[EM] How FairVote IRV propaganda has been very effective.

2008-12-10 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
FairVote is like a politician who tells people what they want to 
hear. That's the art of spin. When it gets repugnant is when what's 
being said is false. A post to the Approval Voting list, from which 
I'm still banned from posting, referred to an article in the LA 
times. It's worth noting that the author of this article has some 
correct ideas, and he has merely been misinformed about the truth. 
The truth isn't rocket science, but it is simply that there are 
implications that often are overlooked by those not familiar with a field.


Opinion

Instant runoff voting

Such an electoral system saves time and money, and ensures a majority winner.
By Blair Bobier
December 10, 2008

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-oe-bobier10-2008dec10,0,6664124.story

Two examples from the seemingly never-ending 2008 election showcase 
the system's flaws. More than a month after election day, we still 
don't know who won Minnesota's Senate race. In Georgia's U.S. Senate 
contest, it took two elections and tens of millions of dollars to 
produce a winner. Both races could have been resolved quickly and 
with less expense using instant runoff voting.


Less expense is a joke. IRV is expensive, and in a very close 
election could be extraordinarily expensive. I haven't studied the 
particular election, but what happened here was that the election was 
close, and there are always a pile of ambiguous ballots, and 
resolving the ambiguities, the way that we count votes here, can be 
tedious. There are better ways to count, see various proposals I've 
made for Public Ballot Imaging. This would quickly reduce ambiguous 
ballots to a specific set, and the range of effects that they could 
have on the outcome could be rapidly determined. If it is close 
enough, then, there would be a clear and open basis for a legal 
challenge to whatever conclusion the election officials issue, and a 
rapid means of resolving the issue.


IRV results in higher numbers of spoiled ballots, some of which would 
be ambiguous, and there are many more opportunities for ties. 
Elimination sequence can affect the next stage of counting. In a 
strong two-party system, IRV will *usually* work, and the only likely 
tie is among the frontrunners, but it is quite unclear that IRV would 
have created a big lead for one candidate or the other. It depends on 
the exact configuration of candidates, and how many voters don't 
fully rank, and so forth. On average, vote transfers don't change the 
first preference order, so in a very close election, it will often 
remain very close after transfers.


Georgia apparently requires a majority, which is a huge safeguard 
against certain common election failures. Again, I haven't studied 
it, but I presume Georgia was top-two runoff. While special elections 
cost money, it's the price of democracy, in fact. IRV, we can now 
tell, produces less democratic results than Top Two Runoff, for 
reasons I won't address here. But it's certainly different, probably 
differs from instant runoff in about one out of three runoff elections.


With instant runoff voting, voters indicate their first, second and 
third choices among candidates on the ballot. If a candidate wins a 
majority of first-choice rankings, that candidate is elected. If no 
candidate receives an initial majority of first-choice rankings, the 
candidate with the fewest first-choice rankings is eliminated and 
that candidate's supporters have their votes count for their second 
choice. The process repeats until a candidate emerges with majority support.


Now, the bait and switch is set up. Majority support. IRV 
supporters repeat that phrase like a mantra, and it is directly 
misleading, to the extent that we could say, with the ordinary 
meaning of words, and the author does explore this, and he thinks 
he's using the ordinary meaning from the argument he makes, it is 
just plain false. Majority in elections means that more than half 
the legal ballots, containing a valid vote, have voted for the 
winner. Preferential voting, of which IRV is an example, though a 
particularly poor one, can allow alternative votes which can be put 
together, but majority still means the same thing. These methods, 
in general, can discover a majority that would be missing if voters 
vote sincerely in Plurality Voting, for their favorite alone. So, if 
we insist on a majority, preferential voting reduces the need for 
runoffs but does not eliminate it. In fact, until this year, which I 
haven't examined yet, the large majority of instant runoffs held 
did not find a majority.


Replacing the Georgia top-two runoff method with IRV would be a very, 
very bad idea, a step backward, actually reversing older reforms, 
moving away from democracy. Replacing Plurality with IRV, better, but 
expensive, and there are other forms of voting, including 
preferential voting, that are far cheaper and which perform better at 
discovering majorities and at finding the best 

[EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet

2008-12-10 Thread Chris Benham
Kristofer,

You wrote (Sun.Nov.23):
Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist. Borda-elimination 
(Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax is quite simple, and everybody 
who's dealt with sports knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll 
partially grant this, though, since the good methods are complex, but 
I'll ask whether you think MAM (Ranked Pairs(wv)) is too complex. In 
MAM, you take all the pairwise contests, sort by strength, and affirm 
down the list unless you would contradict an earlier affirmed contest. 
This method is cloneproof, monotonic, etc...

Raynaud isn't  Borda-elimination.  It is  Pairwise Elimination, i.e. eliminate
the loser of  the most decisive or strongest pairwise result (by one measure or
another) until one candidate remains.  You may have instead meant to write 
Baldwin,though some sources just talk about 2 different versions of  Nanson.

Simpler and much better than any of those methods are  Condorcet//Approval
and  Smith//Approval and  Schwartz//Approval ,in each case interpreting 
ranking as approval and so not allowing ranking among unapproved candidates.

Chris Benham


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[EM] Unmanipulable Majority strategy criterion (Kristofer)

2008-12-10 Thread Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sat.Nov.29):

-snip-

I don't know of any method that meets  the MDQBR you refer to that isn't 
completely invulnerable to Burial (do you?), so I don't see how that criterion 
is 
presently useful.

That's odd, because the example I gave in a reply to Juho was yours.
http://listas.apesol.org/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2006-December/019097.html

Note that the method of that post (which I've been referring to as first 
preference Copeland) ...

-snip-

Kristofer,
Yes,sorry, that was a not-well-considered posting of mine that I'd forgotten.

That method, the basic version of which was introduced by Forest Simmons as 
Clone-proofed
Copeland, doesn't meet  Mutual Dominant Quarter Burial Resistance (MDQBR).

26: AB
25: CA
02: CB
25: BA
22: BC

AB 51-49,   AC 51-49,   BC  73-27.  

FPs: A26,  B47,  C27.  A is the CW and wins with the penalty score of  total 
FPs of candidates
pairwise beaten by of  zero. With over a quarter of the FPs A is a mutual 
dominant quarter 
candidate.

Say two of the 25 BA change to BC:

26: AB
25: CA
02: CB
23: BA
24: BC

AB 51-49,   CA 51-49,   BC  73-27

Now the penalty scores are  A27,  B26,  C47.  The Burial has worked, the new 
winner is B.

Chris Benham



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