyril Brulebois wrote: (Sorry, I'm new to all this) do you mean (1) the regular linux image packages are getting a signature added, and we're using those like we do today, or (2) that we'll have additional linux image packages with the signatures to be used instead of the usual linux image packages when a Secure Boot environment is detected? (or (3) something else…) The secure boot shim is a small bootloader. It's the only part that absolutely needs to be signed by MS, AIUI. It was designed to facilitate distributions in our position. Signed versions are also already available, produced by DD Matthew Garret, though not as Debian packages (perhaps he could be convinced to maintain it?) http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/20303.html http://www.codon.org.uk/~mjg59/shim-signed/ (Assuming the plan is to use Matthew's shim and not the other one created by IIRC, the Linux Foundation.) -- see shy jo signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Plan of action for Secure Boot support
On Tue, 2013-08-13 at 23:38 +0200, Cyril Brulebois wrote: [...] 4. The kernel team may also need to upload kernel images for signing and add linux-image-signed packages with the Debian-signed kernel images. This is because some quirks in the kernel should be run before calling ExitBootServices(). (Sorry, I'm new to all this) do you mean (1) the regular linux image packages are getting a signature added, and we're using those like we do today, or (2) that we'll have additional linux image packages with the signatures to be used instead of the usual linux image packages when a Secure Boot environment is detected? (or (3) something else…) [...] Signing of EFI executables (aside from MS signature on shim) would be done by dak and would require manual intervention from the FTP team. Editing of binary packages is icky, so that's not part of the plan. Instead, after dak signs an executable, the package maintainer downloads and copies those into a separate 'source' package, which has a trivial debian/rules. (And of course will generate an appropriate 'Built-Using' header.) I suppose GRUB's Linux configuration generator will also need to prefer a signed vmlinuz (whatever name it gets) to the unsigned version. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Any smoothly functioning technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
