[EM] Current SODA not monotonic; fixable. (mono-voter-raise)
Consider the following scenario in SODA: 1: A(CBD) 2: B,X 2: C(BAD) 1: D(ACB) 1: null Presume all ties are predictably broken for the alphabetically-first candidate (without this presumption, you'd need larger numbers, but you could still make a similar scenario). Under SODA with rational delegation assignment, C has a choice. If C does not approve B, they are giving A and D a choice between approving A and C so C wins, or only A so A wins; since both A and D will choose the latter, this is tantamount to electing A. If C does approve B, then B will win regardless of what A and D do. C prefers B, so B wins. But if the last null voter adds an undelegated approval for B, then if C approves nobody and D and A approve only A, the result shifts from A to B. Since C knows that A and D will prefer to give the win to C, now C can safely not approve B, and win. So an extra approval for B caused B to lose. Now, even with this flaw, SODA is still a very good system. I've built dozens of voting scenarios in my time, and I can't remember ever building one that took me this much work to get it working the way I wanted. (Note that among its many carefully-balanced aspects, it includes a Condorcet cycle CBAC.) I honestly believe this scenario would never arise. For practical purposes, SODA is indeed monotonic. Still, the lack of bulletproof monotonicity puts a serious damper on SODA's criteria compliances. If I had mono-voter-raise, I could prove the rest of monotonicity, then FBC, a doubly-strong delegated equilibrium for a majority Condorcet winner (which makes it usually rational to delegate), and voted Condorcet, and mutual majority, and probably some others. Without mono-voter-raise, all those proofs fall apart. So I'm considering fixing SODA. The fix that's necessary is to allow candidates to commit to forego some of their votes in the final count. In other words, B here could simply say we won't count that extra approval. With this fix, I can prove monotonicity; and, as I said, the situation would arise once in a purple moon. So, what do people think? Should I change the default definition of SODA to make it have better compliances? Or should I keep it the way it is because the change would never matter in practical terms and would only make the system sound more complex? Sincerely, Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Current SODA not monotonic; fixable. (mono-voter-raise)
On 4/19/2013 11:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: ... So, what do people think? Should I change the default definition of SODA to make it have better compliances? Or should I keep it the way it is because the change would never matter in practical terms and would only make the system sound more complex? Join the club. Each of us favors a method that fails some criterion or another. I think the best fix is to identify how often each failed criterion occurs. Probably as a percentage, or a percentage range. Of course that's difficult to do. Yet it will be more meaningful than just having a yes-or-no checkbox for each criterion. Keep in mind that if you create a variation of SODA, that amounts to creating a new method, which probably requires a new name (or a qualification added to the SODA name). Of course this reply doesn't directly answer your question. The best solutions are not necessarily easy, but usually they are simple. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Instead of Top 2
Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin, etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess them up. But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the same, then the common winner is elected. This idea seems to avoid the problems associated with top2 methods. What would you suggest for methods A and B? I would suggest MJ type grade ballots. Then some good possibilities for Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc. My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA winner and the candidate with the fewest F's. Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish
Maybe this should be published. If the party system isn't about to fall apart - if the argument can be refuted or undermined - then we want to know that in advance. An academic paper plus a Web teaser would probably force the issue one way or another; either prove us wrong on paper, or give us the resources to run the experiment. Alexander Praetorius said: An elector who participates in the open primaries will probably want to vote for an open party. The elector need not participate in the primaries, of course, but open primaries are more meaningful and interesting (c and d) than closed primaries. Yes, but WHY should anyone become an elector who participates in the open primaries in the first place? By elector, I mean someone who is eligible to vote on election day. So most citizens of age are already electors. But it no longer matters what party the elector votes for (open or not). The election results are more-or-less the same regardless (c). (e) The mass media will inform people of this strange news. People will want to know what it means. Journalists will explain: The parties are dying. No, i dont think so. They only started to cover pirates, when they had a lot of voters voting for them. Currently they dont cover pirate stuff at all. The media covers those things which have impact to some degree and impact means, a lot of people are affected by something. So if you have open primaries and two open paper parties, that means, its still a lifeless construct. Media will not cover it. ... You missed point (c), Alex. The open candidate list is largely elected to the Bundestag even if nobody votes for an open party on election day. The votes could all go to the Union, SPD, etc. as usual, and *still* the open list would be largely elected. In that sense, the open parties always win. They are unbeatable. That's food for thought if it's true, and it's also newsworthy. I think the motivation is (d). Nowhere else can I (a German citizen) discuss and vote on the membership of the Bundestag, the candidacy of the Chancellor, and the thousands of official appointments (direct and indirect) of the Chancellor's office. yes you can. join the pirates and you can discuss and vote on the membership. ... Not for the government as whole, you can't. The Pirate Party's candidate list is not the assured membership of the entire Bundestag; nor is the Pirate's leader the assured Chancellor; nor are any of the other primary nominees of the party assured of appointment in the government. These assurances can be provided only by open electoral primaries, and the Pirate Party is not hosting any (d). So the way to move forward is to bring two toolsets together to eliminate the primary network effect (i.e. host an open primary). That's the fastest way I can see. yes, but which two toolsets? I feel the community aspect should be added. In addition to what you've said, there should be communities chosen for strategic reasons. ...to make it even faster. (That will not prevent any other communities from using any one of the two first toolsets, but at least it will make sure, that the communities targeted in the first place are huge, so the features are catered to their needs) Yes, maybe a community can help in bringing two toolsets together. This has been my hope for AG MFT and other Pirates. It's worth a try. But the Pirate Party has not adopted an open primary (d). ... They have. An open primary cannot be anonymous. People have to authenticate themselves in some way. Pirates do not deny people to join in :-) You can participate in crafting the party program, even if you are not member of the pirates. ... If the primary votes of outsiders were counted equal to the member's votes *and* could be cast on facilities beyond the control of the Pirate Party (or any other organization), then that would be an open *program* primary. It would enable the German citizens to craft consensus programs for the government as a whole. Further, if it were backed by open *electoral* primaries, then the consensus programs would be assured of implementation. But none of this is the case. The Pirate Party does not (at least not yet) enable any of this. ... The same is true of the CDU/CSU Union and the SPD. So the Pirate Party is not applying any pressure to these other parties in favour of open primaries. (Conceivably it might by first destroying itself, but I think that's too much to expect of any party organization.) The CDU/CSU and will never use digital tools in order to enable all of their members to participate. ... It wouldn't help them to do so. As noted previously (quoted below), Union members will feel compelled to join in the open electoral primaries *regardless* of what the Union does. Open primaries are necessarily beyond Union control. So it no longer matters what kind of tooling a party organization supports (or does not
Re: [EM] Instead of Top 2
Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice between the two method winners. We would learn something about the popularity of the two methods, which one chose the final winner the most often, which one elicited the most order reversals, etc. The same experiment could be done with any two methods. On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:56 PM, Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin, etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess them up. But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the same, then the common winner is elected. This idea seems to avoid the problems associated with top2 methods. What would you suggest for methods A and B? I would suggest MJ type grade ballots. Then some good possibilities for Method A or B would be MJ itself, XA (chiastic approval), Approval with various possibilities for approval cutoff level, etc. My personal favorite version is to elect the pairwise preferred of the XA winner and the candidate with the fewest F's. Forest Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
