[EM] IC-Smith-T, IC-Schwartz-T, Double-Ended IC-Smith-T, Double-Ended IC-Schwartz-T

2012-07-29 Thread Michael Ossipoff
I mentioned Double-Ended ICT as an enhancement of ICT. Here's another
possibility:

If no one is unbeaten, then you could do the top-count for winner only
among the Smith set or the Schwartz set.

Someone asked me which criteria ICT meets, other than the properties
for which I value it. For one thing, that isn't important. I offer and
propose ICT because of FBC and defection-resistance. That's what makes
it valuable for polling, and that's what would make it uniquely good
for official public elections to choose office-holders or decide
multi-alternative issues.

(But of course I don't claim that it's my proposal. It's due to Kevin
Venzke and Chris Benham)

But would it be correct to say that ICT meets LNHa, and that
Double-Ended ICT meets LNHa and LNHe?

...And that the Smith and Schwartz versions of those methods meet
Condorcet-Loser and the Smith Criterion?

I don't think that ordinary ICT's violations of Smith or Condorcet
loser are important. A Condorcet loser who is the favorite of the most
people, or who is acceptable to the most people, is a very popular
Condorcet loser.

I wouldn't add the Smith or Schwartz complications to ICT, especially
for a first rank-method proposal.

But I like the way Double-Ended ICT simplifies the u/a strategy, and
makes it easier to ensure that you're doing all you can to keep the
winner from coming from some set of candidates that you don't like,
such as the unacceptables.

Double-Ended ICT, if it doesn't have an important problem or fault
that ordinary ICT doesn't have, would be my favorite rank-count
proposal then.

In a u/a election, with ICT, you should top-rank all of the
acceptables. With un-improved Condorcet, you typically won't know what
to do, because, if you top-rank all of the acceptables, one might beat
another, and thereby take away hir CW status, giving the election to
an unacceptable.

With ordinary ICT, you should probably rank the unacceptables in
reverse order of winnability. In Double-Ended ICT, you needn't do
that. Double-Ended ICT's u/a strategy is as simple as that of
Approval, it seems to me, and is the same as that of Approval.

As I said before, Double-Ended ICT, and the Smith and Schwartz
versions are tentative. I don't guarantee that they don't have some
disadvantage, drawback, problem or fault that I don't know of.

Mike Ossipoff

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] ICT doesn't meaningfully fail CC. CC isn't meaningfully incompatible with FBC.

2012-07-29 Thread Jameson Quinn
Can you give a specific example where ICT fails the conventional CC, and
your argument why that isn't meaningful? The words below don't add up to
anything for me, so I think I need a concrete example.

Jameson

2012/7/29 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com

 Suppose you rank X and Y both in 1st place.

 You do so because you prefer that X or Y wins.

 If (in un-improved Condorcet) X beats Y, thereby giving the win to
 someone you like much less than X and Y, you won't like that.

 You'd prefer that that not happen.

 In ICT, your equal top-ranking of X and Y counts as your use of your
 voting power toward keeping X and Y from beating eachother.

 ICT counts equal top-rankings more in keeping with your wishes.

 When the verb beat is defined consistent with your wishes when you
 equal-top rank X and Y, and when your equal top ranking is interpreted
 as you'd like it to be, then ICT doesn't violate Condorcet's
 Criterion, and Condorcet's Criterion is not incompatible with FBC.

 For the same reason, IC-Smith-T, IC-Schwartz-T, Double-Ended
 IC-Smith-T, and Double-Ended IC-Schwartz-T meet the Smith Criterion
 and Condorcet-Loser.

 Mike Ossipoff
 
 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


[EM] Implementing a democratic electoral process (once it is conceived)

2012-07-29 Thread Michael Allan
If it is not too early, then I have some questions about the practical
problem of actually implementing a reformed electoral process.

Fred Gohlke said on July 27:
 re [Juho]: If the second phase is a traditional election,
   traditional financing practices may apply.
 
 That is one of several reasons for having the [official] election on
 the day after the [selected] candidates are announced - it will
 limit the deception and obfuscations of campaigning.

I guess we can safely assume that reforms (whatever they are) will not
begin with the official electoral process.  It is too difficult to
change and too easy to circumvent.  What matters is the selection of
candidates, namely the primary electoral process.  Right?  *

Assume that primary reform is at least possible.  Consider a point in
the future at which there are five main primary processes in operation
at varying levels of turnout, with at least two being reformed
processes (your choice which).

Process  Turnout
---  ---
   P   20 %
   Q   15(at least two are
   R5reformed processes)
   S2
   T1

Is this expectation more-or-less reasonable?  Anyone?

When you speak (Fred) of controlling the time at which candidates are
announced, do you mean only for the process that you and Juho are
mooting, say one of P-T?  Or all processes P-T?  Your purpose would
seem to require control of all the major primaries.


 * Primary electoral reforms accompanied the historical rise of the
   modern party system.  Selection of candidates used to be in local
   hands, but it was centralized it in the latter 1800s.  The most
   important reform for this purpose was the secret ballot.  It was
   promoted for laudible reasons (ending corruption) and less laudable
   (disenfranchising the negro), but the real motivation behind it was
   the concentration of power in political parties, which were then
   gearing up for a newly enfranchised mass electorate.  The secret
   ballot helped them because it eliminated the local hustings in
   which candidates were openly nominated and affirmed (in Britain),
   and eroded the power of the local political machines such as
   Tammany Hall (US).  Political power turns out to be based on
   control of primary elections and little else.  So it happened that
   the parties (as we know them) rose to power.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Fred Gohlke said:
 Good Afternoon, Juho
 
 re: Ok, two phases then. One to elect the party candidates (by
   voters, by party members, or by nominees?) and then the
   final election.
 
 Although we've approached this idea from a party perspective, there's no 
 reason we can't have nominees who don't identify with any of the 
 existing parties.  They will form a separate group.  In terms of phases, 
 we may have:
 
 1) Nominations.
 
 2) A filtering period of some length so the nominees can decide
 which of their number are the best able to proclaim the
 group's position and the best able to engage the other groups
 during the candidate selection phase.  In short, those the
 nominees think the best advocates for their groups.
 
 3) An open competition between the advocates of the various
 groups spanning several weeks during which the nominees for
 the groups advance their perspective and respond to challenges
 from the public, the media, and the other groups, while
 contending with each other for selection as candidates for
 specific public offices.
 
 4) The public election.
 
 
 re: The proportions may be manageable if there are e.g.
   1,000,000 voters, 10 parties, 1000 nominees per party, that
   elect 10 candidates per party. I wonder if you want some
   proportionality (e.g. betwee two wings of a party) or not.
   That would influence also the first phase.
 
 The number of parties and the number of nominees will depend on the 
 public sentiment at the time of the election and the rules (if any) set 
 by those who implement the process.  Proportionality will occur 
 naturally, depending on each party's ability to attract supporters, 
 nominees, and, ultimately, candidates.
 
 The decision to form 'wings' rather than separate parties depends on the 
 dynamics perceived by those who share the separate view. If they feel 
 they can be more effective trying to influence the party, they'll form a 
 wing; if they think they'll be more effective trying to influence the 
 public, they'll form a party.
 
 
 re: If the second phase is a traditional election, traditional
   financing practices may apply.
 
 That is one of several reasons for having the election on the day after 
 the candidates are announced - it will limit the deception and 
 obfuscations of campaigning.
 
 The concept we are discussing assumes a public election in which the 
 people vote for their choices among the candidates.  The competition 
 between the