Still Failing: g-i-installation_debian_sid_daily_hurd_lxde/228

2016-09-21 Thread jenkins
See 
https://jenkins.debian.net/job/g-i-installation_debian_sid_daily_hurd_lxde/228/ 
and 
https://jenkins.debian.net/job/g-i-installation_debian_sid_daily_hurd_lxde/228//console
 and 
https://jenkins.debian.net/job/g-i-installation_debian_sid_daily_hurd_lxde/228//artifact/results/
 if there are any.

Re: Porter roll call for Debian Stretch

2016-09-21 Thread Christian Seiler
On 09/21/2016 08:41 AM, Riku Voipio wrote:
> AFAIK Address space randomizing is not really helpful on 32 bit 
> architectures - there is just not that many places to randomize to[1].

Well, sure, but there's still a huge difference in an explot with
100% reliability, or an exploit that will just crash the program
in 95% of cases. Sure, if there's an easy way to repeatedly try
the exploit 20 times, it won't be a show-stopper, but it will
make the life of people who want to exploit a flaw just a tiny
bit harder.

> At least previously, PIE added ~10% to binary size,

At least on x86 there have been substantial improvements in
receent gcc versions when it comes to PIE support, so the impact
of PIE on executables even on 32bit is a lot smaller than it used
to be. I don't know about ARM though.

Consider the following two data points:

 - A _lot_ of code in Debian is in shared libraries, which are
   compiled with -fPIC anyway. Many executables only spend a
   fraction of their instructions in the executable code itself.

 - It's been considered best practice to enable PIE executables
   if possible (via hardening=+all or similar), so many programs
   in Debian (and e.g. all of my packages except one) already
   use that. I suspect that a lot of of code that you are
   currently running is already PIE, especially in the packages
   that are more actively maintained.

Regards,
Christian



Re: Porter roll call for Debian Stretch

2016-09-21 Thread Riku Voipio
On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 09:16:00PM +, Niels Thykier wrote:
> Over all, most people (who answered it) was positive towards the switch.
>  Based on this, I suspect that if we make PIE default in Stretch, then
> we will do it for all architectures.  That said, you will be notified if
> that default changes for Stretch.

Is this just for ASLR, or is ther another motivating factor for PIE?

AFAIK Address space randomizing is not really helpful on 32 bit 
architectures - there is just not that many places to randomize to[1].
At least previously, PIE added ~10% to binary size, which can have a major
performance impact on the 32-bit arm core's that don't have much cache to
begin with.

Riku
[1] https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/asrandom.pdf



Processed: retitle 838392 to hurd should not build hurd-dev at stage2

2016-09-21 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Processing commands for cont...@bugs.debian.org:

> retitle 838392 hurd should not build hurd-dev at stage2
Bug #838392 [hurd] dpkg: should build-depend on hurd-dev
Changed Bug title to 'hurd should not build hurd-dev at stage2' from 'dpkg: 
should build-depend on hurd-dev'.
> thanks
Stopping processing here.

Please contact me if you need assistance.
-- 
838392: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=838392
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact ow...@bugs.debian.org with problems



Processed: Re: Bug#838392: dpkg: should build-depend on hurd-dev

2016-09-21 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Processing control commands:

> reassign -1 hurd
Bug #838392 [dpkg] dpkg: should build-depend on hurd-dev
Bug reassigned from package 'dpkg' to 'hurd'.
No longer marked as found in versions dpkg/1.18.10.
Ignoring request to alter fixed versions of bug #838392 to the same values 
previously set
> block -1 by 818618
Bug #838392 [hurd] dpkg: should build-depend on hurd-dev
838392 was not blocked by any bugs.
838392 was not blocking any bugs.
Added blocking bug(s) of 838392: 818618

-- 
838392: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=838392
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact ow...@bugs.debian.org with problems