Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 01/13/2014 04:17 PM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
[Moving this to the libguestfs mailing list]
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 03:05:14PM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1
On 01/13/2014 11:49 AM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 10:20:22AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
Secondly we prevent even unconfined_t from putting down labels on
the file system that the kernel does not understand. IE If I am
building a F21 image on a RHEL6 box, it would blow up in enforcing
mode if run as unconfined_t. We added a special policy called
livecd_t that is allowed to put down labels which the kernel does not
understand, and unconfined_t will transition to this domain.
Slightly off-topic, but this (in-)ability to label files with labels
which the kernel doesn't know about affects libguestfs negatively too.
Is there some reason why it's bad?
Well we could add a label to libguestfs to allow these labels. From the
running kernel point of view you end up with unlabeled_t.
I think it's more complex with libguestfs because of the appliance, and
because libguestfs normally runs with SELinux disabled inside the
appliance.
[Note to peanut gallery: libguestfs uses and endorses SELinux and sVirt to
implement containment of qemu *in the host*. The above applies only to the
appliance.]
I know you wrote a good blog posting and we have a (very very old) open bug
to fix libguestfs's SELinux support:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=554829
After thinking about this for some years and Pino Toscano implementing a
new useful copy-attributes API in libguestfs, I think what we really want
is to copy security.selinux xattr from one file to another. This gives us
almost all we need, doesn't require us to run loadpolicy, and should work
independent of guest policy.
Luckily for us ... it works!
$ virt-builder fedora-20 $ guestfish -a fedora-20.img -i
fs getxattrs /etc/shadow
[0] = { attrname: security.selinux attrval:
system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0\x00 }
fs cp /etc/shadow /etc/shadow.copy fs setxattr security.selinux
system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 29 /etc/shadow.copy fs getxattrs
/etc/shadow.copy [0] = {
attrname: security.selinux attrval: system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 }
Is this expected? Are we bypassing the kernel/SELinux in some way? Note
that the libguestfs appliance kernel doesn't (AFAIK) know about the
system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 label.
We also would like to prevent users from making mistakes like assigning
httpd_t to a file when it is a process type.
SELinux is going to check before you put the label down unless you have
the mac_admin capability.
Rich.
That is correct, and what you are doing is correct. In libguestfs case there
is no reason to load_policy in the guest. As long as you don't force the host
to setenforce 0. Setting a XAttr to anything, is ok on an SELinux disabled
system, which is why this is working for you. As long as libguestfs maintains
the SELinux labels inside the guest, it is perfect.
Thanks.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/
iEYEARECAAYFAlLVTIQACgkQrlYvE4MpobNbjQCeMCd2oNg5VT9n3h0QEuQVKlaf
T1UAni/ZEXcgteDI7qKRLVJKi5ppFZbB
=jQvP
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/10/2014 10:47 PM, Dennis Gilmore wrote: El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 18:31:13 -0700 Tim Flink tfl...@redhat.com escribió: On Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:35:59 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com wrote: On Fri, 2014-01-10 at 17:33 -0600, Dennis Gilmore wrote: El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:26:38 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com escribió: On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. Adam this is not true, All Offical Fedora images for years were built on hosts with selinux disabled. F20 was the first time images were built with the host in permissive mode, but then they are built in a mock chroot which has selinux disabled in the chroot Hum, I'm sure back before the script tried to take care of it for you, I'd had multiple failures with both 'enforcing' and 'disabled'. But if you say so... I've also run into problems with livecd-creator and was told the same thing: for best results, run with SELinux in permissive mode - not disabled and not enforcing. It was a while ago but I don't think that it was something I hit for every build. This leads me to suspect that whatever the issue is, it doesn't happen every time and the releng setup must be able to avoid whatever it is that people can (and do) hit with SELinux disabled or enforcing. Also, I think that until F20 releng was building livecds in mock chroots on el boxes (dennis, please correct me if I'm wrong) where both you and I were building livecds on fedora installs. Tim, F20 images were built in f20 chroots on f19 boxes. but selinux on the host was permissive. prior to f20 it was the target os chroot on el Dennis The point being any of these tools to work with SELinux in enforcing mode, we need the processes within the build tools to believe SELinux is disabled, since we do not want them trying to do SELinux things, like loading policy. Secondly we prevent even unconfined_t from putting down labels on the file system that the kernel does not understand. IE If I am building a F21 image on a RHEL6 box, it would blow up in enforcing mode if run as unconfined_t. We added a special policy called livecd_t that is allowed to put down labels which the kernel does not understand, and unconfined_t will transition to this domain. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlLUBDUACgkQrlYvE4MpobOFugCbBY2+4hDmEmeJTy0PCy+7J3un x5AAn1c4H0xrXEwRCjN7vFk6pkywBhaP =a7/6 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 10:20:22AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote: Secondly we prevent even unconfined_t from putting down labels on the file system that the kernel does not understand. IE If I am building a F21 image on a RHEL6 box, it would blow up in enforcing mode if run as unconfined_t. We added a special policy called livecd_t that is allowed to put down labels which the kernel does not understand, and unconfined_t will transition to this domain. Slightly off-topic, but this (in-)ability to label files with labels which the kernel doesn't know about affects libguestfs negatively too. Is there some reason why it's bad? Rich. -- Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones virt-p2v converts physical machines to virtual machines. Boot with a live CD or over the network (PXE) and turn machines into KVM guests. http://libguestfs.org/virt-v2v -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/13/2014 11:49 AM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 10:20:22AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote: Secondly we prevent even unconfined_t from putting down labels on the file system that the kernel does not understand. IE If I am building a F21 image on a RHEL6 box, it would blow up in enforcing mode if run as unconfined_t. We added a special policy called livecd_t that is allowed to put down labels which the kernel does not understand, and unconfined_t will transition to this domain. Slightly off-topic, but this (in-)ability to label files with labels which the kernel doesn't know about affects libguestfs negatively too. Is there some reason why it's bad? Rich. Well we could add a label to libguestfs to allow these labels. From the running kernel point of view you end up with unlabeled_t. We also would like to prevent users from making mistakes like assigning httpd_t to a file when it is a process type. SELinux is going to check before you put the label down unless you have the mac_admin capability. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlLURvoACgkQrlYvE4MpobM8UwCgumLZBVrnwCwwby6jjeKiCXMV q4QAn3R1avfBzgLHG24DPLEYHSmhAgNE =YckJ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
[Moving this to the libguestfs mailing list]
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 03:05:14PM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 01/13/2014 11:49 AM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 10:20:22AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
Secondly we prevent even unconfined_t from putting down labels on the
file system that the kernel does not understand. IE If I am building a
F21 image on a RHEL6 box, it would blow up in enforcing mode if run as
unconfined_t. We added a special policy called livecd_t that is allowed
to put down labels which the kernel does not understand, and unconfined_t
will transition to this domain.
Slightly off-topic, but this (in-)ability to label files with labels which
the kernel doesn't know about affects libguestfs negatively too. Is there
some reason why it's bad?
Well we could add a label to libguestfs to allow these labels. From
the running kernel point of view you end up with unlabeled_t.
I think it's more complex with libguestfs because of the appliance,
and because libguestfs normally runs with SELinux disabled inside the
appliance.
[Note to peanut gallery: libguestfs uses and endorses SELinux and
sVirt to implement containment of qemu *in the host*. The above
applies only to the appliance.]
I know you wrote a good blog posting and we have a (very very old)
open bug to fix libguestfs's SELinux support:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=554829
After thinking about this for some years and Pino Toscano implementing
a new useful copy-attributes API in libguestfs, I think what we
really want is to copy security.selinux xattr from one file to
another. This gives us almost all we need, doesn't require us to run
loadpolicy, and should work independent of guest policy.
Luckily for us ... it works!
$ virt-builder fedora-20
$ guestfish -a fedora-20.img -i
fs getxattrs /etc/shadow
[0] = {
attrname: security.selinux
attrval: system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0\x00
}
fs cp /etc/shadow /etc/shadow.copy
fs setxattr security.selinux system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 29
/etc/shadow.copy
fs getxattrs /etc/shadow.copy [0] = {
attrname: security.selinux
attrval: system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0
}
Is this expected? Are we bypassing the kernel/SELinux in some way?
Note that the libguestfs appliance kernel doesn't (AFAIK) know about
the system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 label.
We also would like to prevent users from making mistakes like
assigning httpd_t to a file when it is a process type.
SELinux is going to check before you put the label down unless you have the
mac_admin capability.
Rich.
--
Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones
Fedora Windows cross-compiler. Compile Windows programs, test, and
build Windows installers. Over 100 libraries supported.
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/MinGW
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. livecd-creator is a string-and-duct-tape hack, it does quite a lot of ugly things. bcl's been trying to replace it with livemedia-creator for a while, but that effort seems to keep running into roadblocks. -- Adam Williamson Fedora QA Community Monkey IRC: adamw | Twitter: AdamW_Fedora | XMPP: adamw AT happyassassin . net http://www.happyassassin.net -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:26:38 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com escribió: On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. Adam this is not true, All Offical Fedora images for years were built on hosts with selinux disabled. F20 was the first time images were built with the host in permissive mode, but then they are built in a mock chroot which has selinux disabled in the chroot Dennis -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJS0IM5AAoJEH7ltONmPFDR0g4QAI6klWhJfx3rNdtYX5k+5CZy jYGsPMyv7SE2N20p0WNj7v0SNA1jo3wcqsugHTsyGME1G72n15zL3PIqaYUuq4rJ RmHQDxfUugq66n5iNnfw7lsJ/N2sqCd86wR1TTnWHKYypqf5XmKx6tBOY6A+uEEF MmOTaoDHVbtFM9bKZGKkfqorhFJH16mNleS1mC/sC/+a5xuGKbVBDYM2Pt+7/H1T YNPTZQhyEUR6k40vTV642yFxkSE/chltBswE9ZXTErey2JUuPLOdrRbppd9tj7vu Lcbxm7NPpXTJA9fKeBlNwIlXq25wVHu98NlyCfawNE6fNZzqWm03tP7If0PHy7x7 KG3M6EUQy+aLm+vRRa/H7iEH/USGe8wgTDY1IizDShuJQeKfAmVtUyXijvGNcGer K3z3BURivWvvXjuZ8sIfZTCq6IDkWC7MQh4X6gPj58t4ZVj3/p5nnxBhVwh1Nksn pumS3/mtUz/c+Rw5JtwWKS2QuUTG4U9ywspjkz7oGqEWDm/Th67t/1zmhof/LT0T lVmJWM6gyz9lhWBGNZhkGfNqcTvNdTo9TJ8nu4eCTKIGQRS7ODk6u/m1sBFxg8/i 0IrxHfW6Od0wrglxwh695G9liRVctLfmrwzTcnmiee/KQRVNa0TTDq7RdvU6Nsp+ zzNex8J/09Vj73TLmg9B =JLdx -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
On Fri, 2014-01-10 at 17:33 -0600, Dennis Gilmore wrote: El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:26:38 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com escribió: On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. Adam this is not true, All Offical Fedora images for years were built on hosts with selinux disabled. F20 was the first time images were built with the host in permissive mode, but then they are built in a mock chroot which has selinux disabled in the chroot Hum, I'm sure back before the script tried to take care of it for you, I'd had multiple failures with both 'enforcing' and 'disabled'. But if you say so... -- Adam Williamson Fedora QA Community Monkey IRC: adamw | Twitter: AdamW_Fedora | XMPP: adamw AT happyassassin . net http://www.happyassassin.net -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
On Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:35:59 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com wrote: On Fri, 2014-01-10 at 17:33 -0600, Dennis Gilmore wrote: El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:26:38 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com escribió: On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. Adam this is not true, All Offical Fedora images for years were built on hosts with selinux disabled. F20 was the first time images were built with the host in permissive mode, but then they are built in a mock chroot which has selinux disabled in the chroot Hum, I'm sure back before the script tried to take care of it for you, I'd had multiple failures with both 'enforcing' and 'disabled'. But if you say so... I've also run into problems with livecd-creator and was told the same thing: for best results, run with SELinux in permissive mode - not disabled and not enforcing. It was a while ago but I don't think that it was something I hit for every build. This leads me to suspect that whatever the issue is, it doesn't happen every time and the releng setup must be able to avoid whatever it is that people can (and do) hit with SELinux disabled or enforcing. Also, I think that until F20 releng was building livecds in mock chroots on el boxes (dennis, please correct me if I'm wrong) where both you and I were building livecds on fedora installs. Tim signature.asc Description: PGP signature -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 18:31:13 -0700 Tim Flink tfl...@redhat.com escribió: On Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:35:59 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com wrote: On Fri, 2014-01-10 at 17:33 -0600, Dennis Gilmore wrote: El Fri, 10 Jan 2014 15:26:38 -0800 Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com escribió: On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 11:32 +0100, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Because live images don't work properly if it's either disabled or enforcing while the image is being generated. Why *that* is I don't know, but before bcl made the livecd-creator script do this, we just had a bit in the livecd-creator instructions which said you have to run setenforce Permissive before starting to build a live image. If you try building a live image with SELinux either disabled or enforcing on the build host, you wind up either with a compose that fails, or an image that can't be booted in enforcing mode. Adam this is not true, All Offical Fedora images for years were built on hosts with selinux disabled. F20 was the first time images were built with the host in permissive mode, but then they are built in a mock chroot which has selinux disabled in the chroot Hum, I'm sure back before the script tried to take care of it for you, I'd had multiple failures with both 'enforcing' and 'disabled'. But if you say so... I've also run into problems with livecd-creator and was told the same thing: for best results, run with SELinux in permissive mode - not disabled and not enforcing. It was a while ago but I don't think that it was something I hit for every build. This leads me to suspect that whatever the issue is, it doesn't happen every time and the releng setup must be able to avoid whatever it is that people can (and do) hit with SELinux disabled or enforcing. Also, I think that until F20 releng was building livecds in mock chroots on el boxes (dennis, please correct me if I'm wrong) where both you and I were building livecds on fedora installs. Tim, F20 images were built in f20 chroots on f19 boxes. but selinux on the host was permissive. prior to f20 it was the target os chroot on el Dennis -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJS0L7UAAoJEH7ltONmPFDRcRkQAMmepLraNTt5/r8IPRU8tos5 pRs1c7a0h+IR0Dn1zZigVmgJzr42ST38X2eKqOJGHZj1Fh48TaJ8wjjTbsI8jhYz iEa8mjbGpJz0qoUw2C6Ah8vjO/isetM2qAniFBX58mG1V3fPrMe51M9KWtzI7pSt 304yO7Eqzf7Wb00MGzD+EWXDLRjlZXW6ekSUXOz1cfxzExDaVmMcIGE59hoh1HNa rPEPmSrU87i1EEcHyT1NHdaQ17KoM2yuqbchjtw4vcHFkdAXcSqeLyvOr8JkE39s CeNH+11wcPKfK7YxcNyBOX679jk9us2kov7t+fnNCglrh1qiAcSUgy3QT+p/qmVP /xYOjm6gy1a3FkWbQAvQ723RBDKJJ8GQ19LSUcByOc9rRrkKKnQQfYNK7as/J2b7 vVBlLIJMPpjMl081JQYI8sxEDvDFrQ8MVniHJFsDomvZjtBXNdxu7nofhiIUNx0A VwfJ1GvReNnIgRLcN1X2i/cDOn736tvilhLFQFdZMcB9bNF7C6xYSeEbERqA8QCI c1JlTtrSnHzpx8XN6yLxl5nM9e/XMBdcpxh5zxihNPQKngCDZ5KtspdTWo/NbpSk g27HBgiKm1Oo/zSFmFHQ+sG2eKqnGDT6EzqsT1IZUdrSfQkzR7q5ad/FWtN2CbKf Lpnl7HtI3f4zIWT+yA81 =mJNO -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
Re: Livecd-creator is disabling selinux
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/09/2014 05:32 AM, Maros Zatko wrote: Dear guys and ladies, So it seems like livecd-creator is silently disabling selinux. Proof: vim $(which livecd-creator) ; line 150 Fact, that it's re-enabled afterwards doesn't ease silent disablement of security feature. I'd love to know the reason and if it's possible to do something about it. Cheers, - maros N.b.: i'm sorry if this is repost Please open a bugzilla on this, and CC me on it. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlLOr3QACgkQrlYvE4MpobN1mwCg3hwxswlI5kvbrJOb0qYzR+23 GnYAoKYoOf+pho+PkL6B6JWiZmN8V5KK =VP4w -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- devel mailing list devel@lists.fedoraproject.org https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
