Re: [EM] I now propose a mock 2012 presidential election, by parties instead of candidates.
Hi Mike, May I suggest that you also include a 3-slot ballot option? I.e., Preferred, Acceptable, Reject. You could call it a Fallback Approval ballot if you like. Many methods (e.g., most Condorcet methods, ER-Bucklin) that don't meet the Participation criterion will do so when restricted to 3-slots. It would be interesting to compare behavior with that level of compression. Ted On 06 Jan 2012 13:56:54 -0800, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > > I've long advocated that you can't adequately discuss the relative merits or > desirability of > voting systems without actually using them. ...without actually trying them > out. For that, > it's absolutely essential to do polling, simulated political elections, using > the methods that are > proposed at EM. > > You don't know the problems of methods that you consider best, until you use > them in > an election, even if a simulated election. > > Therefore, I propose a simulated presidential election. Mainly because we > don't > know who > the 2012 nominations will be yet, I suggest that the voting be by party, > instead of by > candidate. In some ways, that's more meaningful anyway, because policy > platforms are, > or should be, the basis of political voting. > > Some have claimed that we should do polling at external websites, automated > websites. The > main problem with that is flexibility: EM polls have nearly always included > balloting by Approval, > Score Voting, and ranking. And they always should, because all of those > balloting modes are > used by some of the various methods proposed on EM. My poll includes all three > of those > balloting modes...three separate ballots: Approval, Score, and rank. > > Another problem with automated polling websites is ballot-stuffing. > Even though polling websites usually register voters by their > e-mail, that only reduces, but doesn't eliminate the possibility of > ballot-stuffing. Of course that > problem isn't as important in a poll whose only purpose is to demonstrate what > it's like to use > the various voting systems. But, arguably, it still matters, for the purpose > of > such polls, that the > observed result reliably reflect the 1-per-voter ballots. > > This poll could be criticized because EM's membership is international, and > I'm > proposing a > simulated U.S. election. I invite non-U.S. members to vote in this poll, > because its purpose is > merely to demonstrate the use of the proposed voting systems. > > If poll-participants identify themselves, in parenthesis as "international" or > "U.S.", then separate > election results can be determined, one of which would indicate what kind of a > party is > the EM international winner, and the other of which would indicate which kind > of party would > win in the U.S. if EM members are typical. > > ...And EM members are more typical than some might believe, in terms of their > sincere > preferences. I'd suggest that EM members differ from the general public mostly > in that they > aren't Republocrat lesser-of-2-evils voters. Even if some EM members actually > prefer > the Republicans or Democrats, none will favor one of those parties only as a > lesser-evil. > > Strategy? I suggest that any strategy used in this simulated election be > appropriate to the > EM electorate. If you perceive any difference between the EM electorate and > the > general > population, then base your strategy on the EM electorate. It makes a poll more > realistic > if voting is based on the conditions in the poll. > > Should Score voting be sincere, or should it be however you'd vote it in an > actual public > political election? I suggest the latter. > > Sure, with an Approval balloting, it could be argued that there's no need for > Approval > strategy in Score voting, so the Score voting should be sincere, regardless of > whether > you'd rate sincerely in an actual election. I and others have made that > suggestion in > previous EM polls. > > But I don't think that's best in this poll. The purpose of this poll is to try > out the various > methods, not to determine the sincere Score winner among the EM electorate. So > I > suggest voting the Score ballot exactly as you would if it were an actual > public political > election, in which Score voting were the only kind in use. > > Unless Warren argues for suggesting sincere ratings on the Score ballot, I > suggest > voting the same ratings you'd vote in an actual public political Score > election. Because > we want to simulate an actual election. > > As you know, I advocate, as options in an Approval balloting, the following > ways of > voting: > > Approval, MTA, MCA, ABucklin, AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, and AOCBucklin. > > I'll define these ways of voting in a subsequent posting. > > But I'll briefly outline their definitions here: > > You know what Approval, MTA and MCA are. > > AOC is Approval, with the option to make some approvals conditional upon > mutuality, as defined > by the MTAOC pseudocode program that I posted here. > > MTAOC an
[EM] I now propose a mock 2012 presidential election, by parties instead of candidates.
I've long advocated that you can't adequately discuss the relative merits or desirability of voting systems without actually using them. ...without actually trying them out. For that, it's absolutely essential to do polling, simulated political elections, using the methods that are proposed at EM. You don't know the problems of methods that you consider best, until you use them in an election, even if a simulated election. Therefore, I propose a simulated presidential election. Mainly because we don't know who the 2012 nominations will be yet, I suggest that the voting be by party, instead of by candidate. In some ways, that's more meaningful anyway, because policy platforms are, or should be, the basis of political voting. Some have claimed that we should do polling at external websites, automated websites. The main problem with that is flexibility: EM polls have nearly always included balloting by Approval, Score Voting, and ranking. And they always should, because all of those balloting modes are used by some of the various methods proposed on EM. My poll includes all three of those balloting modes...three separate ballots: Approval, Score, and rank. Another problem with automated polling websites is ballot-stuffing. Even though polling websites usually register voters by their e-mail, that only reduces, but doesn't eliminate the possibility of ballot-stuffing. Of course that problem isn't as important in a poll whose only purpose is to demonstrate what it's like to use the various voting systems. But, arguably, it still matters, for the purpose of such polls, that the observed result reliably reflect the 1-per-voter ballots. This poll could be criticized because EM's membership is international, and I'm proposing a simulated U.S. election. I invite non-U.S. members to vote in this poll, because its purpose is merely to demonstrate the use of the proposed voting systems. If poll-participants identify themselves, in parenthesis as "international" or "U.S.", then separate election results can be determined, one of which would indicate what kind of a party is the EM international winner, and the other of which would indicate which kind of party would win in the U.S. if EM members are typical. ...And EM members are more typical than some might believe, in terms of their sincere preferences. I'd suggest that EM members differ from the general public mostly in that they aren't Republocrat lesser-of-2-evils voters. Even if some EM members actually prefer the Republicans or Democrats, none will favor one of those parties only as a lesser-evil. Strategy? I suggest that any strategy used in this simulated election be appropriate to the EM electorate. If you perceive any difference between the EM electorate and the general population, then base your strategy on the EM electorate. It makes a poll more realistic if voting is based on the conditions in the poll. Should Score voting be sincere, or should it be however you'd vote it in an actual public political election? I suggest the latter. Sure, with an Approval balloting, it could be argued that there's no need for Approval strategy in Score voting, so the Score voting should be sincere, regardless of whether you'd rate sincerely in an actual election. I and others have made that suggestion in previous EM polls. But I don't think that's best in this poll. The purpose of this poll is to try out the various methods, not to determine the sincere Score winner among the EM electorate. So I suggest voting the Score ballot exactly as you would if it were an actual public political election, in which Score voting were the only kind in use. Unless Warren argues for suggesting sincere ratings on the Score ballot, I suggest voting the same ratings you'd vote in an actual public political Score election. Because we want to simulate an actual election. As you know, I advocate, as options in an Approval balloting, the following ways of voting: Approval, MTA, MCA, ABucklin, AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, and AOCBucklin. I'll define these ways of voting in a subsequent posting. But I'll briefly outline their definitions here: You know what Approval, MTA and MCA are. AOC is Approval, with the option to make some approvals conditional upon mutuality, as defined by the MTAOC pseudocode program that I posted here. MTAOC and MCAOC are MTA and MCA with that conditionality option. AOCBucklin is ABucklin with that option at each rank position. When there are ballots using the ABucklin &/or AOCBucklin option, the election is equivalent to an ABucklin election, and is counted as such. Of course an Approval ballot counts as an ABucklin ballot that only gives first preferences. MCA and MTA are counted in the obvious way that I previously described, consistent with and compatible with Approval and ABucklin. All of the above remains true when ballots also use the conditionality option. For AOCBucklin, all votes that have been assigned
