Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-02 Thread Adam ENDRODI
On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 07:49:30PM -0500, Phillip Hofmeister wrote:
> 
> If you are really looking for assurance than 'rm -rf /' would not affect
> your day because weekly full backups and nightly incremental should be
> made.  If you don't have valid off system, perhaps off-site backups,
> then what kind of assurance do you really have?

Fixing bogus user apps and taking backups on regular basis are
two orthogonal approaches.  I'm sure you remember the recent debate
about the meaning of `security'.  The former is a preventive,
while the latter is a corrective measure.

Moreover, not only data manipulation can be performed by the means
of an exploited user app.  For instance, sending funny faked emails
to your manager can be quite embarrassing just as well :)

bit,
adam

-- 
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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-02 Thread Adam ENDRODI
On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 07:49:30PM -0500, Phillip Hofmeister wrote:
> 
> If you are really looking for assurance than 'rm -rf /' would not affect
> your day because weekly full backups and nightly incremental should be
> made.  If you don't have valid off system, perhaps off-site backups,
> then what kind of assurance do you really have?

Fixing bogus user apps and taking backups on regular basis are
two orthogonal approaches.  I'm sure you remember the recent debate
about the meaning of `security'.  The former is a preventive,
while the latter is a corrective measure.

Moreover, not only data manipulation can be performed by the means
of an exploited user app.  For instance, sending funny faked emails
to your manager can be quite embarrassing just as well :)

bit,
adam

-- 
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finger://[EMAIL PROTECTED] | Some days, my soul's confined
http://www.keyserver.net | And out of mind
Sleep forever


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread Phillip Hofmeister
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Sat, 01 Nov 2003 at 05:15:34PM -0500, Adam ENDRODI wrote:
> I tend to disagree, I'm afraid.  The presence of remotely
> exploitable bugs in user applications (be it a client of some
> networked game, or a PDF viewer) impose a great risk on the user,
> i.e. not on the system (which protects its integrity), but the
> user who is actually running the program.  For the sake of
> assurance, just imagine how an accidentally executed `rm -rf /'
> on behalf of your desktop uid would affect the rest of the day for you..

I really hate to be the voice of technicality...but...

If you are really looking for assurance than 'rm -rf /' would not affect
your day because weekly full backups and nightly incremental should be
made.  If you don't have valid off system, perhaps off-site backups,
then what kind of assurance do you really have?

- -- 
Phillip Hofmeister

PGP/GPG Key:
http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/
wget -O - http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/key.txt | gpg --import
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Excuse #247: Your process is not ISO 9000 compliant 

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQE/pFSVS3Jybf3L5MQRAsB6AJwNyi+JmzHRueapkrpwTbh6XT9IkACfRLBe
LJi14tZl/pCqLaiyoiCTf8Y=
=X0Xy
-END PGP SIGNATURE-



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread Phillip Hofmeister
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Sat, 01 Nov 2003 at 05:15:34PM -0500, Adam ENDRODI wrote:
> I tend to disagree, I'm afraid.  The presence of remotely
> exploitable bugs in user applications (be it a client of some
> networked game, or a PDF viewer) impose a great risk on the user,
> i.e. not on the system (which protects its integrity), but the
> user who is actually running the program.  For the sake of
> assurance, just imagine how an accidentally executed `rm -rf /'
> on behalf of your desktop uid would affect the rest of the day for you..

I really hate to be the voice of technicality...but...

If you are really looking for assurance than 'rm -rf /' would not affect
your day because weekly full backups and nightly incremental should be
made.  If you don't have valid off system, perhaps off-site backups,
then what kind of assurance do you really have?

- -- 
Phillip Hofmeister

PGP/GPG Key:
http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/
wget -O - http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/key.txt | gpg --import
- --
Excuse #247: Your process is not ISO 9000 compliant 

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQE/pFSVS3Jybf3L5MQRAsB6AJwNyi+JmzHRueapkrpwTbh6XT9IkACfRLBe
LJi14tZl/pCqLaiyoiCTf8Y=
=X0Xy
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread Adam ENDRODI
On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 11:03:16AM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in
> > "simple" programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any
> > untrusted input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug
> > which is associated with many security exposures.  While these are
> > bugs, no privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a
> > security exposure.
> 
> I also agree with that. But this is not clearly the case. Some typical
> scenario are buffer overflows in games (clients, not servers) and other
> client apps (although depending of the particular cases could also be
> abused/exploited).

I tend to disagree, I'm afraid.  The presence of remotely
exploitable bugs in user applications (be it a client of some
networked game, or a PDF viewer) impose a great risk on the user,
i.e. not on the system (which protects its integrity), but the
user who is actually running the program.  For the sake of
assurance, just imagine how an accidentally executed `rm -rf /'
on behalf of your desktop uid would affect the rest of the day for you..

> I stated this is not the case because:- Apache Httpd is a very spreaded 
> software on Internet.
> - It is a server so it could be remotely attacked and it's the perfect
> door for any hacker.- The bug discovered could be used to obtain root 
> remotely (well, the
   
Perhaps, in the co-existance of a bug in a suid root binary
(let's say traceroute.  Anyone?)

bit,
adam

-- 
1024D/37B8D989 954B 998A E5F5 BA2A 3622  82DD 54C2 843D 37B8 D989  
finger://[EMAIL PROTECTED] | Some days, my soul's confined
http://www.keyserver.net | And out of mind
Sleep forever



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread Adam ENDRODI
On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 11:03:16AM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in
> > "simple" programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any
> > untrusted input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug
> > which is associated with many security exposures.  While these are
> > bugs, no privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a
> > security exposure.
> 
> I also agree with that. But this is not clearly the case. Some typical
> scenario are buffer overflows in games (clients, not servers) and other
> client apps (although depending of the particular cases could also be
> abused/exploited).

I tend to disagree, I'm afraid.  The presence of remotely
exploitable bugs in user applications (be it a client of some
networked game, or a PDF viewer) impose a great risk on the user,
i.e. not on the system (which protects its integrity), but the
user who is actually running the program.  For the sake of
assurance, just imagine how an accidentally executed `rm -rf /'
on behalf of your desktop uid would affect the rest of the day for you..

> I stated this is not the case because:- Apache Httpd is a very spreaded software on 
> Internet.
> - It is a server so it could be remotely attacked and it's the perfect
> door for any hacker.- The bug discovered could be used to obtain root remotely 
> (well, the
   
Perhaps, in the co-existance of a bug in a suid root binary
(let's say traceroute.  Anyone?)

bit,
adam

-- 
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Sleep forever


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread roman

Ups, my apologies. You're completely right. I meant "remote access with
apache user rights".
-R

> On Saturday, 2003-11-01 at 11:03:16 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> - the bug is quite serious (local root, at minimun)
>
> I wonder how a user would obtain root priviledges by overrunning an
> Apache worker process. Unless, of course, the admin was clever enough
> to run Apache with "User root".
>
> Lupe Christoph
> --
> | [EMAIL PROTECTED]   |
> http://www.lupe-christoph.de/ | | "Violence is the resort of the
> violent" Lu Tze | | "Thief of Time", Terry
> Pratchett   |





Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread roman

Ups, my apologies. You're completely right. I meant "remote access with
apache user rights".
-R

> On Saturday, 2003-11-01 at 11:03:16 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> - the bug is quite serious (local root, at minimun)
>
> I wonder how a user would obtain root priviledges by overrunning an
> Apache worker process. Unless, of course, the admin was clever enough
> to run Apache with "User root".
>
> Lupe Christoph
> --
> | [EMAIL PROTECTED]   |
> http://www.lupe-christoph.de/ | | "Violence is the resort of the
> violent" Lu Tze | | "Thief of Time", Terry
> Pratchett   |




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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread roman
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 06:06:15PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:
>
>> My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
>> ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
>> security update required because intentionally exploiting this
>> vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
>> http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
>> "yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
>> it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
>> limited".
>
> With any security issue, the risk of exploitation is weighed against
> the risk of an update (instability, introducing new bugs, human errors,
> etc.). If the risk of an update is greater than the risk of the bug
> itself, an update is not desirable.

I agree with that in general terms. Apply to this particular case:
- I trust the Apache team. I mean, they're usually cool maintaining and
fixing Apache bugs. I suppose it's a responsability when your software is
very highly used on Internet.- in other words, the quality of this kind of fix 
would be high
- the bug is quite serious (local root, at minimun) -> bug risk is
medium/high.- summary: risk of bug > risk of update. Yes, this is my point of 
view,
but I've also heard similar comments from many more people. I also wanted
you knew it. I'm not trying to create a flamewar or similar. This is my
last post regarding this issue is nobody throws light to us :-)
> For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in
> "simple" programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any
> untrusted input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug
> which is associated with many security exposures.  While these are
> bugs, no privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a
> security exposure.

I also agree with that. But this is not clearly the case. Some typical
scenario are buffer overflows in games (clients, not servers) and other
client apps (although depending of the particular cases could also be
abused/exploited). I stated this is not the case because:- Apache Httpd is a 
very spreaded software on Internet.
- It is a server so it could be remotely attacked and it's the perfect
door for any hacker.- The bug discovered could be used to obtain root remotely 
(well, the
terms "remote" and "local" could be confussing; I'm pretty sure you follow
Bugtraq and have seen recent posts regarding this; it's not a new issue
though :-)).
> I am not as well-versed on the internals of Apache as our Apache
> maintainers, so I am trusting their word that this does not put our
> users at risk.

Do you know any page which I could trust with last Apache releases for
woody/3.0 (=reliable backports)?




Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-11-01 Thread roman
> On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 06:06:15PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:
>
>> My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
>> ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
>> security update required because intentionally exploiting this
>> vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
>> http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
>> "yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
>> it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
>> limited".
>
> With any security issue, the risk of exploitation is weighed against
> the risk of an update (instability, introducing new bugs, human errors,
> etc.). If the risk of an update is greater than the risk of the bug
> itself, an update is not desirable.

I agree with that in general terms. Apply to this particular case:
- I trust the Apache team. I mean, they're usually cool maintaining and
fixing Apache bugs. I suppose it's a responsability when your software is
very highly used on Internet.- in other words, the quality of this kind of fix would 
be high
- the bug is quite serious (local root, at minimun) -> bug risk is
medium/high.- summary: risk of bug > risk of update. Yes, this is my point of view,
but I've also heard similar comments from many more people. I also wanted
you knew it. I'm not trying to create a flamewar or similar. This is my
last post regarding this issue is nobody throws light to us :-)
> For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in
> "simple" programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any
> untrusted input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug
> which is associated with many security exposures.  While these are
> bugs, no privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a
> security exposure.

I also agree with that. But this is not clearly the case. Some typical
scenario are buffer overflows in games (clients, not servers) and other
client apps (although depending of the particular cases could also be
abused/exploited). I stated this is not the case because:- Apache Httpd is a very 
spreaded software on Internet.
- It is a server so it could be remotely attacked and it's the perfect
door for any hacker.- The bug discovered could be used to obtain root remotely (well, 
the
terms "remote" and "local" could be confussing; I'm pretty sure you follow
Bugtraq and have seen recent posts regarding this; it's not a new issue
though :-)).
> I am not as well-versed on the internals of Apache as our Apache
> maintainers, so I am trusting their word that this does not put our
> users at risk.

Do you know any page which I could trust with last Apache releases for
woody/3.0 (=reliable backports)?



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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matt Zimmerman
Please respect my Mail-Followup-To header and the Debian mailing list
guidelines, and do not CC me on replies.

On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 06:06:15PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:

> My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
> ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
> security update required because intentionally exploiting this
> vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
> http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
> "yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
> it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
> limited".
> 
> Wrong, wrong, wrong. We're talking about a known security issue. Why
> not fixing it?  All security issues should be taken into account and
> should be fixed!!! What would it happen if someone has discovered a
> different attack vector for the *same* bug? Should we wait for this
> event to occur? Not really a good idea...

With any security issue, the risk of exploitation is weighed against the
risk of an update (instability, introducing new bugs, human errors, etc.).
If the risk of an update is greater than the risk of the bug itself, an
update is not desirable.

For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in "simple"
programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any untrusted
input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug which is
associated with many security exposures.  While these are bugs, no
privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a security
exposure.

I am not as well-versed on the internals of Apache as our Apache
maintainers, so I am trusting their word that this does not put our users at
risk.

-- 
 - mdz



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Roman Medina

Sorry, I missunderstood your answer. I thought you were redirecting me
to the other ml. I've also read the answer sent by Matthew Wilcox
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> to this same thread (amongst other related messages
and likes).

My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
security update required because intentionally exploiting this
vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
"yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
limited".

Wrong, wrong, wrong. We're talking about a known security issue. Why
not fixing it?  All security issues should be taken into account and
should be fixed!!! What would it happen if someone has discovered a
different attack vector for the *same* bug? Should we wait for this
event to occur? Not really a good idea...

 Regards,
 --Roman

--
PGP Fingerprint:
09BB EFCD 21ED 4E79 25FB  29E1 E47F 8A7D EAD5 6742
[Key ID: 0xEAD56742. Available at KeyServ]

On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:04:35 -0500, you wrote:

>On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 07:58:50PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:
>> >> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> >
>> >See above.
>> 
>>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe only
>>  to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to discuss it
>>  in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in my apache
>>  error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I probably have
>>  reasons to be scared... or not?
>
>I didn't say that you should subscribe.  I told you where the decision came
>from so that you could ask someone who could give you a more specific
>answer, and in exchange for this, you keep complaining to me about your
>server error logs.  If you cared enough about this issue, you would make the
>effort to investigate it yourself.
>
>-- 
> - mdz



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matt Zimmerman
Please respect my Mail-Followup-To header and the Debian mailing list
guidelines, and do not CC me on replies.

On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 06:06:15PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:

> My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
> ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
> security update required because intentionally exploiting this
> vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
> http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
> "yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
> it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
> limited".
> 
> Wrong, wrong, wrong. We're talking about a known security issue. Why
> not fixing it?  All security issues should be taken into account and
> should be fixed!!! What would it happen if someone has discovered a
> different attack vector for the *same* bug? Should we wait for this
> event to occur? Not really a good idea...

With any security issue, the risk of exploitation is weighed against the
risk of an update (instability, introducing new bugs, human errors, etc.).
If the risk of an update is greater than the risk of the bug itself, an
update is not desirable.

For example, people sometimes file bugs about buffer overflows in "simple"
programs (which run with no privileges and do not act on any untrusted
input) just because they are buffer overflows, a type of bug which is
associated with many security exposures.  While these are bugs, no
privileges can be gained from them, so they do not represent a security
exposure.

I am not as well-versed on the internals of Apache as our Apache
maintainers, so I am trusting their word that this does not put our users at
risk.

-- 
 - mdz


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Roman Medina

Sorry, I missunderstood your answer. I thought you were redirecting me
to the other ml. I've also read the answer sent by Matthew Wilcox
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> to this same thread (amongst other related messages
and likes).

My opinion is that if a security bug is discovered it should be fixed
ASAP. It's really simple. The argument: "We believe that there is no
security update required because intentionally exploiting this
vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration (either
http.conf or .htaccess)." is equivalent to:
"yes, we know that our .deb is vulnerable but we are not going to fix
it because it is difficult to exploit or the exploitability is
limited".

Wrong, wrong, wrong. We're talking about a known security issue. Why
not fixing it?  All security issues should be taken into account and
should be fixed!!! What would it happen if someone has discovered a
different attack vector for the *same* bug? Should we wait for this
event to occur? Not really a good idea...

 Regards,
 --Roman

--
PGP Fingerprint:
09BB EFCD 21ED 4E79 25FB  29E1 E47F 8A7D EAD5 6742
[Key ID: 0xEAD56742. Available at KeyServ]

On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:04:35 -0500, you wrote:

>On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 07:58:50PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:
>> >> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> >
>> >See above.
>> 
>>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe only
>>  to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to discuss it
>>  in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in my apache
>>  error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I probably have
>>  reasons to be scared... or not?
>
>I didn't say that you should subscribe.  I told you where the decision came
>from so that you could ask someone who could give you a more specific
>answer, and in exchange for this, you keep complaining to me about your
>server error logs.  If you cared enough about this issue, you would make the
>effort to investigate it yourself.
>
>-- 
> - mdz


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matthew Wilcox

Hey, morons, don't drop people from the CC.  Otherwise they'll never
know what you're saying.

On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 03:07:26PM +0100, Lupe Christoph wrote:
> Quoting Phillip Hofmeister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> 
> > I believe your justification can be found:
> 
> > http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188
> 
> > I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...
> 
> Given that some of the affected directives can be used in .htaccess
> files, the potential for an ordinary user to exploit this is there.
> This allows access to the user the Apache work processes run as. Not
> much, but depending on local setup, this can be harmful.

But if a malicious user has access to .htaccess, you're already fucked
five ways from sunday.

-- 
"It's not Hollywood.  War is real, war is primarily not about defeat or
victory, it is about death.  I've seen thousands and thousands of dead bodies.
Do you think I want to have an academic debate on this subject?" -- Robert Fisk



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matthew Wilcox
On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 09:07:57PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:
>  I checked woody's apache source and I cannot find any patches 
>  for mod_alias.c in apache-1.3.26/debian/patches directory.
>  So I guess debian's apache is effected by this vulnerability.
>  
>  Do I misunderstand this? Does apache package in debian not
>  require security update?
> 
>  please tell me. thanks.

We believe that there is no security update required because intentionally
exploiting this vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration
(either http.conf or .htaccess).  If a malicious user has access to those
configuration files, they can do many other Bad Things to apache anyway.
So this is not worth fixing.

In the other case, an admin who unintentionally sets up a rule that
would cause this buffer overflow also seems terribly unlikely.

"Fix buffer overflows in mod_alias and mod_rewrite which occurred if
one configured a regular expression with more than 9 captures."

Therefore, we believe no security update is warranted.

[And I'm getting bored of answering this question.]

-- 
"It's not Hollywood.  War is real, war is primarily not about defeat or
victory, it is about death.  I've seen thousands and thousands of dead bodies.
Do you think I want to have an academic debate on this subject?" -- Robert Fisk



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Lupe Christoph
Quoting Phillip Hofmeister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> I believe your justification can be found:

> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188

> I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...

Given that some of the affected directives can be used in .htaccess
files, the potential for an ordinary user to exploit this is there.
This allows access to the user the Apache work processes run as. Not
much, but depending on local setup, this can be harmful.

So I believe it should be fixed.

Lupe Christoph
-- 
| [EMAIL PROTECTED]   |   http://www.lupe-christoph.de/ |
| "Violence is the resort of the violent" Lu Tze |
| "Thief of Time", Terry Pratchett   |



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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matthew Wilcox

Hey, morons, don't drop people from the CC.  Otherwise they'll never
know what you're saying.

On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 03:07:26PM +0100, Lupe Christoph wrote:
> Quoting Phillip Hofmeister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> 
> > I believe your justification can be found:
> 
> > http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188
> 
> > I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...
> 
> Given that some of the affected directives can be used in .htaccess
> files, the potential for an ordinary user to exploit this is there.
> This allows access to the user the Apache work processes run as. Not
> much, but depending on local setup, this can be harmful.

But if a malicious user has access to .htaccess, you're already fucked
five ways from sunday.

-- 
"It's not Hollywood.  War is real, war is primarily not about defeat or
victory, it is about death.  I've seen thousands and thousands of dead bodies.
Do you think I want to have an academic debate on this subject?" -- Robert Fisk


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Matthew Wilcox
On Fri, Oct 31, 2003 at 09:07:57PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:
>  I checked woody's apache source and I cannot find any patches 
>  for mod_alias.c in apache-1.3.26/debian/patches directory.
>  So I guess debian's apache is effected by this vulnerability.
>  
>  Do I misunderstand this? Does apache package in debian not
>  require security update?
> 
>  please tell me. thanks.

We believe that there is no security update required because intentionally
exploiting this vulnerability requires access to apache's configuration
(either http.conf or .htaccess).  If a malicious user has access to those
configuration files, they can do many other Bad Things to apache anyway.
So this is not worth fixing.

In the other case, an admin who unintentionally sets up a rule that
would cause this buffer overflow also seems terribly unlikely.

"Fix buffer overflows in mod_alias and mod_rewrite which occurred if
one configured a regular expression with more than 9 captures."

Therefore, we believe no security update is warranted.

[And I'm getting bored of answering this question.]

-- 
"It's not Hollywood.  War is real, war is primarily not about defeat or
victory, it is about death.  I've seen thousands and thousands of dead bodies.
Do you think I want to have an academic debate on this subject?" -- Robert Fisk


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Lupe Christoph
Quoting Phillip Hofmeister <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> I believe your justification can be found:

> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188

> I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...

Given that some of the affected directives can be used in .htaccess
files, the potential for an ordinary user to exploit this is there.
This allows access to the user the Apache work processes run as. Not
much, but depending on local setup, this can be harmful.

So I believe it should be fixed.

Lupe Christoph
-- 
| [EMAIL PROTECTED]   |   http://www.lupe-christoph.de/ |
| "Violence is the resort of the violent" Lu Tze |
| "Thief of Time", Terry Pratchett   |



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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Hideki Yamane

 Hi,

>> >>  Do you know about apache security issue?
>> >
>> >Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.
>> 
>>  Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
>>  would be effected by this vulnerability.
>
>Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 I checked woody's apache source and I cannot find any patches 
 for mod_alias.c in apache-1.3.26/debian/patches directory.
 So I guess debian's apache is effected by this vulnerability.
 
 Do I misunderstand this? Does apache package in debian not
 require security update?

 please tell me. thanks.

-- 
Regards,

 Hideki Yamanemailto:henrich @ iijmio-mail.jp



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-31 Thread Hideki Yamane

 Hi,

>> >>  Do you know about apache security issue?
>> >
>> >Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.
>> 
>>  Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
>>  would be effected by this vulnerability.
>
>Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 I checked woody's apache source and I cannot find any patches 
 for mod_alias.c in apache-1.3.26/debian/patches directory.
 So I guess debian's apache is effected by this vulnerability.
 
 Do I misunderstand this? Does apache package in debian not
 require security update?

 please tell me. thanks.

-- 
Regards,

 Hideki Yamanemailto:henrich @ iijmio-mail.jp


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Phillip Hofmeister
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 at 01:59:01PM -0500, Roman Medina wrote:
>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe
> only to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to
> discuss it in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in
> my apache error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I
> probably have reasons to be scared... or not?

I believe your justification can be found:

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188

I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...

- -- 
Phillip Hofmeister

PGP/GPG Key:
http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/
wget -O - http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/key.txt | gpg --import
- --
Excuse #227: You must've hit the wrong anykey. 

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)

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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Phillip Hofmeister
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 at 01:59:01PM -0500, Roman Medina wrote:
>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe
> only to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to
> discuss it in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in
> my apache error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I
> probably have reasons to be scared... or not?

I believe your justification can be found:

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=218188

I'm not saying I agree fully with it...but I do understand it...

- -- 
Phillip Hofmeister

PGP/GPG Key:
http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/
wget -O - http://www.zionlth.org/~plhofmei/key.txt | gpg --import
- --
Excuse #227: You must've hit the wrong anykey. 

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQE/ofGVS3Jybf3L5MQRAsmrAJ4w10DScjzozMIoP3FwEos0GiDEqACfbZQB
ldPevKRBm+kss/AuWzG/Eyw=
=4tp+
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 07:58:50PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:

> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:
> >> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >See above.
> 
>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe only
>  to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to discuss it
>  in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in my apache
>  error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I probably have
>  reasons to be scared... or not?

I didn't say that you should subscribe.  I told you where the decision came
from so that you could ask someone who could give you a more specific
answer, and in exchange for this, you keep complaining to me about your
server error logs.  If you cared enough about this issue, you would make the
effort to investigate it yourself.

-- 
 - mdz



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Roman Medina
On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:

>On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 05:49:34PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> It's a Woody 3.0 up-to-date machine. Are you sure Apache shipped on Debian
>> is actually secure? These segfaults scare me... it smells like
>> 0day-exploit...
>> >[...]
>> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>See above.

 I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe
only to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to
discuss it in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in
my apache error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I
probably have reasons to be scared... or not?

 Saludos,
 --Roman

--
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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 07:58:50PM +0100, Roman Medina wrote:

> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:
> >> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >See above.
> 
>  I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe only
>  to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to discuss it
>  in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in my apache
>  error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I probably have
>  reasons to be scared... or not?

I didn't say that you should subscribe.  I told you where the decision came
from so that you could ask someone who could give you a more specific
answer, and in exchange for this, you keep complaining to me about your
server error logs.  If you cared enough about this issue, you would make the
effort to investigate it yourself.

-- 
 - mdz


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Roman Medina
On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 12:21:09 -0500, you wrote:

>On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 05:49:34PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> It's a Woody 3.0 up-to-date machine. Are you sure Apache shipped on Debian
>> is actually secure? These segfaults scare me... it smells like
>> 0day-exploit...
>> >[...]
>> > Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>See above.

 I'm not subscribed to debian-apache neither I'm going to subscribe
only to ask this. If this is a security issue in Debian, why not to
discuss it in a Debian security ml? I repeat it: I have segfaults in
my apache error-logs and this happened only recently (this week) so I
probably have reasons to be scared... or not?

 Saludos,
 --Roman

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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 05:03:36PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:

> >>  Do you know about apache security issue?
> >
> >Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.
> 
>  Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
>  would be effected by this vulnerability.

Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]

-- 
 - mdz



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 05:03:36PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:

> >>  Do you know about apache security issue?
> >
> >Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.
> 
>  Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
>  would be effected by this vulnerability.

Ask [EMAIL PROTECTED]

-- 
 - mdz


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Hideki Yamane

 thanks to your reply.

>>  Do you know about apache security issue?
>
>Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.

 Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
 would be effected by this vulnerability.
 
 * Revision: 1.17, Tue Jul 8 03:45:28 1997 UTC (6 years, 3 months ago) by akosut
   
http://cvs.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi/apache-1.3/src/modules/standard/mod_alias.c?rev=1.17&content-type=text/vnd.viewcvs-markup

 Have woody's apache patched to mod_alias anything ?
 if so, why upstream left it?

-- 
Regards,

 Hideki Yamanemailto:henrich @ iijmio-mail.jp



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Hideki Yamane

 thanks to your reply.

>>  Do you know about apache security issue?
>
>Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.

 Really? mod_alias is so much old(*), I think all of apache 
 would be effected by this vulnerability.
 
 * Revision: 1.17, Tue Jul 8 03:45:28 1997 UTC (6 years, 3 months ago) by akosut
   
http://cvs.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi/apache-1.3/src/modules/standard/mod_alias.c?rev=1.17&content-type=text/vnd.viewcvs-markup

 Have woody's apache patched to mod_alias anything ?
 if so, why upstream left it?

-- 
Regards,

 Hideki Yamanemailto:henrich @ iijmio-mail.jp


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Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-30 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 12:12:27AM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:

>  Do you know about apache security issue?

Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.

-- 
 - mdz



Re: apache security issue (with upstream new release)

2003-10-29 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Oct 30, 2003 at 12:12:27AM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote:

>  Do you know about apache security issue?

Yes.  According to the Apache maintainers, woody does not require an update.

-- 
 - mdz


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