Re: [EM] Buying Votes
Dear Greg, you wrote: I wish I knew how FAWRB worked... I will give a new step-by-step exposition of FAWRB in a new thread during this day. Most people say the majority criterion is a good one. I, for one, doubt its importance. I was merely saying that a counter-criterion inconsistent with the majority criterion hasn't really been offered. That counter-criterion has been offered: "Every voter should have full control over the same amount of winning probability." Methods complying with this then should try to increase the efficiency by providing some means for anonymous cooperation. umm... in any electoral method some subset will have absolute power... What makes you think so? The simplest counter-example to your claim is Random Ballot. Also, in ANY electoral method you can get useless votes. Again: The simplest counter-example to this claim is Random Ballot. For example, if I have 999 people supporting me under some non-majoritarian method, 1 person voting against it won't make a hell of a lot of difference. The 999 have complete power! The question is not whether it makes "a hell of a lot of difference" but whether it makes a difference at all. In FAWRB, you would have incentive to provide that 1 person with some small amount of compensation in order to get her vote, too. This is a gripe with democracy not with majoritarianism. Nope. See above. It's all about *establishing* democracy! Thinking outside the box, they could secede. Yes, and that's a threat to society which could ultimately lead to anarchy. Athenian democracy doesn't work. Sorry. Using a non-determinstic method incurs massive flaws in real life. Give examples, please. Athenian democracy worked well for the Athenians for two centuries. Applying the same logic to majoritarian methods, every opinion has a given probability of being a majority. That probability being zero when the opinion is the minority opinion. Yay we agree OMOV is trivial. Why do you keep bringing up violations of OMOV then? I did never talk about OMOV, it was you who brought it up. Probably you misunderstood me. Denying voters influence is an OMOV flaw. No it's not. Most majoritarian methods comply with OMOV and still deny the minority any influence. I'm asking myself how often I will have to repeat this obvious fact. If there are a group of int(.5*voters)+1 people who vote X > non-X and X is one and only one candidate, how does the minority express its opinion w/o violating OMOV. Er? You ask how they express their opinion? Well, on the ballot, of course? They ARE better, just not intrinsically so. Specific violation of a given property does not a perfect voting system make. Nobody is claiming that since it would be ridiculous. Is there ever an incentive not to secret contract? If so, is it significant? To avoid this is exactly the task of the method designer. The method should be designed so that there are positive incentives to cooperate when the compromise is good enough. I see... is this FAWRB? Candidates have three statuses on a ballot: Favorite, Approved, Disapproved I pick two ballots at random. If there is a candidate that is favorite on both ballots, pick it. If there is a candidate that is favorite on the first and approved on the second, pick it. If there is a candidate that is approved on the first and favorite on the second, pick it. If there is a candidate that is approved on both the first and second, pick it. Otherwise pick the favorite on the first. That's more or less what we call D2MAC, which is similar in spirit to FAWRB and achieves the task of electing a good compromise, too. The main difference is that with D2MAC compromise options which are only good but not *very* good have fewer chances than with FAWRB. Ok now the actual criticism. I know that FAWRB is nondeterministic. Here is why that is bad. Factions (both unwilling to compromise): A 55% B 45% you view A as gaining a "55% chance of victory". This reasoning is flawed. Instead of viewing A as getting .55 victory units, think of it as a random choice between two possible worlds: A-world and B-world A-world is 10% more likely to occur, however they share remarkable similarities. In both worlds >=45% of the people had no say whatsoever. They had a "say" in that they had a fair chance. In reality, chance occurs everywhere anyway. Picking an option is always a risky thing. When economists talk of utility and analyse preferences they almost always mean *expected* utility because the actual utility is the result of a random process. Anyway, the point is that in your example people (if they use the right decision method) will have an incentive to find a compromise C which everyone likes a lot better that the 55%/45% lottery. So they will usually reduce the randomness by cooperation. Now, you're reasoning apppears to stem from a simple observation... "If A achieves one more vote, its chance o
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 8:02 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ok now the actual criticism. I know that FAWRB is nondeterministic. > Here is why that is bad. > > Factions (both unwilling to compromise): > > A 55% > B 45% > > you view A as gaining a "55% chance of victory". > > This reasoning is flawed. Instead of viewing A as getting .55 victory > units, think of it as a random choice between two possible worlds: > > A-world and B-world > > A-world is 10% more likely to occur, however they share remarkable > similarities. > > In both worlds >=45% of the people had no say whatsoever. The trick with his method is that neither A-world or B-world is likely to actually occur. It creates an incentive to find a compromise, called say, AB-world. If all voters vote reasonably, then the result is a high probability that the AB option will be picked. The utlities might be . A-AB-B 55: 100-70-0 45: 0-70-100 In effect, each A supporter agrees to switch his probability to AB in exchange for a B supporter switching to AB. So, the initial probabilities would be A: 55% AB: 0% B: 45% Expected utility 55: 55 45: 45 Total: 100 However, after the negotiation stage, the results might be A: 10% AB: 90% B: 0% Expected utility 55: 10% of 100 and 90% of 70 = 73 45: 90% of 70 = 63 Total: 136 I don't 100% remember the method (and it could do with a web description :p ), but that is what it is attempting to do. The idea is not that it is random. The idea is that it says "OK, if you can't all agree on a compromise, then we will pick a winner at random". The threat that a random winner will be picked is what allows the negotiation. If a majority can just impose its will, then there is no point in compromising. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 8:39 AM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Greg, > > you wrote: >> >> I'm not speaking about majoritarianism in this case, although you are >> correct that it alleviates many of the problems. What I meant was >> there is the potential for vote buying under any voting method where >> voting is verifiable and non-unanimity can pass a policy. > > OK, I agree. > > You continued, answering me: In every reasonable voting method (remember democracy is distinct from consensus), ... >>> >>> I can only remember what I believe to be true. This claim is not! >> >> democracy is distinct from consensus? Of course it is! I can win under >> any reasonable voting method by pleasing less-than-everyone. > > I think I misunderstood you there. What I meant was: Sophisticted democratic > decision methods can lead to almost complete consensus. FAWRB promises to do > so by giving everybody an incentive to search for a good compromise and > making sure it wins with very large probability. This is indeed very near to > reaching consensus! Only majoritarian (and thus undemocratic) methods lead > to results often far from consensus. For this reason, I tend to find > majoritarian methods relatively unreasonable :-) I wish I knew how FAWRB worked... > >> I attempted to explain in >> You Can't Have it Both Ways that a voting system cannot and should not >> be designed to protect rights... but I digress. > > A voting system should not be designed to protect rights? Of course it > should! It should be designed to protect the right of everybody to have an > equal amount of power in decisions! Umm ok... But it should not be designed to protect rights less that one. For instance, how could a voting system possibly protect free speech or something like that? How could a voting system protect the right to property? They don't; you would be foolish to say they should. But you don't say that, so no one is a fool. > >> I have never seen any method lauded so much for disobeying a criterion. ; >> ) > > What's a "criterion"? Usually it is a sentence which can either be true or > false about any decision method. Whether "passing" or "failing" a criterion > is the good thing depends on values. My most important values are first > equality and individual rights, then efficiency. Hence failing the majority > criterion is mandatory for any reasonable decision method since majoritarian > ones disrespect my most important values. Most people say the majority criterion is a good one. I, for one, doubt its importance. I was merely saying that a counter-criterion inconsistent with the majority criterion hasn't really been offered. > >>> You're totally right. This is the best motivation for giving each voter >>> the >>> same voting power instead of giving some majority all of the power. Then >>> the >>> majority has something to "trade". In order to get my proposed option >>> elected, I need their cooperation which I must "buy" by taking their >>> preferences into account in my proposal. >> >> I don't follow. If I reward a majority, then that does nothing to >> prevent future majorities from forming. > > I don't want to prevent any majority from forming. That would be ridiculous > as people have every right to have the same opinion as others. The point is > not whether there are majorities or not. The point is that majorities must > not be given 100% of the decision power in any single decision. umm... in any electoral method some subset will have absolute power... > >> Majoritarianism isn't some >> complete shift of power to whoever can muster 51%... > > Er? That's *exactly* what majoritarianism is! What else than a shift of > power would you call it when 51% of the people need not care what the other > 49% want in some individual decision because they can safely establish what > they want? Obviously they have the complete power in that decision when a > majoritarian method is used. Majoritarianism only supports itself so far as majority support will take it. A majority for instance cannot vote to disenfranchise the other 49%. Also, in ANY electoral method you can get useless votes. For example, if I have 999 people supporting me under some non-majoritarian method, 1 person voting against it won't make a hell of a lot of difference. The 999 have complete power! This is a gripe with democracy not with majoritarianism. > >> Every voter has the same capacity to influence the election. > > If you believe this is the case with your favourite majoritarian method, > then please show me how the latter 45% in the following quite common > situation have the "same capacity to influence the election": 55% wanting A, > 45% wanting B. Just tell me what the 45% can do to avoid getting A for > certain. Nothing. See above 999 to 1 example. Thinking outside the box, they could secede. > > I can tell you what they can do when FAWRB is used: They can just vote for B > and thus give B a 45% winning chance, compared t
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
Dear Greg, you wrote: I'm not speaking about majoritarianism in this case, although you are correct that it alleviates many of the problems. What I meant was there is the potential for vote buying under any voting method where voting is verifiable and non-unanimity can pass a policy. OK, I agree. You continued, answering me: In every reasonable voting method (remember democracy is distinct from consensus), ... I can only remember what I believe to be true. This claim is not! democracy is distinct from consensus? Of course it is! I can win under any reasonable voting method by pleasing less-than-everyone. I think I misunderstood you there. What I meant was: Sophisticted democratic decision methods can lead to almost complete consensus. FAWRB promises to do so by giving everybody an incentive to search for a good compromise and making sure it wins with very large probability. This is indeed very near to reaching consensus! Only majoritarian (and thus undemocratic) methods lead to results often far from consensus. For this reason, I tend to find majoritarian methods relatively unreasonable :-) I attempted to explain in You Can't Have it Both Ways that a voting system cannot and should not be designed to protect rights... but I digress. A voting system should not be designed to protect rights? Of course it should! It should be designed to protect the right of everybody to have an equal amount of power in decisions! I have never seen any method lauded so much for disobeying a criterion. ; ) What's a "criterion"? Usually it is a sentence which can either be true or false about any decision method. Whether "passing" or "failing" a criterion is the good thing depends on values. My most important values are first equality and individual rights, then efficiency. Hence failing the majority criterion is mandatory for any reasonable decision method since majoritarian ones disrespect my most important values. You're totally right. This is the best motivation for giving each voter the same voting power instead of giving some majority all of the power. Then the majority has something to "trade". In order to get my proposed option elected, I need their cooperation which I must "buy" by taking their preferences into account in my proposal. I don't follow. If I reward a majority, then that does nothing to prevent future majorities from forming. I don't want to prevent any majority from forming. That would be ridiculous as people have every right to have the same opinion as others. The point is not whether there are majorities or not. The point is that majorities must not be given 100% of the decision power in any single decision. Majoritarianism isn't some complete shift of power to whoever can muster 51%... Er? That's *exactly* what majoritarianism is! What else than a shift of power would you call it when 51% of the people need not care what the other 49% want in some individual decision because they can safely establish what they want? Obviously they have the complete power in that decision when a majoritarian method is used. Every voter has the same capacity to influence the election. If you believe this is the case with your favourite majoritarian method, then please show me how the latter 45% in the following quite common situation have the "same capacity to influence the election": 55% wanting A, 45% wanting B. Just tell me what the 45% can do to avoid getting A for certain. I can tell you what they can do when FAWRB is used: They can just vote for B and thus give B a 45% winning chance, compared to a 55% winning chance for A. But even better: They can also propose a good compromise option C which everybody prefers much to the 55%/45% lottery. If they suggest such a C, everybody will have an incentive to mark C as "approved" under FAWRB, so that C will be elected with certainty. OMOV and majority are not in conflict. No rules says that a majority method is automatically non-OMOV. OMOV is a purely formal requirement which is so trivial that I cannot remember a single decision method having been discussed here that not fulfilled it when interpreted correctly. "OMOV Interpreted correctly" means "the only information about the voter used in the decision process must be his or her preferences as revealed by him or her on the ballot". What OMOV does *not* guarantee is that everybody has an influence on the decision. Obviously, majoritarian methods are OMOV but make it impossible for as much as 49% of the voters to influence the decision. I don't think that non-majoritarian methods are intrinsically better. If you don't think democracy is important... Right... voting is non-contractual. THAT IS THE POINT! If it were contractual (read "verifiable"), No, I don't read "contractual" as "verifiable". FAWRB makes it essentially contractual in providing safe ways to cooperate anonymously without having to reveal my preferences to any
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 5:49 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > democracy is distinct from consensus? Of course it is! I can win under > any reasonable voting method by pleasing less-than-everyone. There are potential free rider issues with trying to please everyone. In the case of a system that requires total consensus, it is generally called the hold out problem. It can be in everyone's interests (including the hold outs) that decisions are made with less than total agreement. Basically, fast decisions are a public good, but obtaining decisions biased in your favour is a private good. > Right... voting is non-contractual. THAT IS THE POINT! If it were > contractual (read "verifiable"), then all of the corruption and > evilness and vote-buying becomes reality. It depends on how the contracts work. For example, if candidates could make binding campaign promises, then you would have a contract, but not vote buying. Another option is with a PR method and a "program for government". Once the election has happened, a coalition can be formed from parties that have more than 50% of the vote. Because they discuss the policies of the government as a whole, it allows trading of support for one policy in exchange for support in another. > Democracy -- a decision-making algorithm with unrestricted domain (it > is possible to vote for every candidate available in every way > available) that is unbiased (hence discarding > perfect-consensus-or-status-quo.) based on the input of the electorate > i.e. the governed. You could think of rights as the general public protecting themselves from their government. They specify the limits of what their representatives can do. Perhaps, with direct democracy, they wouldn't be needed, but some mechanism for allowing the constitution to be changed slowly is reasonable. For example, if someone doesn't vote, they are assumed to no support an instant change. > If people know for whom I voted, society falls apart. I can manipulate > voters such that a majority (read "group capable of overpowering the > rest in an election") with a marginal benefit can steal crap from the > minority (read "group being overpowered"), who would lose a lot. I can > profit off this. People already do to some extent. You could also think of voting as a detailed opinion poll, the objective is to find out what people really think. > Democracy will only last until people realize they can just vote > themselves the money. Mutual distrust keeps them from realizing this. That is pretty short term thinking. I think voting themselves the money would cause people to leave the country, and or, cause massive civil disobedience. Also, since you have to payoff more than 50% of the society, the amount 'looted' will be pretty small per person. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 1:49 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Greg, > > this was really an interesting posting... > > You wrote: >> >> As I have attempted to explain, voting is the exact opposite of >> individual rights and consensus. > > I must admit I did not read everything you wrote in the last days, but this > seems rather far-fetched to me. > > The most we could say is that many forms of voting (that is, *certain > methods*) are *incompatible* with certain individual rights (in particular, > the right to be able to influence decisions) and/or with consensus. > > However, as I tried to make clear again and again, there *are* methods in > which every voter has some influence on the decision and in which some kind > of consensus can be reached out of pure self-interest. > > Many problems vanish when we drop the misguided requirement of > majoritarianism. I'm not speaking about majoritarianism in this case, although you are correct that it alleviates many of the problems. What I meant was there is the potential for vote buying under any voting method where voting is verifiable and non-unanimity can pass a policy. > >> All of you know what democracy does, but let me put it in the context >> of commodification. > > Well, we certainly know what systems currently termed "democratic" by most > people sometimes do. And I hope we also know what "democracy" *should* do: > give each voter the same power to influence decisions and protect her from > being overruled by any group of voters. Right. Democracies assumes a given series of weights for all people's decisions (usually 0 (children/felons/non-citizens) or 1 (people eligible to vote)). And proceed to crunch the numbers. They do this in a way distinct from absolute consensus. > >> In every reasonable voting method (remember democracy is distinct from >> consensus), ... > > I can only remember what I believe to be true. This claim is not! democracy is distinct from consensus? Of course it is! I can win under any reasonable voting method by pleasing less-than-everyone. In some methods this need only be a majority, in others it may not be a fixed amount of support. There is no definitive number of people I must please to win a Borda election, for instance, the actual number depends on a wide range of other factors. > >> ... it is possible for me to gain power by pleasing some >> subset of society (so long as that subset is sufficiently large). >> >> The people whom I must convince to support my decision can be >> different than the ones who will bear its cost. > > This is mostly true for majoritarian methods, the majority being the group I > must convince, the minority being the ones who will bear its cost. For > non-majoritarian methods like FAWRB, this need not be true, since then the > minority retains their fair share of the decision power and must thus be > involved in the quest for a good compromise if that compromise is to be > elected with certainty. Again. The vote-buying criticism applies to all non-consensus methods. You are correct that non-majoritarian stuff makes this slightly better by removing belligerence of the majority. I attempted to explain in You Can't Have it Both Ways that a voting system cannot and should not be designed to protect rights... but I digress. None of this has anything to do with a "fair share". ANY verifiable non-consensus method will lead to this. > >> I'll call this the Separation of Recipients. Elections divorce benefit >> and cost. > > Majoritarian elections, yes. Using FAWRB will make this much less likely. I have never seen any method lauded so much for disobeying a criterion. ; ) > >> Normally, I cannot buy something and defer the cost to >> someone else without their consent. > > You're totally right. This is the best motivation for giving each voter the > same voting power instead of giving some majority all of the power. Then the > majority has something to "trade". In order to get my proposed option > elected, I need their cooperation which I must "buy" by taking their > preferences into account in my proposal. I don't follow. If I reward a majority, then that does nothing to prevent future majorities from forming. Majoritarianism isn't some complete shift of power to whoever can muster 51%... Every voter has the same capacity to influence the election. OMOV and majority are not in conflict. No rules says that a majority method is automatically non-OMOV. I don't think that non-majoritarian methods are intrinsically better. > >> This is always present in any democratic society. >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_paradox > > At the end of that article, some ways out of the "paradox" are mentioned. > The second of these suggests to sign a "contract" to overcome the underlying > prisoners' dilemma. In the voting context where secrecy is required, binding > contracts can only be reached if they are somehow brokered by the method. > This is effectively done in FAWRB by giving voters th
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
Dear Greg, this was really an interesting posting... You wrote: As I have attempted to explain, voting is the exact opposite of individual rights and concensus. I must admit I did not read everything you wrote in the last days, but this seems rather far-fetched to me. The most we could say is that many forms of voting (that is, *certain methods*) are *incompatible* with certain individual rights (in particular, the right to be able to influence decisions) and/or with consensus. However, as I tried to make clear again and again, there *are* methods in which every voter has some influence on the decision and in which some kind of consensus can be reached out of pure self-interest. Many problems vanish when we drop the misguided requirement of majoritarianism. All of you know what democracy does, but let me put it in the context of commodification. Well, we certainly know what systems currently termed "democratic" by most people sometimes do. And I hope we also know what "democracy" *should* do: give each voter the same power to influence decisions and protect her from being overruled by any group of voters. In every reasonable voting method (remember democracy is distinct from concensus), ... I can only remember what I believe to be true. This claim is not! ... it is possible for me to gain power by pleasing some subset of society (so long as that subset is sufficiently large). The people whom I must convince to support my decision can be different than the ones who will bear its cost. This is mostly true for majoritarian methods, the majority being the group I must convince, the minority being the ones who will bear its cost. For non-majoritarian methods like FAWRB, this need not be true, since then the minority retains their fair share of the decision power and must thus be involved in the quest for a good compromise if that compromise is to be elected with certainty. I'll call this the Separation of Recipients. Elections divorce benefit and cost. Majoritarian elections, yes. Using FAWRB will make this much less likely. Normally, I cannot buy something and defer the cost to someone else without their consent. You're totally right. This is the best motivation for giving each voter the same voting power instead of giving some majority all of the power. Then the majority has something to "trade". In order to get my proposed option elected, I need their cooperation which I must "buy" by taking their preferences into account in my proposal. This is always present in any democratic society. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_paradox At the end of that article, some ways out of the "paradox" are mentioned. The second of these suggests to sign a "contract" to overcome the underlying prisoners' dilemma. In the voting context where secrecy is required, binding contracts can only be reached if they are somehow brokered by the method. This is effectively done in FAWRB by giving voters the possibility to assert their willingness to cooperate by marking compromise options as "approved", and by using these marks in a way which removes incentives to cheat. Majority rule and individual rights are inconsistent. This is the most important lesson! Unfortunately, "majority rule" seems to be almost synonymous for "democracy" for most people (or at least most westerners). This makes it very hard for them to see that in fact majority rule makes democratic decisions impossible! Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
Good Morning, Greg There were several points in your message that caught my attention but, to avoid opening too many topics, I will only address one: re: "This all comes down to the very nature of voting and democracy. As I have attempted to explain, voting is the exact opposite of individual rights ..." I have not seen that sentiment expressed before. It is worthy of further comment: The reason voting is the opposite of individual rights is that our ability to participate in the political process is limited to approving or disapproving choices made by others. Nothing in our present practice allows us to influence the selection of the people or issues for which we vote. That right is reserved to subsets of our society and denied to the rest of us. Thus, our political system is oligarchical, rather than democratic, in nature. Voting under such circumstances violates our natural right to govern ourselves. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Buying Votes
It's more damaging. A precondition for this sort of behavior is verifiability. If a politician knew who voted for him and could reward them, then you would see more policies like that. It happens in real life. Congressional voting records are public. If it weren't so, lobbyists wouldn't try. You are also correct. Individually I do not have to give up much in order to get money. With everyone thinking this way, the policy would probably pass. On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 5:18 PM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I think the issue is that the probability of your voting mattering is low. > > Let's say there is a vote on the motion: > > "Take $50 from everyone and give it to X" > > Presumably, you wouldn't support that vote. > > Now, what if X offered you $20 to vote for it? The odds of your vote > mattering is very low (esp if there are lots of voters), so you might > as well take the $20. > > p = odds that your vote swings it > > Gain of to voting: p*$50 (i.e. your vote defeats the motion) > Gain of selling your vote: $30 > > The effect is that you will vote for a motion that isn't in your best > interests. > > This is why vote buying is much worse than a politician promising to > do something if elected. > > Gain of supporting him: p*(benefit of his policy) > Gain of not supporting him: -p*(cost of his policy) > > Thus both the gain and the loss are multiplied by p, so it doesn't > favour one or the other. > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Buying Votes
As I mentioned a thread ago, commodification of voting is dangerous. In the coming message, I will explain the negative externalities associated with this. This all comes down to the very nature of voting and democracy. As I have attempted to explain, voting is the exact opposite of individual rights and concensus. All of you know what democracy does, but let me put it in the context of commodification. In every reasonable voting method (remember democracy is distinct from concensus), it is possible for me to gain power by pleasing some subset of society (so long as that subset is sufficiently large). The people whom I must convince to support my decision can be different than the ones who will bear its cost. I'll call this the Separation of Recipients. Elections divorce benefit and cost. Normally, I cannot buy something and defer the cost to someone else without their consent. This is always present in any democratic society. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_paradox Majority rule and individual rights are inconsistent. Let me explain why commodification of votes is particularly damning. The entire system of democracy comes crashing down if some majority votes itself into autocracy. Thankfully, people are bad at cooperating. Unless votes are verifiable. Think about it, lobbying exists because lobbyists can see how Congresspeople vote. Such blatant absues do not occur at voter-level. Vote verifiability and hence commodification make it possible for me to trade someone else's well-being for my own. If I act selfishly, I vote for whichever action brings me the slightest increase in my well-being whatever the cost to some external party so long as I can be compensated for the difficulty of voting and loss of the old winner. I will vote my pocketbook. This is not to say that democracy is bad. It is unstable and inefficient, but also peaceful, prosperous, utilitarian, and the champion of human rights. It will continue to work so long as voters can cheat their solicitors. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
