Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racial minorities
Jobst Heitzig said: It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions! I disagree.? The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly' coalition re-organisation. If all the legislators are elected via a single seat system, then in effect, the 2 coalitions must be decided prior to the election.? In fact, in the US, the Republican and Democrat 'coalitions' last on a multi-decade scale. A block of 15% of the legislature would be a minority.? However, if something oppressive was attempted against them, they could switch sides.? However, if all the legislators were elected via a single seat method, then the supporters of those 15% would have to wait until the subsequent election and it might be to late by then. Even if they aren't part of the majority coalition at the time, they could offer to replace one of the current members at a lower 'price'. Also, if the legislature doesn't also decide the government, then there might not even be a fixed majority coalition. PS Anyone know a better free mail system that doesn't cause lots of ??? when I post to this group? Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] [Election-Methods] Clarke taxes and group strategies
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Now, I have the impression that a slight modification of the tax formula may
reduce this incentive considerably. Consider this tax:
?? sum { R(W,k) - R(W(i),k)
?? + sum { ( R(W(i),k) - R(W(i,j),k) ) / 2
?? : j different from i and k }
?? : k different from i }
where W(i,j) is the winner after removal of both i and j. If I'm right, this
formula makes it ineffective to misrepresent ratings for both individual
voters and pairs of voters.
Please check this!
This is a 2-d sum, so people could pay way more than they thought.
The outer loop just calculates the Clarke tax and the inner loop is
an adder.
Anyway, in simple terms, the system is (I think)
- count up the totals excluding your ballot
- If the result is different from the actual result
? pay to change it to the actual winner
? (i.e. the amount the actual winner lost by)
Your system adds
- If the result is further changed by removal of another ballot
?in addition to yours, pay half the cost to switch it to
?the winner that would result with just the removal of your ballot
The 2nd cost gets added for every other potential pair that your ballot
can match with.? In a large election the tax could be massive.
For example, if lots of people cast
A) 10
B) 0
and A defeated B by 15,
then the payment would be huge.
The removal of any one voter's ballot would have no effect, A would still
win by 5.? However, the removal of any 2 would cause B to win.
If there were 1000 voters of that type, then each of them would have to pay
999 times 2.5 in the tax (A loses by 5 999 times and they pay half each
time).
My preference for a solution here is to limit the size that people may bid.
For example, the highest 10% of ratings are assumed to be equal to
the lowest of them.
I.e. where (Rmax-Rmin) on a ballot is greater than the 90th percentile,
rescale the ballot by
(90th percentile)/(Rmax-Rmin)
This means that bidding a really large number will just be ignored and your
ballot rescaled.
This does break the optimal utility effect though.
Raphfrk
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Re: [Election-Methods] Local representation
Juho wrote: I can see three different local/personal representation concepts here. (just to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)? I think a?better way of?breaking down those options would be based on the how the seats are allocated.? The whole regional/national/district issue is separate.? Ofc, for single seaters, it has to be district based. The main issue is the party list?vs PR-STV?question.? The problem is that a party list system breaks the link between the candidate and the elected member.? Party members must remain loyal to the party as the party has all the power. (under national PR-STV)? - the representatives do not know which voters voted for them (the voters can thus contact any representative (that is the name as none:-)) as their own)? I don't entirely agree. I think the most likely outcome of implementing national level PR-STV would be that each candidate would set up his home base in a certain area.? Most of his votes would come from people who live near him.? If you live far away, you are much less likely to be one of his supporters. This is especially true if the ballot access rules apply and you are outside the area that he appeared on the ballot. However, even if you didn't vote for him.? He will still likely try to help you.? Most people with a problem would become a consistant voter for?the person who solved it for them.? Even if it is only 50%, if he helps 100 people, he gets another 50 secure first preferences. Every vote counts so he doesn't care if you are on the other side of the country.? However, if you are on the other side of the country, then it may be harder for him to help as he doesn't know as much about the local area (or who to contact about your issue) and also it might be harder for you to vote for him.? Also, parties will likely split the country up into 'territory' for each of their candidates.? So, you would be referred to one of the local members of that party. Each TD in Ireland builds up a 'personal vote' throughout his career.? This can be pretty significant.? Some popular candidates can achieve around 2 quotas of votes due to being personally popular. Note that the needs of close relationship between a representative and his/her voters regional proportionality and ability to vote without being bound by the party structure or by the districts are all quite separate targets.? I think that PR-STV achieves 2 of them pretty well.? The national level proportionality is not currently possible due to logistics and also due to larger parties not wanting to increase the average number of seats per district. Note that there is a strong correlation between candidates that some voter votes and the ideology that they represent. It is thus typical that a vote to a candidate is also a vote to the ideology/party that he/she represents. The total freedom of STV-PR to vote any candidates of any party may thus quite often be just a nice option but not very needed (typically just low level of noise in the results). Elected candidates probably work for their party anyway, so one can not get rid of these bindings even if the voters would be allowed to bypass them in their ballot.? ? Under PR-STV, candidates have a high degree of loyalty to their supporters.? In Ireland, TDs spend alot of time at their local 'clinics' where locals can go talk to them.? There is also a joke that they spend alot of time at funerals too. The difference between these two approaches is again more freedom vs. clear groupings (that keep the ballots simple, help the voters to understand the bindings of all of the candidates, and after the election bind the representatives to their announced policy).? Right, there can come a point where voter overload is a problem.? However, I think listing local candidates with the option for write ins should keep the burden low enough. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com ? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Matrix voting and cloneproof MMP questions
Kristofer said: That could be an interesting way to solve the indecisive parliament or frequent government change problem where these exist. In order to recall the executive, they have to vote for a new coalition at the same time. They have kinda that rule in Germany.? The only way to remove their Chancellor is to nominate a replacement. There is a proposed alternative to MMP called Fair majority voting that solves some of its problems.? It has the same single winner + national party proportional vote system.? It has some problems of its own though. http://www.mathaware.org/mam/08/EliminateGerrymandering.pdf Basically, each voter votes for a party and candidate.? In each district, plurality is used to work out the winner (I think approval could also work). The fair number of seats for each party is worked out based on the party vote and a set of multiplers are determined so that each party gets the right number of seats. These multipliers are multiplied by the vote total of each candidate in the party. A party which got to few seats would be given a higher multipler. In effect, it flips the results where the margin of victory was small in order to bring all parties to their proportional totals. I am not sure what the best way to do the task that matrix voting tries to accomplish. Normally positions on the executive are not equal in value. There are free riding issues with selection of major posts.? For example, if you rank your party leader first choice as PM, you use up some of your vote for the other positions.? The solution could be to kick out anyone in the party who doesn't rank their own leader first choice, so all equally share the cost. In Northern Ireland, they use the d'Hondt system for allocating seats on the executive. This gives the larger parties an advantage as they get to pick first.? Also, the largest 2 parties get 1 seat each for free. Another option would be a fair division protocol.? If you had 2 equally sized parties, one party leader could split the executive positions into 2 and then the other party leader could pick one group.? This should mean that both groups have roughly equal value. Alternatively, one of the leaders could give each position a value and the other party leader can pick any group of positions such that the total adds up to less than half. If the first leader undervalues a position, the 2nd leader gets a powerful position for a low cost.? Likewise, if he overvalues a position, the 2nd leader will just not take it, giving him a larger share of the other positions. I am not such if this can be expanded to multiple parties of differing sizes. Also, there is the issue that there would be no coherent national policy on anything.? You could have one minister taking actions which cancel out the actions of another minister. (and both spending money doing it).? Ofc, this creates an incentive for them to work together and find a compromise. Also, budgets could be an issue.? One option would be to share tax income out proportionally. Each member of the legislature could decide what ministries their share is allocated to. Tax cuts/raises are an even bigger issue.? Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Fwd: Another Lottery Method for the Record
Didn't actually send this to the list. Original post follows From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sorry in advance, AIM tends to add lots of ? symbols for some reason. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] In small groups: A voter is chosen at random. This voter picks another voter to be eliminated, along with himself. One of the remaining voters is chosen at random, etc. If the number of voters is odd, the last voter left decides the election. If the number of voters is even, a coin is flipped to determine which of the last two voters decides the election. Do the voters vote first before the elimination ? This would allow people to know who they are eliminating. You could even then implement it in 'instant' form. Effectively, voters all vote and candidate totals are worked Voters then submit a ranked ballot (or maybe just 1 combined ballot). The ranked ballot works as anti-plurality + IRV.? If a candidate gets a negative score, they are eliminated.? However, their 'surplus' negative score is transferred like in IRV. The maths might be weird though.? I am not sure if 'zero' is the correct quota. There could be strategy though.? For example, voters might not eliminate an extremely bad candidate because they know someone else will later. Jonathan Lundell wrote Alternatively, only the first voter is chosen at random, and the elimination proceeds in a chain. I assume you mean that the first candidate eliminates a voter and then the eliminated voter eliminates the next one ? In a polarised 2-party setting, this would cause alternating eliminations ... which is probably a good thing. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Dopp: 2. “Requires centr alized vote counting procedures at the state-leve l
The method used in Ireland is the Contingent Vote. There cannot be more than two rounds of counting, because all but the top two are eliminated in one step, if there is no majority in the first round. Sorry to jump in on a (relatively) minor point.? I am 99% sure this is not correct.? The constitution requires that PR-STV be used to elect the president.? Ofc, this can be defined by the Dail via legislation, but I don't think switching to contingent vote would be considered consistent with the constitution. I think you may have misinterpreted the system because of the multiple elimination rule The result after round 1 was 45.24%) McAleese 29.30%) Banotti 13.82%) Scallon 6.96%) Roche 4.69%) Nally The rule is that you can eliminate a group of the lowest candidates as long as the sum of their vote is lower than the vote of the next highest candidate.? The theory is that that even if they all transferred their votes to one of the group, that candidate would still be eliminated anyway as they wouldn't have less votes than any candidate outside the group.? This is somewhat equivalent to declaring a candidate with the majority of the remaining votes a winner because even if all the other candidates transfer their votes to a single one of them, they will still have less votes than the one with the majority. Nally + Roche + Scallon = 25.47% This is lower than Banotti's total (29.30%), so all 3 can be eliminated in one go. Thus round 2 only contains McAleese and Banotti. In effect, round 2,3 and 4 are skipped as it no matter how the transfers go, Nally, Roche and Scallon would be eliminated in that order.? In fact, sometimes the order isn't known for sure, just that they would all be eliminated for sure. For example, if the votes were N: 6 R: 7 S: 12 B: 30 Then it could go one of two ways If Nally transfers mostly to Roche, then after he is eliminated, it becomes R: 13 S: 12 B: 30 The elimination order is N-S-R OTOH, if the votes are split more evenly, it would be something like R: 10 S: 15 B: 30 The elimination order is N-R-S In both cases, N, R and S are eliminated before Banotti. Thus it might look like contingent vote but is actually PR-STV (single seat). Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: [LWVTopics] IRV Voting
From: Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] Comments below -- Forwarded message -- From:? [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sat, May 10, 2008 at 7:22 AM Pathological scenarios can be constructed for all voting systems, including whatever ones Kathy may prefer to IRV. Diagrams from Ka-Ping Yee show that IRV is very weird when compared to other methods. They are a bit complex, but are very informative once you get them.? They allow voting methods to be compared visually. http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ Also, his results were replicated elsewhere: http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/www/ http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/Pictures.html http://ivnryan.com/ping_yee/results.html Also, IRV suffers from centre squeeze.? This means that a compromise candidate who would be mid-way between the 2 main contenders cannot win. Yes.? I prefer IRV to all other systems for electing a single winner to an executive office because it elects a majority winner in a single election without the need for a separate expensive runoff election. Maybe.? It depends on how you define majority. For example 45: ABC 40: BCA 15: C C gets eliminated in the first round and A wins with 45 of the remaining votes (85), so he has 53% of the remaining vote but only 45% of the votes cast.? This is a majority of the remaining votes but not a majority of the cast votes. I'm not sure how Kathy defines support, but it must be different from how I would define it.? IRV uses the same basic logic as a traditional runoff election to find a majority winner.? Any argument along the lines Kathy presents is equally true of IRV AND traditional runoff elections.? Imagine a traditional runoff election (or IRV election) with three candidates, A, B, and C.? If A gets 48%, B gets 46% and C gets 6%, the runoff would be between A or B.? Now let's say all the C voters prefer B over A, so B ends up with 52% to A's 48%. The situation is that: C beats A C beats B A beats B Shouldn't C win ? More importantly, if A or B were to decide not to run, then C wins with IRV. I think the above example could be described as something like 48%: Love A, like C and hate B 46%: Love B, like C and hate A 6%: Love C A is loved by 48% B is loved by 46% C is at least liked by everyone It isn't obvious that electing C is a bad choice. I don't think most people would support a system that would declare the winner of a 3-way race the candidate who was the first choice of only 6% of the voters. First choices aren't everything.? C gets 1st or 2nd choice from everyone. Also, neither A or B are 1st choice of a majority. But all of them agree that our current election method, plurality elections (complete with the spoiler problem), is the worst method. Right, plurality is useless.? However, IRV might be only slightly better. It does eliminate the spoiler, but only when the 3rd party is small. In Australia where it is used, it maintains the 2 party system, so if helping 3rd parties have a chance is your goal, then IRV isn't going to help much. The vast majority of informed opinion (not just that of the IRV-dislikers) is that IRV is the best option for single-seat elections. ? Also some other reasons not to promote IRV (besides the fact that it often ends up putting candidates into office that are not supported by - or even are opposed by - a majority of voters) include: It is theoretically possible to have an election in which NO candidate has majority support, like a rock, paper, scissors endless loop, but IRV is FAR more likely to elect a true majority choice than our current plurality election method with its rampant spoiler problem. The condorcet loop doesn't apply to IRV. The reason that the winner can sometimes not have majority support is that some ballots will 'exhaust'.? If all the candidates on the ballot have already been eliminated (Say the voter only votes for 1 candidate and he is eliminated), then the total number of ballots remaining drops. This means that you can get more than half of the votes in the last round with less than half of the votes cast in the first round. IRV has been counted easily and quickly in recent U.S. elections in places like Burlington, Vermont, and Cary, North Carolina.? Auditing can be more complicated, simply because there is more information from each voter to double check, but can also be more thorough. ? Another issue is that it requires a central office to handle the counts. With plurality (and many other systems), each polling station can announce its results and then they are added together by the central office. With IRV, they must all be sent to a central location for counting, or each?round must be completed locally and then new instructions sent based on the result of each round. San Francisco and Burlington, for example, posted a record of every ballot's set of rankings on the Internet, allowing anyone to tally those elections themselves. That's pretty cool, and
Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge+new method AMP
Jobst wrote: Dear Raphfrk,? it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me:? Also, it is majority compliant. If a majority support a candidate first choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose.? If that is true, your method cannot be a solution to the given problem, since any majoritarian method will elect A in the situation I described -- remember that voters are strategic!? Yours, Jobst Right, under the assumption of perfect strategy.? However, only a small number of voters need to nominate C as compromise for C to win. Are you assuming that the 51% block of voters knows that they have the majority ? In the case you give 51: ACB 49: BCA It seems to me that the voters, will not be sure which of the main candidates have a chance. Assuming the odds are 50/50 and considering a voter in the 51 block and how they cast their nominate vote: Nominate C This will either have no effect or cause C to win. A-C shift: -48 B-C shift: +52 expected utility: +2 Nominate A or B This will either have no effect or shift away from C C-A shift: +48 C-B shift: -52 expected utility: -2 Thus, it is worth it for A and B supporters to nominate C instead of A. Only, 3% of them need to actually do it to elect C. Btw, I think your original proposal is pretty cool too.? I wonder what the effects of putting a threshold would be on the strategic effects. For example, if a candidate represents more than 90% of the balls in the urn, they are declared the winner without drawing any. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP
Juho wrote: Here's an example on how the proposed method might work. I'll use your set of votes but only the rankings. 51: ACB 49: BCA Let's then reverse the votes to see who the voters don't like. 51: BCA 49: ACB Then we'll use STV (or some other proportional method) to select 2 ? (=3-1) candidates. STV would elect B and A. B and A are thus the ? worst candidates (proportionally determined) that will be eliminated. ? Only C remains and is the winner. This is not? clone independent. 52: ACB 48: BCA B+A 'elected', so C wins However, if it is changed to 26: A1A2CB 26: A2A1CB 48: BCA1A2 Since 3 are now elected, it requires 25% of the vote per candidate elected. the 52 block can 'elect' B and C and the 48 block elects A2. This means that A1 wins as he isn't picked. One possible solution to the clone issue is to scale the number of candidates to first choice vote. In effect, in the STV stage, the quota for each candidate would be equal to the number of first choice votes the candidate received. To be 'elected', the candidate would have to exceed the quota. The first candidate to be eliminated becomes the winner. Reversed votes: 26: BCA1A2 26: BCA2A1 48: A2A1CB Quotas (number of first choices in original ballots): A2: 26 A1: 26 C: 0 B: 48 Round 1: A1: 0 A2: 48 B: 52 C: 0 B exceeds quota by 4 and A2 exceeds quota by 22 Round 2: A1: 22 (-26) A2*: 26 (+26) B*: 48 (-4) C: 4 (+4) C is elected though, so A1 still wins. Note this is clone independent though: Quotas A: 52 B: 48 C: 0 Round 1: A: 48 B: 52 C: 0 B exceeds quota Round 2: A: 48 B: 48 C: 4 C exceeds quota A wins. However, if 5 voters voted C first choice, then C would be eliminated as being on the lowest total. One option for that would be to allow people cast a nominating vote as well as the ranking.? The total number of nominee votes would become the quota for each candidate.? If a reasonable number of people (5%) recognised C as a compromise, then he would win. I am not sure of the tactical issues associated with the 2 votes though. Also, it is majority compliant.? If a majority support a candidate first choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose. Another issue is how to actually layout the ballot.? It might be worth having voters enter the reversed ballot order.? In most practical cases, voters would need to enter their lowest ranked candidates, unlike in normal STV where it would be their most ranked. The ballot instructions could be something like: Place an X beside the candidate you wish to nominate in the nominate column In the rank column, rank the candidates in order of your preference giving a rank of 1 to your least favourite, 2 to your next least favourite and so on You do not have to rank all the candidates and any you do not rank will be considered preferred to any ranked candidate Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Approval based equal ranks in PR-STV and Meek's method
Continuing on from the previous post. The first issue is deciding how to share votes if you have more than one elected candidate at the same rank. For example, assume the vote is A=BC and w(a) = 0.6 and w(b) = 0.3 How many votes should each candidate get. One option is A = 0.6 B = 0.3 C = 0.1 (remainder) This has problems if w(a)+w(b) was greater than 1.? Also, if the vote was ABC A = 0.6 B = 0.12 C = 0.28 or BAC A = 0.42 B = 0.3 C = 0.28 then the vote given to C would be larger (0.28 in both cases) This doesn't seem fair.? Both of these three voters should only have to 'spend' the same amount in total to support A and B, rather than A=B requiring 0.9, but AB or BA only requiring 0.72.? A fairer way to do it would be A=BC C = 0.28 (so as to match above) Then A and B should get a share proportional to their keep values A gets 0.72*(0.6)/(0.6+0.3) = 0.48 B gets 0.72*(0.3)/(0.6+0.3) = 0.24 More generally, assuming; A and B are elected w(x) = keep factor for candidate x In, ABC, C gets (1-w(a))*(1-w(b)) Thus, in, A=BC, C should still get (1-w(a))*(1-w(b)) The remainder after passing this amount, to the next rank or hopefuls at this rank is shared between all elected at this rank, in proportion to their keep values. w(x) = keep factor for candidate x V(x) = vote fraction received by x F(x) = fraction received by elected candidate x E(rank) = excess after all elected candidates have received vote share P(rank) = vote share passed to next rank E(rank) = P(rank-1)*(1-w(a))*(1-w(b))*...*(1-w(z))? - including all elected candidates at that rank The remainder is then shared between all the elected. F(a) = w(a) / (w(a)+w(b)+w(c)+.)? - including all elected candidates at that rank V(a) = F(a)*(P(rank-1)-E(rank)) - for all elected candidates at that rank Each hopeful at that rank gets E(rank) If there are no hopefuls then P(rank) = E(rank), Otherwise, it is zero. -- This treats A=BC and ABC the same as far as votes for candidate C are concerned. --- This doesn't solve the problem with de-electing candidates.? I was thinking of giving each candidate 2 vote totals. The first vote total is as above and is used to determine who gets eliminated. However, a second total is also calculated.? This is a worst-case scenario situation for each candidate.? It calculates the lowest possible vote total for each candidate assuming, the candidate was elected all current candidates were elected all remaining seats were filled (by some other hopeful candidates) It is this total that must be brought above the quota before the candidate can be deemed elected. Doing a full search on all possible combinations of hopefuls to elect, could take a while.? However, it could be calculated on a ballot by ballot basis and then it would be very quick.? The only rank where it would matter would be the last rank to be considered (i.e. the highest rank with at least one hopeful). This would result in a total which is lower than the actual value.? However, if this value was above the quota, then it would be certain that that candidate was able to meet the quota no matter which other candidates were deemed elected.? This value would also be used when updating? the keep values so as to ensure it stays above the quota for all candidates, once they have been deemed elected. Also, as more and more candidates were elected and eliminated, there will be fewer ranks which are a mix of hopeful and elected.? This would bring the elected total and the elimination total closer together. Since it only affects elimination order, this still maintains proportionality for solid-coalitions.? Also, a coalition with 1 hopeful left and more than a quota of supporters and 1 candidate left will be guaranteed to have that candidate above a quota as he will be the first choice of all those voters. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Applying Yee diagrams to multi-seat election methods
Yee diagrams were discussed on this list a while ago.? They are diagrams where one pixel is coloured based on the results of an election held with voters centered at that pixel. I was trying to figure out how to use Yee diagrams with PR. The problem is that since there is more than one winner, each pixel cannot be coloured a unique colour. My program generates a diagram for each candidate to show his win region.? This means that unlike Yee's diagrams, one image is needed per candidate. I also created a java applet that will highlight which candidates will win if the voters are centred at the mouse (using a file that has the precalculated results for each pixel). Two circles are show centered on the mouse to show the approx scatter of the voters when the voters are centered at the mouse pointer. It current supports 4 different voting methods - select the N candidates with the highest total utility (not a PR method) - select the N best candidates with a reweighting method like proportional approval voting - use proportional approval voting with mean threshold - use PR-STV with honest voters For each result, the leftmost image is the java applet which allows you pick where the voters should be centered.? It then highlights the candidates who would have won that election. The remaining images, to the right of the applet, show the win regions for each individual candidate. The results are located at: http://ivnryan.com/ping_yee/results.html In the single winner case, PR-STV is showing all the issues highlighted by Yee. However, it also shows up in the multi-winner case for certain inputs. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Is rangevoting.org down? (plus some questions on converting Range to Approval)
From: Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Mar 29, 2008, at 23:35 , Michael Rouse wrote: has someone proposed a method to convert Range votes to maximal strategy Approval votes? I was just wondering what the properties of such a system might be (including cool-looking graphs, if available), and any paradoxes or problems that might arise. For example, would it be possible to convert Range ballots into the equivalent of Approval ballots where every voter has the equivalent of perfectly accurate polling data? It may be possible to create some interesting algorithms. The first problem to solve is that the optimal strategy is not stable since the best strategy of one voter depends on the decisions of other voters. That means that you maybe need to force the voters to use some strategy that is equally good for all but not optimal. There was a suggestion to use the standard approval strategy Approve your favourite of the top 2 and everyone you prefer to that candidate It doesn't converge if there is a condorcet loop. E.g. Voter 1 (ABCD) A: 10 B: 7 C: 3 D: 0 Voter 2 (BCDA) A: 0 B: 10 C: 7 D: 3 Voter 3 (CDAB) A: 3 B: 0 C: 10 D: 7 Voter 4 (DABC) A: 7 B: 3 C: 0 D: 10 Assume, top 2 is A,B. Voter 1 approves A Voter 2 approves B Voter 3 approves A, C, D Voter 4 approves A, D A: 3 B: 1 C: 1 D: 2 New top 2 is A,D Voter 1 approves A Voter 2 approves B, C, D Voter 3 approves D, C Voter 4 approves D A: 1 B: 1 C: 2 D: 3 New top 2 is C,D If you repeat the process it goes A,B D,A C,D B,C A,B and loops (following the condorcet loop) This also happens (I assume) with the strategy approve your favourite of the top 2 and everyone you prefer to the expected winner or approve everyone who you rate higher than the expected utility of the election In the above example, it is a perfect tie, but there might be a way to get it to converge. Also, it doesn't use ratings at all and only considers the rankings. The last strategy would use ratings though. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] elect the compromise
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! -- the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of the commons could apply to this. More specifically, their max contribution would be equal to the difference in utility between the option in question and the expected outcome of the election. There is however still a negotiation step: A: 100, B: 80, C: 20 These people need the per voter payout to exceed $20 for them to shift from A to B A: 0, B: 80, C: 20 Each of these people would be willing to contribute $80 to shift the winner to B from A (Actually, since they get their share of the payout, they will actually be willing to pay $145 each.? If B wins, they lose $145 but then get a payout share of $65 meaning that a B win costs them $80.? I will ignore this effect as it makes it more complex.? It is also a free rider inducing effect though). Assuming 100 voters, there is 80*45 = $3600 available for bids to shift the result to B. The total effective payout to the first faction needs to be $20*55 = $1100. At what point should the first faction switch?? The second faction won't pay more than $80 each but that represents more than 3 times as much as the minimum the first faction will accept. This is where negotiation may be necessary.? Also, for negotiation, accurate knowledge of the potential outcomes are necessary.? Where there are more than 3 options, it may not be clear which options have a chance of winning and also how much they are valued by the other factions. There is no possibility for betrayal in this -- except, of course, that corrupt trustees could abscond with the funds, but ordinary escrow could be used for the funds. There are some free rider issues with the proposal.? It is in the interests of each of the members of the first group not to bid and hope that enough others bid.? The question is if the fa system could handle that.? On each level of the chain, people would be known and it may be hard to pull out.? At the leaf levels, your proxy might ring you up to remind you to bid (and point out that if he doesn't get 80% of his clients to bid, he will make his proxy look bad).? Also, both sides suffer from free rider problems.? There will be members of the first faction who switch at $20 and members of the second faction who won't bid enough.? Perhaps, ?the 2 effects would cancel. Tabarrok proposed what he called dominant insurance contracts.? This may have applications here.? A betting market also achieves the above more directly.? Even without using the market itself to select the winner, trading on the market should make every voter indifferent to the outcome. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- Unlimited storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail. From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary accomodations. In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process. Taking that analogy further. If there was a civil war between a 55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both sides. The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that. However, it does impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing whatever they want. Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to delay them. This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority some power. For example, A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by - 1 count with 2/3 support - 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts - 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts - 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts - 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts This allows a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost. The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule implemented in the first place. A referendum to modify the constitution with 50%+1 support ? I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive. Each member of the assembly declares as a member of a party. Cabinet positions are then allocated using the d'Hondt method. The party leader can assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position. This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest parties always gets to pick first. Assuming that the seats aren't all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small party gets a chance. Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another after the election. I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure. Groups of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could form a sub-party). The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt and then between the parties in the group. The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist and neither. Strategic party changes have been used to shift total cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist. Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It is only a formal equality. It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another. The problem exists outside the individual voter. The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting. This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market. The standard benefits break down. Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal. However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are giving up in exchange for votes later on. Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential coalition. This leads to negotiation between the parties and again that should lead to all opinions being considered. Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible. This can lead to some parties not having much power. However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least bad option so that the worst doesn't happen. This is a safety valve that doesn't really occur. Alternatively, they could go for something like Germany's current grand coalition. Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they could break ranks. Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to alienate potential future coalition partners to much. And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise, it fails. What you call a pure democratic process is just what
