My first kernel patch, fixed warnings.
Signed-off-by: SUNIL KALLUR RAMEGOWDA
---
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 179 +++
1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
index ba0954e..afb0036 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
/* Unmap enckey buffer */
if (ctx->enckey) {
- dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey,
ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
+ dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ ctx->enckey, ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
dev_dbg(dev, "Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
>enckey_dma_addr);
ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0;
@@ -225,7 +226,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
return -ENOMEM;
}
-static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem
*cc_base)
+static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req,
+ void __iomem *cc_base)
{
struct aead_request *areq = (struct aead_request *)ssi_req;
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
@@ -258,12 +260,20 @@ static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void
*ssi_req, void __iomem *c
ctx->authsize),
SSI_SG_FROM_BUF);
- /* If an IV was generated, copy it back to the user provided
buffer. */
+ /* If an IV was generated,
+* copy it back to the user provided buffer.
+*/
if (areq_ctx->backup_giv) {
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR)
- memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv,
+ areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+ CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
+ CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
- memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv,
+ areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+ CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET,
+ CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
}
}
@@ -274,8 +284,8 @@ static int xcbc_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct
ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
{
/* Load the AES key */
hw_desc_init([0]);
- /* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer as for the
output keys,
-* because after this key loading it is not needed anymore
+ /* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer as for the
+* output keys, because after this key loading it is not needed anymore
*/
set_din_type([0], DMA_DLLI,
ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr, ctx->auth_keylen,
@@ -427,7 +437,8 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
* (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
*/
static int
-ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int
keylen)
+ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
dma_addr_t key_dma_addr = 0;
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
@@ -458,9 +469,11 @@ ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8
*key, unsigned int keyl
}
if (likely(keylen != 0)) {
- key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key,
+ keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr))) {
- dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA
failed\n",
+ dev_err(dev,
+ "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -586,7 +599,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
* first 4 bytes in CTR IV
*/
- memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen +
ctx->enc_keylen -
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key +
+ ctx->auth_keylen +