[EM] voters "specifically" wronged by Mono-add-Plump failure
Mike, If you don't know what the Later-no-Help criterion is, why didn't you simply say so, or even make some attempt to look it up? http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion And I would prefer it if you at least keep your offensive gibes out of the subject line. 49: C 27: A>B 24: B>A 20: A (new ballots that change the MMT and MAMT winner from A to C) (120 ballots, majority threshold 61). A>C 71-49, A>B 47-24, B>C 51-49. I'm asking specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described. Say in the above example all the votes are sincere, then I say *specifically* that the A truncators are "wronged". According to you (Mike O.) those voters deserve to "not benefit from" the previously existing "mutual majority support" by having their ballots in effect not just ignored (given zero weight) but given *negative* weight. I say that the algorithm should try to give equal positive weight to all ballots, and that those voters who burden the algorithm with the minimum information can very reasonably expect that the algorithm will succeed in not giving their ballots (in effect) negative weight. But say for a moment that I accept Mike's proposition that the 20A truncators got what they deserved because of their stupidity or laziness or ingratitude or whatever. What about the other 51 voters who prefer A to C? Do they deserve to have their win snatched away from them by the intrusion of those stupid yokels (the A truncators)? Haven't *they* been "wronged"? 49: A 48: B 03: C>B B pairwise beats A, and is CW. Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible with FBC. Various different FBC-complying methods, and especially FBC/ABE methods, will fail CC in various ways, some CC failures being bigger than others--a matter of degree. But they all fail CC. Maybe you're a strict Condorcetist, and I don't criticize you for that. We needn't all have the same goals, values and purposes. When, on learning that compliance with the FBC and the Condorcet criterion are incompatible one decides that FBC is more important and so changes (as Mike has) from a "Condorcetist" to a supporter of FBC-complying methods, I would think that one would be looking for some weakened version (or versions) of the Condorcet criterion that *are* compatible the FBC and not simply start happily embracing any failure of Condorcet, almost no matter how bad. For example FBC compliance is compatible with Kevin Venzke's "Tied at the Top Rule" weakening of the Condorcet criterion, and I doubt that FBC compliance is incompatible with Condorcet Loser (as failed in my first example). (I'm inferring a criterion from part of Kevin's suggested "ICA" method. That criterion says that if there are any candidates who pairwise beat all the other candidates using the special tied-at-the-top rule then the winner must be one of them. In situations where there is no equal-top ranking/rating it says the same thing as the Condorcet criterion.) http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Tied_at_the_top http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica Chris Benham Mike Ossipoff wrote (16 Dec 2011): Chris: You said: In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote: > MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from. > People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know, > so far, about its properties, ... That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why I think they are important. [endquote] I wasn't criticizing you there. I was merely asking Forest about MAMT. > You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: > > With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, > mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that > coalition > does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. > > How is that a "failure"?? You replied: I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing. [endquote] You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs of mine that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then that's ok. I accept that you don't. No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described. You continued: Failing LNHelp while meeting LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive. One of the problems with that is that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about? Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial strategy. [endquote] That's what I mean by repetition of generalities such as your criteria, and such as "unfair to sincere truncators" and "burial strategy", etc. I asked you specifically about situations with MMT. I asked who is wro
Re: [EM] Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp
On 16 Dec 2011 13:29:30 -0800, David L. Wetzell wrote: > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: Kathy Dopp > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:11:11 -0500 > Subject: Re: [EM] Egg or Chicken. >> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 14:59:14 -0600 >> From: David L Wetzell >> >> if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation >> it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will >> prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. >> >> This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we >> can trust that with changes, there'll be more scope for >> experimentation and consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. This is precisely the kind of game theory that leads to the two party problem with FPTP: we need to coalesce behind the strongest contender in order to have some kind of voice, be it only a compromise. So no, I don't think it is a good reason. > KD: Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional > representation, it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV > which will sour the public on any notions of changing US electoral > systems for decades and greatly hinder any progress towards > proportional systems. > > dlw: That is what is in dispute. > > KD:We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been > tried and rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, > transparency eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. > Right now there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV > was tried decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. > > dlw: Unfair? Why because it emulates the workings of a caucus by > considering only one vote per voter at a time? Yes, precisely. The traditional Robert's Rules method of taking only a single vote at a time is at fault. It produces a suboptimal result by segmenting the problem too much. It is similar to the less optimal result you get from dividing space by partitioning in each dimension separately to get bricks, instead of hexagons in 2D or truncated octagons in 3D. > dlw: If a 2-stage approach is used then it's less complex and the > results can be tabulated at the precinct level. > > dlw: I'm sure the Cold War red scare stopped progress in NYC and > elsewhere a lot more than "IRV" > > KD: IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and > do not solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to > convince people not to implement any new electoral method and show > people how deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative > electoral methods can be. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing > them that IRV finds majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, > would save money, and on and on...) > > dlw: It's called marketing. FairVote wisely simplified the benefits > of IRV. IRV does find majority winners a lot more often than FPTP > and it reduces the spoiler problem considerably. It does save money > compared with a two round approach and its' "problems" are easy to > fix. That is debatable. I happen to think that the goal/object of IRV is different from what one wants to achieve in a single winner election. If you model your government on a natural system (and the US Founders based their arguments by appealing to "Natural Law"), then you do best when you create a diverse and representational set of options (hence PR for legislatures) and only then apply selective pressure using a centrist single winner method. IRV is not based on centrism. As the single-winner limit of STV, it is better (not "best") at finding a representative of the majority, not the best representative of the entire population. As for STV, one can keep patching to deal with its many problems, but at its core it also make a number of false choices: * why can't a voter say that they prefer several candidates equally? * why must choices be ranked? * why do candidates have to be eliminated? * why can't lower rankings be considered? Ted > dlw > > Kathy Dopp > http://electionmathematics.org > Town of Colonie, NY 12304 > "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the > discussion with true facts." > "Renewable energy is homeland security." > > Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections > http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 > > View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: > http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp
On 12/16/11 4:29 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: KD:Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation, it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems. dlw: That is what is in dispute. the point is, while STV might be the best and simplest method to gain a more proportional representation for multi-winner elections, it still is inferior to a simple Condorcet method (say, minmax margins or ranked-pairs) for single-winner elections. and, although i usually don't agree with her, she has a point with souring the public. here, in Burlington, the anti-IRV crowd (which Kathy has identified with, here in the local blogs) has the attitude that while they won this election by a small margin (about 300 outa 6K or 7K), it was a vindication of the commandment from God that thou shalt mark the ballot only once. and with an "X". it will take a generation to pass before we'll be able to revisit the question of election reform and then we'll only do it if the Progressive Party survives that period of time. if we devolve back to a 2-party system, i doubt there will be much political incentive to revisit the issue of ranked-choice voting (tabulated by a decent Condorcet-compliant method, i would hope that they wouldn't forget the lesson learned regarding IRV, and do forget the phony-balony arguments from the "Keep Voting Simple" crowd). KD:We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. Right now there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV was tried decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. dlw: Unfair? Why because it emulates the workings of a caucus by considering only one vote per voter at a time? dlw: If a 2-stage approach is used then it's less complex and the results can be tabulated at the precinct level. dlw: I'm sure the Cold War red scare stopped progress in NYC and elsewhere a lot more than "IRV" KD: IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not solve any of plurality's problems, this is where Kathy overstates the case. IRV *definitely* speaks to (but not in a consistent way) the common problem (in 3+ way races) of tactical voting where the voting tactic is called "compromising". it did not solve that problem in Burlington 2009 completely. it only solved it for the liberal majority of voters while effectively transferring that to the GOP Prog-haters. but she is wrong that it does nothing, in comparison to FPTP, to reduce the problem. so then the justification she needs to make is why support the method that increases the occurrence of this problem from IRV (where the burden of tactical voting is placed in the shoulders of a minority) to FPTP (where the burden of tactical voting is placed on a split majority). so it's a great way to convince people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods can be. that also polemically overstates the case. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and on and on...) need more than 2 uses to recoup non-recurring costs. (you recoup them by being a "decisive" method and not going to runoff.) and the argument that IRV yields a "false majority" winner is ineffective coming from the "Keep Voting Simple" crowd because they returned us to a clearly more false majority winner. that was confirmed one year later when we tried to require a 50%+ majority to elect. this side clearly wants a method that they can game to get their minority-supported candidate elected and we are now, dealing with that fact (the first mayoral election since IRV was repealed). we won't know for about a month, but the Progs might not nominate a candidate and *maybe* even will simply endorse the Democrat nominee. if that happens, it will be a straight two-candidate race (well, there *might* be a significant independent, so we might still have a problem) and no one will be able to dispute who is the majority candidate (unless it's very close). IRV also failed in 2009, but it's failure was in electing the 2nd-most preferred candidate, but without IRV, we could very well have gotten the 3rd-most preferred candidate. neither method sends the correct pair combination of candidates to the runoff. (one caveat, if IRV-BTR is used, it *would* send the correct candidate to the final runoff, who the other candidate going to the runoff is is sorta irrelevant.) so Kathy misses it, in preferring Dumber over Dumb. and it was an thick irony in 2010 (the IRV repeal vote) to have to choose between Dumb
Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 42
[quote]Well said. Yes, "deviously dishonest" is the right description for FairVote's tactics. Having someone like Rob Richie as the high-profile well-funded "representative" of electoral reform in this country is a big embarrassment for electoral reform. Mike Ossipoff[/quote] Rob Richie has great gifts in organizational leadership and the design and marketing of electoral reform. He's no slacker in electoral analytics but he doesn't give theory too much weight. It is unwise to attack him, when you all don't really have wherewithal organizationally and rhetorically to replace him. Like I wrote, when we get electoral reform, there'll be great scope for consideration of electoral alternatives, but right now it's best to be good soldiers united against FPTP and the Democracy In Name Only due to the nearly exclusive use of single-winner elections in the US. dlw On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 3:30 PM, < election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com > > You can reach the person managing the list at >election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Oops! Errors in GMAT definition. Correct definition. > (MIKE OSSIPOFF) > 2. You gave the right description of FairVote (MIKE OSSIPOFF) > 3. how primary forecasts work (David L Wetzell) > 4. Re: MMT: You're evading my questions. I didn't ask for > repetition about generalities. (MIKE OSSIPOFF) > 5. Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp (David L Wetzell) > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > To: > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 20:15:20 + > Subject: [EM] Oops! Errors in GMAT definition. Correct definition. > > > > Here is the correct definition of GMAT, the one that I meant to post > before: > > Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT): > > A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated > above bottom by each member of the same set of ballots--where, for each > ballot in that set, the set of candidates includes at least one of that > ballot's top-rated candidates. > > If there is at least one mutual approval set for which the number of > ballots > rating all of its members above bottom is greater than the number of > ballots > rating at top anyone outside that set, then the winner is the most > top-rated > candidate in the mutual approval set with the most ballots voting all its > members above bottom. > > Otherwise, the winner is the most top-rated candidate. > > [end of GMAT definition] > > Though the requirements for the winning set aren't much more complicated > than those in MMT, the wording becomes quite a bit longer and more > complicated. > > That's why, as I said, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal, > even though it doesn't meet Mono-Add-Plump. For reasons I discussed before, > I don't feel that MMT's Mono-Add-Plump will seem unfair, surprising or > wrong > to people. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > > > > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > To: > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 20:29:54 + > Subject: [EM] You gave the right description of FairVote > > Kathy Dop wrote: > > Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation, > it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the > public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and > greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems. We've > already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and > rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency > eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. Right now > there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV was tried > decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. > > IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not > solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince > people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how > deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods > can be. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds > majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and > on and on...) > > [endquote] > > Well said. Yes, "deviously dishonest" is the right description for > FairVote's tactics. Having someone like Rob Richie as the high-profile > well-funded "representative" of electoral reform in this country is > a big embarrassment for electoral reform. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > -- Forwarded message -- > Fr
[EM] Chicken or Egg re: Kathy Dopp
-- Forwarded message -- From: Kathy Dopp To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:11:11 -0500 Subject: Re: [EM] Egg or Chicken. > Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 14:59:14 -0600 > From: David L Wetzell > > if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll > give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great > labs for experimentation with electoral reform. > > This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust > that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and > consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. KD:Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation, it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems. dlw: That is what is in dispute. KD:We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. Right now there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV was tried decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. dlw: Unfair? Why because it emulates the workings of a caucus by considering only one vote per voter at a time? dlw: If a 2-stage approach is used then it's less complex and the results can be tabulated at the precinct level. dlw: I'm sure the Cold War red scare stopped progress in NYC and elsewhere a lot more than "IRV" KD: IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods can be. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and on and on...) dlw: It's called marketing. FairVote wisely simplified the benefits of IRV. IRV does find majority winners a lot more often than FPTP and it reduces the spoiler problem considerably. It does save money compared with a two round approach and its' "problems" are easy to fix. dlw Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." "Renewable energy is homeland security." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] MMT: You're evading my questions. I didn't ask for repetition about generalities.
Chris: You said: In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote: > MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from. > People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know, > so far, about its properties, ... That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why I think they are important. [endquote] I wasn't criticizing you there. I was merely asking Forest about MAMT. > You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: > > With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, > mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that > coalition > does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. > > How is that a "failure"?? You replied: I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing. [endquote] You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs of mine that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then that's ok. I accept that you don't. No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described. You continued: Failing LNHelp while meeting LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive. One of the problems with that is that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about? Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial strategy. [endquote] That's what I mean by repetition of generalities such as your criteria, and such as "unfair to sincere truncators" and "burial strategy", etc. I asked you specifically about situations with MMT. I asked who is wronged therein. I didn't ask for repetition about generalities. I've told why your criteria, and your terms such as those in the paragraph before last, don't describe problems with MMT results and situations. > You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: > > I don't know what that criterion is. It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S. From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example: 49: A 48: B 03: C>B I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you? Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario that motivates many to support electoral reform? [endquote] B pairwise beats A, and is CW. Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible with FBC. Various different FBC-complying methods, and especially FBC/ABE methods, will fail CC in various ways, some CC failures being bigger than others--a matter of degree. But they all fail CC. Maybe you're a strict Condorcetist, and I don't criticize you for that. We needn't all have the same goals, values and purposes. In your example, there's something favoring A and there's something favoting B. A is better in 1st choice ratings. B has more (1st place + 2nd place) support. It's a toss-up, unless your goal is to elect the pairwise winner and the CW. > You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: > > I've already commented on that a few times. Yes, and I obliquely responded to your comment. But to be blunt, if failure of Mono-add-Plump isn't self-evidently *completely ridiculous* (and so much so that anything not compatible with Mono-add-Plump compliance is thereby made a complete nonsense of), then I have no idea what is. [endquote] Not good enough. I asked you specifically what is wrong with situations and results that I described for MMT. Angry noises may serve to vent your anger, but they don't answer my question. Could it be that you're evading my questions about what is wrong, unfair or surprising about the MMT situations and results that I asked you about? You continued: This doesn't come anywhere near cutting it: > Your favorite initially won only because of mutual majority support. > The plumpers > declined that mutual support, as is their right. Having declined > mutual support, > should it be surprising or unfair if they no longer have it? Is it "surprising or unfair" that some new voters should in effect have their ballots given negative weight because they refused to play silly games with some candidates they weren't interested in and maybe knew nothing about? Err*yes*. [endquote] Err...You mean "silly games like mutual majority coalition support? :-) If they think that is silly, then they certainly have the right to decline it
[EM] how primary forecasts work
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/how-our-primary-forecasts-work/ this is interesting and raises the issue of how things wd change when an alternative election rule is used. I think the uncertainty would go up. dlw On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 2:02 PM, < election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >election-methods@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com > > You can reach the person managing the list at >election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT) (MIKE OSSIPOFF) > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > To: > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 19:58:39 + > Subject: [EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT) > > Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT): > > (like MMT except that it requires only greatest mutual approval > instead of majority mutual approval) > > A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated > above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters--where > that set includes, for each ballot, at least one of that ballot's > top-rated candidates. > > If there is a mutual approval set all of whose members are rated above > bottom by more voters than rate anyone else top, then the winner is the > most top-rated member of that set. > > Otherwise the winner is the most top-rated candidate. > > [end of GMAT definition] > > GMAT meets FBC, avoids the ABE problem, provides majority rule protection, > and meets Mono-Add-Plump. > > Methods that substitute something else for majority often seem to > add a little longer wording, or add a little wording complexity. > > Therefore, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal. But GMAT is > my 2nd choice for best public proposal. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > ___ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] You gave the right description of FairVote
Kathy Dop wrote: Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation, it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems. We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. Right now there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV was tried decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods can be. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and on and on...) [endquote] Well said. Yes, "deviously dishonest" is the right description for FairVote's tactics. Having someone like Rob Richie as the high-profile well-funded "representative" of electoral reform in this country is a big embarrassment for electoral reform. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Oops! Errors in GMAT definition. Correct definition.
Here is the correct definition of GMAT, the one that I meant to post before: Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT): A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated above bottom by each member of the same set of ballots--where, for each ballot in that set, the set of candidates includes at least one of that ballot's top-rated candidates. If there is at least one mutual approval set for which the number of ballots rating all of its members above bottom is greater than the number of ballots rating at top anyone outside that set, then the winner is the most top-rated candidate in the mutual approval set with the most ballots voting all its members above bottom. Otherwise, the winner is the most top-rated candidate. [end of GMAT definition] Though the requirements for the winning set aren't much more complicated than those in MMT, the wording becomes quite a bit longer and more complicated. That's why, as I said, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal, even though it doesn't meet Mono-Add-Plump. For reasons I discussed before, I don't feel that MMT's Mono-Add-Plump will seem unfair, surprising or wrong to people. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT)
Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT): (like MMT except that it requires only greatest mutual approval instead of majority mutual approval) A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters--where that set includes, for each ballot, at least one of that ballot's top-rated candidates. If there is a mutual approval set all of whose members are rated above bottom by more voters than rate anyone else top, then the winner is the most top-rated member of that set. Otherwise the winner is the most top-rated candidate. [end of GMAT definition] GMAT meets FBC, avoids the ABE problem, provides majority rule protection, and meets Mono-Add-Plump. Methods that substitute something else for majority often seem to add a little longer wording, or add a little wording complexity. Therefore, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal. But GMAT is my 2nd choice for best public proposal. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Egg or Chicken.
> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 14:59:14 -0600 > From: David L Wetzell > > if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll > give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great > labs for experimentation with electoral reform. > > This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust > that with changes, there'll be more scope for experimentation and > consideration of multiple alternatives to FPTP. Actually, if we support the adoption of proportional representation, it is a good reason to strongly oppose IRV and STV which will sour the public on any notions of changing US electoral systems for decades and greatly hinder any progress towards proportional systems. We've already seen this occur in jurisdictions where IRV has been tried and rejected when it was noticed how overly complex, transparency eviscerating, and fundamentally unfair IRV methods are. Right now there is a push to get rid of it in San Franscisco. IRV was tried decades ago in NYC and stopped progress there for decades. IRV/STV methods introduce problems plurality does not have and do not solve any of plurality's problems, so it's a great way to convince people not to implement any new electoral method and show people how deviously dishonest the proponents of alternative electoral methods can be. (Fair Vote lied to people by convincing them that IRV finds majority winners and solves the spoiler problem, would save money, and on and on...) Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." "Renewable energy is homeland security." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion "failures" you mentioned for MMT
Mike, In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote: MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from. People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know, so far, about its properties, ... That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why I think they are important. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest. How is that a "failure"?? I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing. Failing LNHelp while meeting LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive. One of the problems with that is that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about? Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial strategy. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S. From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example: 49: A 48: B 03: C>B I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you? Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario that motivates many to support electoral reform? You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. Yes, and I obliquely responded to your comment. But to be blunt, if failure of Mono-add-Plump isn't self-evidently *completely ridiculous* (and so much so that anything not compatible with Mono-add-Plump compliance is thereby made a complete nonsense of), then I have no idea what is. The only way this view of mine could be dented (and I made a bit wiser and sadder) is if it was proved to me that compliance with Mono-add-Plump isn't compatible with some other clearly desirable (IMO) property or set of properties. This doesn't come anywhere near cutting it: Your favorite initially won only because of mutual majority support. The plumpers declined that mutual support, as is their right. Having declined mutual support, should it be surprising or unfair if they no longer have it? Is it "surprising or unfair" that some new voters should in effect have their ballots given negative weight because they refused to play silly games with some candidates they weren't interested in and maybe knew nothing about? Err*yes*. As Jameson said, the chicken dilemma, also called the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of. However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it, while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection: You (Chris) proposed one some time ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem? Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and obviously motivated way, for public propsal? I've been distracted and thinking about other things. I'll get around to addressing those questions, along with my closer look at Forest's MMMPO method. Chris Benham Mike Ossipoff wrote (15 Dec 2011): Chris: You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump: I've already commented on that a few times. You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion: But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC. You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd: I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical importance. You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense: Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM. Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions. Rather than being an accidental "failure", that is the point of MMT. To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition. You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help: With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen, mutually-supported, majority coalition.
