Re: [EM] An interesting real election
How is #1 not a Condorcet Winner, since #1 pairwise-beats every other alternative? _ From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Andrew Myers Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2011 4:41 PM To: Election Methods Mailing List Subject: [EM] An interesting real election Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should win? Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11, and #6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs. #1. Hill's method (Condorcet-IRV) picks #6 as the winner. -- Andrew 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. - 13 15 17 16 13 2. 9 - 13 14 17 15 3. 11 11 - 13 15 14 4. 9 10 10 - 14 13 5. 11 10 9 10 - 13 6. 14 11 11 13 10 - Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An interesting real election
Strike my previous reply... Didn't notice that #6 pairwise beat #1, but pairwise lost to #2-#5. Here's a case where I'd actually like to see instead of the pairwise matrix the matrix that shows counts of votes for #1, #2, ... #5. In particular, which is the Bucklin winner? #6 loses or ties with every alternative except #1. _ From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Andrew Myers Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2011 4:41 PM To: Election Methods Mailing List Subject: [EM] An interesting real election Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should win? Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11, and #6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs. #1. Hill's method (Condorcet-IRV) picks #6 as the winner. -- Andrew 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. - 13 15 17 16 13 2. 9 - 13 14 17 15 3. 11 11 - 13 15 14 4. 9 10 10 - 14 13 5. 11 10 9 10 - 13 6. 14 11 11 13 10 - Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An interesting real election
On 1/30/11 2:39 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote: Strike my previous reply... Didn't notice that #6 pairwise beat #1, but pairwise lost to #2-#5. Here's a case where I'd actually like to see instead of the pairwise matrix the matrix that shows counts of votes for #1, #2, ... #5. In particular, which is the Bucklin winner? #6 loses or ties with every alternative except #1. I've attached the ballots. Note that there were actually 15 candidates in this election; I just showed the action for the top 6 in my earlier mail. Each ballot is one row, and position x shows the ranking that the voter assigned to candidate x. The listing uses the unranked numbers for the candidates, so the top 6 candidates are not candidates 1-6. There is also one more ballot in the listing below than for the matrix I sent earlier, but the same relatively interesting situation still pertains. -- Andrew 8,6,5,3,15,7,13,12,1,2,12,12,12,4,14 15,10,7,4,9,3,14,13,1,8,5,12,2,11,6 15,6,4,3,12,2,6,11,11,11,1,13,7,11,14 3,4,13,9,2,1,15,10,9,9,14,12,9,11,11 15,12,2,7,14,8,13,6,3,1,12,12,6,4,5 4,14,5,15,6,7,14,14,14,14,14,2,1,14,3 4,6,8,2,14,9,15,13,12,12,7,3,5,12,1 4,15,3,8,15,7,15,15,2,1,5,15,15,15,6 15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,1,1,15,15,2,15,2 15,5,6,2,15,14,14,14,14,3,1,14,4,14,14 15,15,15,2,15,15,15,5,4,15,15,15,1,15,3 15,12,4,11,11,2,14,13,11,11,11,1,11,11,3 7,11,4,3,10,6,12,15,5,2,13,9,1,14,8 2,5,6,7,15,8,14,12,3,1,10,11,4,13,9 15,14,14,14,2,14,1,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14 7,12,12,4,14,2,15,1,6,3,12,13,12,5,12 9,11,2,1,8,4,10,5,3,6,12,13,14,7,15 15,5,12,4,12,12,13,12,2,12,3,12,1,12,14 1,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,1,15,15,15,15,15 1,8,3,7,4,7,15,15,2,15,15,15,5,15,15 4,15,15,1,15,15,15,15,3,2,15,15,15,15,15 15,8,10,10,6,1,14,14,4,2,5,11,3,14,7 13,4,2,6,14,5,15,10,9,1,11,8,7,12,3 3,4,14,2,14,6,14,14,7,15,1,14,5,14,8 15,10,10,2,14,10,14,10,2,1,10,10,2,10,10 15,15,15,15,3,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,1,2,15 6,6,8,6,3,7,15,1,3,11,9,15,12,15,7 15,15,14,3,2,10,15,4,13,1,15,15,11,15,12 10,3,4,15,14,5,8,13,1,9,6,11,2,12,7 14,15,15,15,10,8,15,15,3,2,1,15,15,15,15 9,11,2,3,12,4,15,1,5,6,13,14,8,7,10 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] HB240 could lead to Approval voting in New Hampshire
HB240 is a New Hampshire bill to allow Approval voting for all state offices and Presidential primaries. Here is the link to the Slashdot story: http://politics.slashdot.org/story/11/01/30/1911232/New-Hampshire-Bill-Could-Lead-To-Adoption-of-Approval-Voting#comments I would be very happy to see this signed into law. :) Mike Rouse Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] HB240 could lead to Approval voting in New Hampshire
This is a HUGE deal! I believe there will be a hearing on this bill at the NH State Legislature this TUESDAY. Can anyone go and testify in its favor, either this Tuesday, or possibly at some later hearings? Thanks, - Jan On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:22 PM, Michael Rouse mrou...@mrouse.com wrote: HB240 is a New Hampshire bill to allow Approval voting for all state offices and Presidential primaries. Here is the link to the Slashdot story: http://politics.slashdot.org/story/11/01/30/1911232/New-Hampshire-Bill-Could-Lead-To-Adoption-of-Approval-Voting#comments I would be very happy to see this signed into law. :) Mike Rouse Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An interesting real election
1 has a path to 6 at least as strong as 6's path to 1, namely 136, at 15-11 and 14-11. It seems a little odd, to me at least, that 6's path to 1 should benefit 2 but not 6 itself. Starting from the top seems the only way of ensuring that the path that orders the two candidates relative to each other is the one which actually contributes to the final outcome. --- On Sat, 1/29/11, Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu wrote: From: Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu Subject: [EM] An interesting real election To: Election Methods Mailing List election-meth...@electorama.com Date: Saturday, January 29, 2011, 4:40 PM Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should win? Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11, and #6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs. #1. Hill's method (Condorcet-IRV) picks #6 as the winner. -- Andrew 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. - 13 15 17 16 13 2. 9 - 13 14 17 15 3. 11 11 - 13 15 14 4. 9 10 10 - 14 13 5. 11 10 9 10 - 13 6. 14 11 11 13 10 - -Inline Attachment Follows- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An interesting real election
It's a little tough to spot without the coloring that CIVS does, but #1 loses pairwise to #6. This makes #2 win according to Schulze. As Markus points out, #2 is the candidate with the weakest pairwise defeat (13-9 vs the 14-13 defeat of #1 by #6). -- Andrew On 1/30/11 2:33 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote: How is #1 not a Condorcet Winner, since #1 pairwise-beats every other alternative? *From:* election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] *On Behalf Of *Andrew Myers *Sent:* Saturday, January 29, 2011 4:41 PM *To:* Election Methods Mailing List *Subject:* [EM] An interesting real election Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should win? Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11, and #6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs. #1. Hill's method (Condorcet-IRV) picks #6 as the winner. -- Andrew 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. - 13 15 17 16 13 2. 9 - 13 14 17 15 3. 11 11 - 13 15 14 4. 9 10 10 - 14 13 5. 11 10 9 10 - 13 6. 14 11 11 13 10 - Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An interesting real election
Hi Aaron, --- En date de : Dim 30.1.11, Aaron Armitage eutychus_sl...@yahoo.com a écrit : 1 has a path to 6 at least as strong as 6's path to 1, namely 136, at 15-11 and 14-11. It seems a little odd, to me at least, that 6's path to 1 should benefit 2 but not 6 itself. When you say benefit do you mean elect or something more broad? It seems to me election is the only meaningful benefit but of course only one candidate can receive it. Starting from the top seems the only way of ensuring that the path that orders the two candidates relative to each other is the one which actually contributes to the final outcome. I don't understand this. Are you saying the Schulze outcome in this election is an example where these two things differed? It's true that 1's path to 6 is better than the reverse, but the only method that will never elect the loser of such a comparison is Schulze. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
