[EM] “¡One can introduce advanced voting systems to ponies, but one cannot make the ponies implement the advanced voting systems!”

2012-12-03 Thread ⸘Ŭalabio‽
¡Hello!

¿How fare you?

“¡One can introduce advanced voting systems to ponies, but one cannot 
make the ponies implement the advanced voting systems!”

That is play off of the saying:

“¡One can take an horse to water, but one cannot make the horse drink!”

Some people take a vote to determine which is the best mare:

Pegasi:

*   FlutterShy
*   Rainbow Dash

EarthMares:

*   Pinkamena Diane Pie
*   AppleJack

Unicorns:

*   Rarity
*   Twilight Sparkle

They already tried plurality, but it did not work.  Now the try 
truncated Borda-Count with #1 getting 2 points and #2 getting 1 point.  I had 
to tell them that it was truncated Borda-Count.

I explained regular Borda-Count, Score-Voting, Approval Voting, 
Oklahoman Electoral Primary-System, Quaker-Poll, Cumulative Voting, IRV, 
Plurality, et cetera.  Now that I think about it, although I mentioned 
Condorcet, I have not yet explained it.  Maybe, I should explain Condorcet.  
Well anyway, after all of this, they stick with truncated Borda-Count.

The conversation starts in the discussion of this comic:

*   http://friendshipisdragons.thecomicseries.com/comics/212

Scroll down through the comments until you find my name “Walabio” and 
then scroll up until you find the beginning of the thread.  The voting 
continues until Monday, so you can see how things progress in the discussion 
for later comics.

Normally, I would not bother posting here  every time I try to teach 
about advanced voting systems to people on the InterNet, but the above pun 
about drinking horses just makes it to funny not to share.

¡Peace!

-- 

“⸘Ŭalabio‽” wala...@macosx.com

Skype:
Walabio

An IntactWiki:
http://circleaks.org/

“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your 
own facts.”
——
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

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[EM] Gerrymandering

2012-12-03 Thread Jonathan Denn
Fair Redistricting or Ending Gerrymandering is always a great grievance among 
electoral reformers. But the solution is much more elusive. Do you folks ever 
venture into that area?

Jon Denn

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Re: [EM] Gerrymandering

2012-12-03 Thread robert bristow-johnson

On 12/3/12 8:00 AM, Jonathan Denn wrote:

Fair Redistricting or Ending Gerrymandering is always a great grievance among electoral 
reformers. But the solution is much more elusive. Do you folks ever venture into that 
area?



can't say that i've done anything about it, but i have studied a little 
bit about the math that defines Apportionment where the 435 
Representatives in the House are apportioned among the 50 U.S. states.  
the current method is this Huntington-Hill method and i am still 
somewhat dubious of it.


about redistricting, how the lines get drawn, i wish that there would be 
an algorithm that would do it without the input from the state 
legislatures, because we *know* they do that with political 
self-interest in mind.  here is a consequence: in the November 2012 
election, not only did the Democrats win the presidency, keep control of 
the Senate and gain seats both in the Senate and in the House, it turns 
out that even though the House retained GOP control that *more* voters 
in the U.S. that voted in the House races voted for Democrat candidates 
than voted for GOP candidates.  i say this everytime a GOP apologist 
claims that they have a mandate (to obstruct Obama) in the House.  how 
is it that more voters voted Democrat yet there are more GOP 
representatives elected?  i presume because of gerrymandering.  it must 
be the case that in most of the races where the GOP candidate wins, that 
they won with a smaller margin than in the races where the Dem candidate 
won.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

Imagination is more important than knowledge.




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Re: [EM] Gerrymandering

2012-12-03 Thread Richard Fobes

On 12/3/2012 5:00 AM, Jonathan Denn wrote:

Fair Redistricting or Ending Gerrymandering is always a great
grievance among electoral reformers. But the solution is

 much more elusive. Do you folks ever venture into that area?

Yes.  VoteFair ranking includes VoteFair representation ranking and 
VoteFair partial-proportional ranking which, together, eliminate the 
need to care about where district boundaries are drawn (as long as they 
contain the same number of eligible voters).


Here is a web page that gives an overview and contains links to the details:

http://www.votefair.org/calculation_details.html

To clarify, some other election-method experts (here and elsewhere) 
advocate trying to make the district-boundary-drawing process as fair 
as possible, such as by using mathematics or an impartial jury.  In 
contrast, I advocate using a method that produces roughly equivalent 
results regardless of where the boundaries are drawn.


The European PR (proportional representation) systems also use this 
gerrymandering-resistant approach.  However, PR uses single-mark 
ballots.  The result is that PR looks good based on measuring the party 
balance in parliament, yet PR elects the wrong candidates from the major 
parties.


Richard Fobes


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Re: [EM] Gerrymandering

2012-12-03 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 12/03/2012 02:00 PM, Jonathan Denn wrote:

Fair Redistricting or Ending Gerrymandering is always a great
grievance among electoral reformers. But the solution is much
more elusive. Do you folks ever venture into that area?


I'd prefer dissolving that particular problem to solving it. Use a 
multiwinner method like STV and the incentive to do gerrymandering 
pretty much disappears. The subsequent proliferation of parties makes it 
much harder to get a majority to support the gerrymander in the first 
place, too. Or give the task to a nonpartisan group or organization, 
such as the independent commissions in Canada or Australia.


It is *possible* to add restrictions, such as compactness minima, that 
make it harder to do gerrymandering, but that also limits the ability to 
make districts follow communities of interest. These restrictions make 
the process more blind, but not just blind to malicious tweaking. Again, 
I think it is better to remove the incentive, because that's what 
ultimately causes the gerrymandering.


(Norway uses party list PR and each highest-level administrative region 
is a district for the purposes of party list PR. These regions have 
different populations and so elect different numbers of MPs. Even if the 
incentive was there, gerrymandering would be practically impossible -- 
it would be like trying to gerrymander state boundaries to bias the Senate.)



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Re: [EM] An artist's view on voting methods

2012-12-03 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 12/03/2012 05:35 AM, Michael Allan wrote:

Jonathan Denn said:

Someone is editing Kurt Vonnegut letters for publication. This was
online today... I'm struck with editor meaning voter and
stories as candidates
...I invite you to read the fifteen tales ...


I believe whole civilizations have been voted into existence by this
method, more or less.  The candidate stories for the collection are
myths of a cherished past (as in The Iliad), or utopias of a hopeful
future (New Testament) or both (Mahabharata).  The narrow method is
one of cultural selection; but the larger process, which Vonnegut
seems also to ask of his students, might more pointedly be called
cultural *e*lection.

Could such an election happen in modern times, do you think?


One should be careful with election by story, though. The worst kind of 
modern-day dictatorial regimes have often been backed by stories or 
myths to lend the regime legitimacy. For instance, left-wing 
authoritarian rulers have claimed power to have been given to them by 
the workers or the people, and that the centralization of power through 
authoritarian measures is needed in order to protect the system from 
vast external enemies that would otherwise destroy it, and so that the 
rulers can direct the nation towards a glorious future. Similar 
mythology exists on the right: see, for instance, Gentile's description
of the structure of Italian Fascism: 
http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s12/s12-gentile.pdf . Among 
other things, he notes that totalitarianism provides a single narrative, 
then seeks to politicize all of life so as to pull it into that narrative.



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Re: [EM] Possibly more stable consensus government

2012-12-03 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm

On 11/29/2012 09:02 PM, Raph Frank wrote:

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 9:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm

However, if you need supermajority support for decisions, then you have to
have something to put in place when the supermajority support isn't there.


One option is to select 2 PMs.  That is what they do in Northern Ireland.

The cabinet is decided by the d'Hondt method (so proportional) and
there is 1 PM (actually first minister) from each community.

  So, the vote would work something like

  - vote for PM (including cabinet) combination
  -- if a candidate gets 60%, he is appointed PM, finish

  - Round 2
  -- Anyone with more than 1/3 of the vote gets nominated as joint PM
  -- Keep voting until 2 get 1/3 or more
  -- If that fails, then if 1 gets 1/3, he can take office, as half a PM
  (maybe have previous PM as other one)
  -- Each PM appoints half of the office
  --- The PM who got the most votes has to option to go first or second
  --- Each picks a department alternatively
  -- Department of finance might be different

You could have more departments than cabinet positions.  Each PM gets
to appoint half the seats to anyone he likes, and then can assign any
departments he picked any way he likes.

The more departments, the more even the balance of power between the 2 PMs.

You could also split them based on the relative support of the 2 PMs,
but that would mean constant adjustment as support goes up an down.

Each PM would require 1/3 support to stay in office (voting for both
would count as 1/2 a vote each)

It might also be required that both submit  their cabinet member
choices and if either can't get 1/3 support, they are considered to
have lost confidence.


I see. That's a third option, then: you distill, to use such a term, the 
lines of disagreement or representation blocs into the executive, so 
that the executive has to find consensus rather than having to wait on 
the legislature to do so.


That might work in combination with the idea of Simmons. You could have 
a vote where you ask the members of the assembly for their favorite as 
well as their consensus choice. If the consensus candidate gets more 
than the threshold (say 60%), he gets the task of appointing the other 
ministers, otherwise some PR method is used to elect a small number 
(perhaps only two) joint PMs.


That sounds better than having a PM chosen by random ballot when the 
consensus choice fails; but the PR method would have to be probabilistic 
to be strategy-proof, I think.



So a supermajority requirement upon forming the government and a minority
for a vote of no confidence would be a recipe for instability (and probably
rule by the bureaucracy).


I was thinking 50% to form after an election and 60% to vote no confidence.


Yes. I'm just saying that 60% to form and =50% for no confidence would 
definitely not work.



Another option is that if no government is formed by 60%, the old one
stays in power and a new election is automatically triggered within 30
days.

After that election, if nobody has 60%, then 50% is sufficient, but
maybe if that happens the term is reduced by 50%.

No matter how the government is picked, 60% would be required to
replace it with a different one.


That would provide an incentive for the slight majority to hold out for 
an election, so that they can reaffirm their slight majority and then 
get through on a 50%. I do see the point, though, because a very slight 
majority couldn't be sure they would stay a majority after the election.



1/3: new election
2/3: Each legislator nominates a candidate and then a random
legislator is picked and his choice wins[*]

  [*] could use something like IRV to eliminate very small options (say  20%)


Perhaps something like multistage Hay voting ( 
http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html ) could be used to 
remove clones while keeping the method strategy-proof, also.


The mathematics is a little too tough for me, so I don't know if one 
could remove very small options in multistage Hay without upsetting the 
resistance to strategy.



The problem with requiring 60% to take down the government, means you
have to swing 20% of the house to cause a collapse.  That is a shift
of power to the executive.


And secondarily, to the faction that managed to get their government 
through, yes. In more general terms: a 60% barrier to no-confidence 
favors the status quo because the status quo can survive on less (40%) 
than any of the alternatives.



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Re: [EM] An artist's view on voting methods

2012-12-03 Thread Michael Allan
Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
 One should be careful with election by story, though. The worst kind
 of modern-day dictatorial regimes have often been backed by stories
 or myths to lend the regime legitimacy. ...

Yes, I agree.  The events of the 20th century effectively innoculated
a generation against this particular disease, but younger generations
aren't necessarily immune.  Under the right circumstances, propaganda
can masquerade as a legitimate world view.  It can fool people into
making terrible mistakes.

 ... For instance, left-wing authoritarian rulers have claimed power
 to have been given to them by the workers or the people, and that
 the centralization of power through authoritarian measures is needed
 in order to protect the system from vast external enemies that would
 otherwise destroy it, and so that the rulers can direct the nation
 towards a glorious future. Similar mythology exists on the right:
 see, for instance, Gentile's description of the structure of Italian
 Fascism: http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s12/s12-gentile.pdf
 Among other things, he notes that totalitarianism provides a
 single narrative, then seeks to politicize all of life so as to
 pull it into that narrative.

This trick depends on an un-elected narrative, of course.  There are
moments in history when people make the wrong choices and are trapped
by them, and come to regret them.  Examples are post-Periclean Athens
and Weimar Germany.  But the basis of legitimacy for these mistakes is
narrow (often a single vote) compared to the lengthy and elaborate
election of a narrative world view.  Examples again are compilations
such as The Iliad, The Mahabharata, Ramayana, Old and New Testaments.
These are traditionally the work of centuries, and they stand for a
long time, if not forever.

Could such a cultural election happen in modern times, do you think?
Or what might prevent it?

Mike


Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
 On 12/03/2012 05:35 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
  Jonathan Denn said:
  Someone is editing Kurt Vonnegut letters for publication. This was
  online today... I'm struck with editor meaning voter and
  stories as candidates
  ...I invite you to read the fifteen tales ...
 
  I believe whole civilizations have been voted into existence by this
  method, more or less.  The candidate stories for the collection are
  myths of a cherished past (as in The Iliad), or utopias of a hopeful
  future (New Testament) or both (Mahabharata).  The narrow method is
  one of cultural selection; but the larger process, which Vonnegut
  seems also to ask of his students, might more pointedly be called
  cultural *e*lection.
 
  Could such an election happen in modern times, do you think?
 
 One should be careful with election by story, though. The worst kind of 
 modern-day dictatorial regimes have often been backed by stories or 
 myths to lend the regime legitimacy. For instance, left-wing 
 authoritarian rulers have claimed power to have been given to them by 
 the workers or the people, and that the centralization of power through 
 authoritarian measures is needed in order to protect the system from 
 vast external enemies that would otherwise destroy it, and so that the 
 rulers can direct the nation towards a glorious future. Similar 
 mythology exists on the right: see, for instance, Gentile's description
 of the structure of Italian Fascism: 
 http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s12/s12-gentile.pdf . Among 
 other things, he notes that totalitarianism provides a single narrative, 
 then seeks to politicize all of life so as to pull it into that narrative.

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