Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1458-1] New openafs packages fix denial of service vulnerability

2008-01-11 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 01:24:28AM -0500, Thomas Bushnell BSG wrote:
 If a security bug were found in the afs client-side package, which is
 implemented as a kernel module, would the announcement not look just
 like the one we saw for DSA 1458-1?

See for yourself:
http://www.debian.org/security/2007/dsa-1271

noah



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Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1458-1] New openafs packages fix denial of service vulnerability

2008-01-11 Thread Joey Hess
Noah Meyerhans wrote:
 We mention all the binary packages in the advisory because they're the
 versions that are going to be installed by apt* and people are going
 to want checksums, file sizes, etc.

.. For no good reason, since apt checks all those things for you.

That information is a confusing relic, and could be removed from the
advisory templates.

-- 
see shy jo


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Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1458-1] New openafs packages fix denial of service vulnerability

2008-01-11 Thread James Shupe
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I don't think there is anything wrong with the templates... Just because
it doesn't suit you specifically doesn't mean it doesn't help out somebody
else. It's always better to have too much information than too little.

On Fri, January 11, 2008 1:07 pm, Noah Meyerhans wrote:
 On Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 12:53:08PM -0500, Joey Hess wrote:
 Noah Meyerhans wrote:
  We mention all the binary packages in the advisory because they're the
  versions that are going to be installed by apt* and people are going
  to want checksums, file sizes, etc.

 .. For no good reason, since apt checks all those things for you.

 That information is a confusing relic, and could be removed from the
 advisory templates.

 I agree, but there's no concensus within the security team about this.
 The argument is that not all sites can or choose to use apt to install
 updated packages, and that we should make it reasonably convinent for
 these sites to verify package integrity via other means.

 noah




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HermeTek Network Solutions
http://www.hermetek.com
1.866.325.6207

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Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1458-1] New openafs packages fix denial of service vulnerability

2008-01-11 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 12:53:08PM -0500, Joey Hess wrote:
 Noah Meyerhans wrote:
  We mention all the binary packages in the advisory because they're the
  versions that are going to be installed by apt* and people are going
  to want checksums, file sizes, etc.
 
 .. For no good reason, since apt checks all those things for you.
 
 That information is a confusing relic, and could be removed from the
 advisory templates.

I agree, but there's no concensus within the security team about this.
The argument is that not all sites can or choose to use apt to install
updated packages, and that we should make it reasonably convinent for
these sites to verify package integrity via other means.

noah



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