Re: [Election-Methods] Matrix voting and cloneproof MMP questions

2008-07-10 Thread Markus Schulze

Dear James Gilmour,

you wrote (10 July 2008):

 If you are going to mess about with MMP to the
 extent that you suggest in the hope of making
 some significant improvements to what is
 basically a very poor voting system, why not
 just adopt STV-PR and do the job properly?

When you promote pure STV in a country that
already uses proportional representation by
party lists, then you will be accused immediately
that you were dishonest and that your real aim
was to increase the effective threshold to gain
representation.

My own experience says that, when you want to
promote STV in a country that already uses
proportional representation by party lists,
then your proposal must contain provisions
to compensate party proportionality on the
national level. Otherwise, your proposal is
a non-starter.

Markus Schulze



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Re: [Election-Methods] Matrix voting and cloneproof MMP questions

2008-07-10 Thread James Gilmour
Markus Schulze   Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2008 8:45 AM
   If you are going to mess about with MMP to the
   extent that you suggest in the hope of making
   some significant improvements to what is
   basically a very poor voting system, why not
   just adopt STV-PR and do the job properly?
 
 When you promote pure STV in a country that
 already uses proportional representation by
 party lists, then you will be accused immediately
 that you were dishonest and that your real aim
 was to increase the effective threshold to gain
 representation.
 
 My own experience says that, when you want to
 promote STV in a country that already uses
 proportional representation by party lists,
 then your proposal must contain provisions
 to compensate party proportionality on the
 national level. Otherwise, your proposal is
 a non-starter.

Markus, you make a very valid point which I, as a practical reformer, fully 
appreciate.  Any reform proposal, and the campaign to
support it, must be wholly appropriate to the local political circumstances.

It would certainly not be part of my agenda to increase the representation 
threshold for any political purpose, but I do recognise
the political problems that can be created by very low effective thresholds 
(e.g. Israel).  It must, however, be accepted that many
party list systems (including MMP systems) have imposed thresholds and that 
these thresholds are completely arbitrary, e.g. 5% of
the party list vote nationally  -  but why not 4% or 6%? . If you are going to 
impose such an arbitrary threshold, why go the bother
of summing the votes nationally?  Why not just use the effective thresholds 
that would result from the underlying regional structure
that exists in many countries and is built into in their voting systems (e.g. 
where parties present lists on a regional basis)?

It must also be appreciated that the effective threshold to gain representation 
in STV-PR is lower than a simple analysis based on
dividing the national first preference vote by the average quota would suggest, 
for two reasons.

In STV, the vote transfers are extremely important and when these are taken 
into account, the effect on small parties and
candidates with less support can change the perspective very dramatically.  For 
example, in the 2007 local government elections in
Scotland (3 and 4-member districts) the lowest proportions of quotas secured by 
winning candidates of the five main parties were:
0.32, 0.42, 0.42, 0.46, 0.48,   Malta shows the dangers of getting hung up on 
first preference votes when the main feature of the
STV voting system is that the votes are transferable.   It is also an unsafe 
assumption that every first preference vote for a
particular candidate is a party vote for that candidate's party.

Parties and candidates (usually) respond to the characteristics of whatever 
voting system is in use.  Thus the approach adopted by
smaller parties where it is STV-PR, is to concentrate their resources where 
their support is strongest and so achieve the local
threshold.  That's how the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, with about 2% of 
the first preference votes province-wide, won 2% of
the seats overall in the Northern Ireland Assembly (1998) when the district 
magnitude was only 6 (Droop quota threshold = 14.3%).

There is always a trade-off between guaranteed local representation (small 
districts) and proportionality (large districts),
whatever the voting system.  While STV-PR, as normally implemented, might 
reduce the effective threshold to gain representation for
parties nationally, that loss has to be set against the gains for the voters of 
more localised representation and of shifting the
balance of power and accountability from the parties to the voters.  How that 
balance is best presented depends on local politics.
No matter how enthusiastic the electors may be, such a change will nearly 
always be opposed by the larger political parties and
their backers!!

James

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Re: [Election-Methods] USING Condorcet

2008-07-10 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Juho,

A quick response.

--- En date de : Mar 8.7.08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
 Ok, this is a good concrete example scenario. The votes are
 of course  
 simplified. Surely there would be also considerable number
 of other  
 kind of opinions than these three. 
 But let's see first where these simplified votes could lead to.
 
 Sincere opinions:
 45 ABC
 40 BAC
 15 CBA
 
 It seems that C is an extremist candidate (at the B side of
 the  
 political map since they prefer B over A). In line with
 this  
 explanation it is natural that A supporters prefer B over
 C. It is a  
 bit more strange that all B voters prefer A over C. Maybe C
 is so  
 radical that all others hate him/her. (The nature of the
 scenario  
 will however stay quite similar even if there were also
 some BCA  
 voters.)
 
 The A party or A proponents have a plan to bury B under C.

I don't know about this. Is it necessary to have a plan? This isn't like
pushover strategy where only a certain percentage of the faction should
vote in a certain way, or risk failure. You're not going to be the one
strategizer too many.

 What if the A proponents manage to get the required 89%
 strategic  
 votes or more to support their strategic plan? Then the C
 supporters  
 can use a compromise counter strategy and rank B first. If
 more than  
 5 of the C supporters will use this strategy that will
 nullify the A  
 strategy even if they manage to get 100% of the A
 supporters to  
 follow the strategy. Less strategic C voters needed if less
 than 100%  
 of the A voters will follow the strategy.

Nullification is no consolation though, because there is nothing to fear
from it. You may as well say that some of the C voters strategically
vote for their last choice A in order to make A a majority favorite so
that A voters' strategy does nothing.

 If the method uses winning votes then the B supporters may
 also use  
 truncation as their counter strategy. 30 votes or more (out
 of the  
 40) needed. That would be a threat to elect C if A voters
 will apply  
 the strategy.

Yes. If WV or Condorcet//Approval is used I don't believe there would be
a problem, since truncating the worse frontrunner would be both natural
and effective. (Actually, as long as truncation is allowed I believe
voters won't rank the worse frontrunner anyway, even if you tell them they
ought to or safely can.)

 Theoretical examples on paper give complete information of
 the  
 opinions and allow complete control of (uniform) voter
 behaviour, and  

My claim is that the former is plausible (at least the information will be
complete to the extent necessary) and the latter unnecessary, when
it's predictable that truncation will not be used.

 (One more reason why A voters should not use burial
 strategy is that  
 if C is stronger than expected then their strategy might
 also lead to  
 electing C instead of B.

If there's any possibility of this scenario, I don't believe people would
use burial.

Kevin Venzke



  
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