Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-03 Thread Nick France via dev-security-policy
On Wednesday, June 3, 2020 at 2:38:33 AM UTC+1, Benjamin Seidenberg wrote:
> Greetings:
> 
> Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's
> program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had
> with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would
> be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private
> keys). Therefore, I can only assume that they mined their problem report
> submissions in order to generate their marketing contact lists.
> 
> This leads to two questions:
> 
> 1.) Is anyone aware of any policies that speak to this practice? I'm not
> aware of anything in the BRs or Mozilla policy that speak to this, but
> there are many other standards, documents, audit regimes, etc., which are
> incorporated by reference that I am not familiar with, and so it's possible
> one of them has something to say on this issue.
> 
> 2.) While I felt like this practice (if it happened the way I assumed) is
> inappropriate, is there a consensus from others that that is the case? If
> so, is there any interest in adding requirements to Mozilla's Policy about
> handling of information from problem reports received by CAs?
> 
> I do recall a discussion a while back on this list where a reporter had
> their information forwarded on to the certificate owner and got
> unpleasant emails in response and was asking whether the CAs were obligated
> to protect the identity of the reporters, but I don't recall any
> conclusions being reached.
> 
> Good Day,
> Benjamin


Benjamin, Ryan,

Apologies. Both of your email addresses did have a message sent to you from 
Sectigo in the past day or two regarding an upcoming webinar, which should not 
have been sent to you.
Both of your contacts were within our centralised ticketing and CRM system from 
your previous abuse reports.
A subset of users in the group for certificate and malware abuse were 
incorrectly contacted.

We have now marked all contact addresses who have submitted certificate and 
malware abuse reports as opt-out, and this will cover new reports going forward.
I believe at least Benjamin followed the opt-out link, which we have already 
taken action on.

Apologies once again - we do not wish for this to discourage the abuse reports 
we receive from the community.

Thanks,
Nick
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Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy
As already said, this is purely about personal data processing, so the relevant 
regulation applies. I don't see need for the Root Programs to deal with this, 
as compliance with privacy regulations is already a requisite for Webtrust and 
other audits.

In countries affected by GDPR, which is the one I'm more familiar, 
incorporating in a DB the email address and use it for unsolicited email 
wouldn't be permitted. This would be OK only if the contact comes from a web 
form where the sender can see the privacy notice and explicitly accepts been 
contacted for marketing purposes. Implicit consent is not allowed anymore.
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Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 10:25 PM Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> I dislike being added to lists as much as the next person. There are
> numerous reasons for what might have happened. Had you setup an address for
> the purpose of contacting them, or any other company, you’d know for sure.
>
> My personal approach would be to ask them before emailing the list. And
> I’m not pointing the finger because you decided to email the list :))
>
> I’ve received some unsolicited emails from people here, but I’m lucky
> because I appreciated each one - but they weren’t marketing emails.
>
> - Paul
>
>
> >> On Jun 2, 2020, at 6:38 PM, Benjamin Seidenberg via dev-security-policy
>  wrote:
> > Greetings:
> >
> > Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's
> > program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had
> > with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would
> > be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private
> > keys). Therefore, I can only assume that they mined their problem report
> > submissions in order to generate their marketing contact lists.


As did I, not having done any business with Sectigo, on my personal email,
which I’ve only ever used for problem reporting with them.


> >
> > This leads to two questions:
> >
> > 1.) Is anyone aware of any policies that speak to this practice? I'm not
> > aware of anything in the BRs or Mozilla policy that speak to this, but
> > there are many other standards, documents, audit regimes, etc., which are
> > incorporated by reference that I am not familiar with, and so it's
> possible
> > one of them has something to say on this issue.
>

I’m not aware of any, although it seems a rather brazen and distasteful
practice.

>
> > 2.) While I felt like this practice (if it happened the way I assumed) is
> > inappropriate, is there a consensus from others that that is the case? If
> > so, is there any interest in adding requirements to Mozilla's Policy
> about
> > handling of information from problem reports received by CAs?


I think something more concrete is useful here before contemplating. I’m
supportive of policies preventing such crass usages, but I’m worried CAs
already take very liberal interpretations of things to be kept private in
order to avoid transparency, and this might further embolden such
shenanigans.
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Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 06:38:12PM -0700, Benjamin Seidenberg via 
dev-security-policy wrote:
> Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's
> program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had
> with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would
> be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private
> keys). Therefore, I can only assume that they mined their problem report
> submissions in order to generate their marketing contact lists.

I've sent several hundred certificate problem reports to a number of CAs in
the past few months, and I'm yet to get marketing spam from Sectigo as a
result.  I have had one (suspected) scrape-from-problem-report incident from
a different CA, but I can't be 100% sure, since I was at that time still
sending out problem reports from my personal address.  I now use per-report
plus-addressed addresses that go to a dedicated account -- its possible that
the spamcannons don't recognise + as a valid local-part character, though. 


> 1.) Is anyone aware of any policies that speak to this practice? I'm not
> aware of anything in the BRs or Mozilla policy that speak to this, but
> there are many other standards, documents, audit regimes, etc., which are
> incorporated by reference that I am not familiar with, and so it's possible
> one of them has something to say on this issue.

No, I am not aware of anything specific to CAs/PKIs that would prohibit such
a practice.  You'd need to fall back to general data-handling legislation
like GDPR, California's new statute, and so on (as relevant to your
jurisdiction).

> 2.) While I felt like this practice (if it happened the way I assumed) is
> inappropriate, is there a consensus from others that that is the case? If
> so, is there any interest in adding requirements to Mozilla's Policy about
> handling of information from problem reports received by CAs?

It's certainly dumb as rocks, because the sort of people who are reporting
problems to CAs are not, by and large, the sort of people who are going to
be purchasing managers for things like managed PKI, and those same people
are also probably going to be the sort of people who are not fans of getting
spammed.  However, Rule 1, I believe, is that spammers are dumb.  If they
weren't, they wouldn't scrape whois data for abuse reporting addresses...

As far as making requirements in Mozilla Policy, I have my doubts that it'd
really fly.  As you note, the far more risky problem of having problem
reporters exposed to potential unpleasantness from incompetent subscribers
being unhappy at the wrong people:

> I do recall a discussion a while back on this list where a reporter had
> their information forwarded on to the certificate owner and got
> unpleasant emails in response and was asking whether the CAs were obligated
> to protect the identity of the reporters, but I don't recall any
> conclusions being reached.

was not conclusively addressed, and so I doubt there would be much interest
in a rule that said "thou shalt not spam people who report problems".

For all those reasons and more, I've switched to a separate e-mail account
and per-reort addresses -- no (obvious) human to threaten with spurious
lawsuits, and if I get spam it's blindingly obvious where it came from.  The
automated reporting system I've setup also watches OCSP for revocation times
and keeps full and complete records of all correspondence and timestamps, so
I can tell exactly what (for example) the reporting timeframes were, and
whether the BR requirements were met.

On that front, actually, would it be of any use to you (or others) if there
was a way to route your problem reports through my Revokinator system?  It'd
give you some amount of protection against spam and the such like, and
built-in OCSP / revocation time tracking.

- Matt

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Re: Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy
I dislike being added to lists as much as the next person. There are numerous 
reasons for what might have happened. Had you setup an address for the purpose 
of contacting them, or any other company, you’d know for sure. 

My personal approach would be to ask them before emailing the list. And I’m not 
pointing the finger because you decided to email the list :))

I’ve received some unsolicited emails from people here, but I’m lucky because I 
appreciated each one - but they weren’t marketing emails. 

- Paul


>> On Jun 2, 2020, at 6:38 PM, Benjamin Seidenberg via dev-security-policy 
>>  wrote:
> Greetings:
> 
> Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's
> program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had
> with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would
> be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private
> keys). Therefore, I can only assume that they mined their problem report
> submissions in order to generate their marketing contact lists.
> 
> This leads to two questions:
> 
> 1.) Is anyone aware of any policies that speak to this practice? I'm not
> aware of anything in the BRs or Mozilla policy that speak to this, but
> there are many other standards, documents, audit regimes, etc., which are
> incorporated by reference that I am not familiar with, and so it's possible
> one of them has something to say on this issue.
> 
> 2.) While I felt like this practice (if it happened the way I assumed) is
> inappropriate, is there a consensus from others that that is the case? If
> so, is there any interest in adding requirements to Mozilla's Policy about
> handling of information from problem reports received by CAs?
> 
> I do recall a discussion a while back on this list where a reporter had
> their information forwarded on to the certificate owner and got
> unpleasant emails in response and was asking whether the CAs were obligated
> to protect the identity of the reporters, but I don't recall any
> conclusions being reached.
> 
> Good Day,
> Benjamin
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Use of information collected from problem reporting addresses for marketing?

2020-06-02 Thread Benjamin Seidenberg via dev-security-policy
Greetings:

Today, I received a marketing email from one of the CAs in Mozilla's
program (Sectigo). As far as I know, the only interactions I've ever had
with this CA where they would have gotten my name and email address would
be from me submitting problem reports to them (for compromised private
keys). Therefore, I can only assume that they mined their problem report
submissions in order to generate their marketing contact lists.

This leads to two questions:

1.) Is anyone aware of any policies that speak to this practice? I'm not
aware of anything in the BRs or Mozilla policy that speak to this, but
there are many other standards, documents, audit regimes, etc., which are
incorporated by reference that I am not familiar with, and so it's possible
one of them has something to say on this issue.

2.) While I felt like this practice (if it happened the way I assumed) is
inappropriate, is there a consensus from others that that is the case? If
so, is there any interest in adding requirements to Mozilla's Policy about
handling of information from problem reports received by CAs?

I do recall a discussion a while back on this list where a reporter had
their information forwarded on to the certificate owner and got
unpleasant emails in response and was asking whether the CAs were obligated
to protect the identity of the reporters, but I don't recall any
conclusions being reached.

Good Day,
Benjamin
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