Re: [EM] Single-winner method with strong winners (was: Poll for favorite single winner voting system with OpaVote)
On 17.10.2011, at 1.44, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think I probably did: For a skilled reader like you those two rows below that define the method should be enough. So I guess you know what the method will do. --- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate pair and those who are at least as approved as the less approved of those two. - a pair of candidates is approved by a voter if she approves at least one of those candidates This method is summable. One should sum up information about pairwise comparisons, pair approvals and individual approvals. 20: A1 A2 15: A2 A1 33: B C 32: C B In this example we have three major parties, A, B and C. Or alternatively we have four parties. In that case parties A1 and A2 are ideologically close to each others. This method elects B since pair A1, B (or A2, B) is the most approved pair (approved by 68 voters), A2 is more approved than B, and B beats both A1 and A2 in pairwise comparison. Use of approvals typically requires a (sincere) strategy. In this method the voters should try to impact on which two candidates will be at least as approved as the most approved pair of candidates. That means that it would make sense to approve at least one candidate with reasonable chances to be among the most approved candidates (and not to approve too many of the candidates). Does this method work well enough? Are this kind of methods useful methods in general? I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe you determine the critical pair of candidates in exactly the same way. However, while my method just has an instant runoff between those two candidates, you are possibly letting in some other candidates. That is essential. Those additional candidates and extra round with some Condorcet method (= a good single winner method) are needed to make it work in the intended way (= according to the requirements in the requirements section). I don't think there is a big problem on paper... It's quite likely that I tested in my sim some methods very similar to your proposal, and didn't report on them just because I found them to be . What would you expect to be the problems in this category of methods? Why are they less than the best? Note also that the target of the method is somewhat different that the regular requirements for single winner methods (i.e. elect the strongest, not the compromise candidate). It is planned for a few-party system that should be an improved version of a plurality based two-party system. But I guess strategic vulnerabilities should be treated pretty much the same way as with other methods. What I found to be of interest, of course, is that very little strategy remained on the ranking side of the method, since its main purpose was to resolve a two-way race. Your method will compromise on that a bit... What do you mean with a two-way race? And what is the compromise? The idea is to pick the winner among those candidates that can be considered to be at least equal in strength with what single candidates of traditional two leading parties would be. Those candidates were picked by comparing their strength (= their level of approval) to the strength of the members of the most liked proportional pair. Do you have majority favorite covered...? What do you mean with this? One more characterization for all the readers. The proposed method is supposed to work pretty much as plurality does today with single-member districts. But it allows also third parties to run without becoming spoilers. And in a related manner it allows also multiple very similar parties to run, or one party to have multiple candidates without them becoming spoilers. And at the same time the method tries to eliminate the problems that may occur if one directly replaces plurality with Condorcet. I.e. the method aims at electing candidates with lots of strong (=approved) support, and avoids electing e.g. candidates that would be good compromise candidates but not approved by many (= one definition of a weal candidate that includes also weak Condorcet winners). Juho Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Methods
matt welland wrote: Assuming that a) decent information about the candidates has been available via news, web and debates and b) reasonable quality approval polls have been conducted prior to the election then: In the case where there are too few good options then clearly the candidates do not represent a good cross section of the values and criteria considered important to the people or the people are are too diverse to be easily represented. This is not a problem that can be solved by an election system. All a ranked system would do is hide the issue and choose some candidate that clearly a large portion of the population would not be happy with. In the case of too few good options, no election system of any sort can directly fix the problem. The election method or system helps in an indirect way: by leveling the playing field, it permits entry by candidates or parties who notice that there's room for something better. I think that, as levelers, many ranked vote methods will work. Some don't, if you consider the Australian results under IRV indicative, but that's not inherent to all ranked ballot methods, in my opinion. In the case where there are many good options then approval is exposing that fact. It is true that this scenario makes strategic voting more important but since we are assuming that decent information and prior polling is available I think voters can apply a pretty simple strategy to decide if it is safe to not vote for the front runner they don't really like. Assuming a party or conservative/liberal philosophical split then if the candidate they do like is ahead of the leading candidate in the opposing camp then they can safely not vote for the front runner in their camp they don't like. Hard to explain but trivial once understood. Again, I think it is very, very important to note that the ranked systems actually lose or hide information relative to approval in both these cases. In what manner does a ranked method hide information? Neither ranked ballot methods nor strategic Approval can distinguish between everybody's equally good and everybody's equally bad. Note that in the first case the results and impact of a ranked system are actually worse than the results of approval. The political pressure to converge and appeal to a broad spectrum is greater under approval than the ranked systems. The evaluation of a voting system only makes sense in the context of all the other things going on in a society. The pressure on politicians to actually meet the needs of the people is a massively important factor and ranked systems appear to wash out some of that force which is a very bad thing IMHO. Again, why is that the case? In Approval, you're either in or you're out; but in ranked methods, the method can refine upon those two groups and find the better of the good (be that by broad or deep support relative to the others). If anything, this finer gradient should increase the impact, not decrease it, because the search will more often be pointed in the right direction. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Poll for favorite single winner voting system with OpaVote
Mike, The election closes on Sunday, and I will post a summary of results here using a few methods. It is interesting see what supporters of one method think about other methods.. The ballots are also available for people to do with as they like. For the election that you want to conduct, you could use OpaVote to ensure that voters can only vote once. There is an Election mode where you supply the email addresses of all the voters, and OpaVote sends each voter an email with a special link that allows them to vote. OpaVote keeps track of who has voted and ensures that each voter only votes once. To avoid spamming people, perhaps you could you use the email addresses from the this list but remove anyone who has email delivery disabled. Let me know if you need help setting it up. Jeff --- Mike Ossipoff wrote but i thought they were reporting results in the near future. how are they reporting their results? will they be telling us who the STV winner is, the Schulze winner, the Ranked-pairs winner, the Borda winner, the Bucklin winner, the Coombs winner? . Kristofer is right--It's ok if the the polling website or the poll-conductor doesn't do the count. It's enough if the rankings are easily available to anyone who wants to count them as they choose to. I was a bit unfair when I implied that the poll-conductor should do the count. ... In the poll that I will conduct, if anyone wants to designate FPTP, they may. Likewise, of course, anyone may nominate any method they want to. The method that you, as a voter, designate, needn't be one of the nominated methods that we're voting between--though it of course could be. And your designated method needn't be simple enough for a public proposal, though I think it would be much better if it is--so that our election can demonstrate publicly-proposable methods. I'm talking a lot about my poll, though I haven't yet proposed it, or set it up at a website (if that's how I'm going to do it). That brings up another point: Website polls, of course, have nearly no security. Yes, you can require people to register their e-mail address. I have two e-mail accounts and addresses. If I wanted to cheat in the election, I could register and vote with both accounts. The current poll's registration requirement helps avoid the most blatant ballot- stuffing, but it doesn't prevent ballot-stuffing. I know of one, and only one, secure way to conduct a poll on the Internet: Do it at this mailing list. That's how we, at EM, did polls for years. I understand that, now, it's more popular to do polling at other websites, because the voting is easier. But is that worth abandoning any chance of having a secure, un-ballot-stuffed poll? I certainly don't think so. _ OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting http://www.OpenSTV.org http://www.OpaVote.org Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration wording refinement
I have made this edit (of a single sentence) in the original Google Docs version of the Declaration, and in the copy here: http://www.votefair.org/declaration.html I think it's now in its final form. As before, if anyone who already signed it does not like the minor changes, please speak up. Again, thank you Kristofer Munsterhjelm! Richard Fobes On 10/16/2011 12:47 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Richard Fobes wrote: How about a wording such as this: Unanimously we agree that all of these supported methods are significantly better than plurality voting, and we endorse using them in governmental elections. This wording could replace the following sentence: Every person signing this declaration supports our call to end the use of plurality voting in governmental elections. Thank you Kristofer Munsterhjelm and Dave Ketchum for expressing your desire to make the declaration stronger. Yes, I could accept that, as it conveys what I was trying to get at :-) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A design flaw in the electoral system
Juho Laatu wrote: True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the (large) elections that I have ever participated. ... You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember if your vote made a difference. I think I had my fair share of power (1 / number of voters). Well, if the vote makes no difference, then it has no power. Its power could not be 1/N, in any case; it is either zero (no effect) or something closer to N (decisive). But a decisive vote is exceedingly rare and you're unlikely to cast one in your lifetime. (One more possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.) Politicians won't be concerned about an individual vote, of course, because it makes no difference. I think you were generalizing here to other voters, but the argument hinges on the individual vote. That vote *ought* to have an effect, but it does not. The situation is rightly difficult to accept. Whatever political liberty you (or I) can salvage in the face of state power, it cannot come from that vote. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Juho Laatu wrote: True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the (large) elections that I have ever participated. But on the other hand, was that the intention of the election? Probably not. I guess the intention was to elect those alternatives that had wide support. Allowing me to change the winner (with any significant probability) would have violated the principles of democracy. If you (or I) have any political freedom in the face of state power and laws, then it cannot possibly come from voting in elections. I think I had my fair share of power (1 / number of voters). (One more possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.) Juho On 14.10.2011, at 20.39, Michael Allan wrote: Hi Juho, Yes, there are many additional factors. Already a vote without any discussions between voters can be seen as a part of a complex process. At lest the input that the voter got was complex, even if the voter did not produce any output in his environment. Also the margin of the victory will be meaningful like Andrew Myers said. ... Granted that a margin of victory has effects in the objective world, it does not follow that an individual vote also has effects. Or at least Andrew does not appear to be claiming this. ... And the voter himself could be already thinking about the next election. In order to win then, every single additional vote in this election may be important. Again, that does not seem to follow. We are still confronted with a measurable effect of zero, as empirical science can show: 1. Take the last election in which you voted, and look at its outcome (P). Who got into office? 2. Subtract your vote from that election. 3. Recalculate the outcome without your vote (Q). 4. Look at the difference between P and Q. 5. Repeat for all the elections you ever participated in. Your vote never made a difference. My vote never made a differerence. Others: did your vote ever make a difference? If you (or I) have any political freedom in the face of state power and laws, then it cannot possibly come from voting in elections. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Juho Laatu wrote: On 7.10.2011, at 12.19, Michael Allan wrote: Imagine one person is nodding in agreement to a proposal, while another is shaking her head. We could ask, What effect did this voter *as such* have on the decision that was reached, or anything that followed from it? In most cases, the answer would be incalculable, tied up in a web of cause and effect that plays out endlessly. We might say it was boundless, or that it hovered somewhere between zero and infinity. In further reply to Juho, I would offer this indeterminacy as an alternative to the apparent dilemma of no effect vs. decisive effect. Yes, there are many additional factors. Already a vote without any discussions between voters can be seen as a part of a complex process. At lest the input that the voter got was complex, even if the voter did not produce any output in his environment. Also the margin of the victory will be meaningful like Andrew Myers said. And the voter himself could be already thinking about the next election. In order to win then, every single additional vote in this election may be important. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] A design flaw in the electoral system
On 17.10.2011, at 23.33, Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the (large) elections that I have ever participated. ... You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember if your vote made a difference. Most elections that I have participated in have been multi-winner elections. It is possible that my favourite has won with one vote but nobody has told me about that. I have not often checked the final results in that level of detail. It is also possible that my single vote has changed the proportional shares of seats of the parties. It is more probable (but not guaranteed) that I would have heard about such a tight race. I think I had my fair share of power (1 / number of voters). Well, if the vote makes no difference, then it has no power. Its power could not be 1/N, in any case; it is either zero (no effect) or something closer to N (decisive). But a decisive vote is exceedingly rare and you're unlikely to cast one in your lifetime. In multi-party elections also other numbers than 0 and 1 (or N) are possible. If we assume that the whole election had an impact (1 or N), but no single vote was decisive, then who had the power? The politicians also fought for my vote and therefore they drafted some plans and made some promises, so I feel that my vote (or the fact that I can vote and I voted) had some power (even if my vote was not a decisive vote). Maybe the election was fought (and plans for the future made and presented) already before the election day and before the votes were counted. Maybe the election results just verified what had already been decided just before the election day. (One more possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.) Politicians won't be concerned about an individual vote, of course, because it makes no difference. Do you mean that since no individual vote makes a difference the politicians should stay home and not spend time and money in the campaigns (shaking my hand and promising me things)? I think you were generalizing here to other voters, but the argument hinges on the individual vote. That vote *ought* to have an effect, but it does not. The situation is rightly difficult to accept. Whatever political liberty you (or I) can salvage in the face of state power, it cannot come from that vote. Maybe the explanation that I gave above, works here too. Maybe the key was the campaign time and programs and promises there. My best explanation is however still to think in terms of how can we influence and not how can I influence, when we consider whether we should vote in the next election or not. Also the fact that we vote is important since it keeps the politicians alert. Juho -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Juho Laatu wrote: True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the (large) elections that I have ever participated. But on the other hand, was that the intention of the election? Probably not. I guess the intention was to elect those alternatives that had wide support. Allowing me to change the winner (with any significant probability) would have violated the principles of democracy. If you (or I) have any political freedom in the face of state power and laws, then it cannot possibly come from voting in elections. I think I had my fair share of power (1 / number of voters). (One more possible explanation is that the politicians were at least afraid of me voting against them, and that's why they did what I wanted them to do.) Juho On 14.10.2011, at 20.39, Michael Allan wrote: Hi Juho, Yes, there are many additional factors. Already a vote without any discussions between voters can be seen as a part of a complex process. At lest the input that the voter got was complex, even if the voter did not produce any output in his environment. Also the margin of the victory will be meaningful like Andrew Myers said. ... Granted that a margin of victory has effects in the objective world, it does not follow that an individual vote also has effects. Or at least Andrew does not appear to be claiming this. ... And the voter himself could be already thinking about the next election. In order to win then, every single additional vote in this election may be important. Again, that does not seem to follow. We are still confronted with a measurable effect of zero, as empirical science can show: 1. Take the last election in which you voted, and look at its outcome (P). Who got into office? 2. Subtract your vote from that election. 3. Recalculate the outcome without your vote (Q). 4. Look at the difference between P and Q. 5. Repeat for all the elections you ever participated in. Your vote never made a difference. My vote never made a
Re: [EM] Methods
Kristofer offers a bit of thought, but we are still missing too much of the basic needs. Voter NEEDs to be able to vote for candidates preferred (plural). Approval offers this much, at little cost, but nothing more. Voter NEEDs to be able to indicate relative preference among those voted for. Start with one or more first choices. Then add in less liked, wanted only if first choices lose. For example, vote for the most tolerable of the expected leaders, wanted only if better cannot get elected. Condorcet ranking is one way to offer this. Voters NEED to have the desires they express counted. IRV is the most visible failure of this type - accepting Condorcet style ranking, but then making decisions based only on what are, for the moment, top ranks. Voting and counting rules need to be kept simple to help with understanding. I admit to preference for Condorcet, but demand of others comparable quality. Dave Ketchum Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Methods
Also, Approval is like a solid, reliable and simple hand-tool. It isn't as labor-saving as a good rank method. The rank-methods are labor-saving machines. But machines can have their problems /or idiosyncracies. The ranking methods are like the saw, labor intensive and expensive to use whereas the approval method is like the axe, rough and crude but fast and efficient and does exactly what needs to be done and no more. Approval definitely does what needs to be done. And, as you pointed out, Approval-polls before the election will give a whole different kind and amount of information, as compared to our present Plurality polls. Our polls always ask people how they'd vote if the election were held today. So of course, they vote for their lesser-evil, whom they don't like, and no one ever find out, from the poll, what people's actual preferences are. That trick wouldn't work with Approval polling. Asked how they'd vote if the election were today, people would give Approval votes to everyone they like more than their perceived necessary compromise. There's no way to word an Approval poll that could avoid the voting public having that information. So yes, with Approval polling, as you said, the first Approval election might be enough to bring full improvement. (By the way, let's do, in all our communities around the country, a Condorcet poll on the 2012 candidates, to find out who's CW. Then we aggregate the results, and share that CW info with various progressive political leaders, small-party leaders, and progressive media.) Relevant to something else said in the thread, in a different message, one of the good strategies in Approval is to vote for every candidate who's better than your expectation in the election. In other words, vote for every candidate whom (if you had that power) you'd rather put in office instead of holding an election. The result would be: We'd get a result that would be a pleasant surprise to the most people, and an unpleasant surprise to the fewest people. Only a very few of the very best rank methods are as good as Approval. But the best rank methods are quite adequate too. I'd be glad to have them, if that's what we eventually get. Either would be fine. Of course Approval meets the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC). Condorcet(wv) doesn't. I've been present when a friend voted in an Internet presidential poll, by rank balloting. I don't remember what the count method was. Though she prefers Nader's policies to those of Kerry and other Democrats (and of course, of the Republicans who have the same policies), she voted all of the Democrats over Nader. With Condorcet(wv), I couldn't assure her that she can never benefit from that. That's when I began to feel that FBC is absolutely essential in U.S. elections. There are some good rank methods that meet FBC, along with other helpful criteria such as SDSC, SFC. The deciding factor, in the choice between Approval and a briefly-defined, FBC-complying rank method should be Which will the voters sign an initiative petition for? Which will they vote yes for the enactment of? That's what matters. I'd be delighted if voters enacted Approval or a good rank method. I don't know which people would be more likely to support. I've noticed that rank methods seem to elicit more interest. More like Yeah! than Yeah. On the other hand, as I said, we'd have the big issue and battle about which rank count. The IRVists might have already wined, dined, and power-lunched the national leaders of small parties we approach. Choosing a good method is one thing, but telling the man-in-the-street why it's a good method is a difficult task. Polling is the only way to find out for sure what the voters will be most likely to enact. However I think in many elections nuance is wasted effort and allowing it is actually harmful to the process, especially since ranking and range can be used strategically (I guess you guys call it burial?). In some rank methods. In Condorcet(wv). But, there, the order reversers must have the biggest candidate (in terms of favoriteness), and a quite large fraction of them must reverse. And only a small fraction of the intended victims need to truncate, in order for the reversers to get an outcome worse, in their view, than the one that they buried. But there's no offensive order-reversal in Bucklin. Maybe it can be tried in MDDA, but most likely defensive truncation thwarts it as in wv. I haven't thorougly checked that out yet. The version of Bucklin that I like allows equal ranking, giving whole votes to those equal ranked, with all rankings giving to next choices simultaneously if no one yet has a vote total exceeding half the number of voters. I call that version Stepwise Approval (SA), though I don't claim to be its first proponent. There's fascinatingly large array of rank methods that meet FBC, and many that meet SFC SDSC too. I've barely begun
Re: [EM] Methods
On Mon, 2011-10-17 at 20:42 +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: matt welland wrote: Again, I think it is very, very important to note that the ranked systems actually lose or hide information relative to approval in both these cases. In what manner does a ranked method hide information? Neither ranked ballot methods nor strategic Approval can distinguish between everybody's equally good and everybody's equally bad. Note that in the first case the results and impact of a ranked system are actually worse than the results of approval. The political pressure to converge and appeal to a broad spectrum is greater under approval than the ranked systems. The evaluation of a voting system only makes sense in the context of all the other things going on in a society. The pressure on politicians to actually meet the needs of the people is a massively important factor and ranked systems appear to wash out some of that force which is a very bad thing IMHO. Again, why is that the case? In Approval, you're either in or you're out; but in ranked methods, the method can refine upon those two groups and find the better of the good (be that by broad or deep support relative to the others). If anything, this finer gradient should increase the impact, not decrease it, because the search will more often be pointed in the right direction. A ranked system cannot give the feedback that all the candidates are disliked (e.g. all candidates get less than 50% approval). It also cannot feedback that all the candidates are essentially equivalent (all have very high approval). Ranked systems essentially normalize the vote. I think this is a serious issue. A ranked system can give a false impression that there is a favorite but the truth might be that none of the candidates are acceptable. Ironically by trying to capture nuances the ranked systems have lost an interesting and valuable part of the voter feedback. A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adol Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate that one of them is the condorcet winner giving no indication that none are acceptable. I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The ability for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the candidates are worthy of the post under contest. I don't know how to prove it but my hunch is that approval would be more resistant to manipulation by the so-called one percenter elites than ranked systems. We *need* headlines that read Gallup Poll Indicates that No Candidate for President is Acceptable! (in the case where it was true of course). You can never get that headline with ranked systems. Matt -=- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
