Re: [EM] Generalizing "manipulability"
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote: > On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: > > > The mail contained quite good > > definitions. > > > > I didn't however agree with the > > referenced part below. I think "sincere" > > and "zero-knowledge best strategic" > > ballot need not be the same. For example > > in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot could > > be A=50 B=51 but my best strategic vote > > would be A=0 B=99. Also other methods > > may have similarly small differences > > between "sincere" and "zero-knowledge > > best strategic" ballots. > > My argument is that the Range values (as well as the > Approval cutoff point) have meaning only within the method. > We know from your example how you rank A vs B, but the > actual values are uninterpreted except within the count. > > The term "sincere" is metaphorical at best, even > with linear ballots. What I'm arguing is that that > metaphor breaks down with non-linear methods, and the > appropriate generalization/abstraction of a sincere ballot > is a zero-knowledge ballot. I don't quite see why ranking based methods (Range, Approval) would not follow the same principles/definitions as rating based methods. The sincere message of the voter was above that she only slightly prefers B over A but the strategic vote indicated that she finds B to be maximally better than A (or that in order to make B win she better vote this way). Juho > > > > > > > Juho > > > > > > --- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell > wrote: > > > >> The generalization of a "sincere" ballot > then > >> becomes the zero-knowledge (of other voters' > behavior) > >> ballot, although we might still want to talk about > a > >> "sincere ordering" (that is, the sincere > linear > >> ballot) in trying to determine a "best > possible" > >> outcome. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] MN IRV Case - Judge's Memo & Order
FYI, Here is Judge McGunnigle's memo & order where he decided in favor of the Defendants (Fair Vote and the City of Minneapolis). You can see that the Judge makes a plethora of incorrect assertions - and so was misled by Defendants on the facts. Plaintiffs wil need to make a much clearer case that the Appeal's Judge can more easily understand. http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/MNcase/2009JudgeMcGunnigleIRV-order.pdf The Judge even made several misstatements of fact in his "undisputed facts" section, and about a dozen misstatements of facts overall. Cheers, Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Condorcet - let's move ahead
Hi, [I'm not subscribed to rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, so I won't see replies posted only there.] On 1/9/09 Dave Ketchum wrote: Extended now to EM - I should have started this in both. On Fri, 09 Jan 2009 15:40:58 - Bruce R. Gilson wrote: --- In rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, Dave Ketchum wrote: We need to sort thru the possibilities of going with Condorcet. I claim: Method must be open - starting with the N*N matrix being available to anyone who wants to check and review in detail. If the matrix shows a CW, that CW better get to win. Cycle resolution also better be simple to do. We need to debate what we document and do here such as basing our work on margins or vote counts. Yes. My biggest gripe with Condorcet is that cycle resolution in many systems is so complex that it does not seem that a typical voter (as opposed to people like us who are personally interested in electoral systems) could understand what is being done. -snip- I think there's no need to gripe or fret. Resolving cycles doesn't need to be complex. Here are 2 solutions. 1) The "Maximize Affirmed Majorities" voting method (MAM) is an excellent Condorcet method and is very natural. Here's a simple way to explain how it works and why: The basis of the majority rule principle is that the more people there are who think candidate A is better than candidate B, the more likely it is that A will be better than B for society. (Regardless of whether they think A is best.) Since majorities can conflict like "rock paper scissors" (as shown in the example that follows) the majority rule principle suggests such conflicts should be resolved in favor of the larger majorities. Example: Suppose there are 3 candidates: Rock, Paper and Scissors. Suppose there are 9 voters, who each rank the candidates from best to worst (top to bottom): *_4__3__2_ Rock Scissors Paper Scissors PaperRock PaperRock Scissors** * 7 voters (a majority) rank Scissors over Paper. 6 voters (a majority) rank Rock over Scissors. 5 voters (a majority) rank Paper over Rock. By paying attention first to the larger majorities--Scissors over Paper, then Rock over Scissors--we establish that Scissors finishes over Paper and then that Rock finishes over Scissors: *Rock Scissors Paper** * It can be seen at a glance that Rock also finishes over Paper. The smaller majority who rank Paper over Rock are outweighed. Since Rock finishes over both Scissors and Paper, we elect Rock. I think that's not too complex. (How did anyone reach the dubious conclusion that beatpaths or clone-proof Schwarz sequential dropping will be easier than MAM to explain?) I think the only operational concept that will take work to explain is that there is more than one majority when there are more than two alternatives. (Analogous to a round robin tournament, common to all Condorcet methods, and not really hard to explain.) Most people already know what an order of finish is, and I think most people are familiar enough with orderings that they will recognize the transitive property of orderings when it's presented visually. Jargon terms such as "Condorcet winner," "beats pairwise" and "winning votes" are unnecessary. Their use may interfere with moving ahead. Top-to-bottom orderings are more intuitive than the left-to-right orientation many other writers use in their examples. Two common meanings of "top" are "best" and "favorite." Two common meanings of "bottom" are "worst" and "least favored." In those contexts, "over" means "better" or "more preferred." Left-to-right offers no such friendly connotations (except to the "leftist" minority, and the opposite to the "rightist" minority). Left-to-right becomes even worse when symbols like the "greater than" sign (>) are used, since a lot of people are repelled by math symbols. Left-to-right rankings may interfere with moving ahead. 2) One could promote the variation of Instant Runoff (IRV) that allows candidates to withdraw from contention after the votes are published. (I'm not suggesting eliminating the secret ballot. The corresponding voters' identities would not be published.) The withdrawal option mitigates the spoiling problem of plain IRV. It reduces incentives for voters to misrepresent preferences (true also for Condorcet methods, but I think not true for Range Voting, Approval or Borda). I expect IRV+Withdrawal would exhibit a solid Condorcetian tendency to elect within the sincere top cycle, since supporters of spoilers would pressure them to withdraw when needed to defeat their "greater evil." Obviously, its promotion could leverage the efforts of the promoters of plain IRV. It can even be argued that IRV+Withdrawal satisfies the spirit
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
Hallo, FairVote always argued that Brown vs. Smallwood declared Bucklin unconstitutional because of its violation of later-no-harm. FairVote always claimed that, therefore, also Condorcet methods were unconstitutional. However, the memorandum of the district court doesn't agree to this interpretation of Brown vs. Smallwood. This means that this memorandum is a progress at least in so far as FairVote cannot use Brown vs. Smallwood anymore as an argument against Condorcet methods. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Generalizing "manipulability"
On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: The mail contained quite good definitions. I didn't however agree with the referenced part below. I think "sincere" and "zero-knowledge best strategic" ballot need not be the same. For example in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot could be A=50 B=51 but my best strategic vote would be A=0 B=99. Also other methods may have similarly small differences between "sincere" and "zero-knowledge best strategic" ballots. My argument is that the Range values (as well as the Approval cutoff point) have meaning only within the method. We know from your example how you rank A vs B, but the actual values are uninterpreted except within the count. The term "sincere" is metaphorical at best, even with linear ballots. What I'm arguing is that that metaphor breaks down with non-linear methods, and the appropriate generalization/abstraction of a sincere ballot is a zero-knowledge ballot. Juho --- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote: The generalization of a "sincere" ballot then becomes the zero-knowledge (of other voters' behavior) ballot, although we might still want to talk about a "sincere ordering" (that is, the sincere linear ballot) in trying to determine a "best possible" outcome. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Generalizing "manipulability"
The mail contained quite good definitions. I didn't however agree with the referenced part below. I think "sincere" and "zero-knowledge best strategic" ballot need not be the same. For example in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot could be A=50 B=51 but my best strategic vote would be A=0 B=99. Also other methods may have similarly small differences between "sincere" and "zero-knowledge best strategic" ballots. Juho --- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell wrote: > The generalization of a "sincere" ballot then > becomes the zero-knowledge (of other voters' behavior) > ballot, although we might still want to talk about a > "sincere ordering" (that is, the sincere linear > ballot) in trying to determine a "best possible" > outcome. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Generalizing "manipulability"
On Jan 8, 2009, at 4:45 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: The whole concept of strategic voting is flawed when applied to Range. Voters place vote strength where they think it will do the most good -- if they think. Some don't. Approval is essentially, as Brams claimed, "strategy-free," in the old meaning, and the only way that it was at all possible to call it vulnerable was that critics claimed that there was some absolute "approval" relation between a voter and a candidate. It would be useful to generalize the concept of strategic voting (and the related concepts of manipulation and sincerity) to other than linear ballots (that is, a ballot with an ordinal ranking of the voter's preferences). With linear ballots (and so Borda, IRV and various Condorcet methods) we define a "sincere" ballot as the one a voter would cast if the voter were a dictator, and manipulability as the ability of a voter to achieve a better result (where "better" means the election of a candidate ranked higher on that voter's sincere ballot) by voting "insincerely" or "strategically"--that is, by casting a ballot different from their sincere ballot. An election method that is not manipulable in this sense is defined to be "strategy-free". A two-candidate plurality election is strategy-free. Most interesting elections are not. With any practical election method using linear ballots, manipulation cannot succeed unless the voter has knowledge of how the other voters are voting. This knowledge need not be perfect. I propose (and I don't claim that this is original, though I don't recall seeing the definition) that we use this observation to generalize the idea of manipulability to election methods, such as Range and Approval, that do not use linear ballots, thus: An election method is manipulable if a voter has a rational motivation to cast different ballots depending on the voter's knowledge (or belief) of the ballots of other voters. In such an election, a voter should vote strategically when the ballot that will produce the "best" outcome (for that voter) depends on the behavior of the other voters, the strategy consisting of determining, by some means depending on the method, which ballot that is. For example, in an Approval election, with a preference of A>B>C, we will always vote for A, but whether we vote for B depends on how well we believe B and C are doing with other voters. If we believe that C cannot win, then we vote for A only, to improve our chance of electing A over B. If we believe that C is a serious threat, then we vote for A and B, to improve our chance of rejecting C. The generalization of a "sincere" ballot then becomes the zero- knowledge (of other voters' behavior) ballot, although we might still want to talk about a "sincere ordering" (that is, the sincere linear ballot) in trying to determine a "best possible" outcome. It seems to me that it's clearly desirable to be able to optimize the outcome by casting a sincere linear ballot. Such a ballot is reasonably expressive (that is, it contains more information about my preferences than, say, a plurality or approval ballot) without (in itself) requiring me to strategize. Unfortunately, no such election method exists, and many (most?) of the arguments on this list are over the tradeoffs implied by that sad fact. The best we can do is to find a method in which it's very unlikely that we can improve our outcome by voting other than sincerely. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.
--- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated > or does it depend on what I think how others will vote? > > Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to > determine from my preferences and independent of the other > voters? > > If the latter is the case, the method deserves to be called > "strategy-free". The whole thing has nothing to do > with "sincerity". Refering to > "sincerity", that concept in itself being > difficult to define even for methods as simple as Plurality, > complicates the strategy discussion unnecessarily. Are you looking for the English language meaning of sincerity or some technical definition of it (e.g. some voting related criterion)? What is the problem with sincerity in Plurality? Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Sat, 17/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > 1) Most countries of the world have > > decided to base their democratic > > processes on secret votes. It would > > be difficult to change their current > > principles. > > It's true that most of them decided to use *private* > voting in the > state's electoral systems. On the other hand, they > also decided to > use *public* voting in the legislative assemblies. OK. That's why I drafted the version where "low level" votes are secret and "high level" votes public. > > (These are not "principles", in any case. > Principles are usually not > open to decision. These are "practices".) > > I do not suggest that state practices ought to be changed. > The > changes I suggest are entirely in the public sphere (among > ordinary > people) and leave untouched the practices of voting in > state elections > and legislative assemblies. What would be a typical case where you recommend public votes to be used? > (They will not affect > "how" we vote at > state facilities, but they could affect "who and > what" we vote for.) > > My experience so far is that people are somewhat reluctant > to consider > the possibility of voting openly in primary elections. I > can't say > whether this stems from the novelty of casting public > votes, or an > unfamiliarity with the purpose of primaries, or some other > factor - I > lack the data. > > Based on this experience, though, I decided to postpone > alpha trials > of the medium until after I've added normative voting. > People may > have a different reaction to the possibility of drafting > and voting on > legislative bills. They can't do *that*, even in > private. And the > traditional practice is that legislators vote publicly, so > there > shouldn't be any gut reactions against it. I will know > more, soon... > > > 2) The biggest problems may not be in > > large coercion/buying campaigns and > > explicit coercion/buying but in small > > scale and voters' own independent > > decisions. There may be intentional or > > imagined pressure at homes, work and > > many types of communities (village, > > friends, religious, professional). > > Yes, it's an important point. But I did answer to it > in the post you > quote, which I also quote in this footnote: > > http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#fn-2 > > The general observation is that private opionion and public > opinion > are not equivalents. In the original post (and link > above), I propose > a medium for the expression of *public* opinion. I also > describe how > it will (as best I can forsee) relate to other media for > the > expression of both *private* opinion in party primaries and > state > electoral systems, and *public* opinion in state > legislatures, city > councils, and so forth. You see a problem in this, but > what exactly? I believe the practice/principle of having secret votes also often implies interest in allowing people to vote as they privately think. Difference between public and private opinions is thus often seen to mean some sort of unwanted pressure that makes people vote some other way than they really would like to vote. > > I understand that you are concerned that *some* people > cannot > participate in public politics, or cannot participate as > honestly as > they would like. Yes. Or actually I was talked about that being a common attitude in societies in general. > You and Kristopher went on to discuss how > you might > solve this problem by precluding the possibility of public > expression > entirely (as far as votes go), and falling back to a medium > of private > expression. Yes. Or at least by keeping the lowest layers secret. > But that does not solve the problem of public > participation. It can only contribute to it. If we > preclude public > voting, then it's no longer just a fraction of the > population that is > intimidated, silenced and excluded from the public sphere - > all are > silenced and excluded. I don't see how secret voting would particularly limit public participation. Public voting maybe automatically forces/encourages public participation but secret votes allow that too. People are also free to tell how they voted even if their vote was secret. One limitation is that the voter can not prove to the candidate that she voted that she really voter for her. But that also does not limit public participation. > > On the other hand, if we facilitate public voting, then we > enable the > vast majority of people to participate in the public > sphere, to > discuss problems such as this, and to come up with real > solutions. I guess there are also other more common reasons to why people do not actively participate in public sphere (lack of time, lack of interest, risk of disagreements with others, not knowing enough, higher interest in some other areas). Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mail
Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed.
At 01:40 PM 1/16/2009, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear folks, I haven't followed this long thread, so perhaps this has been mentioned before. If so, sorry... Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: Because the concept was developed to apply to methods using a preference list, whether explicit on the ballot or presumed to exist in the mind of the voter, a strategic vote was one which reversed preference, simple. But with Approval and Range, it is possible to vote equal preference. Is that insincere if the voter has a preference? The critics of Range and Approval have claimed so, and thus they can claim that Range and Approval are "vulnerable to strategic voting." In my view, the main question in the whole strategy-proofness debate should be this: To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated or does it depend on what I think how others will vote? Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to determine from my preferences and independent of the other voters? There is a very serious error incorporated here, which is that human beings discount improbable outcomes in determining preference strengths. Suppose it's Range Voting. Can I Range Vote regardless of the probability of success for each candidate? Sure, I could. However, my vote will be ineffective, quite likely. To really bring this into perspective, consider that any voter may be able to write in a candidate. Let's also postulate a ballot where *two* candidates can be written in. So I decide to write in my absolute, total favorite possibility. How much better would this candidate be than the best candidate on the ballot? And I also write in the worst candidate I can think of. How much worse would this candidate be? Now, if I think try to figure out my utilities for each candidate, I'm probably going to cluster them somewhere near the middle. And thus, *in the real election*, I cluster them near the middle. But what do voters actually do? The consider the realistic candidate set, and normalize their probabilities to that set. In most elections the realistic candidate set is only two candidates. Sometimes it might be three, very rarely is it more than that. So the voter will sensibly normalize to only two candidates, usually. But this is strategic voting. Is "strategic voting" -- this kind -- complicated? No. It's actually *instinctive.* Most people won't even think about canddiates not on the ballot, and they won't sweat over minor candidates, unless they prefer them, which is, by definition, not common. It's true: preference order is relatively easy to determine *if equal preferences are allowed.* In Range voting, I'd personally start with preference order. Borda Count institutionalizes this; Borda Count with equal ranking allowed is easier to vote than pure Borda Count, generally, because the voter can simply determine preferences and then, when determining a preference is difficult, equal rank. The only "problem" is where to put the empty rank that's created. But this kind of Borda Count *is* Range Voting. The idea that it's difficult to vote Range is based on the idea that voters must somehow figure out a complicated strategy that depends on other voters. No, they don't need to. They can *somewhat* increase the power of their vote if they simply rank, first, the likely candidates. This is what we do all the time with choices. Thinking only of likely possibilities: Favorite: top rank. Worst: bottom rank. The rest either in between somewhere or equal ranked with one of the first two. If the latter is the case, the method deserves to be called "strategy-free". The whole thing has nothing to do with "sincerity". Refering to "sincerity", that concept in itself being difficult to define even for methods as simple as Plurality, complicates the strategy discussion unnecessarily. Sure. But what I'm pointing out is that "strategy-free" is actually undesirable. Sure, if we could extract a complete set of absolute utilities from each voter, we would have a strategy-free method, and a desirable one, but a very cumbersome and difficult method to implement. Short of that, attempting to create strategy-free methods forces us into the arms of what is worse: the neglect of preference strength. And we still end up with vulnerability to *insincere* strategy, with the only argument for these methods, in this area, being that they are more difficult to follow. Which, of course, ignores the possibility of voter coordination, whcih could use very complex strategy. Applied to Approval and Range Voting, this clearly renders them "not strategy-proof", since optimal strategy does heavily depend on what I think others will do. Random Ballot, on the other hand, is clearly "strategy-free" since my optimal strategy is always to tick my favourite. Right. Now, how smart is that as a voting method? It produces really good results *on average*, but the range of variation is probably una
Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
At 07:59 PM 1/15/2009, Markus Schulze wrote:
in 1915, the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared
the "preferential system" unconstitutional. The
decision ("Brown vs. Smallwood") is here:
http://rangevoting.org/BrownVsmallwood.pdf
The crucial sentence is (page 508):
> We do right in upholding the right of the
> citizen to cast a vote for the candidate of
> his choice unimpaired by second or additional
> choice votes by other voters.
Now, a county judge had to decide whether
Brown vs. Smallwood also applies to IRV.
The judge came to the conclusion that
Brown vs. Smallwood doesn't apply to IRV.
The decision is here:
http://www.fairvotemn.org/sites/fairvotemn.org/files/IRV%20Lawsuit_Hennepin%20Cnty%20Crt%20Opinion%20011309_1.PDF
In my opinion, the decision is very problematic.
The judge judged the methods not by their
properties, but by IRV's underlying heuristic.
It's complicated. This was, however, more or less the result I
feared, though I'm pretty sure it will be appealed. The problem is
that this court didn't read Brown v. Smallwood completely, nor did
they read it accurately. Brown v. Smallwood, very clearly, prohibited
all forms of preferential voting, but FairVote successfully diverted
the court's attention to one passage which reads like a concern for
Later No Harm.
We can see the classic smokescreen here. The Court begins with a
statement describing the quorum for a single-seat election, "the
majority of the voters." The description does correctly insert, in
one place, "for continuing candidates," but doesn't excplicitly take
note that the threshold is a shifting one, an incautious reader would
assume otherwise, since the description talks about continuing rounds
until a "candidate reaches the threshold number of votes."
However, IRV is, in my opinion, constitutional. But so was Bucklin.
What's unfortunately here is that the decision appears to uphold
Brown while also allowing IRV. That doesn't bode well for better
election reform in Minnesota.
IRV is a plurality method; it has a peculiar way of finding
plurality. That peculiarity isn't unconstitutional, and I would agree
that an IRV winner is usually better than a plurality winner, where
they differ. However, there are still problems, of course. It is
quite possible for a candidate to win under IRV, when more voters
voted against this candidate than for this candidate, and
specifically, that more voters voted for another candidate over this
candidate. The Court did not adequately address this, it directly
flies in the face of the "majority of the votes" concept. The
majority of the voters voted against the IRV winner, but because of
how they voted, their votes did not count.
IRV counts many more votes than the number of voters, there are a
whole series of ultimately preposterous statements made by the court.
It just doesn't count them *simultaneously*. Bucklin counted them
simultaneously, which ensured that all of them would be counted. But
a candidate still faces, with IRV, one candidate after another, from
a particular voter, instead of just one. The result is pretty much the same.
The plaintiffs did not pursue the mostly likely avenue of success.
Note that had the plaintiffs been successful, pretty much all voting
reform would have remained impossible in Minnesota, except for LNH
compatible methods, which is the worst of preferential voting methods.
I would have hoped that Friend of the Court briefs would have been
filed seeking overturning of Brown; I suppose that will be
appropriate when it gets to a higher court, if it does. The Brown
ruling was out of synch with the rest of the courts in the U.S.,
which didn't have a problem with Bucklin, nor with IRV.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > 1) Most countries of the world have > decided to base their democratic > processes on secret votes. It would > be difficult to change their current > principles. It's true that most of them decided to use *private* voting in the state's electoral systems. On the other hand, they also decided to use *public* voting in the legislative assemblies. (These are not "principles", in any case. Principles are usually not open to decision. These are "practices".) I do not suggest that state practices ought to be changed. The changes I suggest are entirely in the public sphere (among ordinary people) and leave untouched the practices of voting in state elections and legislative assemblies. (They will not affect "how" we vote at state facilities, but they could affect "who and what" we vote for.) My experience so far is that people are somewhat reluctant to consider the possibility of voting openly in primary elections. I can't say whether this stems from the novelty of casting public votes, or an unfamiliarity with the purpose of primaries, or some other factor - I lack the data. Based on this experience, though, I decided to postpone alpha trials of the medium until after I've added normative voting. People may have a different reaction to the possibility of drafting and voting on legislative bills. They can't do *that*, even in private. And the traditional practice is that legislators vote publicly, so there shouldn't be any gut reactions against it. I will know more, soon... > 2) The biggest problems may not be in > large coercion/buying campaigns and > explicit coercion/buying but in small > scale and voters' own independent > decisions. There may be intentional or > imagined pressure at homes, work and > many types of communities (village, > friends, religious, professional). Yes, it's an important point. But I did answer to it in the post you quote, which I also quote in this footnote: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#fn-2 The general observation is that private opionion and public opinion are not equivalents. In the original post (and link above), I propose a medium for the expression of *public* opinion. I also describe how it will (as best I can forsee) relate to other media for the expression of both *private* opinion in party primaries and state electoral systems, and *public* opinion in state legislatures, city councils, and so forth. You see a problem in this, but what exactly? I understand that you are concerned that *some* people cannot participate in public politics, or cannot participate as honestly as they would like. You and Kristopher went on to discuss how you might solve this problem by precluding the possibility of public expression entirely (as far as votes go), and falling back to a medium of private expression. But that does not solve the problem of public participation. It can only contribute to it. If we preclude public voting, then it's no longer just a fraction of the population that is intimidated, silenced and excluded from the public sphere - all are silenced and excluded. On the other hand, if we facilitate public voting, then we enable the vast majority of people to participate in the public sphere, to discuss problems such as this, and to come up with real solutions. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
