Re: Open Source CA Software
I think open source is great, but it's not a panacea. While there are many CAs and several root programs, this community is a relatively small one in the grand scheme. Prior events suggest that there are not enough people with the necessary skill overlap to parse both the rules and the code to make useful analysis while also having an interest in doing so. On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 9:59 AM Mike Kushner via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 11:54:52 PM UTC+1, James Burton wrote: > > Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse > > and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead > > and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check > for > > issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. > > > > Thank you, > > > > Burton > > Dude, EJBCA has been open source long enough to be able to legally vote > and have a driver's license. Literally. But I agree, and we are open source > for exactly that reason. > > I will add though, and stress, that this was not an issue with how EJBCA > generates serial numbers. EJBCA still produces serial numbers with the max > entropy for a given serial number length, as configured in number of > octets. If you set EJBCA to use 20 octets you'll get 159 bits of entropy, > the max available without breaking the RFC, and it's been that way since > 2014. > > To save people time, by the way, here you go: > > https://svn.cesecore.eu/svn/ejbca/trunk/ejbca/modules/cesecore-common/src/org/cesecore/certificates/ca/internal/SernoGeneratorRandom.java > > This was not an issue with the source, it was an issue with the end user's > understanding of what it means to define an SN length as given number of of > octets, how integer octets are defined in x690, and what entropy that can > be derived. That is all a documentation failure on our end - we could have > been more explicit, and we could have reached out more. > > There's also the faulty assumption that SN length = entropy. As we've > seen, many other CA implementations produce SNs with far less entropy than > their length would allow. I'm not saying that there's anything inherently > wrong with that, but it illustrates the danger of making assumptions. > > As we didn't follow cabf at the time we weren't fully aware of the > severity of the problem, and assumed that affected parties understood their > configurations and raised the SN length. > ___ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Open Source CA Software
On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 11:54:52 PM UTC+1, James Burton wrote: > Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse > and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead > and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check for > issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. > > Thank you, > > Burton Dude, EJBCA has been open source long enough to be able to legally vote and have a driver's license. Literally. But I agree, and we are open source for exactly that reason. I will add though, and stress, that this was not an issue with how EJBCA generates serial numbers. EJBCA still produces serial numbers with the max entropy for a given serial number length, as configured in number of octets. If you set EJBCA to use 20 octets you'll get 159 bits of entropy, the max available without breaking the RFC, and it's been that way since 2014. To save people time, by the way, here you go: https://svn.cesecore.eu/svn/ejbca/trunk/ejbca/modules/cesecore-common/src/org/cesecore/certificates/ca/internal/SernoGeneratorRandom.java This was not an issue with the source, it was an issue with the end user's understanding of what it means to define an SN length as given number of of octets, how integer octets are defined in x690, and what entropy that can be derived. That is all a documentation failure on our end - we could have been more explicit, and we could have reached out more. There's also the faulty assumption that SN length = entropy. As we've seen, many other CA implementations produce SNs with far less entropy than their length would allow. I'm not saying that there's anything inherently wrong with that, but it illustrates the danger of making assumptions. As we didn't follow cabf at the time we weren't fully aware of the severity of the problem, and assumed that affected parties understood their configurations and raised the SN length. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Open Source CA Software
Hi, It might have been found, but there's a good chance it would have been bypassed anyhow. Since it was not a bug in the code, you would have to had analyzed it in the context of the discussions around b164, which I think there are probably very few people who could/would. I may be wrong, and we surely appreciate the more eyes on EJBCA the better. We love issue reports from the Community. My take is that this was a bit of pure chance at play here. As EJBCA had used 8 octets serial numbers (64 bits) as default since 2001, and by coincidence CAB Forum chose exactly the same number, 64 bits (note that I speak only about the number itself here, not about the meaning). Simply by the similarity of those numbers it was overlooked that dragons were lurking. If CAB Forum had chosen 56, 72, 96 or any other random number, nobody would have missed it and compliant configurations would have been made. Generally, as you know, EJBCA has a wide array of use cases where CAB Forum is one important, but must remain configurable (down to 4 octets serials as example). An important user base as CAB Forum deserves compliant defaults of course, which has now been addressed by Mike and his team. Here's hoping for more code reviews! Cheers, Tomas On Friday, March 15, 2019 at 12:35:53 AM UTC+1, James Burton wrote: > (Forgot to post it to m.d.s.p) > > Your right that we all failed to conduct the proper due diligence source > code checks on EJBCA and therefore missed this important issue. We all need > to learn from this past mistake and implement better checks which prevents > issues like this that might arise in the future. > > Thank you, > > Burton > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 10:57 PM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 6:54 PM James Burton via dev-security-policy < > > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > >> Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse > >> and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead > >> and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check for > >> issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. > >> > > > > Considering EJBCA is open-source, this does not seem that it would > > logically follow. > > ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Open Source CA Software
(Forgot to post it to m.d.s.p) Your right that we all failed to conduct the proper due diligence source code checks on EJBCA and therefore missed this important issue. We all need to learn from this past mistake and implement better checks which prevents issues like this that might arise in the future. Thank you, Burton On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 10:57 PM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 6:54 PM James Burton via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse >> and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead >> and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check for >> issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. >> > > Considering EJBCA is open-source, this does not seem that it would > logically follow. > ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Open Source CA Software
On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 6:54 PM James Burton via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse > and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead > and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check for > issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. > Considering EJBCA is open-source, this does not seem that it would logically follow. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Open Source CA Software
Let's Encrypt CA software 'Boulder' is open source for everyone to browse and check for issues. All other CAs should follow the Let's Encrypt lead and open source their own CA software for everyone to browse and check for issues. We might have found the serial number issue sooner. Thank you, Burton ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
