certutil - iPaddress SubjectAltName extension

2014-07-14 Thread Bernhard Thalmayr
Hi experts, although I'm pretty sure this has been asked before I could 
not find any pointers in the archive.


What is the reason, why certutil supports 'dNSName' GeneralNames for 
SubjectAltName but not 'iPAddress' (RFC 3270 secion 4.2.1.7)?


Especially Directory Servers (used for 'native LDAP') often use IP 
instead of FQDN in the SAN extension of the server cert an it's not too 
nice to use 'openssl' to get this.


I've seen bug 396255, which suggests there was so intention to support it.

TIA,
Bernhard

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Re: NSS Custom Crypto Module

2014-07-14 Thread ramahmoo
Is there any documentation about how to use ckfw or someone has to read and
understand it from source examples erc.?



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The TPM is dead, long live the TEE!

2014-07-14 Thread Anders Rundgren

Somewhat unfortunate for Microsoft and Intel who have bet the house on TPMs 
(Trusted Platform Modules), all their competitors in the mobile space including Google 
and Apple, have rather settled on embedded TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) schemes 
enabling systems like this:

http://www.nasdaq.com/article/samsung-mobilesecurity-platform-to-be-part-of-next-android-20140625-00937

iOS:
http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

How come the competition didn't buy into the TPM?

TPMs are based on a one-size-fits-all security API philosophy. Since Intel 
relies on external vendors supplying TPM-components this (IMHO fairly unwieldy) API must 
also be standardized which makes the process updating TPMs extremely slow and costly.

TEEs OTOH can be fitted at any time with application-specific security APIs 
which both can be standardized or entirely proprietary. In fact, even 
third-parties can crate new security APIs using GlobalPlatform's TEE!

How about security? Since there is (generally) very little consensus on these 
matters, I should probably not dive too deep into this :-)

Anders
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Re: certutil - iPaddress SubjectAltName extension

2014-07-14 Thread Kai Engert
On Mon, 2014-07-14 at 10:47 +0200, Bernhard Thalmayr wrote:
 What is the reason, why certutil supports 'dNSName' GeneralNames for 
 SubjectAltName but not 'iPAddress' (RFC 3270 secion 4.2.1.7)?

Do you refer to the command line parameters -7 and -8 ?
I don't know why this subset was chosen in the past.

However, just recently we added support for additional SAN variations
(in version 3.16.2), which provides the new parameter --extSAN.

Can you try it? If it doesn't work as expected, please let us know.

Kai


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Re: The TPM is dead, long live the TEE!

2014-07-14 Thread Falcon Darkstar Momot
On 12/07/2014 05:33, Anders Rundgren wrote:
 Somewhat unfortunate for Microsoft and Intel who have bet the house
 on TPMs (Trusted Platform Modules), all their competitors in the
 mobile space including Google and Apple, have rather settled on
 embedded TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) schemes enabling systems
 like this:

 http://www.nasdaq.com/article/samsung-mobilesecurity-platform-to-be-part-of-next-android-20140625-00937


 iOS:
 http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

 How come the competition didn't buy into the TPM?

 TPMs are based on a one-size-fits-all security API philosophy. Since
 Intel relies on external vendors supplying TPM-components this (IMHO
 fairly unwieldy) API must also be standardized which makes the process
 updating TPMs extremely slow and costly.

 TEEs OTOH can be fitted at any time with application-specific security
 APIs which both can be standardized or entirely proprietary. In fact,
 even third-parties can crate new security APIs using GlobalPlatform's
 TEE!

 How about security? Since there is (generally) very little consensus
 on these matters, I should probably not dive too deep into this :-)

 Anders

Perhaps for another interesting example of the mobile industry's
legendary security foresight you might try to find a transcript or notes
from a talk two gentlemen by the names of Josh Thomas and Nathan Keltner
gave at recon in montreal this year titled here be dragons: a bedtime
tale for sleepless nights.  In it, they called out how terrible
inter-vendor coordination coupled with allowing several people to add
their own APIs to the trust zone code (in that particular case, a DRM
API) resulted in a trivial and complete read/write what where
vulnerability in the trust zone (as implemented by one particular
vendor), followed by code execution.

I really don't think mobile didn't do this therefore it's {not
relevant,a bad idea} is valid.  The TEE has a different set of
problems, but it certainly has them, and I think it's managed to
embarrass a lot more people than TPM has during its tenure.  Also, the
platforms are only converged on the surface (if that).

--Falcon K.
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Re: certutil - iPaddress SubjectAltName extension

2014-07-14 Thread Bernhard Thalmayr

Thanks a lot for the details Kai, much appreciated.

Indeed I was referring to options '-7', '-8' as they are decribed at 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/tools/NSS_Tools_certutil


I was not aware of '--extSAN' as it seems to be missing from the above 
doc. Thanks for pointing it out. I will give it a shot.


Is there any documentation available for '--extSAN' parameter? Mr. 
Google did not find any helpful resource.


Thanks again,
Bernhard

Am 7/14/14 8:11 PM, schrieb Kai Engert:

On Mon, 2014-07-14 at 10:47 +0200, Bernhard Thalmayr wrote:

What is the reason, why certutil supports 'dNSName' GeneralNames for
SubjectAltName but not 'iPAddress' (RFC 3270 secion 4.2.1.7)?


Do you refer to the command line parameters -7 and -8 ?
I don't know why this subset was chosen in the past.

However, just recently we added support for additional SAN variations
(in version 3.16.2), which provides the new parameter --extSAN.

Can you try it? If it doesn't work as expected, please let us know.

Kai





--
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IT-Consulting Bernhard Thalmayr
Herxheimer Str. 5, 83620 Vagen (Munich area), Germany
Tel: +49 (0)8062 7769174
Mobile: +49 (0)176 55060699

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