Re: Posix sems still not recommended?

2009-04-24 Thread venkatnv

Well ... i think we found the root cause, in one of the libraries being used,
the mutex was not being initialized. Thanks!


venkatnv wrote:
 
 We are observing issues with pthread Mutexes on Apache22/Solaris10. Not
 sure if this is relevant to this thread, but would appreciate any  inputs.
 
 - We are running Apache22 in Worker mode. Apache22 is compiled with gcc346
 on Solaris10
 - We are having a custom module (DSO) loaded with Apache.
 
 On stress test, we see that a mutex is not working as intended.
 (pthread_mutex_lock)
 To be precise, we are seeing core dumps and further investigation revealed
 that there are two threads that have acquired a lock using
 pthread_mutex_lock, a the same time. 
 
 Please note that we do not see this behavior on Apache2. This occurs only
 with Apache22. Has anyone come across a similar situation. Any help in
 narrowing down the cause would be greatly appreciated!
 
 Regards,
 Venkat.
 
 
 Rainer Jung-3 wrote:
 
 On 30.03.2009 20:58, Jeff Trawick wrote:
 On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 2:33 PM, Jeff Trawick traw...@gmail.com
 mailto:traw...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 2:07 PM, Jim Jagielski j...@jagunet.com
 mailto:j...@jagunet.com wrote:

 Anyone know if:

 # POSIX semaphores and cross-process pthread mutexes are not # used
 by default since they have less desirable behaviour when # e.g. a
 process holding the mutex segfaults.

 is still applicable, at least for posix sems?


 AFAIK, the Solaris-specific recovery logic for cross-process pthread
 mutexes has been working reliably for a long time, but with the
 current wind direction APR is choosing fcntl(), which has sysdef
 implementations on that


 ugh; sysdef implications
 
 and quite often shows EDEADLOCK, even when you can prove there can't be
 one. Especially when starting to use more than one lock of that type
 (e.g. when SSL comes into the game).
 
 platform.

 no clues here about the POSIX semaphores
 
 I would be much interested in an answer as well. Because of the
 EDEADLOCK problems I did suggest using the pthread based mutex on
 Solaris for a while to people and got no problem reports. But what
 experience do others have?
 
 In a related thread on the Tomcat users list about mod_jk I wrote in
 February:
 
I now did some searching and it turns out that the implementation of
pthread mutexes for Solaris 10 has very recently changed quite a bit.
So all speculations about improved pthread mutex behaviour
(especially for robust mutexes) in the last years might have become
obsolete.
 
The new implementation is contained in Solaris kernel patch 137137-09
and most likely also in Solaris 10 Update 6 (10/08). I didn't check,
whether that update simply contains the kernel patch or the fix is
included independently.
 
Some detail is logged in Sunsolve under the bug IDs
 
6296770 2160259 6664275 6697344 6729759 6564706
 
 Regards,
 
 Rainer
 
 
 
 

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Re: Posix sems still not recommended?

2009-04-24 Thread Jeff Trawick
On Fri, Apr 24, 2009 at 2:10 PM, venkatnv venka...@yahoo.com wrote:


 Well ... i think we found the root cause, in one of the libraries being
 used,
 the mutex was not being initialized. Thanks!


 venkatnv wrote:
 
  We are observing issues with pthread Mutexes on Apache22/Solaris10. Not
  sure if this is relevant to this thread, but would appreciate any
  inputs.


Thanks for following up on that ;)  It did seem to be a different issue
altogether.

Good luck!


Re: Buffer overflow in apr_brigade_vprintf() ?

2009-04-24 Thread Ruediger Pluem


On 04/24/2009 10:10 PM, C. Michael Pilato wrote:
 [Please Cc: me in responses -- I think I still have APR commit privs, but
  I'm not active here and not subscribed to the mailing lists.]
 
 In the past couple of weeks, I've seen two different reports of what appears
 to be corruption in the stream of data transmitted by Subversion's
 mod_dav_svn through Apache and back to the Subversion client.  What is seen
 client-side is an opening XML tag, a truncated bit of CDATA inside the
 tag, and then a missing XML closing tag.  The problem seems to occur with
 magically sized chunks of data, so it can be hard to reproduce[1].
 
 Here are the relevant pieces of the call stack:
 
 mod_dav_svn/reports/replay.c's change_file_or_dir_prop() function contains
 the following (which is base64-encoding Subversion file and directory
 properties, and tossing them into an XML REPORT request response):
 
const svn_string_t *enc_value = svn_base64_encode_string2(value, TRUE,
  pool);
SVN_ERR(dav_svn__send_xml
 (eb-bb, eb-output,
  S:change-%s-prop name=\%s\%s/S:change-%s-prop DEBUG_CR,
  file_or_dir, qname, enc_value-data, file_or_dir));
 
 dav_svn__send_xml() is a wrapper around apr_brigade_vprintf().
 
 As you know, apr_brigade_vprintf() (in buckets/apr_brigade.c) looks like so:
 
 APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_brigade_vprintf(apr_bucket_brigade *b,
   apr_brigade_flush flush,
   void *ctx,
   const char *fmt, va_list va)
 {
 /* the cast, in order of appearance */
 struct brigade_vprintf_data_t vd;
 char buf[APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE];
 int written;
 
 vd.vbuff.curpos = buf;
 vd.vbuff.endpos = buf + APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE;
 vd.b = b;
 vd.flusher = flush;
 vd.ctx = ctx;
 vd.cbuff = buf;
 
 written = apr_vformatter(brigade_flush, vd.vbuff, fmt, va);
 
 if (written == -1) {
   return -1;
 }
 
 /* tack on null terminator to remaining string */
 *(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';
 
 /* write out what remains in the buffer */
 return apr_brigade_write(b, flush, ctx, buf, vd.vbuff.curpos - buf);
 }
 
 The function apr_vformatter() uses the buffer buf to format the string.
 This function in turn uses the macro INS_CHAR to add characters to the
 buffer.  INS_CHAR is defined like this:
 
 #define INS_CHAR(c, sp, bep, cc)\
 {   \
 if (sp) {   \
 if (sp = bep) {\
 vbuff-curpos = sp; \
 if (flush_func(vbuff))  \
 return -1;  \
 sp = vbuff-curpos; \
 bep = vbuff-endpos;\
 }   \
 *sp++ = (c);\
 }   \
 cc++;   \
 }
 
 So, when the macro is executed to add a new character to the buffer and the
 buffer is full, the flush function is called to make room for the new
 character, and then the character is added.  Of course, if the buffer has
 room for exactly one more character, it is not flushed, the character is
 added, and the current position of the buffer is at its end (which is
 actually one byte beyond the space allocated for the buffer).
 
 After the call to apr_vformatter(), there will be stuff in the buffer.  In
 the special case above, the buffer may be perfectly full (perhaps after
 having been flushed one or more times, but still full now).  Then, without
 checking for that condition, this line is executed:
 
 /* tack on null terminator to remaining string */
 *(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';
 
 Uh-oh.  Buffer overflow!
 
 Our CollabNet engineer is proposing a simple fix:  defining 'buf' inside
 apr_brigade_vprintf() like so:
 
 char buf[APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE + 1]
 
 (Note the + 1 to make room for that pesky NULL byte.)
 
 But I'm wondering if an equally correct fix would be to simply not tack the
 '\0' onto the buffer at all.  Doesn't apr_brigade_write() accept both the
 buffer and the number of bytes to write?  Does it really need a
 null-terminated string, especially considering that its input could be
 arbitrary binary data?  Other calls to it pass things like str and
 strlen(str), which would ignore the NULL byte in str.

Thanks for the detailed analysis. IMHO the best fix is to simply remove
 *(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';
apr_brigade_write does not expect a 'string' that means a sequence
of bytes with '\0' marking its end. It expects a buffer of a given length.
The way it is called by apr_brigade_vprintf it does never ever now that the
buffer it gets is 

Re: Buffer overflow in apr_brigade_vprintf() ?

2009-04-24 Thread Jeff Trawick
On Fri, Apr 24, 2009 at 4:10 PM, C. Michael Pilato cmpil...@collab.netwrote:

 [Please Cc: me in responses -- I think I still have APR commit privs, but
  I'm not active here and not subscribed to the mailing lists.]

 In the past couple of weeks, I've seen two different reports of what
 appears
 to be corruption in the stream of data transmitted by Subversion's
 mod_dav_svn through Apache and back to the Subversion client.  What is seen
 client-side is an opening XML tag, a truncated bit of CDATA inside the
 tag, and then a missing XML closing tag.  The problem seems to occur with
 magically sized chunks of data, so it can be hard to reproduce[1].

 Here are the relevant pieces of the call stack:

 mod_dav_svn/reports/replay.c's change_file_or_dir_prop() function contains
 the following (which is base64-encoding Subversion file and directory
 properties, and tossing them into an XML REPORT request response):

   const svn_string_t *enc_value = svn_base64_encode_string2(value, TRUE,
 pool);
   SVN_ERR(dav_svn__send_xml
(eb-bb, eb-output,
 S:change-%s-prop name=\%s\%s/S:change-%s-prop DEBUG_CR,
 file_or_dir, qname, enc_value-data, file_or_dir));

 dav_svn__send_xml() is a wrapper around apr_brigade_vprintf().

 As you know, apr_brigade_vprintf() (in buckets/apr_brigade.c) looks like
 so:

 APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_brigade_vprintf(apr_bucket_brigade *b,
  apr_brigade_flush flush,
  void *ctx,
  const char *fmt, va_list va)
 {
/* the cast, in order of appearance */
struct brigade_vprintf_data_t vd;
char buf[APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE];
int written;

vd.vbuff.curpos = buf;
vd.vbuff.endpos = buf + APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE;
vd.b = b;
vd.flusher = flush;
vd.ctx = ctx;
vd.cbuff = buf;

written = apr_vformatter(brigade_flush, vd.vbuff, fmt, va);

if (written == -1) {
  return -1;
}

/* tack on null terminator to remaining string */
*(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';

/* write out what remains in the buffer */
return apr_brigade_write(b, flush, ctx, buf, vd.vbuff.curpos - buf);
 }

 The function apr_vformatter() uses the buffer buf to format the string.
 This function in turn uses the macro INS_CHAR to add characters to the
 buffer.  INS_CHAR is defined like this:

 #define INS_CHAR(c, sp, bep, cc)\
 {   \
if (sp) {   \
if (sp = bep) {\
vbuff-curpos = sp; \
if (flush_func(vbuff))  \
return -1;  \
sp = vbuff-curpos; \
bep = vbuff-endpos;\
}   \
*sp++ = (c);\
}   \
cc++;   \
 }

 So, when the macro is executed to add a new character to the buffer and the
 buffer is full, the flush function is called to make room for the new
 character, and then the character is added.  Of course, if the buffer has
 room for exactly one more character, it is not flushed, the character is
 added, and the current position of the buffer is at its end (which is
 actually one byte beyond the space allocated for the buffer).

 After the call to apr_vformatter(), there will be stuff in the buffer.  In
 the special case above, the buffer may be perfectly full (perhaps after
 having been flushed one or more times, but still full now).  Then, without
 checking for that condition, this line is executed:

/* tack on null terminator to remaining string */
*(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';

 Uh-oh.  Buffer overflow!

 Our CollabNet engineer is proposing a simple fix:  defining 'buf' inside
 apr_brigade_vprintf() like so:

char buf[APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE + 1]

 (Note the + 1 to make room for that pesky NULL byte.)

 But I'm wondering if an equally correct fix would be to simply not tack the
 '\0' onto the buffer at all.  Doesn't apr_brigade_write() accept both the
 buffer and the number of bytes to write?  Does it really need a
 null-terminated string, especially considering that its input could be
 arbitrary binary data?  Other calls to it pass things like str and
 strlen(str), which would ignore the NULL byte in str.


I agree; it won't have the terminating '\0' once it is written to the
brigade, and apr_brigade_write() doesn't need it.


Re: Buffer overflow in apr_brigade_vprintf() ?

2009-04-24 Thread Ruediger Pluem


On 04/24/2009 10:10 PM, C. Michael Pilato wrote:

 
 /* tack on null terminator to remaining string */
 *(vd.vbuff.curpos) = '\0';
 
 Uh-oh.  Buffer overflow!
 
 Our CollabNet engineer is proposing a simple fix:  defining 'buf' inside
 apr_brigade_vprintf() like so:
 
 char buf[APR_BUCKET_BUFF_SIZE + 1]
 
 (Note the + 1 to make room for that pesky NULL byte.)
 
 But I'm wondering if an equally correct fix would be to simply not tack the
 '\0' onto the buffer at all.  Doesn't apr_brigade_write() accept both the
 buffer and the number of bytes to write?  Does it really need a
 null-terminated string, especially considering that its input could be
 arbitrary binary data?  Other calls to it pass things like str and
 strlen(str), which would ignore the NULL byte in str.
 
 [1]
 http://subversion.tigris.org/ds/viewMessage.do?dsForumId=462viewType=browseAlldsMessageId=1745697
 

Fixed in r768417 (http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revrevision=768417).

Regards

RĂ¼diger


Re: Buffer overflow in apr_brigade_vprintf() ?

2009-04-24 Thread C. Michael Pilato
C. Michael Pilato wrote:
 [Please Cc: me in responses -- I think I still have APR commit privs, but
  I'm not active here and not subscribed to the mailing lists.]
 
 In the past couple of weeks, I've seen two different reports of what appears
 to be corruption in the stream of data transmitted by Subversion's
 mod_dav_svn through Apache and back to the Subversion client.  What is seen
 client-side is an opening XML tag, a truncated bit of CDATA inside the
 tag, and then a missing XML closing tag.  The problem seems to occur with
 magically sized chunks of data, so it can be hard to reproduce[1].

[...]

Just to bring this to closure, the bug was fixed by committing the removal
of the code that tacks the NULL byte onto a possibly-already-full buffer:

   http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revrevision=768417

(Thanks, Ruediger and Jeff!)

-- 
C. Michael Pilato cmpil...@collab.net
CollabNet  www.collab.net  Distributed Development On Demand



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