Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 7:57 AM CERT Coordination Center wrote: > Thanks Rob! > > Actually, as I look at one of these cases: > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 > > The latest certificate using the above key expires in just a few days. > But you can see the track record of the same private key being used > repeatedly to obtain new certificates. > > My question is this: When a certificate is revoked, is that certificate > revoked in isolation, or is the private key used to obtain that > certificate placed in some sort of blacklist where it cannot be used to > obtain any future certificates? The scenario I'm picturing is that a > customer gets a certificate revoked, but then just uses the same private > key to obtain a new certificate. Potentially from another CA, if they > have trouble with the one that did the revoking. > > It has been discussed in the past that CAs should, at a minimum, be confirming that they're not signing a public key they have previously revoked for key compromise. Otherwise, they have already "obtained evidence" and are required to revoke any new certificate(s) within 24 hours of issuance per BR 4.9.1.1(3): "The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise" Earlier in this thread, Tim wrote "It would probably be a good idea to submit the keys to https://pwnedkeys.com/submit.html as well, as a centralized way for CAs to verify that the keys are in fact compromised." I am not aware of any current requirement for CAs to submit compromised keys to this database or to check it prior to issuance. I suppose that explaining to the revocation-receiving customer why the > revocation happened is a good start. However, I could imagine that at > least some of the involved customers may not fully grasp the concept of > protecting private key material. After all, each one of the cases in > these two batches is a case of the customer publishing the private key > in an app in the Google Play store. > > I've seen cases where the app developer knowingly goes to another CA, apparently because that's easier than modifying their app to remove the dependency on an embedded private key and publicly-trusted certificate. I guess the general gist of what's going on here is that for each case > we've reported in the two batches, the private key material is > compromised. And as such, no certificate should ever be issued for such > a key, by any CA (in my opinion). Does such a mechanism exist to > prevent customers from shooting themselves in the foot in this way? > (compromised key re-use) > > That's going to be up to the individual CA. I would expect most to notify their customer if they try to reuse a key pair that the CA has previously revoked for key compromise. Related: The first batch that we notified included a number of > already-expired certificates. Based on responses I got for those, I got > the impression that there was no action to be taken by the CAs for those > expired certificates. As a result, I ensured that the second batch > omitted cases that lack evidence of a currently-valid certificate. If > there is any key-level blacklisting going on with the CAs, this was > perhaps an incorrect action to take on my part. > > Thoughts? Is there any value to sharing compromised keys used to obtain > certificates that may already be expired? > > > -- > > Thank you, >Will Dormann > > = > Vulnerability Analyst > CERT Coordination Center > 4500 Fifth Ave. > Pittsburgh, PA 15213 > 1-412-268-7090 > = > > > > > ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
Thanks Rob! Actually, as I look at one of these cases: https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 The latest certificate using the above key expires in just a few days. But you can see the track record of the same private key being used repeatedly to obtain new certificates. My question is this: When a certificate is revoked, is that certificate revoked in isolation, or is the private key used to obtain that certificate placed in some sort of blacklist where it cannot be used to obtain any future certificates? The scenario I'm picturing is that a customer gets a certificate revoked, but then just uses the same private key to obtain a new certificate. Potentially from another CA, if they have trouble with the one that did the revoking. I suppose that explaining to the revocation-receiving customer why the revocation happened is a good start. However, I could imagine that at least some of the involved customers may not fully grasp the concept of protecting private key material. After all, each one of the cases in these two batches is a case of the customer publishing the private key in an app in the Google Play store. I guess the general gist of what's going on here is that for each case we've reported in the two batches, the private key material is compromised. And as such, no certificate should ever be issued for such a key, by any CA (in my opinion). Does such a mechanism exist to prevent customers from shooting themselves in the foot in this way? (compromised key re-use) Related: The first batch that we notified included a number of already-expired certificates. Based on responses I got for those, I got the impression that there was no action to be taken by the CAs for those expired certificates. As a result, I ensured that the second batch omitted cases that lack evidence of a currently-valid certificate. If there is any key-level blacklisting going on with the CAs, this was perhaps an incorrect action to take on my part. Thoughts? Is there any value to sharing compromised keys used to obtain certificates that may already be expired? -- Thank you, Will Dormann = Vulnerability Analyst CERT Coordination Center 4500 Fifth Ave. Pittsburgh, PA 15213 1-412-268-7090 = On 4/4/2019 5:28 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > I've just created a batch for this second list on the Revocation Tracker: > > https://misissued.com/batch/49/ > > On 03/04/2019 15:50, CERT Coordination Center wrote: >> Hi Wayne, >> >> Sorry about the delay in getting back to you. This first round of CA >> notifications went out at approximately 10AM Eastern time on March 25, 2019. >> >> I just sent out a new set of notifications. This time the notifications >> were limited only currently-valid certificates, as expired-cert >> notification was an oversight in the first batch. This second list is: >> >> - >> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f2da5b49d3df3ebd9fe910c9972eea948f2d55f2f36c42658462f4b7aabe38a5 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=3198c26a22ed9d9602dad91e50dad40d67dcdae8075d2f7fca0c8b025c4a563b >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1dbbd0bf172681ea65ef078865e6f38864e4b40282e9eff72d756383a7b21c51 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ccf794fb078d757d59073173daec5ef7ba34a21ecdaa0f61761a21f5736a0fc7 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c108876bca95ab02a0a3d10c7e38981cfc97789922a93bc3fed2a5734e93e97f >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=876b1175c135cd388d5b596985129a27967bdbbbe92c615ae9cdc7e33d6dfc62 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=71e1d2ce60955944b522ac4d9674e078f98a07e8edaaf1219c4324660e39139a >> https://crt.sh/?q=DC:66:CB:49:F6:DD:A8:13:5C:9D:7A:9E:F0:8A:1F:F7:6B:56:C2:57:88:20:6A:C4:63:F3:76:5B:47:7A:79:C7 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7e6d9d6a0e18d4ba0526068f9a80e8a7bdbba1191a6bf6e0384545b57edd45c >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=98087a0e49cc3f232aa0e79ed84ec26e4ce07e5bca4e2913f2ff986b25ac4f57 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d2e4cf3dbf22f164f2301525a9ba6c2185926717c0a930abf322356bfd75e593 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fa362787ec3d1c185602d45e364fa3aa9049a6d54a15aa58302d123f37de621e >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f5d5f1cdb56cbac9f7306469ca7380f16226b60689d288cc5154962c55bc1605 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a808916ae117cb5ef2c7e73ee11cff0231be1f706106110ca51df4e3914e8b24 >> >> - >> >> >> This second batch of notifications went out to the respective CAs at >> approximately 10:30AM Eastern time today (April 3, 2019) >> >> > signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
I've just created a batch for this second list on the Revocation Tracker: https://misissued.com/batch/49/ On 03/04/2019 15:50, CERT Coordination Center wrote: > Hi Wayne, > > Sorry about the delay in getting back to you. This first round of CA > notifications went out at approximately 10AM Eastern time on March 25, 2019. > > I just sent out a new set of notifications. This time the notifications > were limited only currently-valid certificates, as expired-cert > notification was an oversight in the first batch. This second list is: > > - > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f2da5b49d3df3ebd9fe910c9972eea948f2d55f2f36c42658462f4b7aabe38a5 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=3198c26a22ed9d9602dad91e50dad40d67dcdae8075d2f7fca0c8b025c4a563b > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1dbbd0bf172681ea65ef078865e6f38864e4b40282e9eff72d756383a7b21c51 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ccf794fb078d757d59073173daec5ef7ba34a21ecdaa0f61761a21f5736a0fc7 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c108876bca95ab02a0a3d10c7e38981cfc97789922a93bc3fed2a5734e93e97f > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=876b1175c135cd388d5b596985129a27967bdbbbe92c615ae9cdc7e33d6dfc62 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=71e1d2ce60955944b522ac4d9674e078f98a07e8edaaf1219c4324660e39139a > https://crt.sh/?q=DC:66:CB:49:F6:DD:A8:13:5C:9D:7A:9E:F0:8A:1F:F7:6B:56:C2:57:88:20:6A:C4:63:F3:76:5B:47:7A:79:C7 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7e6d9d6a0e18d4ba0526068f9a80e8a7bdbba1191a6bf6e0384545b57edd45c > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=98087a0e49cc3f232aa0e79ed84ec26e4ce07e5bca4e2913f2ff986b25ac4f57 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d2e4cf3dbf22f164f2301525a9ba6c2185926717c0a930abf322356bfd75e593 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fa362787ec3d1c185602d45e364fa3aa9049a6d54a15aa58302d123f37de621e > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f5d5f1cdb56cbac9f7306469ca7380f16226b60689d288cc5154962c55bc1605 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a808916ae117cb5ef2c7e73ee11cff0231be1f706106110ca51df4e3914e8b24 > > - > > > This second batch of notifications went out to the respective CAs at > approximately 10:30AM Eastern time today (April 3, 2019) > > -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
Hi Wayne, Sorry about the delay in getting back to you. This first round of CA notifications went out at approximately 10AM Eastern time on March 25, 2019. I just sent out a new set of notifications. This time the notifications were limited only currently-valid certificates, as expired-cert notification was an oversight in the first batch. This second list is: - https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f2da5b49d3df3ebd9fe910c9972eea948f2d55f2f36c42658462f4b7aabe38a5 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=3198c26a22ed9d9602dad91e50dad40d67dcdae8075d2f7fca0c8b025c4a563b https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1dbbd0bf172681ea65ef078865e6f38864e4b40282e9eff72d756383a7b21c51 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ccf794fb078d757d59073173daec5ef7ba34a21ecdaa0f61761a21f5736a0fc7 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c108876bca95ab02a0a3d10c7e38981cfc97789922a93bc3fed2a5734e93e97f https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=876b1175c135cd388d5b596985129a27967bdbbbe92c615ae9cdc7e33d6dfc62 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=71e1d2ce60955944b522ac4d9674e078f98a07e8edaaf1219c4324660e39139a https://crt.sh/?q=DC:66:CB:49:F6:DD:A8:13:5C:9D:7A:9E:F0:8A:1F:F7:6B:56:C2:57:88:20:6A:C4:63:F3:76:5B:47:7A:79:C7 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7e6d9d6a0e18d4ba0526068f9a80e8a7bdbba1191a6bf6e0384545b57edd45c https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=98087a0e49cc3f232aa0e79ed84ec26e4ce07e5bca4e2913f2ff986b25ac4f57 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d2e4cf3dbf22f164f2301525a9ba6c2185926717c0a930abf322356bfd75e593 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fa362787ec3d1c185602d45e364fa3aa9049a6d54a15aa58302d123f37de621e https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f5d5f1cdb56cbac9f7306469ca7380f16226b60689d288cc5154962c55bc1605 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a808916ae117cb5ef2c7e73ee11cff0231be1f706106110ca51df4e3914e8b24 - This second batch of notifications went out to the respective CAs at approximately 10:30AM Eastern time today (April 3, 2019) -- Thank you, Will Dormann = Vulnerability Analyst CERT Coordination Center 4500 Fifth Ave. Pittsburgh, PA 15213 1-412-268-7090 = On 3/25/2019 8:44 PM, Wayne Thayer wrote: > Thank you for the report Will and for the tracking info Rob. > > It appears that all but one of these certificates is currently revoked, but > roughly 5 more weren't revoked until earlier today, which I assume was more > than 24 hours since they were reported to the CA. > > Will: can you share an approximate date/time when these certificates were > reported to the CAs? You should have also received a preliminary report > from the CAs within 24 hours as described in BR section 4.9.5. > > - Wayne > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:11 AM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> I've just created a batch for this list on the Revocation Tracker: >> >> https://misissued.com/batch/47/ >> >> On 22/03/2019 19:05, CERT Coordination Center via dev-security-policy >> wrote: >>> Hi folks, >>> >>> I'm sharing this information with this list per suggestion of Hanno >>> Böck. Some time ago we started looking at private keys that are >>> included with Android apps that are publicly available in the Google >>> Play store. Some subset of these keys have been used to obtain >>> certificates from CAs participating in the CT project (as visible on >>> https://crt.sh) >>> >>> The following crt.sh link to keys/certificates that are associated with >>> the compromised (released to the public) private keys: >>> >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d31922465b3b7a85718752f1ae9bacb7cd1522996b073cd4da2464cdf84f697d >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a7c10b71f3c0827222573dcc73dac168d91bf3c564b1f5bd43924baf0472576c >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=2766f6f5afa36174a08ca27aadaeba6621486960f385bed7ea83173ac2617703 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0cf68ccb3c210c91f742efb4d6091f2467132f33df63b56a8dcb2c84cf9a7502 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=84041b5545a35e4bedcb4e1b88e0790dcf70a14abdf5f34d186e3a5656d060b0 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b4fb504d853e52a1ef4b49a5005d39d4ca5c2e1f98bacedd7befb728d589095 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fddde47bfd018ea5b8b04be6dca332203e776d5249517b8db3acf5fa19abba10 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=24184bbe0eadbcfd69b06b0e6f10d07c58413ecdb080cc609469d8a13ad33417 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ebb22a8bd69d1780ec0d74e23c2f83cdd559ef065766dfa80d19be0496ca3e35 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d92b4545299cb1c2426205295a8acc24205bd7a9b7f1ab767c9270d6bed929e9 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=7732d4c9781979c2eda1dca14d610f627bf0eb14ad6d9f86c69d8f3a42c39430 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cd6b8f0a1862390bd20dd81e63b266847bf645cdc440f4022fc165e34ff6a7f1 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?q=FB:1A:41:67:06:26:2B:99:8A:97:73:9A:FC:C7:E3:77:48:C3:E5:21:47:7E:FD:D5:03:D0:0C:31:C4:95:C5:07 >>> >> https://crt.sh/?q=A7:30:9D:E5:1D:44:85:6A:E6:00:74:C3:0F:3E:3E:EA:23:EA:78:2D:84:6C:10:77:0B:1C:8F:24:B3:6D:D4:4D >>> >>
RE: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
[Somehow the list got dropped on this when I did reply-all] It would probably be a good idea to submit the keys to https://pwnedkeys.com/submit.html as well, as a centralized way for CAs to verify that the keys are in fact compromised. We received one of these reports in the form of a BouncyCastle keystore file (.bks), which I didn't even know was a thing until it arrived, with a password to unlock the file. However, while we were able to unlock the keystore with the provided password after setting up the BouncyCastle security provider, that password didn't unlock the private key itself inside the keystore. Thus, we were unable to verify that the key was actually compromised. At that point, though, we realized that the question was moot as the certificate we had issued using it was already expired. But I guess I'm wondering, if other CAs received what we did, were they able to independently verify that the keys are in fact compromised before revoking the certificates? Regards, Tim -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 8:44 PM To: Rob Stradling Cc: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org; CERT Coordination Center Subject: Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544 Thank you for the report Will and for the tracking info Rob. It appears that all but one of these certificates is currently revoked, but roughly 5 more weren't revoked until earlier today, which I assume was more than 24 hours since they were reported to the CA. Will: can you share an approximate date/time when these certificates were reported to the CAs? You should have also received a preliminary report from the CAs within 24 hours as described in BR section 4.9.5. - Wayne On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:11 AM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I've just created a batch for this list on the Revocation Tracker: > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8CDKo2HEw=5=https%3a%2f%2fmisissued%2ecom%2fbatch%2f47%2f > > On 22/03/2019 19:05, CERT Coordination Center via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > Hi folks, > > > > I'm sharing this information with this list per suggestion of Hanno > > Böck. Some time ago we started looking at private keys that are > > included with Android apps that are publicly available in the Google > > Play store. Some subset of these keys have been used to obtain > > certificates from CAs participating in the CT project (as visible on > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8SHJN2NRQ=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%29 > > > > The following > > http://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8faJo6GQA=5=http%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh > > link to keys/certificates that are associated with > > the compromised (released to the public) private keys: > > > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z5GHcN6HFA=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3dd31922465b3b7a85718752f1ae9bacb7cd1522996b073cd4da2464cdf84f697d > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z5HaK4mCRQ=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3da7c10b71f3c0827222573dcc73dac168d91bf3c564b1f5bd43924baf0472576c > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8DbcNfTQA=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3d2766f6f5afa36174a08ca27aadaeba6621486960f385bed7ea83173ac2617703 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8GEIo2MFg=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3d0cf68ccb3c210c91f742efb4d6091f2467132f33df63b56a8dcb2c84cf9a7502 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8vVcdfXQw=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3d84041b5545a35e4bedcb4e1b88e0790dcf70a14abdf5f34d186e3a5656d060b0 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8KBcNjRRQ=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3d9b4fb504d853e52a1ef4b49a5005d39d4ca5c2e1f98bacedd7befb728d589095 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8vXK4uNQw=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3dfddde47bfd018ea5b8b04be6dca332203e776d5249517b8db3acf5fa19abba10 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8HQcd2NRQ=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3d24184bbe0eadbcfd69b06b0e6f10d07c58413ecdb080cc609469d8a13ad33417 > > > https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062=ivaZ3MdKgZAwIVeod_yJkAE0dhfvL1c4z8rXJomHQQ=5=https%3a%2f%2fcrt%2esh%2f%3fspkisha256%3debb22a8bd69d1780ec0d74e23c2f83cdd559ef065766dfa80d19be0496ca3e35 > > > htt
Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
Thank you for the report Will and for the tracking info Rob. It appears that all but one of these certificates is currently revoked, but roughly 5 more weren't revoked until earlier today, which I assume was more than 24 hours since they were reported to the CA. Will: can you share an approximate date/time when these certificates were reported to the CAs? You should have also received a preliminary report from the CAs within 24 hours as described in BR section 4.9.5. - Wayne On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:11 AM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I've just created a batch for this list on the Revocation Tracker: > > https://misissued.com/batch/47/ > > On 22/03/2019 19:05, CERT Coordination Center via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > Hi folks, > > > > I'm sharing this information with this list per suggestion of Hanno > > Böck. Some time ago we started looking at private keys that are > > included with Android apps that are publicly available in the Google > > Play store. Some subset of these keys have been used to obtain > > certificates from CAs participating in the CT project (as visible on > > https://crt.sh) > > > > The following crt.sh link to keys/certificates that are associated with > > the compromised (released to the public) private keys: > > > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d31922465b3b7a85718752f1ae9bacb7cd1522996b073cd4da2464cdf84f697d > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a7c10b71f3c0827222573dcc73dac168d91bf3c564b1f5bd43924baf0472576c > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=2766f6f5afa36174a08ca27aadaeba6621486960f385bed7ea83173ac2617703 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0cf68ccb3c210c91f742efb4d6091f2467132f33df63b56a8dcb2c84cf9a7502 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=84041b5545a35e4bedcb4e1b88e0790dcf70a14abdf5f34d186e3a5656d060b0 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b4fb504d853e52a1ef4b49a5005d39d4ca5c2e1f98bacedd7befb728d589095 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fddde47bfd018ea5b8b04be6dca332203e776d5249517b8db3acf5fa19abba10 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=24184bbe0eadbcfd69b06b0e6f10d07c58413ecdb080cc609469d8a13ad33417 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ebb22a8bd69d1780ec0d74e23c2f83cdd559ef065766dfa80d19be0496ca3e35 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d92b4545299cb1c2426205295a8acc24205bd7a9b7f1ab767c9270d6bed929e9 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=7732d4c9781979c2eda1dca14d610f627bf0eb14ad6d9f86c69d8f3a42c39430 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cd6b8f0a1862390bd20dd81e63b266847bf645cdc440f4022fc165e34ff6a7f1 > > > https://crt.sh/?q=FB:1A:41:67:06:26:2B:99:8A:97:73:9A:FC:C7:E3:77:48:C3:E5:21:47:7E:FD:D5:03:D0:0C:31:C4:95:C5:07 > > > https://crt.sh/?q=A7:30:9D:E5:1D:44:85:6A:E6:00:74:C3:0F:3E:3E:EA:23:EA:78:2D:84:6C:10:77:0B:1C:8F:24:B3:6D:D4:4D > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=79c923c2d644eafef947d40d915b42684d35600a71cea6db22e88d7619a7825c > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45c363fd97c114bdbaa8444d068a0347d18c862e657dd90e2a48ac978f533015 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8206e318193186cace874b77d4b361ec37940e884d6ca10fca430164da663416 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=887b1c8bbfb6d54dc47cf4f2397e07e3ccd850ea26bf3bcd8e269bc5b2917266 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d1a0748edb263fdf9fe8370db55b2669e52dec46cc61f7eec607febce66bba70 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b805cc36a8a84d5f462d8230cb6c05fcd13c7f4d81143c4c58692e1c71ac5c66 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7f5a035038a3f933998ad503fe3535f823355101181ed51e1a942156a178dc2 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=493f34228ad3179e2dad25a392acae4d2dcaebcf633240a9df9d7f4413c4e681 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b40f2df2dc2bbc5d176cfb7b870342678e19cbf1ab14bef6ea22e20d60ec1b9 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cbcbef7bedeb58b1fd36af2bbf32f3269d8a920d7aa77a4d6f7e5beb7c4b656e > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=357d37290366067db84ddc291ed15eeb0fef413235101c996a8d6f97e14dfa33 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f8e3776c8f5cd1617faf006e2bfa3b7be3ea11960aa55f7ef72416bde1b7f958 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e199b309105b8f05f8af089eb9b97d7c4caf2490974c8d4e069a2ca5aca4574 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b56d3c26284ad6a2faa95ca5f4c13ab69d995abea034bac169146f5401a7a02 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=758854a6e58cd778129d56e72617d9312ac4a3bcf9c9b1227a117bb5ea83245e > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0a7b4ca246d82b7b1abe7192be4960a1b9d236f59d056dae3c98bd9c147262f9 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b4a95d9b6d13a38c5e1c5002c69084f4de054e9dc2139afb5fa2454b8042147a > > > https://crt.sh/?q=59:A2:F6:05:11:57:A4:11:03:2E:39:45:2B:35:BF:01:E0:04:03:9E:C4:BA:EE:DE:1A:F8:BE:18:B2:4A:85:25 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e9bc0bd50ea63c19a0e9f04dea75bcca4f18306fea65859cc0676bfeeed87d5 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45ebf9d2308a2b156e50ec13b0a27abc22124d4c167df730dc871773cdbfe66f > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f0a48dd187500284ed98bd9293b3821f60efdf704aed5c14b7c366fc6a02aad9 > > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=07d669c4c024b6e5e1ab0d47e3af705764adb8066ab797ed9be6d690086f0772 > > >
Re: CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
I've just created a batch for this list on the Revocation Tracker: https://misissued.com/batch/47/ On 22/03/2019 19:05, CERT Coordination Center via dev-security-policy wrote: > Hi folks, > > I'm sharing this information with this list per suggestion of Hanno > Böck. Some time ago we started looking at private keys that are > included with Android apps that are publicly available in the Google > Play store. Some subset of these keys have been used to obtain > certificates from CAs participating in the CT project (as visible on > https://crt.sh) > > The following crt.sh link to keys/certificates that are associated with > the compromised (released to the public) private keys: > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d31922465b3b7a85718752f1ae9bacb7cd1522996b073cd4da2464cdf84f697d > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a7c10b71f3c0827222573dcc73dac168d91bf3c564b1f5bd43924baf0472576c > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=2766f6f5afa36174a08ca27aadaeba6621486960f385bed7ea83173ac2617703 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0cf68ccb3c210c91f742efb4d6091f2467132f33df63b56a8dcb2c84cf9a7502 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=84041b5545a35e4bedcb4e1b88e0790dcf70a14abdf5f34d186e3a5656d060b0 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b4fb504d853e52a1ef4b49a5005d39d4ca5c2e1f98bacedd7befb728d589095 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fddde47bfd018ea5b8b04be6dca332203e776d5249517b8db3acf5fa19abba10 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=24184bbe0eadbcfd69b06b0e6f10d07c58413ecdb080cc609469d8a13ad33417 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ebb22a8bd69d1780ec0d74e23c2f83cdd559ef065766dfa80d19be0496ca3e35 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d92b4545299cb1c2426205295a8acc24205bd7a9b7f1ab767c9270d6bed929e9 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=7732d4c9781979c2eda1dca14d610f627bf0eb14ad6d9f86c69d8f3a42c39430 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cd6b8f0a1862390bd20dd81e63b266847bf645cdc440f4022fc165e34ff6a7f1 > https://crt.sh/?q=FB:1A:41:67:06:26:2B:99:8A:97:73:9A:FC:C7:E3:77:48:C3:E5:21:47:7E:FD:D5:03:D0:0C:31:C4:95:C5:07 > https://crt.sh/?q=A7:30:9D:E5:1D:44:85:6A:E6:00:74:C3:0F:3E:3E:EA:23:EA:78:2D:84:6C:10:77:0B:1C:8F:24:B3:6D:D4:4D > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=79c923c2d644eafef947d40d915b42684d35600a71cea6db22e88d7619a7825c > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45c363fd97c114bdbaa8444d068a0347d18c862e657dd90e2a48ac978f533015 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8206e318193186cace874b77d4b361ec37940e884d6ca10fca430164da663416 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=887b1c8bbfb6d54dc47cf4f2397e07e3ccd850ea26bf3bcd8e269bc5b2917266 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d1a0748edb263fdf9fe8370db55b2669e52dec46cc61f7eec607febce66bba70 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b805cc36a8a84d5f462d8230cb6c05fcd13c7f4d81143c4c58692e1c71ac5c66 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7f5a035038a3f933998ad503fe3535f823355101181ed51e1a942156a178dc2 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=493f34228ad3179e2dad25a392acae4d2dcaebcf633240a9df9d7f4413c4e681 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b40f2df2dc2bbc5d176cfb7b870342678e19cbf1ab14bef6ea22e20d60ec1b9 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cbcbef7bedeb58b1fd36af2bbf32f3269d8a920d7aa77a4d6f7e5beb7c4b656e > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=357d37290366067db84ddc291ed15eeb0fef413235101c996a8d6f97e14dfa33 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f8e3776c8f5cd1617faf006e2bfa3b7be3ea11960aa55f7ef72416bde1b7f958 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e199b309105b8f05f8af089eb9b97d7c4caf2490974c8d4e069a2ca5aca4574 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b56d3c26284ad6a2faa95ca5f4c13ab69d995abea034bac169146f5401a7a02 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=758854a6e58cd778129d56e72617d9312ac4a3bcf9c9b1227a117bb5ea83245e > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0a7b4ca246d82b7b1abe7192be4960a1b9d236f59d056dae3c98bd9c147262f9 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b4a95d9b6d13a38c5e1c5002c69084f4de054e9dc2139afb5fa2454b8042147a > https://crt.sh/?q=59:A2:F6:05:11:57:A4:11:03:2E:39:45:2B:35:BF:01:E0:04:03:9E:C4:BA:EE:DE:1A:F8:BE:18:B2:4A:85:25 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e9bc0bd50ea63c19a0e9f04dea75bcca4f18306fea65859cc0676bfeeed87d5 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45ebf9d2308a2b156e50ec13b0a27abc22124d4c167df730dc871773cdbfe66f > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f0a48dd187500284ed98bd9293b3821f60efdf704aed5c14b7c366fc6a02aad9 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=07d669c4c024b6e5e1ab0d47e3af705764adb8066ab797ed9be6d690086f0772 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=22f6b4e6f9e06687c9df8c9cf4715e7fc58cdf7163d404d2362a4288b7c7e975 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=50259dd332075155f9fb4ae2dc23ad193b343941a6efef81d7d2ea2ee1aae1ec > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a1c5cd8e193dffe45230254b62e27f4438414b69b439f835fea54f741c6c6f59 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=e3e5c7ff15cd52ce05902b8ae42ae08c3257457136756c89a35f7ee8554c9e59 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d1c40311777bdc363fbe01eda747126efd2de188864cdba4ea5c131e1439da6e > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c327dc1213ae46b0d3d716bced1d2dc588508a66ae1f032c685d18c12b5a226f > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fd1eebe89eb69f45a81eb1fb6bf7216365ff1c138eebad311abcad66c1edf3f9 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1b43aeac546388919f0a08dbbaa76750811d255379b884a19578fd3dc99bf996 > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=90a3d4ea7c5d74a0ace3ecf8edec3431c2745763b2b01337002f46807d6481fd >
CA-issued certificates for publicly-available private keys VU#553544
Hi folks, I'm sharing this information with this list per suggestion of Hanno Böck. Some time ago we started looking at private keys that are included with Android apps that are publicly available in the Google Play store. Some subset of these keys have been used to obtain certificates from CAs participating in the CT project (as visible on https://crt.sh) The following crt.sh link to keys/certificates that are associated with the compromised (released to the public) private keys: https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d31922465b3b7a85718752f1ae9bacb7cd1522996b073cd4da2464cdf84f697d https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a7c10b71f3c0827222573dcc73dac168d91bf3c564b1f5bd43924baf0472576c https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=2766f6f5afa36174a08ca27aadaeba6621486960f385bed7ea83173ac2617703 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0cf68ccb3c210c91f742efb4d6091f2467132f33df63b56a8dcb2c84cf9a7502 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=84041b5545a35e4bedcb4e1b88e0790dcf70a14abdf5f34d186e3a5656d060b0 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b4fb504d853e52a1ef4b49a5005d39d4ca5c2e1f98bacedd7befb728d589095 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fddde47bfd018ea5b8b04be6dca332203e776d5249517b8db3acf5fa19abba10 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=24184bbe0eadbcfd69b06b0e6f10d07c58413ecdb080cc609469d8a13ad33417 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ebb22a8bd69d1780ec0d74e23c2f83cdd559ef065766dfa80d19be0496ca3e35 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d92b4545299cb1c2426205295a8acc24205bd7a9b7f1ab767c9270d6bed929e9 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=7732d4c9781979c2eda1dca14d610f627bf0eb14ad6d9f86c69d8f3a42c39430 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cd6b8f0a1862390bd20dd81e63b266847bf645cdc440f4022fc165e34ff6a7f1 https://crt.sh/?q=FB:1A:41:67:06:26:2B:99:8A:97:73:9A:FC:C7:E3:77:48:C3:E5:21:47:7E:FD:D5:03:D0:0C:31:C4:95:C5:07 https://crt.sh/?q=A7:30:9D:E5:1D:44:85:6A:E6:00:74:C3:0F:3E:3E:EA:23:EA:78:2D:84:6C:10:77:0B:1C:8F:24:B3:6D:D4:4D https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=79c923c2d644eafef947d40d915b42684d35600a71cea6db22e88d7619a7825c https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45c363fd97c114bdbaa8444d068a0347d18c862e657dd90e2a48ac978f533015 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8206e318193186cace874b77d4b361ec37940e884d6ca10fca430164da663416 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=887b1c8bbfb6d54dc47cf4f2397e07e3ccd850ea26bf3bcd8e269bc5b2917266 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d1a0748edb263fdf9fe8370db55b2669e52dec46cc61f7eec607febce66bba70 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b805cc36a8a84d5f462d8230cb6c05fcd13c7f4d81143c4c58692e1c71ac5c66 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7f5a035038a3f933998ad503fe3535f823355101181ed51e1a942156a178dc2 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=493f34228ad3179e2dad25a392acae4d2dcaebcf633240a9df9d7f4413c4e681 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b40f2df2dc2bbc5d176cfb7b870342678e19cbf1ab14bef6ea22e20d60ec1b9 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=cbcbef7bedeb58b1fd36af2bbf32f3269d8a920d7aa77a4d6f7e5beb7c4b656e https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=357d37290366067db84ddc291ed15eeb0fef413235101c996a8d6f97e14dfa33 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f8e3776c8f5cd1617faf006e2bfa3b7be3ea11960aa55f7ef72416bde1b7f958 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e199b309105b8f05f8af089eb9b97d7c4caf2490974c8d4e069a2ca5aca4574 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=9b56d3c26284ad6a2faa95ca5f4c13ab69d995abea034bac169146f5401a7a02 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=758854a6e58cd778129d56e72617d9312ac4a3bcf9c9b1227a117bb5ea83245e https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=0a7b4ca246d82b7b1abe7192be4960a1b9d236f59d056dae3c98bd9c147262f9 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=b4a95d9b6d13a38c5e1c5002c69084f4de054e9dc2139afb5fa2454b8042147a https://crt.sh/?q=59:A2:F6:05:11:57:A4:11:03:2E:39:45:2B:35:BF:01:E0:04:03:9E:C4:BA:EE:DE:1A:F8:BE:18:B2:4A:85:25 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=6e9bc0bd50ea63c19a0e9f04dea75bcca4f18306fea65859cc0676bfeeed87d5 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=45ebf9d2308a2b156e50ec13b0a27abc22124d4c167df730dc871773cdbfe66f https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f0a48dd187500284ed98bd9293b3821f60efdf704aed5c14b7c366fc6a02aad9 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=07d669c4c024b6e5e1ab0d47e3af705764adb8066ab797ed9be6d690086f0772 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=22f6b4e6f9e06687c9df8c9cf4715e7fc58cdf7163d404d2362a4288b7c7e975 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=50259dd332075155f9fb4ae2dc23ad193b343941a6efef81d7d2ea2ee1aae1ec https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a1c5cd8e193dffe45230254b62e27f4438414b69b439f835fea54f741c6c6f59 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=e3e5c7ff15cd52ce05902b8ae42ae08c3257457136756c89a35f7ee8554c9e59 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d1c40311777bdc363fbe01eda747126efd2de188864cdba4ea5c131e1439da6e https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c327dc1213ae46b0d3d716bced1d2dc588508a66ae1f032c685d18c12b5a226f https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fd1eebe89eb69f45a81eb1fb6bf7216365ff1c138eebad311abcad66c1edf3f9 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1b43aeac546388919f0a08dbbaa76750811d255379b884a19578fd3dc99bf996 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=90a3d4ea7c5d74a0ace3ecf8edec3431c2745763b2b01337002f46807d6481fd https://crt.sh/?q=7F:6B:B5:9D:E2:D5:65:AD:AC:CB:C1:CD:3D:13:E7:4A:97:73:48:BA:1D:B0:5F:FE:22:87:88:1F:B4:05:43:F3 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=4064ad789590c24922efb7cd43717894348db4685485105e692de58f85e38a97 https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=56eac7e904baab457374d00c70014dc7f7f4f60d1bf11b55f04320a62d58c8fc
