Re: [EM] Geometric Condorcet cycle example, improved

2009-12-30 Thread fsimmons
Actually it's the symmetry property of metrics  (d(p,q)=d(q,p)), not the
triangle inequality, that guarantees the absence of a Condorcet cycle in the
triangle case:

Suppose that A, B, and C are the only candidates, and that voters are
concentrated very near their favorites.

Assume that preferences are determined by distances, i.e. a voter prefers a
nearer candidate over a more distant one.

Without loss in generality, assume that d(A,B) is the greatest of the three
distances.

Then we have the preference profile:

x: ACB
y:BCA
z: C 

Suppose, by way of contradiction, that we have a Condorcet cycle.  The without
loss in generality suppose that the cycle is A beats B beats C  beats  A.

The first step in this beat path ( A beats B)  implies (x+z)y,  while the
second step  (B beats C) implies y(x+z).

We got into this contradiction by assuming the existence of a cycle.  So that
assumption is untenable.

We have made tacit use of the symmetry property of distance by assuming that the
longest side of the triangle was agreed upon by both A and B, i.e. A thought B
was the most distant candidate, and B considered  A to be the most distant
candidate. 

To show that this property is essential, suppose that we use taxicab distance
is a grid of one way streets, and that  A, B, and C are located three of the
corners  [say (0,0), (1,0), and (0,1)] of a block about which the one way
streets have a counterclockwise orientation.  

Then (by taxi) it is quicker to go from A to B than from A to C,  from B to C
than from B to A, and from C to A than from C to B.  The preference profile has
to be of the form...

x: ABC
y: BCA
z: CAB

which leads to a Condorcet cycle whenever no candidate has a majority.

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Re: [EM] Geometric Condorcet cycle example, improved

2009-12-29 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Hi folks,

I just recalled that four years ago I constructed a sophisticated
example which is somewhat similar:
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-May/015982.html

Happy New Year!
Jobst


Warren Smith schrieb:
 This point-set also works:
 A=(1,0) B=(0,4) C=(3,5) D=(9,2)
 
 

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Re: [EM] Geometric Condorcet cycle example, improved

2009-12-29 Thread fsimmons
Warren,Thanks for upgrading my example to be valid for the L^1 through 
L^infinity cases.  Of course, it's still true that four points are needed, 
since the proof that there is no example like this with three relies only on 
the triangle inequality, which is satisfied for any metric.Jobst,I remember 
that example, and I'm sure that it was a subconscious
influence on my trapezoid example.  Certainly, your point in the last
paragraph

Aren't such examples a good reason to always consider more than just onepiece 
of the information (like approval or ranks or defeats or directsupport) and 
instead combine them to get the whole picture?is the most important lesson to 
learn from such examples.Guten Rutsch,Forest
- Original Message -From: Jobst Heitzig Date: Tuesday, December 29, 
2009 4:51 amSubject: Re: [EM] Geometric Condorcet cycle example, improvedTo: 
Warren Smith Cc: election-methods , Forest W Simmons  Hi folks,  I just 
recalled that four years ago I constructed a sophisticated example which is 
somewhat similar: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods- 
electorama.com/2005-May/015982.html  Happy New Year! Jobst   Warren Smith 
schrieb:  This point-set also works:  A=(1,0) B=(0,4) C=(3,5) D=(9,2)   
 

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