Re: [DNSOP] HTTPS upgrades (was Re: Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT))

2022-03-01 Thread Benjamin Kaduk
On Wed, Mar 02, 2022 at 02:46:05PM +1100, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 2, 2022, at 14:18, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker wrote:
> > This (mostly implicit) requirement is a potential barrier for adoption of
> > the HTTPS RRtype, and while the precondition is very often going to be
> > satisfied, I wanted to get a sense for whether we should make the
> > requirement more explicit, and possibly more prominent in the document
> > (e.g., mention it in the Introduction).  I don't know what the right
> > answer is, but it seems important enough to ensure that the topic receives
> > deliberate consideration.
> 
> Your point about highlighting more than loss of functionality is a good one.  
> The idea that request semantics might be altered by swapping the scheme is 
> far more relevant.
> 
> That said, I'm comfortable with deploying with the upgrade requirement as 
> stated.  While we did have a number of examples where the assumed 
> HTTP<->HTTPS equivalence did not hold in the past, the diminishing share of 
> cleartext HTTP usage is overwhelmingly the vestiges that do not have any 
> HTTPS service on the same name.  
> 
> As noted, those servers with a need to maintain distinct resources that 
> differ only in scheme simply cannot use the HTTPS RR.  That is entirely 
> appropriate.
> 

For clarity, I'm also comfortable with the upgrade requirement as stated;
this discuss was intended to just relate to how and how much we talk about
the requirement.

-Ben

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[DNSOP] HTTPS upgrades (was Re: Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT))

2022-03-01 Thread Martin Thomson
On Wed, Mar 2, 2022, at 14:18, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker wrote:
> This (mostly implicit) requirement is a potential barrier for adoption of
> the HTTPS RRtype, and while the precondition is very often going to be
> satisfied, I wanted to get a sense for whether we should make the
> requirement more explicit, and possibly more prominent in the document
> (e.g., mention it in the Introduction).  I don't know what the right
> answer is, but it seems important enough to ensure that the topic receives
> deliberate consideration.

Your point about highlighting more than loss of functionality is a good one.  
The idea that request semantics might be altered by swapping the scheme is far 
more relevant.

That said, I'm comfortable with deploying with the upgrade requirement as 
stated.  While we did have a number of examples where the assumed HTTP<->HTTPS 
equivalence did not hold in the past, the diminishing share of cleartext HTTP 
usage is overwhelmingly the vestiges that do not have any HTTPS service on the 
same name.  

As noted, those servers with a need to maintain distinct resources that differ 
only in scheme simply cannot use the HTTPS RR.  That is entirely appropriate.

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[DNSOP] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

2022-03-01 Thread Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker
Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: Discuss

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--
DISCUSS:
--

I'd like to have a (hopefully brief!) discussion about our description of
the "strict transport security" functionality the HTTPS RRtype provides,
with respect to its accuracty/completeness and how explicit vs implicit we
should be about the corresponding divergence from "pure" HTTP behavior.

It's pretty clear that at a pure HTTP protocol level (which as far as I
can tell is the scope of applicability that we claim) that resources
accessed with "http" scheme and resources accessed with "https" scheme
have no intrinsic relationship -- §4.2.2 of
draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19 says:

   Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared
   identity with the "http" scheme.  They are distinct origins with
   separate namespaces.  [...]

But the procedures in this document (e.g., §9.5, §9) seem pretty clear
that, when an HTTPS record is published, accesses for "http" scheme
resources should be converted to "https" scheme accesses, with implication
that the client should expect to get the same resource back from the
modified query compared to the unmodified "http"-scheme one.

While there is a caution in §9.5 that:

   If this redirection would result in a loss of functionality (e.g.
   important resources that are only available on the "http" origin),
   the operator MUST NOT publish an HTTPS RR.

but in my reading it leaves some important details as only implicit!
We need to care not only about resources only available on one vs the
other origin, but also about whether the translation would change the
semantics of the client's request/response exchange.  That is, whether the
resources accessible by the different schemes are actually analogous
(which, per the above, is not required by HTTP and is subject to the site
administrator's control or in some cases other application protocols on
top of HTTP used by that origin).

This (mostly implicit) requirement is a potential barrier for adoption of
the HTTPS RRtype, and while the precondition is very often going to be
satisfied, I wanted to get a sense for whether we should make the
requirement more explicit, and possibly more prominent in the document
(e.g., mention it in the Introduction).  I don't know what the right
answer is, but it seems important enough to ensure that the topic receives
deliberate consideration.


--
COMMENT:
--

First off, thanks for this well-written document!  It was pretty clear and
easy to read despite covering some fairly complex logic.

I made a github pull request with some hopefully boring editorial
suggestions: https://github.com/MikeBishop/dns-alt-svc/pull/365

I did have a few high-ish-level thoughts that I either wasn't sure where
to put in the section-by-section comments or wanted to make a bit more
prominent.

The first is a bit hard for me to describe, but basically, when we
construct a QNAME for an SVCB or HTTPS query, we include information
reflecting URI scheme and port, but when we get a TargetName back, that's
been flattened to a single name, in some sense "using up more" of the DNS
hostname namespace under the control of the alternative endpoint then in
the authority's namespace.  That is, if I wanted to provide service for
both "foo" and "bar" schemes on two ports each, in order to serve all
four combinations for a single service name, I would need to allocate four
hostnames for alternative endpoints.  We do mention this property as it
relates to URI schemes, in §11.1 where we say that "zone owners SHOULD
choose alias target names that indicate the scheme in use", but I didn't
see much discussion of the port-related aspects.  I know that the
ServiceMode response can include a port to use in the parameters, so it's
not really a concern about losing flexibility of what ports to use.  It
just seems "unbalanced" in some sense that I can't really put my finger
on.  On the other hand, it's not like hostnames are a particularly limited
resource, so I don't really see any practical consequences of this setup;
I'm just curious if this is a topic that the WG gave much consideration
to.

I was also struck by the procedure near the end of §3 where we append to
the 

[DNSOP] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: (with COMMENT)

2022-03-01 Thread Martin Duke via Datatracker
Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-08: No Objection

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--
COMMENT:
--

To this DNS non-expert, I found it hard to follow the motivation for AliasMode.
In particular, I asked myself the following questions that could have been
answered in the Introduction or in (2.4.2):

- Why is it not OK for a CNAME to alias the apex, but OK for AliasMode to do
so? [having asked around, it's because CNAME aliases all the record types,
which is nonsensical for the apex, and AliasMode does not]

- For non-apex domains, under what conditions would I use AliasMode instead of
a CNAME? Is it just when I don't want to bring along record types besides A,
, and SVCB?



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