Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
> defer the execution of the image.
>
> Cc: Jian J Wang
> Cc: Hao A Wu
> Cc: Liming Gao
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi
> ---
> .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++-
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
>Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride
> mapping.
>
> - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
> + Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
>SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
> @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
> );
> ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
> DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
>}
> } else {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded
> and an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid
> resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
>DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
>DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
> }
>}
> }
>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude
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Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> -Original Message-
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Dandan Bi
> Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 11:06 AM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Wang, Jian J; Wu, Hao A; Gao, Liming; Laszlo Ersek
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride:
> Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
>
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
> defer the execution of the image.
>
> Cc: Jian J Wang
> Cc: Hao A Wu
> Cc: Liming Gao
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi
> ---
> .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++-
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644
> ---
> a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> +++
> b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
>Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride
> mapping.
>
> - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
> + Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
>SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
> @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
> );
> ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
> DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
>}
> } else {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid
> resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu
Best Regards,
Hao Wu
>DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
>DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
> }
>}
> }
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
>
>
>
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[edk2-devel] [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.
But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
defer the execution of the image.
Cc: Jian J Wang
Cc: Hao A Wu
Cc: Liming Gao
Cc: Laszlo Ersek
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi
---
.../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
/** @file
Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride
mapping.
- Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h"
@@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
);
ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL);
DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;
}
} else {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution
of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+ }
DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;
DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;
}
}
}
--
2.18.0.windows.1
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