Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to
respond.
On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho and Kristofer:
Just a few preliminary words before I continue my reply to
Kristofer that I
interrupted a few hours ago:
We all agree that Approval would be much easier to propose and
enact than
would Condorcet. Therefore, we must also agree that, given the
same level of
effort, the expected time needed to enact Approval is quite a bit
less than
the expected time needed to enact Condorcet.
Now, given that, there are two reasons why you could say that we
should try
for Condorcet instead of Approval:
I'm still not quite certain what elections this proposal refers to.
If it refers to use of different single-winner methods in single-
winner districts of a multi-winner election to elect members to
some representative body, then I'm not ready to recommend elther of
those changes before I understand what the goals are.
On another subject:
But if you want to suggest that others shouldn't propose Approval,
then you
need to give a good reason.
Approval may be an easy and acceptaböe first step. My opinion is
that you should plan also next steps, in case someone wants to
cancel the reform, drive it further, or if the strategic
vulnerabilities of Approval pop up in some election (like the
Condorcet criterion problem popped up in Burlington, althogh that
was maybe not even noticed by all).
I know of no useful reason for rejecting Approval's replacement of
Plurality - it's permission to approve of more than one as equally
desired while rejecting less than Plurality and the increasing in
complexity is trivial.
But stepping from Plurality or Approval to Condorcet is also doable
and worthy.
This is a bigger change because it allows voting for unequally desired
candidates with unequal ranks, thus directing those preferred to be
given preference in winning. This preference allows voters to include
less-liked candidates while directing counters to consider better-
liked candidates as preferred.
Note: Burlington, as displaying IRV's weakness, is not truly
Condorcet, for it has restrictions on ranking and its counters must
make decisions without considering all the content of the votes.
DWK
Juho
Now, to resume my Kristofer reply:
Mike Ossipoff
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