Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

2011-09-07 Thread Dave Ketchum

Noise, but possibly worth a response.

In writing about a Condorcet race the standard format seems to be AXY.

For voting the ballot format seems to be to be able to assign rank  
numbers to as many of the candidates as the voter chooses.


In reporting election results the n*n matrix has findable values for  
each pair of candidates.


Robert calls the format he has seen for the matrix silly, and  
suggests another format.


The reporting is a human readable copy of what is being computed -  
with the computing almost certainly done by computer if many  
candidates.  Therefore a reporting format such as Robert's would be  
usable if humans could agree - or even have selectable choices of  
formats if enough desire.


Dave Ketchum

On Sep 7, 2011, at 1:12 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:



still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or  
their elected representatives) to try out different ballot formats  
than ranked choice but...



... The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to  
those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. ...


why, oh why, are all of you election method experts stuck on that  
silly n x n matrix geometry (where the main diagonal has no  
information you have to associate one number on the lower left with  
another number on the upper right, and it isn't obvious which number  
goes with which candidate) instead of grouping the pairwise totals  
*in* *pairs*???   like



  A  56
  B  44

  A  88   B  65
  C  12   C  35

  A  90   B  82   C  55
  D  10   D  18   D  45


THAT format is where you have useful information about the  
relationships between candidates at a glance.


if we're gonna tell people about Condorcet, why are we putting it in  
a stupid rectangular array where it is difficult to tell who beat  
who?  it only makes it harder to sell this to skeptics.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

Imagination is more important than knowledge.




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
list info





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Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

2011-09-06 Thread Stéphane Rouillon

 Ok, where do I sign up?

On 2011-09-05 23:13, Dave Ketchum wrote:

I finally got around to a bit.

I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?


Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line, 
something, such as indentation, should show start of each item.


I see Enthusiasts here - Should also go with Experts below.


Introduction
It is time to change our voting system.

We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from 
around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in 
elections in which there are more than two candidates. In this 
declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt replacement election 
methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results.


Proper question is whether there MAY be more than two candidates:
. There will never be more than two - so election method does not 
matter.
. When there are more, voters can wish to vote against the worst 
by voting for more than one - impossible with plurality.
. We cannot be bothered with this need - how bad this is depends 
on value of the election.


Part of selling against plurality:
. Wherever current experience is that runoffs are rarely needed 
and there is very little voting for other than the two main 
candidates, deciders may feel that there is no need for preparing for 
what has never happened to them.


. Even with that normality, there can be times when voting for 
others happens in significant numbers.  We need to alert deciders that 
this can happen in any district and this is what needs preparing for 
even if they are used to things staying simpler.



Better ballots
With better information from the voters, we can find better winners.


Approval gives nothing but ability to vote for more than one.

All the others provide for voters indicating which of the candidates 
they vote for are also their most preferred.


Also, while Condorcet ranking unconditionally says that higher ranks 
are better than lower, there is nothing requiring or permitting saying 
how much higher.


The other methods, depending on statements as to how much higher a 
ranked candidate may be, require that the voter indicate magnitude in 
the vote.



Fairer counting methods


Condorcet:
. It is an approach to a tie that CAN result in those leading 
candidates needing some extra analysis to decide on a winner.


. The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those 
wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates.




There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner 
(when there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet 
winner, and they are, in alphabetical order: 


I claim that, if there is one, the CW should be found and, at our 
distance, we do not need to check on how the method goes about that.


Even if there is no CW, the n*n matrix used to look for the CW is the 
obvious source for deciding on a winner - which points toward using 
n*n for this analysis.


I have not chased down the innards of using IRV here, but wonder if, 
as used here, it is immune to the problems that afflicted IRV in 
Burlington.


Anyway, I ask that IRV discussion stay out of the Condorcet discussion 
- seems like there were, earlier, better words about IRV than I see here.


Also, seems like SODA should be kept away from Condorcet.


In

Using the fairer methods in organizations
Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.



One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the 
nomination process of a political party. It is true that our 
supported methods make this process less important, because, unlike 
plurality, they do not break down when more than one candidate from 
a party is running. Still, we expect that many parties would still 
want to have a formal nomination (“primary election”) process so as 
to focus their efforts on one or two candidates per office. We 
believe that any party using a superior voting system internally 
will see immediate benefits. A primary process with increased 
turnout, with fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic 
result will result in a stronger nominee who is better-prepared to 
win in the general election.


This presumably is true in some states.  In New York parties do not do 
elections.  Primaries, done by government for the parties, handle both 
primary elections AND electing party officers.




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

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Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

2011-09-06 Thread robert bristow-johnson


still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or their 
elected representatives) to try out different ballot formats than ranked 
choice but...



... The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those 
wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. ...


why, oh why, are all of you election method experts stuck on that silly 
n x n matrix geometry (where the main diagonal has no information you 
have to associate one number on the lower left with another number on 
the upper right, and it isn't obvious which number goes with which 
candidate) instead of grouping the pairwise totals *in* *pairs*???   like



   A  56
   B  44

   A  88   B  65
   C  12   C  35

   A  90   B  82   C  55
   D  10   D  18   D  45


THAT format is where you have useful information about the relationships 
between candidates at a glance.


if we're gonna tell people about Condorcet, why are we putting it in a 
stupid rectangular array where it is difficult to tell who beat who?  it 
only makes it harder to sell this to skeptics.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

Imagination is more important than knowledge.




Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch

2011-09-05 Thread Dave Ketchum

I finally got around to a bit.

I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?


Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line,  
something, such as indentation, should show start of each item.


I see Enthusiasts here - Should also go with Experts below.


Introduction
It is time to change our voting system.

We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from  
around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting  
in elections in which there are more than two candidates. In this  
declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt replacement election  
methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results.


Proper question is whether there MAY be more than two candidates:
. There will never be more than two - so election method does not  
matter.
. When there are more, voters can wish to vote against the worst  
by voting for more than one - impossible with plurality.
. We cannot be bothered with this need - how bad this is depends  
on value of the election.


Part of selling against plurality:
. Wherever current experience is that runoffs are rarely needed  
and there is very little voting for other than the two main  
candidates, deciders may feel that there is no need for preparing for  
what has never happened to them.


. Even with that normality, there can be times when voting for  
others happens in significant numbers.  We need to alert deciders that  
this can happen in any district and this is what needs preparing for  
even if they are used to things staying simpler.



Better ballots
With better information from the voters, we can find better winners.


Approval gives nothing but ability to vote for more than one.

All the others provide for voters indicating which of the candidates  
they vote for are also their most preferred.


Also, while Condorcet ranking unconditionally says that higher ranks  
are better than lower, there is nothing requiring or permitting saying  
how much higher.


The other methods, depending on statements as to how much higher a  
ranked candidate may be, require that the voter indicate magnitude in  
the vote.



Fairer counting methods



Condorcet:
. It is an approach to a tie that CAN result in those leading  
candidates needing some extra analysis to decide on a winner.


. The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those  
wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates.




There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner  
(when there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet  
winner, and they are, in alphabetical order:


I claim that, if there is one, the CW should be found and, at our  
distance, we do not need to check on how the method goes about that.


Even if there is no CW, the n*n matrix used to look for the CW is the  
obvious source for deciding on a winner - which points toward using  
n*n for this analysis.


I have not chased down the innards of using IRV here, but wonder if,  
as used here, it is immune to the problems that afflicted IRV in   
Burlington.


Anyway, I ask that IRV discussion stay out of the Condorcet discussion  
- seems like there were, earlier, better words about IRV than I see  
here.


Also, seems like SODA should be kept away from Condorcet.


In

Using the fairer methods in organizations
Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform.




One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the  
nomination process of a political party. It is true that our  
supported methods make this process less important, because, unlike  
plurality, they do not break down when more than one candidate from  
a party is running. Still, we expect that many parties would still  
want to have a formal nomination (“primary election”) process so as  
to focus their efforts on one or two candidates per office. We  
believe that any party using a superior voting system internally  
will see immediate benefits. A primary process with increased  
turnout, with fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic  
result will result in a stronger nominee who is better-prepared to  
win in the general election.


This presumably is true in some states.  In New York parties do not do  
elections.  Primaries, done by government for the parties, handle both  
primary elections AND electing party officers.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info