Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 12/2/11 11:46 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: Deep down, I am skeptical of whether a multi-party system improves things that much or would do so in my country. RBJ:i am thoroughly convinced that a multi-party (and viable independent) system improves things over the two-party system. besides the money thing, dlw: It might improve things over our current two-party system, but is there really no choice C? Ie, 2 major parties, an indefinite number of minor parties trying to become or merge with a major party, and a whole lot of LTPs who specialize in contesting more local elections and o.w. move the political center thru voting strategically together in less local elections and engaging in civil disobedience actions. RBJ: i just cannot believe that exhausting our social choice to between Dumb and Dumber is the lot that a democratic society must be forced to accept. what was so frustrating during Town Meeting Day in 2010 (when the IRV repeal vote was up), it was another choice between Dumb and Dumber. and, as usual, Dumber prevailed in that choice. nobody seems to get it (present company excluded). added to the result of the 2000 prez election and, even more so, the 2004 result, the aggregate evidence is that American voters are stupid. incredibly stupid. and a large portion of Burlington Democrats were stupid to join with the GOPpers, the latter who were acting simply in their self-interest to repeal IRV. and the Progs were dumb to continue to blather IRV happy talk as if it worked just fine in 2009. dlw: It wd have worked just fine if it was continued. you keep repeating that without justifying it with any facts. if it was continued and was in place for the coming mayoral election in 2012, the GOP Prog haters would be saying to themselves In this town full of liberals, I gotta choose between Liberal and More Liberal because if I vote for the guy I really like, More Liberal gets elected. It's failure to elect the CW was a byproduct of how IRV does not end the tendency twds 2 party domination. Sorry David, but you blather. the reason that IRV failed to elect the CW is that it is not a Condorcet-compliant method. like Borda or Bucklin. the reason that IRV failed to elect the CW is because IRV elects the IRV winner. sometimes the IRV winner is the same as the CW and sometimes it is not. 2-party domination is certainly, to use a term you seem to like, non sequitur. you can apply the same blather to the use of the Electoral College in electing the president. sometimes the EC elects the same candidate that the popular vote does, but it is not constrained to do so in all cases. it has different criteria than the popular vote, although often the two will agree on the same candidate. dlw:Burlington's two major parties would not be the same as the two nat'l major parties. RBJ:David, we don't have two major parties. we have three. dlw: I'm speaking in future tense. If we got 2 dynamic major parties then we don't need a centrist party, cuz the center will be too dynamic to be the basis for a party platform. silly blather. my interest in voting method reform is because long ago i came to the other conclusion (we need more than two viable parties). RBJ: Republicans would vote Democrat in Burlington mayoral elections. if forced to. but they would like to give their own guy their primary support. IRV promised them that they could vote for their guy and, by doing so, not elect the candidate they hated the most. and in 2009, IRV precisely failed that promise. dlw: You can't make a melding pot without breaking some vases. David, YOU DO NOT GET IT. it went pt over your head. stop trying to impress us with argument when you just really do not get it. IRV promised something. in 2009 in Burlington Vermont, IRV failed to deliver on that promise in a totally objective and technical manner. it's like the steering system in your car failed and the car was directed into the ditch. something didn't work right. something didn't work as intended. unfortunately, as a consequence, the whole concept of ranked-choice voting got sullied by that failure of this particular method of tabulating the votes. unfortunately, even though IRV was repealed by a pretty thin margin (4%), the detractors of IRV (and, because of guilt by association in their simple minds, ranked voting by any other method) believe that God himself ordained the traditional vote-for-one-with-an-X ballot. IRV tends to do that, it doesn't do it all the time, especially when there's a transition to a new set of two major parties around the new political center. totally unimpressive blather. you're stringing together words without creating meaning. RBJ:it not a tug-of-war with a single rope and the centrists have to decide whether
[EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:
Forest, I don't understand the algorithm's definition. It seems to be saying that it's MinMax(Margins), only computing X's gross pairwise score against Y by giving X 2 points for every ballot on which X is both top-rated and voted strictly above Y, and otherwise giving X 1 point for every ballot on which X is top-rated *or* voted strictly above Y. But from trying that on the first example it's obvious that isn't it. Can someone please explain it to me? Chris Benham Forest Simmons wrote (2 Dec 2011): Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have been worrying about lately: (1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2: In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X above Y or if beta gives a top rating to X. Otherwise enter a zero. IN row X and column y of matrix M2, enter a 1 if y is rated strictly above x on beta. Otherwise enter a zero. (2) Sum the matrices M1 and M2 over all ballots beta. (3) Let M be the difference of these respective sums . (4) Elect the candidate who has the (algebraically) greatest minimum row value in matrix M. Consider the scenario 49 C 27 AB 24 BA Since there are no equal top ratings, the method elects the same candidate A as minmax margins would. In the case 49 C 27 AB 24 B There are no equal top ratings, so the method gives the same result as minmax margins, namely C wins (by the tie breaking rule based on second lowest row value between B and C). Now for 49 C 27 A=B 24 B In this case B wins, so the A supporters have a way of stopping C from being elected when they know that the B voters really are indifferent between A and C. The equal top rule for matrix M1 essentially transforms minmax into a method satisfying the FBC. Thoughts? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV's adequacy depends on a two-party system
IRV has some strong links to the two-party system. That is also one key reason why it is seems to be the most popular approach to reform in the USA. Jameson Quinn talked about two-party dominance and two-party duopoly, and here we have terms two-party and centre-squeeze. We have also seen terms like weak Condorcet winner. These are all related in a way that I intend to discuss below. In addition to the centre-squeeze property, IRV has also an edge-squeeze property. I mean that in the word pair centre and squeeze, the squeeze part is actually the dominant part. Any squeezed candidate (with low first preference support) is likely to be eliminated soon in the IRV elimination process. My message is that instead of having all these terms, maybe one natural approach would be to classify IRV and few of its kind as a separate subcategory of methods. What separates (from this point of view) IRV and plurality from Approval and Condorcet is their tendency to avoid electing minor centrist compromise candidates. That can be seen as an intentional property, not just as a failure. In some recent discussions there have been also some other methods whose aim is to maintain the two-party dominance (duopoly in Jameson Quinn's terms), but still allow third parties to run without becoming spoilers. This category of methods could be called two-party methods (or duopoly methods). The philosophy of such methods is to elect strong candidates, where strong means that these candidates will have typically more than or close to 50% support, and they have more (first preference) support than any other alternative candidate. This approach has the tendency to lead dominance of two major parties. Within this group of methods we might set additional requirements like being able to allow also third parties/candidates to compete and one day replace one of the two dominant ones. In this set-up we may propose better alternatives to (from this point of view) bad two-party methods like plurality (that is quite terrible with third parties), but without going all the way to the compromise seeking single-winner methods like Approval and Condorcet. Note that if there will be a reform in the USA, the end result could be quite different if the chosen new method is still a two-party method or if it is a compromise seeking single-winner method. Both reform types allow third parties to compete and become elected one day, but two-party methods would still have the tendency to maintain the dominance of two parties (or at least two or three major parties with chances to win in each single winner district). A compromise seeking method could elect multiple compromise candidates from small groupings in the representative bodies, and as a president too. This would mean that the president would quite typically not have majority support in the representative bodies. And that would lead to somewhat different behaviour of the whole system, when compared to what it is today. Already single-winner reforms may thus be classified in this way in two categories - those that aim at duopoly or tripoly (=major representatives) and those that aim at a richer mixture of single-seat winners (=major and compromise representatives). Already the two-party method based reforms could lead to meaningful changes by allowing new parties (major party of some district) to enter the representative bodies. That could mean that new governments could be coalition governments (e.g. Democrat + Progressive) instead of the single-party governments of today. Based on this discussion, possible reforms could be classified at least in three categories: two-party reforms, more general/liberal single-winner reforms, and proportional representation based reforms (in the order of radicalness). The title of this mail stream would mean that IRV belongs in the first category of reforms. Juho On 3.12.2011, at 6.49, Brian Olson wrote: Just the subject line on this is the most amusing thing I've read on this list in a while. Well said, sir! On Dec 2, 2011, at 2:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: David Wetzel said: s for center-squeezing, that's not really a problem in the US as a whole... Third parties are too small and scattered. [endquote] Ok, so David is saying that IRV is adequate adequate only in a two-party system. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] MMT written right
Mutual-Majority-Top (MMT): 3-slot. Top, Middle, Bottom (unmarked) For any set of candidates rated above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters, the winner must come from that set. The winner is the most top-rated member of that set. If there is no such set, then the winner is the most top-rated candidate in the election. [end of MMT definition] Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Fwd: how goes American PR?
American PR is a coming. You must decide if you want to keep quibbling over the best single-winner election rule or push hard for a better mix of multi and single-winner election rules in the US. dlw -- Forwarded message -- From: Rob Richie r...@fairvote.org Date: Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 11:05 AM Subject: Re: how goes American PR? To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com A little slow in getting our American PR-like plans drawn, but we'll have them done for hte whole country in early 2012 and heat up in our outreach... getting some related opeds. Next year should be a good one for the idea -- lots of chances to talk about it. Rob On Wed, Nov 30, 2011 at 12:26 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.comwrote: I wonder if tea-partiers unhappy w. the Republican party might get in on it? dlw -- ~ Respect for Every Vote and Every Voice Rob Richie Executive Director FairVote 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 610 Takoma Park, MD 20912 www.fairvote.org http://www.fairvote.org r...@fairvote.org (301) 270-4616 Please support FairVote through action and tax-deductible donations -- see http://fairvote.org/donate. For federal employees, please consider a gift to us through the Combined Federal Campaign (FairVote's CFC number is 10132.) Thank you! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:
Chris, you're right that it is very close to MinMax(margins). Let's compare and contrast: In both MinMax versions a matrix M is used to determine the winner in the same way: if the least number in row i is greater than the least number in any other row of the matrix M, then candidate i is elected. [By convention each negative number is less than every positive number, and among several negative numbers the most negative is the least. So -6 -32 5, etc.] In both methods each entry of the matrix M is the difference betwee two numbers (minuend minus subtrahend). The subrtrahend in this difference is exactly the same in both methods. The subtrahend in row i column j of M is the number of ballots on which candidate j is rated or ranked strictly above candidate i. It's in the minuend that the two methods part company: In MinMax(margins) the minuend of the (i, j) entry is the number of ballots on which candidate i is rated or ranked strictly above candidate j. In MinMax(TopTierPairwiseRule) the minuend of the (i, j) entry is the number of ballots on which candidate i is ranked (or rated) strictly above candidate j plus the number of ballots on which candidate i is rated or ranked equal top with candidate j. A third method that I call MinMax(EqualRankPairwiseRule) uses the same subtrahend but defines the minuend as the number of ballots on which candidate i is ranked both above bottom AND above or equal to candidate j. This last method MinMax(ERPR) also satisfies the FBC, and furthermore it nevers gives incentive for insincere order reversal. Both MinMax(ERPR) and MinMax(TTPR) satisfy the mono-add-equal-top criterion: if additional ballots are added with the previous winner ranked top or equal top, the winner is unchanged. Furthermore, suppose that candidate i is the winner under MinMax(ERPR), and that the least number in row i of matrix M is -7. Suppose that this number -7 appears only in columns 3, 9, and 15 of row i. If a new ballot ranks candidate i above or equal to candidates 3, 9, and 15, then the method will still elect candidate i when the new ballot is counted along with the old ones. Note that in the case of MinMax(ERPR) the diagonal entries (i, i) in the matrix M are the respective implicit approvals of the candidates, since ranked candidates are ranked equal to themselves but not above themselves. All three of these MinMax methods are monotone, but fail clone independence in the same sense that MinMax(wv) does. The equal ranking option mitigates this failure. Perhaps further modifications could mitigate it more, if not altogether remove it. For example, incorporating some version of the Cardinal Weighted Pairwise idea might restore clone independence to the same degree enjoyed by Approval and other Cardinal Ratings methods. We can deal with that later. Meanwhile, with a three slot method, clones tend to get equal ranked a lot, so the clone dependence is not much worse than it is in Approval. We need a popular name that can catch on with the public. Any ideas? Forest - Original Message - From: C.Benham Date: Saturday, December 3, 2011 0:24 am Subject: This might be the method we've been looking for: To: em Cc: Forest W Simmons Forest, I don't understand the algorithm's definition. It seems to be saying that it's MinMax(Margins), only computing X's gross pairwise score against Y by giving X 2 points for every ballot on which X is both top-rated and voted strictly above Y, and otherwise giving X 1 point for every ballot on which X is top-rated *or* voted strictly above Y. But from trying that on the first example it's obvious that isn't it. Can someone please explain it to me? Chris Benham Forest Simmons wrote (2 Dec 2011): Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have been worrying about lately: (1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2: In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X above Y or if beta gives a top rating to X. Otherwise enter a zero. IN row X and column y of matrix M2, enter a 1 if y is rated strictly above x on beta. Otherwise enter a zero. (2) Sum the matrices M1 and M2 over all ballots beta. (3) Let M be the difference of these respective sums . (4) Elect the candidate who has the (algebraically) greatest minimum row value in matrix M. Consider the scenario 49 C 27 AB 24 BA Since there are no equal top ratings, the method elects the same candidate A as minmax margins would. In the case 49 C 27 AB 24 B There are no equal top ratings, so the method gives the same result as minmax margins, namely C wins (by the tie breaking rule based on second lowest row value between B and C). Now for 49 C 27 A=B 24 B In this case B wins, so the A supporters have a way of stopping C from being elected when they know that the B voters
Re: [EM] Fwd: how goes American PR?
Does American PR have a specific meaning yet? I'm sure I'll be in favor of it, whatever PR variant it is; but while I'm still ignorant, let me guess a little. I doubt it's a mixed-member system. They're good, but the US, despite (or perhaps because of) being one of the most partisan countries around, has too much suspicion of party machines for that to catch on. So that leaves ... I guess the most-probable options are global STV or STV in small multimember districts (3-5 members). Again, these are both quite good systems I'd support. But if it's not too late to offer a suggestion... I'd strongly encourage you to consider something like PAL representationhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation. It's certainly not the simplest system there is, but then no PR system is really simple. And as advantages you get: -- High potential for 100% continuity (if the statewide gerrymander was fairly proportional, and if third parties don't pick up any seats). This is a HUGE advantage when selling to incumbents. I mean, seriously, tremendous. -- Voters and/or peers have the real power to remove even the most well-encrusted incumbent if they sour on him or her. That is, it's voter-centric, not party-centric -- Almost every voter gets their own local representative WHOM THEY VOTED FOR. This is absolutely something that would resonate with US voters, raised on tales of No taxation without representation. Check it out. (And yes, I think that we can work together over PR, even if we don't see eye-to-eye on single winner systems.) Jameson 2011/12/3 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com American PR is a coming. You must decide if you want to keep quibbling over the best single-winner election rule or push hard for a better mix of multi and single-winner election rules in the US. dlw -- Forwarded message -- From: Rob Richie r...@fairvote.org Date: Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 11:05 AM Subject: Re: how goes American PR? To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com A little slow in getting our American PR-like plans drawn, but we'll have them done for hte whole country in early 2012 and heat up in our outreach... getting some related opeds. Next year should be a good one for the idea -- lots of chances to talk about it. Rob On Wed, Nov 30, 2011 at 12:26 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.comwrote: I wonder if tea-partiers unhappy w. the Republican party might get in on it? dlw -- ~ Respect for Every Vote and Every Voice Rob Richie Executive Director FairVote 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 610 Takoma Park, MD 20912 www.fairvote.org http://www.fairvote.org r...@fairvote.org (301) 270-4616 Please support FairVote through action and tax-deductible donations -- see http://fairvote.org/donate. For federal employees, please consider a gift to us through the Combined Federal Campaign (FairVote's CFC number is 10132.) Thank you! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
Thanks for worthy comments, but I disagree a bit: We need single-member districts, for we have offices that fit, such as mayor and governor. We need to ban plurality. While plurality is enough on a good day, most any election can have bad days. I will promote Condorcet (see B2 below) - among its advantages are that voting here is no more effort than plurality on good days (think of a community's treasurer - simply reelect via ranking only such on good days; want to demand replacements on bad days). We need an agreed method for doing PR for such as legislatures. They can be done single-member, but those managing elections can choose PR. While STV exists, I suggest having the voters use something more like Condorcet for PR. On Dec 2, 2011, at 1:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: This thread now has 50 messages, back-and-forth. I'll try to make this my last word on the subject. Basically, the bottom line for me is that I trust real evidence more than I trust theory, but I need to find room to take hopeful action. That's not a matter of building an elaborate model of reality in my head and then repeatedly claiming that I'm a pragmatist; it's a matter of trying to make my questions as simple as possible, answering them with evidence, and then finding the shortest path of least resistance to hope. What does the evidence tell us? A. Evidence about the status quo says: 1. Plurality is a theoretically-horrible system, with no redeeming features. 2. Single-member districts have certain advantages, but also serious problems; I'd say that on the whole the problems dominate. (?) 3. In practice, the problems with both plurality and single-member districts seem to culminate in two-party domination. 4. It takes a lot of money to get elected in the current system. 5. Status quo politics are badly broken. 6. It's likely that 3 is one main cause of 4, and that 3 and 4 together are the main causes of 5. Thus there is a need to change either plurality, single-member districts, or both. (?) B. Evidence about IRV says: 1. There's been a well-organized and decently-funded national campaign for IRV. I'm speakin of course about Fairvote, whose spending on IRV over its history has probably totalled millions of dollars. Fair Vote offers a valuable service to voters - better than just approving candidates, as in Approval, voters use ranking to indicate whether they like A or B better - but are not required to indicate amount that A is better than B. Fair Vote also gives a simple task to vote counters - recognizing that small groups of voters can like best different groups of candidates, discard such top groups until the winner has a majority of what remain top. 1a. It's had real successes 1b. It's still fallen widely short of the progress that is needed. It can happen that one of the top groups discarded, per above, was only part of the votes for the truly best liked candidate - who thus fails to win. 2. Even in places that were initially favorable to IRV, and have tried it, opposition is persistent. (This includes Australia, where reputable polls have found majorities favoring changing the system.) 3. IRV pathologies can happen in real life. Burlington proves what simulations tell us to expect. 4. Especially when pathologies happen, IRV is subject to repeal. 5. IRV does not seem to end two-party domination; certainly it does not do so reliably. (?) 6. In a hard-fought national referendum in the UK, where both sides had significant funding and organization, IRV lost resoundingly. B2. Condorcet has had less use than IRV. 1. It offers the same service to voters, except also permitting equal ranking. 2. Counting is (as if) into an x*x matrix showing which of each possible pair of candidates would win in a race between those two. 3. There is value in humans reading x*x - it tells how third parties are doing even when they do not win - clues as to whether they are worth joining; clues as to where the center of gravity is moving. 4. The Condorcet Winner (CW) is recognized as proper winner even when discussing other methods. It means winning when racing against each other candidate with Condorcet counting. 5. Only by having at least 3 strong candidates and them being voted in a cycle such as ABCA, is there no CW. 6. I and a few others argue strongly that only candidates the voter could approve getting elected should be ranked - and against ranking others such as enemies. C. Evidence about other single-winner systems says: 1. Non-IRV voting activists are, as a whole, fractious and disorganized. 2. It is very difficult to get all voting reform advocates to agree on a single best system. 2a. It's especially difficult to get theorists to support IRV in spite of its theoretical flaws. (?) Not surprising, since the flaws are real. 3. It is less difficult to get reform advocates and
Re: [EM] Fwd: how goes American PR?
so Jan, i heard that you were for keeping plurality voting over IRV in Fort Collins. is that true? do you continue to feel the same way about FPTP vs. IRV? On 12/3/11 3:37 PM, Jan Kok wrote: The US President's power is huge. He can veto bills passed by Congress, and he can start wars. And now, de facto, can even order assassinations of US citizens. this is more of an issue of (constitutionally) how much power a president or other nation's head-of-state should have. whether a single-seat office holder has a lot (or too much) power or not, doesn't change the notion of how that person should be elected in a democracy and, particularly, a democracy that makes room for more than two viable parties and for independent candidates. So, it's important that we have good single-winner election methods to make the best possible choices of winners for single-winner offices. it is regardless of how much power that single winner gets. even for the official Town Clown, why award the office to the loser? or the 2nd-place winner? IRV/RCV is a poor method. It can make poor choices of winners, such as in the 2009 Burlington, VT mayor's race, and is more complicated than other methods. it *has* made poor choices. doesn't mean that it always had. IRV doesn't do too bad when it elects the CW (and all the CW needs to attain is a place in the final round, then the CW is also the IRVW). but the same argument can be used for the Electoral College vs. the popular vote. it doesn't make much sense to keep the E.C. because most of the time it elects the winner of the popular vote which is deemed the measure of how well it works. if that's the case, why not ditch the E.C. and just elect the popular vote winner? same for IRV vs. Condorcet. The complexity makes it difficult to sell to voters, some of whom are _extremely_ resistant to change. yeah, but tax laws are complex too. and we continue to pay taxes with complexity in the code (and some are _extremely_ resistant to that also). some people tell me that Condorcet is more complicated than IRV. i disagree but in any case reject the notion of adopting simple laws that are unfair eschewing those that have more subtlety but are naturally fairer. The complexity also makes it more expensive to count the votes, not really. the scan/count machines can do fine with the ranked ballot, whether it's IRV or not. IRV is harder to hand count. but Condorcet would be even more laborious to hand count, i think. and makes IRV elections more vulnerable to fraud. all elections are vulnerable to fraud if there is corruption in official places and the rule-of-law is diminished. the only manner that IRV is *more* vulnerable w.r.t. other methods is that it is not precinct summable. it's harder to fix an election that covers many voting places if the results from the individual polling places cannot be tabulated and reported independently from each place. now you can still do that with IRV (the media gets a copy of the same thumb drive that the precinct clerk takes to the central counting place), but the auditors in the media might not be able to easily check the overall results unless the method is precinct summable. And when IRV gets rejected or repealed, as it has in several places, it poisons the well, making it harder to introduce other, better voting methods. and that, i fully agree with. So, as long as there are people pushing IRV, let the quibbling (about single-winner methods) continue! i agree with that, too. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
