Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread aliban

Hello,

Maintainers remember: it's much better to *not* install/activate a network
service than to have a service, even if it's chrooted, or running under lower
privileges (like the ahavi maintainers describe in
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/MainInclusionReportAvahi) which, BTW, is not that
common. The keyword here is 'exposure'.


 The avahi-daemon is nicely chrooted, and runs under a different user.
 You just can't have the functionality of plug'n'play on a network
 without any central server without listening at some point to
 something...
  

Can you please count the open ports on your system? Are there still
telnet, timeserver, sunrpc ... waiting for connections?
Why did you disable them?

I am sure this was discussed several times in the past. Anyway, it is an
open secret to better not connect your new installed debian to internet
until you have switched down all these security-riscs (Btw. with new
installed windows XP you should better not connect to the internet
without activating a firewall first and updating your system because
otherwise you will get infected with some worm within minutes... - I am
sure Windows Vista will disable all listening services until the user
turns them on or at least activate a firewall by default for internet
access). I am sure most debian users and admins will say something like
But this is debian..., Admin is responsible for security... or root
must know what he is doing
I think this is a general security problem here. You are right,
plug'n'play is cool thing the normal user want. But I also asume that
this normal user wont be aware of this listening port, don't you think
so? Please count the open ports on your systems again... how many are
there? Maybe samba, even maybe ssh and apache and maybe this avahi (that
is not as known as the rest). I think it is justified to ask the
user/admin to activate this avahi thing... I don't think the user's will
get spamed with these kind of questions even if we would have this as a
general rule.

People can have the avahi-feature anyway and I think asking *one* time a
security related question would be a good thing. In addition to that
unexperienced users will learn the general rule that an open port is a
security risk!

Really, do *almost all* rhythmbox users need to share music (and 
consequentely need
ahavi)? 


 That's not the point, the point is to make it easy to do so.  And yes,
 a lot of users share music between computers.  Those people want that
 to be simple.  You can't cut every feature out because only 10% of the
 users use it.

 It's not like you're running Rhythmbox on a firewall, and iptables is
 still there, you can remove avahi, you can configure it not to start
 etc.

Better let a user explicitly activate it if he needs it. That
application can suggest him to do so if the rhytmbox-power-user will
press the button browse for music...



regards


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Re: first A record of security.debian.org extremely slow

2006-03-03 Thread Rolf Kutz
* Quoting Marc Haber ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):

 On Thu, Mar 02, 2006 at 11:09:28PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
  
  I typically use an Exim .forward file which invokes a special script
  using pipe.  The script creates a file, and a cron job which runs
  periodically checks for the existence of that file and performs the
  desired action when it exists.  This means that DSA sent in quick
  succession only trigger the action once.
 
 So you have debian-security subscribed on all systems, and all systems
 need to run a publicly reachable mail system?

You can trigger the update via ssh or wget.

- Rolf


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Re: first A record of security.debian.org extremely slow

2006-03-03 Thread Marc Haber
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 11:11:30AM +0100, Rolf Kutz wrote:
 You can trigger the update via ssh or wget.

The entire scheme strikes me as reinventing a mechanism which has been
existing for years now, being called cron-apt.

Greetings
Marc

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
Hi,

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, aliban wrote:
 Can you please count the open ports on your system? Are there still
 telnet, timeserver, sunrpc ... waiting for connections?

 On my system?  nmap reports:
53/tcp open  domain

 Some netstat digging shows:
 tcp0  0 0.0.0.0:53  0.0.0.0:*
 LISTEN 18007/pdnsd
 udp0  0 0.0.0.0:53530.0.0.0:*
 29989/avahi-daemon

 And so what?  Do you want to proove me it listens on the network?
 That's by design, the point is to listen for queries.

 Why did you disable them?

 I didn't disable anything, I installed what I wanted.  I installed
 iptables and have set it up too.

 I am sure this was discussed several times in the past. Anyway, it is an
 open secret to better not connect your new installed debian to internet
 until you have switched down all these security-riscs (Btw. with new
 installed windows XP you should better not connect to the internet
 without activating a firewall first and updating your system because
 otherwise you will get infected with some worm within minutes... - I am
 sure Windows Vista will disable all listening services until the user
 turns them on or at least activate a firewall by default for internet
 access). I am sure most debian users and admins will say something like
 But this is debian..., Admin is responsible for security... or root
 must know what he is doing

 This is a desktop machine, it should permit sharing of files on your
 local network.  DNS servers have their port 53 open to respond to name
 resolution queries, just consider your desktop installation to be a
 name server responding to stuff such as what services are available,
 what shares are available etc.

 I think this is a general security problem here. You are right,
 plug'n'play is cool thing the normal user want. But I also asume that
 this normal user wont be aware of this listening port, don't you think
 so?

 Do you have any other solution permitting the same functionalities, but
 without the listening port?  I'm listening to any suggestions.  BTW,
 this is a standard, that other software is adhering, such as Apple's
 iTunes.  Will your solution permit interoperability with iTunes?

 Please count the open ports on your systems again... how many are
 there? Maybe samba, even maybe ssh and apache and maybe this avahi (that
 is not as known as the rest). I think it is justified to ask the
 user/admin to activate this avahi thing... I don't think the user's will
 get spamed with these kind of questions even if we would have this as a
 general rule.

 Sure, I'm fine with a debconf question permitting for example *not* to
 start avahi.  It's just that this question will only be visible for
 certain priorities (for example only for priority = low, or medium),
 and will default to enable avahi (as for other daemons, and so that it
 works out of the box).

 But you are doing nice in pointing at typical services running on a
 desktop machine:
 - apache2 (and will be even more common with gnome-suer-share and DAV
   file sharing)
 - samba

 Does any of these run chrooted like avahi does?  Samba even runs as
 root.  Which of samba or avahi has the power to change file ownership,
 permissions, or simply to serve sensible files such as /etc/shadow?

 People can have the avahi-feature anyway and I think asking *one* time a
 security related question would be a good thing. In addition to that
 unexperienced users will learn the general rule that an open port is a
 security risk!

 Sure, no problem.

 Better let a user explicitly activate it if he needs it. That
 application can suggest him to do so if the rhytmbox-power-user will
 press the button browse for music...

 Well, no: that's the opposite of plug'n'play.  See, if you're USB stick
 contains a malicious vfat file system, it gets automatically mounted
 nevertheless.  It's a feature.

   Cheers,

-- 
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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
 (This reply was started some days ago, but I thought it might be best
  to wait a little before responding to you.  Besides, I took some time
  to document myself on some of the issues you mentionned.)

Hi,

On Wed, Feb 22, 2006, Michael Stone wrote:
 (nss-mdns does mdns too, but it's not related to avahi)
 Package: avahi-daemon
 Recommends: libnss-mdns
 The dependency chains here get a little scary.

 Indeed, but it's even worse! avahi-daemon recommends libnss-mdns which
 recommends zeroconf.  However, both Recommends are bogus.  There's a
 bug against the second one, and I talked a little with Sjoerd on the
 first one, and it seems it's not required either, it's more of
 something until we get a mdns task.

 So yes, you're correct, this is a scary dependency, which shouldn't be
 there.  Nor the libnss-mdns dependency on zeroconf shouldn't be there
 (it should be the other way around actually).

 And zeroconf is a software which is known to cause some trouble in
 existing network configurations (not avahi alone).

 From a security point of view, everything feature introduce risk.  If
 you base all you reasonning on security, that is if you make security
 rule number 1, you get zero feature.
 And if you introduce questionable features with huge security 
 implications without thinking them through you get a real mess which is 
 going to take a lot of work down the road to clean up. There's a real 
 danger inherent in focusing on a particular bit of functionality and 
 ignoring its larger implications, *especially* in a project as large as 
 debian.

 If music sharing is a questionable feature to you, you don't need to
 discuss this further, you're obviously the security guy, talking in
 debian-security@ of stuff he doesn't want to support security-wise, and
 don't want to see running on his server.  Would this discussion happen
 on a multimedia list, the situation would be kind of the opposite, and
 people would be shouting loud if that wasn't pulled in by default.

 The rest of your point is simply too fuzzy to discuss any further,
 you're being too general sorry.

 You can't take the decision to remove a feature because most people
 install GNOME for other reasons than that feature.  Otherwise one would
 use the same reasonning for all features in GNOME and remove them all.
 Your logic is frankly questionable. Anytime you start with a
 proposition like making that decision equates to removing every 
 possible feature you're probably making a logical leap.

 Probably, I certainly don't have to discuss all features as painfully
 as this one.  But there's no other way to get it, the point being in
 not having any central server, you have to listen for requests.  Any
 other proposal to implement the functionality and interoperability with
 iTunes is welcome.

 Besides, the work is done quite cleanly with a chroot and a separate
 user.

 But sure, a small door has been opened which wasn't there before.

 I don't see any of those appearing on any network I maintain. I've now 
 trumped your assertion with one of my own, do I win something?

 That's outrageous, the fact you don't have anything on your network is
 a real pity, it means you simply have no ground to talk on the feature
 you want absolutely removed.  I've seen a lot of types of shares while
 browsing various networks, the latest of which were the networks of
 geeks at FOSDEM: typically a mixture of feature-maniacs, and
 security-paranoiacs.  Surprisingly, lot's of stuff was advertized
 there, ranging from music and file shares to SSH, HTTP, or SFTP
 servers.

 Will other people at FOSDEM confirm this?  Just install the
 service-discovery-applet and switch networks for a while.

On any 
 *managed* network I don't think that having stuff like this appear out 
 of nowhere is particularly beneficial. On a small home network I'm not 
 convinced it buys you anything because you're not generally dealing with 
 enough stuff to need a service location solution. I'm sure its 
 potentially very useful on geeky home networks with lots of systems and 
 services, but I'm not sure that's a reasonable basis for a default 
 configuration.

 Right, people running Debian or Ubuntu at home are typically not
 interested in sharing music between computers at home.

 I completely agree with the managed network part, but in such a
 network:
 - would you have music players installed?
 - wouldn't you filter out any other port than HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP?

   Cheers,

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
Hi there,

 For people on the list interested in the discussion, Michael Stone has
 filed #355064, where the discussion went on.

   Bye,
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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
  This is a desktop machine, it should permit sharing of files on your
  local network.  DNS servers have their port 53 open to respond to name

In what planet do you live?  Desktop machines are plugged to extremely
hostile networks all the time (think cable modems).

There is no *should* here, at all.

  Well, no: that's the opposite of plug'n'play.  See, if you're USB stick
  contains a malicious vfat file system, it gets automatically mounted
  nevertheless.  It's a feature.

Not in my servers, it doesn't.  And I should add, not even in my desktops:
all removable filesystems are mounted nodev, nosuid.

Mounting malicious filesystems automatically (vfat can't be one AFAIK, but
it won't bork if you tell it to be nosuid, nodev either) is never a feature,
it is a security hole.

Actually, should we not file security bugs against everything that comes
configured to mount removable filesystems out-of-the box and does so without
specifying nodev, nosuid ?

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Stone

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 02:36:38PM +0100, Loïc Minier wrote:

Do you have any other solution permitting the same functionalities, but
without the listening port?  


No. If someone wants that functionality than that's how they need to get 
it. The question has always been about what level of effort is necessary 
on the user's part to enable that functionality.



But you are doing nice in pointing at typical services running on a
desktop machine:
- apache2 (and will be even more common with gnome-suer-share and DAV
  file sharing)
- samba


You think that's part of a typical desktop system? Fascinating. 


Does any of these run chrooted like avahi does?  Samba even runs as
root.  Which of samba or avahi has the power to change file ownership,
permissions, or simply to serve sensible files such as /etc/shadow?


You continue with the specious arguments. What non-server dependency 
pulls in samba? What dependency pulls in gnome-user-share? The argument 
isn't whether someone who intentionally installs a package should get 
the functionality of the package, it's about what kind of side-effects 
might unknowningly be enabled by someone installing an apparantly 
unrelated package.


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Stone

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 02:45:28PM +0100, Loïc Minier wrote:

Indeed, but it's even worse! avahi-daemon recommends libnss-mdns which
recommends zeroconf.  However, both Recommends are bogus.  There's a
bug against the second one, and I talked a little with Sjoerd on the
first one, and it seems it's not required either, it's more of
something until we get a mdns task.

So yes, you're correct, this is a scary dependency, which shouldn't be
there.  


Ok, that sounds much better.


If music sharing is a questionable feature to you, you don't need to
discuss this further, you're obviously the security guy, talking in
debian-security@ of stuff he doesn't want to support security-wise, and
don't want to see running on his server.  Would this discussion happen
on a multimedia list, the situation would be kind of the opposite, and
people would be shouting loud if that wasn't pulled in by default.


Well, that's why I reconsidered requesting changes to rhythmbox and 
suggested its removal from the generic gnome dependency instead. If 
the dependency chain was initiated by something a lot more specific than 
gnome (for example, music sharing or something) I'd feel a lot more 
comfortable with it.  The problem here is that music playing is 
bluring into music serving, and IMO the communities interested in each 
don't necessarily overlap. I've never questioned whether there are 
people who want to share music, only how much functionality in that 
direction should be provided without a more explicit sign of interest 
from the user.



The rest of your point is simply too fuzzy to discuss any further,
you're being too general sorry.


Well, it's a general problem. Every network service you enable has some 
risk. Some functionality requires network services. The decision about 
what services should be enabled on a fairly common out-of-the-box 
configuration should be made at the big-picture level, not at the level 
of a developer trying to maximize the functionality of a particular 
package. Unfortunately debian doesn't much concept of a steering 
committee.



That's outrageous, the fact you don't have anything on your network is
a real pity, 


Whoa, I didn't say I didn't have services on my network, I said that I 
don't have magical self-initiating services. If I want to provide 
something I make a decision to do so and give it a sensible/appropriate 
name service entry. I don't want my appliances or workstations deciding 
for themselves whether they should be services. As a matter of fact I 
have a music server on my (home) network--one that I specifically 
configured and enabled, and which isn't a workstation.



I completely agree with the managed network part, but in such a
network:
- would you have music players installed?


Why not? I find listening to some music at my desk to be nice. That gets 
back to the now-blurred line between music *player* and music *sharer*. 


- wouldn't you filter out any other port than HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP?


I don't get that question.

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Stone

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 10:47:56AM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:

Not in my servers, it doesn't.  And I should add, not even in my desktops:
all removable filesystems are mounted nodev, nosuid.

Mounting malicious filesystems automatically (vfat can't be one AFAIK, but
it won't bork if you tell it to be nosuid, nodev either) is never a feature,
it is a security hole.


Well, a filesystem can be malicious whether it's mounted nosuid or not. 
Consider the case of a crafted directory structure that tickles a kernel 
bug, for example. There's no question that making things easier for 
desktop users adds risks, the question is where to strike the balence.


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Michael Stone wrote:
 On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 10:47:56AM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
 Mounting malicious filesystems automatically (vfat can't be one AFAIK, but
 it won't bork if you tell it to be nosuid, nodev either) is never a 
 feature,
 it is a security hole.
 
 Well, a filesystem can be malicious whether it's mounted nosuid or not. 
 Consider the case of a crafted directory structure that tickles a kernel 
 bug, for example. There's no question that making things easier for 

True.  But that requires a broken kernel, which we patch regularly as a
security procedure anyway.  Mounting removable filesystems suid,dev allow a
lot more damage *by design* in the standard Linux security-model.

So, I repeat my question: should we hunt down and file bugs (grave or worse)
on packages automounting removable media without nosid, nodev ?

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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automounting (was Re: avahi-daemon)

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Stone

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 11:20:56AM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:

So, I repeat my question: should we hunt down and file bugs (grave or worse)
on packages automounting removable media without nosid, nodev ?


Here's what I'd suggest:

Write a policy that covers best practices and see how current 
implementations map to it. Enter a dialog with maintainers of packages 
which do something else. See if you can get consensus. Address any 
concerns. At that point you can try to get the policy formalized. 


The problem is scoped tightly enough that it doesn't appear intractable.

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
  If music sharing is a questionable feature to you, you don't need to
  discuss this further, you're obviously the security guy, talking in
  debian-security@ of stuff he doesn't want to support security-wise, and

You are *not allowed* to support security holes by the Social Contract, on
the grounds that they can cause far more damage to users than whatever
benefits they might bring.  So drop the attitude.  We're trying for a
middle-ground solution, here.

  don't want to see running on his server.  Would this discussion happen
  on a multimedia list, the situation would be kind of the opposite, and
  people would be shouting loud if that wasn't pulled in by default.

Then they can (read: should) use DeMudi, and DeMudi has all the excuses in
the world to ship with all mdns services enabled by default.  The Debian
project *officially* recognizes the need for specialized distributions, you
know.

OTOH, when you package for Debian, you are doing the general distribution
packaging.  You are not allowed to cather to any special group needs in
detriment of security, expect a lot of complaining if you do.

So let's work on a way to reach a middle ground, shall we?  In fact, I think
you already stated in another post that a master switch would be fine, so
this discursion could very well end here and now.

  not having any central server, you have to listen for requests.  Any
  other proposal to implement the functionality and interoperability with
  iTunes is welcome.

The master switch addresses both your needs, and the security ones.  All you
need to do is not to hide it if you're shipping it with the default being
the less secure choice.

IMHO, make it priority medium, use a shared template that all mdns services
can use (there is no reason why we shouldn't generalize this solution), and
you can default to mdns enabled.  Do not use priority low, unless you are
going to default to mdns disabled.

  Besides, the work is done quite cleanly with a chroot and a separate
  user.

Yes, which is good.  But don't feel singled out, we are just as severe with
every package.  A lot of them decided to ship bound to localhost for this
reason.  Others implement master switches through debconf.  Others prefer to
ship with functionality disabled.

As for using a separate user, that is the *rule*, not the exception.  Yes,
some crap in Debian still wants to run as root by default for dubious
reasons, but that's not the rule anymore.

  That's outrageous, the fact you don't have anything on your network is

No, it is not.  Your assumptions are just that, assumptions.  And they may
not be right.

Do not assume you can even *run* an active (as opposed to a passive -
listens only, never transmits) mdns service in a network just because a
package that has mdns capabilities was installed: you cannot know that.

Above all, never ever assume desktops are plugged to trusted networks. That
is, in fact, outrageous.

  I completely agree with the managed network part, but in such a
  network:
  - would you have music players installed?
  - wouldn't you filter out any other port than HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP?

Inside the network?  Most managed networks have filtering at the borders, at
key router nodes, and if it has a more advanced distributed-firewall
mentality, on the all of the important boxes themselves (but that usually
doesn't reach the workstations).

Sure, there are places where the local workstations have remote-controlled
firewalls, but they're not common (and AFAIK rarely used for anything but
emergency virus/worm spread control).

That said, music players are quite often allowed in a lot of managed
networks.  I never worked at a place where they were forbidden, in fact (but
that doesn't mean music *sharing* is allowed).

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: first A record of security.debian.org extremely slow

2006-03-03 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 11:13:52AM +0100, Marc Haber wrote:
 On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 11:11:30AM +0100, Rolf Kutz wrote:
  You can trigger the update via ssh or wget.
 
 The entire scheme strikes me as reinventing a mechanism which has been
 existing for years now, being called cron-apt.

I don't believe it does. Cron-apt is a pull mechanism (download the
latest packages, check if there are upgrades and notify the admin). 
A mail filter which parses the DSAs and tells people to update is a push
mechanism. 

Notice that in the later (push) you could have somebody review if the
update is critical enough, or only tell systems to upgrade once the patch
has been tested internally. That seems easier to me than, in the pull system,
set up an intermediate mirror of security.debian.org with *approved* updates,
have the systems update automatically and have a sysadmin move the updates
from the official mirror over to that internal mirror based on whether the
update is critical or not.

Also, in my mind's view, a push mechanism is bound to be more effective than
probing the security mirror daily and could also be capable of narrowing the
time between patch release and installation (if automated) since you don't
have to wait for a given point in time to make the check.

Florian, in any case, I see no mentioning of where those scripts being
available. Are they?

Regards

Javier


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 02:36:38PM +0100, Loïc Minier wrote:
  This is a desktop machine, it should permit sharing of files on your
  local network.  DNS servers have their port 53 open to respond to name
  resolution queries, just consider your desktop installation to be a
  name server responding to stuff such as what services are available,
  what shares are available etc.

/me looks doumbfounded

Excuse me? Since when does a typical desktop machine provide users to share
*music* on a local network? (Don't tergiverse the fact that ahdavi is used,
in rythmbox, to share music, not files)

And for the same thing, why would a typical desktop machine provide users
to share even files! My desktop system at home (and my parent's and my
uncle's and whatnot) are completely stand-alone desktop systems, connected to
the Internet, with no LAN. They only need to talk to their (serial or USB
connected) printer, that's all!

I'm surprised that the over-bloat of Windows' desktop is now considered to be
the good way of doing things.

:-(

Javier


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
(IMHO this dicussion is reaching to a point in which it should move to
d-devel instead, but I'll keep it here)

On Thu, Mar 02, 2006 at 09:06:27PM +0100, Loïc Minier wrote:
 On Thu, Feb 23, 2006, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote:
  IMHO the problem here is having a music program (as rhythmbox) Recommends:
  avahi-daemon, when IMHO it should be Suggests: . The functionality
  provided by avahi-daemon (a network service for sharing music) is not 
  something
  I would say that all rhythmbox users require (based on rhythmbox' 
  description, which
  looks like a music library organization tool for me). However, it will get 
  it
  installed per default by users using 'aptitude' (not 'apt') which is the
  recommended tool these days.
 
  It would be overly complicated to handle the case of a Suggests instead
  of a Recommends correctly: even if the code was updated to handle both

Overly complicated? You are overestimating it. It's as simple with a
Suggests: as with a Recommends: (people still use 'apt-get' which does not
pull in Recommends: automatically). 

The software cannot rely on it being installed so it should check if the
thing it needs is there, if it's not then it asks the user to install it.
This can be an error in STDERR (as it is now, I believe) but, more elegantly,
could be a window message instructing users what to do and what they gain
(and lose) if they do (or don't). It's not that complicated.

  cases at run time, and would hide the relevant options when these are
  not available, the documentation would still point at unavailable
  features.

So? The whole point of documentation is to tell people how to do stuff.
Rhythmbox' section on Share music should start with You need to have 
installed for this feature to work. That's it. As simple as that.

And the popup mixing application level information with package level
  information would also be awful: You should install package foo to get
  this functionality.

That's been done for ages. Let me bring you a new use case for your
consideration (recent in my mind) and related to Suggests/Recommends and
enhanced program functionality of another (buggy) program which is music
related.

First, I would like you to take a look at the ITU's statistics 
(available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/), you can see there
that the average number of PCs per *100* habitants for European countries (in
the year 2004) is 28.48 [1]

Based on that, you could assume that having more than one computer per
household is not all that common. So, I *believe* that your average 
computer home user is typically going to extract music from CDs (to listen in
their computer or on other devices, like MP3 players) more, on average, than
sharing with neighbour PCs.

Now, take a look at Grip (install it), it's an application to extract audio
data from CDs. Grip is useless unless you install additional encoders.  If
you don't have them (and there are in it's Suggests: or Depends:) then the
software should instruct you to go and install them. Grip fails to do so
properly, and people bug it often. There's no MP3 encoder in the Debian
archive, what should Grip do then? 

a) suggest: or recommend: inexistant packages [2]
b) download and install an MP3 encoder on installation from somewhere lease
c) subrepticiously package an mp3 encoder in the Debian package and bypass
   the FTP masters
d) fail to work, and tell user that he cannot find an encoding program
e) document the fact that there are no MP3 encoders in Debian and that you
   have to fetch them somewhere else

IMHO, it should do d) and e) not try to be smarter than the user and do a),
b) or c) just for the sake of plug and play. It fails to do so properly
(there is no documentation regarding the lack of MP3 encoders in Debian)
and so it get bugged to oblivion. Should have it taken the plug and play
option, b) or c), it could probably work out of the box, but then it would be
violating an (unwritten) Debian policy, right?

Do you see still think that the argument for the sake of Plug  Play, for
the sake of the average user should brandished in front of people as an
excuse for not doing things properly?

  You might as well get the issue documented in the RB BTS if you want,
  I'll simply link to this thread where I clearly state that I think it's
  a desirable feature which should be working by default.  :)

I don't agree with you here and if I get to see avahi being installed in a
default GNOME install in Debian and will make damn sure that I get to see it
removed.

  The dep was strict because RB wouldn't start without it.  Now it will
  start, but with a warning.  I'm quite sure you can get it to crash if
  avahi isn't there though, but that's a bug.

Then it's a bug, and it should be fixed in RB. 

  The avahi-daemon is nicely chrooted, and runs under a different user.
  You just can't have the functionality of plug'n'play on a network
  without any central server without listening at some point to
 

Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
Hi,

On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
 On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
   If music sharing is a questionable feature to you, you don't need to
   discuss this further, you're obviously the security guy, talking in
   debian-security@ of stuff he doesn't want to support security-wise, and
 You are *not allowed* to support security holes by the Social Contract, on
 the grounds that they can cause far more damage to users than whatever
 benefits they might bring.  So drop the attitude.  We're trying for a
 middle-ground solution, here.

 The Social Contract empowers me to serve our users.  This is what I
 believe I'm doing.  What about *you* drop the attitude.  *I'm* trying
 for a middle-ground solution too, as long as it works by default.  I
 proposed multiple options in other posts, all of them ignored.  People
 *not* trying for a middle-ground solution are those claiming an open
 port by default is unacceptable, no matter what.

   don't want to see running on his server.  Would this discussion happen
   on a multimedia list, the situation would be kind of the opposite, and
   people would be shouting loud if that wasn't pulled in by default.
 Then they can (read: should) use DeMudi, and DeMudi has all the excuses in
 the world to ship with all mdns services enabled by default.  The Debian
 project *officially* recognizes the need for specialized distributions, you
 know.

 Or perhaps people wanting total security should create their own distro.

 Perhaps these people should use Euronode, Gibraltar, or Luinux.

 OTOH, when you package for Debian, you are doing the general distribution
 packaging.  You are not allowed to cather to any special group needs in
 detriment of security, expect a lot of complaining if you do.

 And when I package GNOME stuff for Debian, I'm doing general GNOME
 packaging in Debian packages.  I'm not allowed to cather to any special
 group needs in favor pf security and in detriment of features.

 Will you push me in reverting any argument you provide in favor of
 security the other way around, or is my point sufficiently clear?

 Please, bring solutions in this discussion, not arguments, we've got
 enough already.

 So let's work on a way to reach a middle ground, shall we?  In fact, I think
 you already stated in another post that a master switch would be fine, so
 this discursion could very well end here and now.

 Yep, I proposed multiple solutions already, one of which being a
 debconf-handled setting to start avahi on boot or not (which obviously
 would need to be set to start by default, as for other daemons).

 The master switch addresses both your needs, and the security ones.  All you
 need to do is not to hide it if you're shipping it with the default being
 the less secure choice.

 I didn't intend to hide it, but it probably won't be high-priority, as
 we both know how this clutters Debian installs.

 IMHO, make it priority medium, use a shared template that all mdns services
 can use (there is no reason why we shouldn't generalize this solution), and
 you can default to mdns enabled.  Do not use priority low, unless you are
 going to default to mdns disabled.

 I don't know between priority medium and low.  I should probably look
 at existing debconf-handled settings to get a picture.

   Besides, the work is done quite cleanly with a chroot and a separate
   user.
 Yes, which is good.  But don't feel singled out, we are just as severe with
 every package.  A lot of them decided to ship bound to localhost for this
 reason.  Others implement master switches through debconf.  Others prefer to
 ship with functionality disabled.

 And here comes localhost again: it's the fourth time someone mentions
 listening to localhost in this discussion, which is quite worthless for
 a publishing / discovery daemon.

 As for using a separate user, that is the *rule*, not the exception.  Yes,
 some crap in Debian still wants to run as root by default for dubious
 reasons, but that's not the rule anymore.

 Still, samba will be more common than avahi for a while.

 Do not assume you can even *run* an active (as opposed to a passive -
 listens only, never transmits) mdns service in a network just because a
 package that has mdns capabilities was installed: you cannot know that.

 That's not enough to have something active, the functionality must be
 enabled in the music player too.

   I completely agree with the managed network part, but in such a
   network:
   - would you have music players installed?
   - wouldn't you filter out any other port than HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP?
 Inside the network?  Most managed networks have filtering at the borders, at
 key router nodes, and if it has a more advanced distributed-firewall
 mentality, on the all of the important boxes themselves (but that usually
 doesn't reach the workstations).

 I thought security people would recommend havin a per-port ACL for
 allowed traffic, and port visibility set to limit 

Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
   Well, no: that's the opposite of plug'n'play.  See, if you're USB stick
   contains a malicious vfat file system, it gets automatically mounted
   nevertheless.  It's a feature.
 Not in my servers, it doesn't.  And I should add, not even in my desktops:
 all removable filesystems are mounted nodev, nosuid.

 Oh, and that was certainly the default when you pulled in GNOME?

 Mounting malicious filesystems automatically (vfat can't be one AFAIK, but
 it won't bork if you tell it to be nosuid, nodev either) is never a feature,
 it is a security hole.

 vfat and iso9660 had holes in the FS drivers themselves recently IIRC.

 Actually, should we not file security bugs against everything that comes
 configured to mount removable filesystems out-of-the box and does so without
 specifying nodev, nosuid ?

 Think just before that: it's not only the mount options, it's the
 simple mounting which is risky.  It's not music sharing, it's listening
 on the network.

   Cheers,

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Loïc Minier
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
 True.  But that requires a broken kernel, which we patch regularly as a
 security procedure anyway.  Mounting removable filesystems suid,dev allow a
 lot more damage *by design* in the standard Linux security-model.

 And we also support avahi security-wise, and would patch it in the case
 of a knwon vulnerability.

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Bonk vulnerability!

2006-03-03 Thread Zakai Kinan
I just installed a server with sarge 3.1 and after
testing it with nessus it is vulnerable to bonk.  I am
trying to figure out how that is possible and how to
fix it?  My other servers are not vulnerable to bonk. 
I run a debian shop. 


Thanks for any insight,

ZK

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
 On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
  True.  But that requires a broken kernel, which we patch regularly as a
  security procedure anyway.  Mounting removable filesystems suid,dev allow a
  lot more damage *by design* in the standard Linux security-model.
 
  And we also support avahi security-wise, and would patch it in the case
  of a knwon vulnerability.

Nobody ever implied that avahi is badly maintained.  And unless mdns/avahi
is somehow being shipped configured in such a way so as to allow for
immediate local root priviledge escalations, I don't think I understood the
point you wanted to make.

I stated that the fact that an hipotetic kernel bug *also* allows for local
root exploits through a nosuid,nodev removable filesystem does *not* excuse
us to have removable filesystems being mounted suid,dev, which depending on
the filesystem type allows for immediate local root privilege escalation,
*by* *design*.

 Current Earth status:   NOT DESTROYED
How fortunate, that ;-)

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
 On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
Well, no: that's the opposite of plug'n'play.  See, if you're USB stick
contains a malicious vfat file system, it gets automatically mounted
nevertheless.  It's a feature.
  Not in my servers, it doesn't.  And I should add, not even in my desktops:
  all removable filesystems are mounted nodev, nosuid.
 
  Oh, and that was certainly the default when you pulled in GNOME?

I have purged GNOME in deference to their lousy practices, so I wouldn't
know.  KDE tried to do that for a while, but it seems to have disabled it
again (or it is buggy).

And I am probably going to raise the issue with the package maintainers as
soon as I have the time to verify the status of all the automounting
packages in Debian, which will take a while.

If their default is suid,dev, that will have to change.

  Actually, should we not file security bugs against everything that comes
  configured to mount removable filesystems out-of-the box and does so without
  specifying nodev, nosuid ?
 
  Think just before that: it's not only the mount options, it's the
  simple mounting which is risky.  It's not music sharing, it's listening
  on the network.

If automounting of removable filesystems is defaulting to enabled, that will
also be an issue to be addressed, sure.

But music sharing isn't designed to allow for local root exploits, is it?
Mounting unix-compatible filesystems in dev,suid modes is.  If you're
worried we are holding mdns apps to a different standard, don't.  It's just
a matter of what is in the radar right now ;-)

I will have to check first if the kernel is taking some extra care, as that
might reduce the number of affected packages.

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Fri, 03 Mar 2006, Loïc Minier wrote:
  proposed multiple options in other posts, all of them ignored.  People
  *not* trying for a middle-ground solution are those claiming an open
  port by default is unacceptable, no matter what.

You will notice I didn't propose you disable open ports by default.  What
part of ask it using debconf, priority medium or higher, default can be
enabled tells you do not have open ports for mdns open by default?

don't want to see running on his server.  Would this discussion happen
on a multimedia list, the situation would be kind of the opposite, and
people would be shouting loud if that wasn't pulled in by default.
  Then they can (read: should) use DeMudi, and DeMudi has all the excuses in
  the world to ship with all mdns services enabled by default.  The Debian
  project *officially* recognizes the need for specialized distributions, you
  know.
 
  Or perhaps people wanting total security should create their own distro.

They did, just like the multimedia people.

  Will you push me in reverting any argument you provide in favor of
  security the other way around, or is my point sufficiently clear?

See first paragraph reply.

  Please, bring solutions in this discussion, not arguments, we've got
  enough already.

See first paragraph reply.

  Yep, I proposed multiple solutions already, one of which being a
  debconf-handled setting to start avahi on boot or not (which obviously
  would need to be set to start by default, as for other daemons).

Well, that has more to do with avahi-server than your mdns app. And if you
look for the thread, you will notice I replied to whomever asked that that
avahi-server should start automatically like just every other daemon in
Debian does, that it made sense to bind avahi-server to IPADDR_ANY, and to
use policy-rc.d if you don't want stuff like that hapenning.

But this still does not mean mdns apps should not have the mdns master
switch.  Unless they *need* avahi-server installed and active to even open
a mdns socket, in which case they don't need to implement anything (the
master switch is avahi-server).

  The master switch addresses both your needs, and the security ones.  All you
  need to do is not to hide it if you're shipping it with the default being
  the less secure choice.
 
  I didn't intend to hide it, but it probably won't be high-priority, as
  we both know how this clutters Debian installs.

Leave it at Medium, it is enough.  Avahi mdns isn't high risk (this does not
apply to zeroconf, but I understand that avahi mdns clients and avahi-server
are a different kettle of fish).

  I don't know between priority medium and low.  I should probably look
  at existing debconf-handled settings to get a picture.

Setting it at low defeats the purpose of the question.  The idea is that it
is a *master* switch, no matter how many avahi client apps you install, you
get asked only for the first one.  Since there are (no matter how slight)
security implications, most installs should see it (thus priority medium).

  And here comes localhost again: it's the fourth time someone mentions
  listening to localhost in this discussion, which is quite worthless for
  a publishing / discovery daemon.

It is mentioned as an example that others do *something* to avoid listening
on outside interfaces.  At least to me it is very obvious that in avahi's
case it doesn't make sense to listen on lo only.

You *could*, for a more difficult implementation than the master switch, ask
instead in which interface should avahi servers and clients listen (and
allow for the none reply).  I don't think that's worth the trouble,
however, so I didn't suggest it at first.

  Anyway, I'm not the avahi maintainer, I'm quite sure he would be ok to
  apply a patch providing the relevant debconf-handled settings, would he
  get a bug report requesting this.

That's probably the way to go, as it is much better implemented as a shared
debconf template, and avahi's master packages seem the better place to
document it, at the very least.

-- 
  One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie. -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: Bonk vulnerability!

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Loftis



--On March 3, 2006 10:01:54 AM -0800 Zakai Kinan [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
wrote:



I just installed a server with sarge 3.1 and after
testing it with nessus it is vulnerable to bonk.  I am
trying to figure out how that is possible and how to
fix it?  My other servers are not vulnerable to bonk.
I run a debian shop.


Thanks for any insight,



I've no idea WTF 'bonk' is, having never heard of it before, but I'll bet 
it's a badly written nessus plugin or just a plugin that's false 
positive-ing.




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Re: Bonk vulnerability!

2006-03-03 Thread David Clymer

On Fri, 2006-03-03 at 13:01 -0700, Michael Loftis wrote:
 
 
 --On March 3, 2006 10:01:54 AM -0800 Zakai Kinan [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 wrote:
 
  I just installed a server with sarge 3.1 and after
  testing it with nessus it is vulnerable to bonk.  I am
  trying to figure out how that is possible and how to
  fix it?  My other servers are not vulnerable to bonk.
  I run a debian shop.
 
 
  Thanks for any insight,
 
 
 I've no idea WTF 'bonk' is, having never heard of it before, but I'll bet 
 it's a badly written nessus plugin or just a plugin that's false 
 positive-ing.
 
 

http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=bonk

I really don't see why being vulnerable to bonk is such a bad thing. I
wouldn't mind being a bit more susceptible, myself.

-davidc

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Re: avahi-daemon

2006-03-03 Thread Joey Hess
Loïc Minier wrote:
  It would be overly complicated to handle the case of a Suggests instead
  of a Recommends correctly: even if the code was updated to handle both
  cases at run time, and would hide the relevant options when these are
  not available, the documentation would still point at unavailable
  features.
And the popup mixing application level information with package level
  information would also be awful: You should install package foo to get
  this functionality.

Standard Desktop task installs do not install Recommends anyway, so
rhythmbox does not pull in avahi-daemon in those situations and you need
to deal with that somehow.

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Re: Bonk vulnerability!

2006-03-03 Thread Zakai Kinan
Oh, that is cute.  Bonk is similar to teardrop.  I was
able to use nessus plugin to crash the sarge 3.1
server.


ZK

--- David Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 On Fri, 2006-03-03 at 13:01 -0700, Michael Loftis
 wrote:
  
  
  --On March 3, 2006 10:01:54 AM -0800 Zakai Kinan
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  wrote:
  
   I just installed a server with sarge 3.1 and
 after
   testing it with nessus it is vulnerable to bonk.
  I am
   trying to figure out how that is possible and
 how to
   fix it?  My other servers are not vulnerable to
 bonk.
   I run a debian shop.
  
  
   Thanks for any insight,
  
  
  I've no idea WTF 'bonk' is, having never heard of
 it before, but I'll bet 
  it's a badly written nessus plugin or just a
 plugin that's false 
  positive-ing.
  
  
 
 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=bonk
 
 I really don't see why being vulnerable to bonk is
 such a bad thing. I
 wouldn't mind being a bit more susceptible, myself.
 
 -davidc
 
 --
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 disk?
 
 
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 To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 



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Re: Bonk vulnerability!

2006-03-03 Thread Michael Loftis



--On March 3, 2006 1:55:14 PM -0800 Zakai Kinan [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
wrote:



Oh, that is cute.  Bonk is similar to teardrop.  I was
able to use nessus plugin to crash the sarge 3.1
server.


Did it actually crash or did nessus just report one?  If it crashed what 
was the Ooops onscreen?  This is dubious at best since I'm not aware of any 
variant of Linux that is susceptible to this attack, and no box I've got 
here is (3.0, 3.1, RH, SuSE)


If your machine is crashing it's probably completely unrelated to 'bonk' 
and is either a driver issue or hardware issue.



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Internal trusted networks? (was Re: avahi-daemon)

2006-03-03 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Fri, Mar 03, 2006 at 06:47:34PM +0100, Loïc Minier wrote:
 Hi,
 
 On Fri, Mar 03, 2006, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
  Inside the network?  Most managed networks have filtering at the borders, at
  key router nodes, and if it has a more advanced distributed-firewall
  mentality, on the all of the important boxes themselves (but that usually
  doesn't reach the workstations).
 
  I thought security people would recommend havin a per-port ACL for
  allowed traffic, and port visibility set to limit the view to only the
  router when not otherwise required.

I don't think you have seen many corporate (i.e. hundreds of nodes) networks.
I've seen a few, and, from my limited experience:

a) people in charge of switches do not belong to the IT security department
   (there's a whole communications department for level 2 and even inter
   network routing)

b) it is not possible to set per-port ACLs for traffic since services are not 
   completely defined (are you sure that the people in management don't have
   to access the file servers at engineering?) and there's just too many
   end nodes (with new ones being introduced and old ones removed from the
   network continously)

c) there are multiple routing entities in the network (not just the border
   router) due to having multiple interconnected LANs (some really nasty and
   *big* networks are a single LAN, but that's difficult to handle). So the
   needed visibility for a host is more than just a single router.

d) ACLs in core routers (think Cisco Catalyst) only buy you so much
   security-wise (it might prevent IP spoofing but they are not, after all, 
   stateful filters) and has performance considerations (specially if you
   are running Gigabit)

So even if the security people as you so put it, would recommend per-port
ACL allowed traffic they would (and do) get shunned by other IT departments.
At most, IT security can get a bridge firewall [1] setup between sensible
networks to isolate and try to control traffic between them. 

  I completely agree that it's quite common to have the network filtered
  at its borders, and that's usually considered some internal trusted
  network.

With people bringing laptops (and all kind of devices) from the outside of
the network, unprotected/uncontrolled WiFi access points, etc. there is no
such thing as an internal trusted network.

Regards

Javier

[1] Some call it IPS, but then again, that's were the hype now is... or
was... you never now.


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